Tag Archive for: China

The ‘China’ challenge: now a multi-generational test for Australian strategy

In the week of Australia’s 3 May election, ASPI will release Agenda for Change 2025: preparedness and resilience in an uncertain world, a report promoting public debate and understanding on issues of strategic importance to Australia. This is an article from the report.

Navigating increasingly complex and sharp geostrategic competition while advancing Australia’s long-term national interests will be the fundamental test for the next government. China remains a key systemic challenge in this regard—not just for Australia but for the Indo-Pacific and the rules-based order that has served Australia so well since World War II.

Since entering office, the Albanese government has approached its China policy through the prism of stabilisation—along with the formula of cooperating where we can, disagreeing where we must, and engaging in the national interest. That has worked to reset the bilateral relationship, but stabilisation is a transitionary state, not a strategy. Australia’s ‘China challenge’ isn’t cyclical. It’s structural. And, thus, it requires fundamental change for Australia to retain agency and sovereign decision-making.

Indeed, the current relationship is one of increased diplomacy simultaneously with increased malign Chinese activity, and therefore more uneven. Put another way: when one party is seeking stability and another is seeking to destabilise, the destabiliser will always be dominant until facing pushback.

This means, for an incoming government, the key question is: now that Australia–China relations have stabilised in diplomacy but not security, is there a need for a next phase? The answer should be ‘Yes.’

A mercantilist Trumpian world makes this already difficult task harder. The US–Australia relationship remains crucial to security in the region, but Australia must adapt to new realities. The (slim) possibility of a grand bargain between Washington and Beijing also has the potential to sideline Indo-Pacific allies, including Australia. The risk lies in the potential for a US–China agreement that prioritises perceived bilateral interests over the collective security and economic wellbeing of the region.

The unlikely possibility of a grand bargain isn’t the only threat from the US–China relationship. Ad hoc agreements, such as a potential deal over TikTok that doesn’t solve the national-security risk, will also affect Australia, both nationally and regionally. That’s because any sign that the US will take a purely economic approach to China will probably only incentivise more nations to do the same and become even more (over) dependent on the Chinese economy and technology.

To ensure that the US remains invested in the liberal democratic order in the Indo-Pacific, Australia must clearly and consistently demonstrate to the US the tangible benefits of doing so.

Australia has already faced years of coercion from Beijing for choosing national security and international alliances over economic gain but should expect growing pressure to pick sides in ways that will constrain trade and investment choice. The Trump administration’s America First Trade Policy and America First Investment Policy indicate that countries with close trade and investment ties with China could face new obstacles when investing in the US, while countries without those ties may enjoy expedited access.

Amid this ‘harsh’ competition, we’re seeing China accelerating its efforts to pursue military, economic and technological dominance. China’s military aggression has become more pronounced over the past year. In August 2024, a Chinese spy plane breached Japanese airspace for the first time ever. Later in the year, the Chinese Government held its largest military exercises around Taiwan in almost 30 years. Meanwhile, unsafe encounters between Chinese and Australian military aircraft, initiated by the Chinese, have continued to roil relations.

Compounding this is the ‘creeping normalcy’ of China’s use of coercion to bully its near neighbours and to advance unlawful maritime claims, threaten maritime shipping lanes, and destabilise territory along China’s periphery—namely the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait.

More unusually, in February this year, three Chinese warships sailed 150 nautical miles east of Sydney to what Australia’s Director-General of National Intelligence, Andrew Shearer, described as ‘the furthest south a PLAN task group has operated’. Days later, the Chinese vessels undertook live-fire drills in the Tasman Sea in an unprecedented exhibition of non-allied force—before undertaking an almost complete circumnavigation of the continent. Analysts expect such activities to become more frequent as the PLAN expands its power-projection capabilities south—sending a message not just to Australia and New Zealand, but to Pacific partners as well. The message to, and about, the US shouldn’t be ignored: Beijing was telling the US that it can’t prevent China creating a sphere of influence, and telling regional nations that the US had lost power. It didn’t help that a less than ideal response from the Australian Government was reinforced by no comment at all from the US administration.

Meanwhile, the Cook Islands recently signed a pact to deepen ties with China, without consulting with New Zealand (its free association partner). The prospect of a standing Chinese military presence in the southwest Pacific continues to haunt Australian defence planners. Equally concerning for our economic and fiscal planners are persistent risks associated with China’s debt-trap diplomacy, which is creating significant debt burdens, straining the economies of Pacific nations, diverting resources from essential services and requiring Australia to step in.

In emerging technologies—what’s now the ‘centre of gravity’ when it comes to national power—ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker confirms that China now leads advanced research in 57 of 64 key fields. Those technologies include many with defence applications, such as radar, advanced aircraft engines, drones, swarming and collaborative robots, and satellite positioning and navigation. The number carrying a high risk of monopoly by China has jumped from 14 in 2023 to 24. China is expected to further expand that dominance over the next decade, and we’re already seeing its investment in research resulting in commercial innovation and leadership (for example, DeepSeek).

The Australia–China trade relationship managed to buck some negative trends in 2024. China lifted tariffs on Australian wine and ended import bans on beef and lobster, effectively ending the active Chinese-initiated economic coercion of Australia underway since 2018. The problem is that it’s a mistake to view coercion as existing only once punishment begins—if the threat of punishment results in one not taking action, then that’s still coercion. And it reflects the state of China’s relationship with Australia, and many others. Beijing removed the economic measures only after Australia suspended two WTO cases, which allowed Beijing to save face from what would have been clear international rulings that China had engaged in unfair trade practices against Australia. Notwithstanding the compromises made by Australia, those developments were significant. China is Australia’s number one two-way trading partner; nearly a third of Australia’s exports went to China in 2023.

Although the ending of bans offers the perception of relief, failure to discern between China’s intent and capability—not just in the economic domain, but across the military, diplomatic and technological domains—puts Australia at risk.

China’s actions, not its words—especially in our own region—should drive our choices. From talking points to policy, Australia’s strategic narrative on China has so far been narrowly fixed in terms of Beijing’s apparent intent. The challenge for an incoming government is to shift that focus to China’s capability.

That doesn’t preclude ‘cooperation’ with China where we think we can and should cooperate, but due diligence must be undertaken. Too often, policymakers and politicians use climate change as the easy example of where we should aim to cooperate but fail to acknowledge that China is the largest emitter of carbon dioxide and that, in all likelihood, cooperation with China on issues such as renewable-energy technologies means facilitating China’s systemic use of modern slavery in regions such as Xinjiang. The key is to ensure that our own decisions don’t constrain our future choices as the price Australia pays for stable or cooperative ties with China.

Crucially, Australia shouldn’t limit itself to only being able to ‘disagree where we must’, but rather disagree where we should for national security and sovereignty. That requires a response framework that focuses in equal measure on ‘prevention’ (minimising the conditions from which Chinese coercion can manifest), ‘protection’ (proactive measures to defend against adverse impacts of such coercion), ‘resilience’ (building capabilities to bounce back quicker where coercion is applied) and ‘deterrence’ (imposing costs collectively to deter the continued use of coercion).

Economically, that means we shouldn’t try to replace the decades-long complementarity of the Chinese and Australian economies. Instead, we should focus on:

—building greater diversification and conscious redundancy—with other regional partners and with Europe

—building the dynamism and productivity of our businesses, including through revised industrial policy settings and increasing adoption of technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI).

While China is Australia’s top trade partner on traditional measures, excluding foreign direct investment (FDI), the US is Australia’s other major trade partner, including FDI. So, it can’t be the case that China’s ranking means it dominates our thinking. With Japan, South Korea, India, the US and Taiwan ranked 2 to 6 (and 2 to 6 accounting for more than the 30% that’s China), we’re as economically dependent on the ‘allied’ powers as we are on China.

In scientific developments and critical technologies, most of our strategic partners—the US, Japan, Britain, the EU and South Korea—are larger and have globally competitive tech sectors they’ve spent decades building. In recent years, those areas have included AI, semiconductors, quantum computing and biotechnology.

By contrast, Australia largely remains a mid-sized mining and tourism–dependent economy with a low national spend on R&D (we sit below the OECD average). Building greater sovereign capability in our science and technology sector is needed to improve the shape and size of our economy, as well as its competitiveness. At present, we also poorly understand the industrial dependencies within our economy. That’s resulting in Australian industries becoming uncompetitive and disappearing. For example, the loss of nickel mines has killed fertiliser production. Building real resilience requires us to understand those complex interdependencies, to take more risks in responding (fail fast, but learn faster), and to build new trusted partnerships while strengthening existing ones.

The next Australian Government should therefore consider the following four strategies.

Reframing the ‘China’ challenge as a multigenerational national enterprise

Commence development of an integrated (public and classified) national strategy—embedded as a standing national enterprise. This needs to start from a holistic view of our national interests and our values to determine not just who we must trade with, but how we must trade with them, the undivided purpose being to make us both more prosperous and secure. We have long worked towards a liberal economic order governed by rules—free trade and free markets. The intent of this national enterprise is to not let China trade (or America First trade) water down our national commitment to a liberal economic order.

This national strategy should be enabled by an appropriately tailored whole-of-government coordination mechanism, potentially the reinvention of a dedicated Australian National Security Adviser role with a secretariat, as ASPI has recommended separately. And it should reflect engagement not just across the federal government, but with states and territories and across the economy, as well as think tanks and civil society.

The Prime Minister should give effect to this proposal by making a national address or statement detailing why such a reframing is critical, and then provide an annual account to parliament of progress against the strategy. That statement should speak plainly to the strategic challenges that confront Australia and the Indo-Pacific region and be focused on lifting public awareness and understanding. The purpose will be to alert, not alarm, and to be accountable for progress.

Behind closed doors, an incoming government should elevate systematic planning to identify points of vulnerability or potential leverage. That includes a review of Australia’s supply-chain resilience across sectors relevant to national resilience.

Embedding economic resilience

Complementing the 2024 Independent Intelligence Review’s call for ‘an uplift in intelligence support on economic security’ and a matching review of economic security policymaking architecture, appoint a Minister for Economic Resilience. This could be modelled on Japan’s approach to coordinating and implementing policies to make its economy more robust, more competitive and less vulnerable to external shocks—and which sits as a crucial component of Japan’s overall national-security strategy.

The ministerial portfolio would involve, among other functions, a focus on:

—securing supply chains (particularly for essential goods and technology); that includes diversifying supply sources, promoting domestic production and reducing reliance on potentially vulnerable foreign suppliers

—safeguarding sensitive technologies and intellectual property from foreign interference or leakage; that includes protecting patents and restricting export of strategically important technologies

—driving a coordinated effort to rebuild manufacturing capability and rethink the industrial ecosystem that drives innovation and productivity; that includes building an understanding of industrial dependencies within our economy where investment is necessary for real resilience.

Enabling this would be a redesign of cabinet decision-making processes through the introduction of an advisory framework that better supports cross-cutting decision-making at the intersection of economic prosperity and security, ensuring that the objectives in each domain are rigorously assessed against the impact in the other. That would require a greater focus within the Australian Public Service on developing ‘dual skilled’ personnel who are equally proficient and capable in economics and in national security.

Blocking a ‘G2’ world

Reinvest in collective action to push back on the risk of a ‘G2’ world, in which the fate of Australia and the region is decided exclusively in Beijing and Washington. The current government has pointed to a multipolar diffusion of power in East Asia as an ideal; that is, while there are two great powers, multiple countries retain global influence and impact.

That should indeed become a more explicit strategic objective, but we also need to recognise that a world of multiple influential nations without an architecture for a rules-based order would be just as bad for Australian security and prosperity. Historically, the US and Europe have been the ‘global police forces’ of the rules-based system. We need to adapt our approaches to ensure that they remain ‘fit for purpose’. That requires Australia to commit to even closer relations with Europe, Japan, the ROK, India and the non-aligned world to drive an agenda of purposeful and tangible reform to the rules-based system.

Doing so also requires the development of a ‘strengthened deterrence’ strategy that reflects the reality that the trans-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific no longer exist as distinct geographical locations. The longstanding judgement that authoritarian regimes don’t trust each other enough to work together is no longer accurate. Countering one adversary now requires addressing the influence of the other.

Enhancing competitive edge

Implement a two-pronged approach that attracts our best and brightest in emerging technologies back home from places such as Silicon Valley, while also offering fast-track visas to top US-based scientists and researchers who are newly out of a job or low on the funding they need to keep their start-up or scientific lab running. All would provide shared benefit to our alliance with the US and close partnerships.

Complementing that would be the implementation of a comprehensive strategy to create an Australian AI ecosystem that drives innovation and enhances economic competitiveness—ensuring Australia’s place higher in the value chain. The UK Government is pursuing such a strategy. That includes driving AI adoption through investments in infrastructure, talent and R&D, while also establishing a flexible regulatory environment and actively encouraging both domestic and international investment in the sector. There’s a focus on sector-specific regulatory approaches, empowering existing regulators and promoting the UK as a global hub for AI innovation and safety. That’s a valuable approach for Australia to consider.

Taiwan: the sponge that soaks up Chinese power

Taiwan has an inadvertent, rarely acknowledged role in global affairs: it’s a kind of sponge, soaking up much of China’s political, military and diplomatic efforts. Taiwan absorbs Chinese power of persuasion and coercion that won’t be directed elsewhere while the island remains free.

This means that supporting Taiwan is not merely a moral stance in favour of democracy; it is a strategic and economic necessity. Taiwan’s independence from China anchors the regional order—and maybe even the global order. While it remains separate from China, Beijing is delayed in shifting attention to new, potentially more dangerous fronts.

Every leader of the People’s Republic of China—from Mao Zedong to Xi Jinping—has made ‘reunification’ a non-negotiable part of the party’s mission. Xi has tied Taiwan’s future directly to what he calls the ‘Chinese Dream’ of national rejuvenation. Unification is ‘essential’ to achieving China’s rise as a great power, he says. Party officials have referred to Xi Jinping as the ‘helmsman’ guiding China’s national rejuvenation.

The intensity of this focus is obvious. The Chinese armed forces have made preparing for an invasion and occupation of Taiwan their top strategic priority, developing a vast arsenal of missiles, air and naval forces designed to overwhelm the island’s defences and deter US intervention.

Military exercises simulating blockades or invasion have become normalised. In 2022, just over 1,700 Chinese military aircraft flew into Taiwan’s de facto air defence identification zone, twice as many as in the previous year. In 2024, that figure was more than 3,000. As the graphs below show, in 2024 Chinese aircraft and seafaring vessels were spotted around Taiwan on all but five days of the year. The exceptions were caused mostly by typhoons in the area.

China’s military and paramilitary activities around Taiwan in 2024. Source: ASPI’s State of the Strait Database.

And alongside this military pressure, Beijing wages an unrelenting pressure campaign to isolate Taiwan internationally, intimidate nations that support it and subvert Taiwanese society. This sustained, multi-domain strategy of intensifying coercion reflects just how much of China’s political and strategic bandwidth Taiwan consumes.

China devotes enormous resources to keeping Taiwan under pressure. The Taiwan issue so dominates Beijing’s strategic agenda that it slows, redirects, and tempers other assertive behaviours: it has fewer resources for other domains, including in the South China Sea, along the Indian border, in Africa and in the Pacific islands.

If unification remains the regime’s priority, Beijing must be cautious not to unnecessarily provoke crises elsewhere that could derail its Taiwan plans. Military adventurism in the East China Sea or South China Sea carries the risk of triggering a conflict and diverting resources that might undermine China’s ability to seize Taiwan. So, Taiwan’s function as a sponge for China’s attention is also a check on broader aggression. Beijing would be more emboldened to pursue its other strategic priorities if Taiwan capitulated.

There’s also a domestic angle. The Chinese Communist Party uses Taiwan to fuel nationalist sentiment, to justify defence spending instead of fixing an economy weighed down by structural issues, and to distract from other internal challenges. If the Taiwan issue were solved, the regime would need a new outlet for this energy—potentially one more dangerous for China’s neighbours.

Policymakers must ask a sobering question: what happens if Taiwan is annexed by China? This would not satisfy Beijing’s appetite but rather embolden it. Absorption of Hong Kong has only freed up more resources to focus on coercion of Taiwan.

With Taiwan under its control, China would gain a crucial forward base for power projection. Its navy would have more available resources to operate in the Pacific, threatening shipping lanes and enforcing the rights of internal waters within the Taiwan Strait. China could pressure Japan more aggressively over the Senkaku Islands or enforce dominance in the South China Sea. The Philippines, just south of Taiwan, would be more vulnerable to Chinese coercion.

Moreover, the psychological impact of a Chinese victory would ripple across Asia. US allies might question Washington’s resolve. Smaller countries might accommodate Chinese influence to avoid becoming the next target. The delicate balance of power in the Indo-Pacific would tilt—not towards peace, but towards authoritarian dominance.

Policymakers in Indo-Pacific capitals need to send a clear message: maintaining the status quo in the Taiwan Strait helps preserve the broader stability of the Indo-Pacific. Conversely, abandoning Taiwan would not end China’s expansion; it would accelerate it.

Taiwan may be small in size, but it plays a disproportionate role in shaping Asia’s future. So long as it remains a sponge for CCP attention, the rest of the region has a chance to stay dry.

China targets Canada’s election—and may be targeting Australia’s

Following Canadian authorities’ discovery of a Chinese information operation targeting their country’s election, Australians, too, should beware such risks.

In fact, there are already signs that Beijing is interfering in campaigning for the Australian election to be held on 3 May.

In Canada, China evidently prefers the Liberal government of Prime Minister Mark Carney to the Conservative opposition. In Australia, we are seeing messaging against Opposition Leader Peter Dutton—suggesting that Beijing wants the Labor government of Anthony Albanese to be re-elected.

The Australian Secret Intelligence Organisation and the Australian Electoral Commission are cooperating to guard against China’s now well established habit of trying to shape foreign elections.

For Australian voters, especially those consuming media in languages other than English, the information environment is crowded and contested. Overtly, there are foreign official state channels (communications by foreign governments) and state-controlled outlets (those funded and editorially controlled by foreign states).

Covertly, there are attributed and non-attributed channels. Attributed channels operate under foreign state oversight without publicly disclosing affiliation. Non-attributed channels aren’t directly linked to foreign states, but are nonetheless aligned. The interwoven and reinforcing nature of these channels is part of the cause for concern, particularly as they operate outside regulatory or journalistic oversight.

Politicians usually refrain from commenting on foreign elections, though Papua New Guinea’s foreign minister this week raised eyebrows by saying he personally hoped Labor would win Australia’s. China’s interference is different to such one-off instances: it’s persistent, widespread and surreptitious.

Indicative sample of state-affiliated entities, it is not an exhaustive list. Source: 3rd EEAS Report on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference Threats Report, March 2025.

In early April, Canada’s Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections (SITE) Taskforce revealed that a  Chinese-language influence campaign backed by Beijing was targeting Chinese-speaking Canadians on the popular multi-function app WeChat. The messaging promoted Carney as a strong statesman, subtly framing him as a leader more capable of managing relations with the United States.

The taskforce found that the campaign originated from Youli-Youmian, a popular WeChat news account, which Canadian intelligence linked to the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission. The authorities had also picked up on the account in June 2023 and January 2025, when it targeted other members of parliament. This time the authorities found ‘coordinated inauthentic behaviour’—the use of a network of accounts to amplify a narrative disguised as organic public opinion. This activity peaked in March.

This tactic mirrors a developing pattern of Chinese electoral influence, where efforts are not always confrontational but rather cloaked in affinity and praise. Unlike the older image of disinformation campaigns as combative, these efforts are subtler. They don’t necessarily involve falsehoods and are not sought by the candidates themselves. This makes detection, let alone public consensus on countermeasures, more difficult.

In contrast, China-supported messages targeting Australia’s federal election have taken an overtly critical form. They often show up on state-aligned media, such as the Global Times, and on Chinese social media platforms, such as Rednote and WeChat.

For example, in response to Dutton’s concern a Chinese research vessel might be mapping Australia’s undersea cables, the Global Times accused Dutton of ‘beating the drums of war’ and using China as a political wedge in the election campaign. The editorial, which was also reposted in China Military news, took aim at what it framed as ‘paranoia’ and ‘double standards,’ pointing out that Australia’s own naval activities in contested waters, such as the Taiwan Strait, were not similarly scrutinised. Australian media outlets picked up this Global Times article and reported it widely, feeding directly into Australia’s public election discourse.

Screenshot showing Global Times article republished by China Military.

Screencap of 7 News coverage of Chinese state media articles.

Popular Chinese-language WeChat accounts have also amplified such narratives. One outlet, Australian Financial News (AFN) Daily, is a self-described financial media platform.  It recently published a series of highly circulated articles, collectively read more than 100,000 times, portraying Dutton as ‘a reckless, Trump-aligned figure unfit for leadership’.

Headlines included ‘Chinese people absolutely loathe him! If Dutton takes power, Australia will be in chaos!’ ‘华人极度讨厌！达顿上台后，澳洲大变!’ and ‘Completely doomed! Dutton’s rise will crash Australia’s housing market!’ ‘彻底完蛋！达顿上台，澳洲房价必将暴跌!’ Despite AFN’s nominal tie with Australia, its official account IP address traces back to an organisation called Changsha Aoxuan Culture Communication. The IP territory is registered to Hunan, China.

Example of headlines targeting Peter Dutton.

Official account information for AFNdaily in Chinese (left) and English translation (right).

China’s approach differs with local conditions. In Canada, efforts involve community-level micro-targeting through Chinese-language media platforms. In Australia, efforts have been at a macro level, with state media weighing in on elite political debates. But in both cases, the aim is the same: to seed confusion and divide public sentiment, ultimately reshaping policy trajectories in Beijing’s favour.

In the lead-up to the federal election, the presence of such narratives in Australia’s information environment may distort the truth at a sensitive democratic moment. Democratic resilience depends on transparency of the media and information environment. It’s increasingly requiring us to engage with new forms of information manipulation.

Ultimately, Chinese electoral influence reflects Beijing’s ambitions and tests the strength and self-awareness of democracies. By treating this challenge as either overblown paranoia or merely a problem for intelligence agencies, we risk missing the point. Our democracy and sovereignty require our elections to be based on Australian perceptions of what our politicians are telling us—whether truth, untruth or half-truth—not on what foreign adversaries such as China are secretly feeding us.

Bookshelf: How China sees things

Here’s a book that looks not in at China but out from China.

David Daokui Li’s China’s World View: Demystifying China to Prevent Global Conflict is a refreshing offering in that Li is very much a part of the Chinese system, despite his studies and appointments at US universities. He is a professor of economics at Tsinghua University and has been a member of the monetary policy committee of China’s central bank. And while he defends Chinese economic and political authoritarian governance, he offers many insights and dispels some myths.

China’s World View provides a detailed explanation of the Chinese approach to governance. What is perhaps the most striking is the array of consultative processes in this authoritarian system. Li himself is often called upon to advise the Chinese Communist Party and government on economic policy. Li writes of the paternalistic relationship between government and citizens, and how the party is sensitive to public opinion and possible discontent. Even authoritarian governments depend on popular support.

Li emphasises that ‘history is the key to understanding today’s China’, and he writes that ‘Chinese people are accustomed to having a long-term view and perceiving history in cycles’. Elite views are particularly shaped by the century of humiliation—from the Opium War in the early 1840s to the end of the Japanese invasion in 1945—and the tumultuous period under Mao Zedong’s leadership.

Li argues that history helps understand the Chinese government’s extraordinary stimulus in response to the global financial crisis, representing 7.5 percent of GDP in 2009 and 2010. Premier Wen Jiabao ‘did not wish to be recorded in history to be a slow-acting decision maker facing a brewing crisis’. Many Chinese economists have since attacked Wen for driving Chinese debt to very high levels. But Li is convinced that Wen made the right decision at the time. It is also true that authoritarian regimes see crises as existential threats and that Wen may have acted out of fears for regime security.

China practices ‘respect-centred’ diplomacy through which it seeks respect and moral recognition, according to Li. Chinese foreign policies, such as the Belt and Road Initiative, are not solely in pursuit of economic and other interests. Such Belt and Road partners as Sri Lanka may not agree. Li writes that US President Donald Trump’s biggest mistake was his lack of respect for the Chinese government. (China’s World View was published in March 2024, before Trump’s return to the White House.)

Li’s discussion of respect-centred diplomacy makes no mention of China’s infamous wolf-warrior diplomacy, nor China’s sometimes vindictive reactions when it feels that it is disrespected. There is no reference to China’s economic sanctions on Australia, in response to the call for an independent, international enquiry into the origins of Covid-19. Indeed, there is no mention of Australia in the book.

So what is China’s world view?

According to Li, there would be four main aspects to the mainstream perspective of China’s world view.

First, China believes in mutual respect between countries for political and ideological diversity, meaning the West should not interfere in Chinese politics. There is no mention of Chinese interference in other countries using grey zone and other activities.

Second, economic collaboration should be the cornerstone of international cooperation, since politics can be divisive.

Third is historical conservatism, meaning that China does not seek to overturn history, such as Russia’s seizure of Chinese lands during the 19th century. But accepting history does not limit Chinese claims to Taiwan, the Senkaku Islands and the South China Sea.

Fourth, China does not seek to expand its territory (!).

Li is convinced that the rise of China is beneficial for the whole world as it has increased opportunities for others and expanded the provision of global public goods. Moreover, friendly competition between China and the United States is fostering innovation and progress in many fields.

China’s World View is an important book. Not many Western readers will be convinced by Li’s defence of the Chinese socio-political system, but he does offer important insights. Moreover, with China being an unavoidable reality in international politics and economics, the West must understand Chinese thinking, and Li’s book goes some way in helping such understanding.

Whatever the CCP says, regimes don’t have the rights of nations

All nation states have a right to defend themselves. But do regimes enjoy an equal right to self-defence? Is the security of a particular party-in-power a fundamental right of nations? The Chinese government is asking us to answer in the affirmative. Australians need to say no.

As a governing regime, the Chinese Communist Party claims many of the prerogatives of a nation state. This includes a monopoly over the legitimate use of physical force—Max Weber’s classic definition of a state.

As the world adjusts to the rise of China, its leaders want us to make way for the CCP’s triumphal arrival as the regime that made it all possible. This includes recognition of the party’s right to self-preservation on par with the rights of nations.

The United Nations Charter affirms the sovereign equality of member states, including their right to preserve their territorial integrity and political independence, free from force or coercion, and to resist external interference in their domestic jurisdictions.

Nothing in the UN Charter or associated documents, however, commits member nations to recognising the same rights for regimes. This places authoritarian regimes such as the CCP at a geopolitical disadvantage in seeking international recognition commensurate with their wealth, power and prestige.

Regime competition runs on a different track to international geopolitical competition, Yale scholar Nicholas Bequelin recently observed in Foreign Policy. The liberal rules-based order of the postwar period lends greater legitimacy to democratic states than to autocratic ones. This hampers the CCP’s search for recognition as a particularistic regime with security interests that serve not only the country but the party and its desire for self-preservation. The motives driving China’s adversarial relationship with the United States, Bequelin concludes, ‘are to be found in the imperatives of regime competition rather than in pure geopolitical calculations.’

The quest for regime security does not end with a geopolitical victory here or there. No authoritarian regime can rest easy until the world beyond itself is rendered safe for the pre-emptive defence of regime security. So current great-power competition is not just a matter of ideological competition within a stable geopolitical system; it involves reframing the system to treat regime security and national security with equal legitimacy.

CCP leaders are moving to reduce their relative disadvantage by altering the terms of international engagement. One of Beijing’s goals in its commitment to new international groupings is to insert commitments to the equal rights of regimes into public declarations. For example, the BRICS security agenda is taking shape around CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping’s Global Security Initiative (GSI), which equates regime security with national security. The 16th BRICS summit concluded on 24 October last year with the release of its Kazan Declaration a security document that had strong similarities the GSI, which was first spelled out by Xi at the 2022 Boao Forum.

Key phrases in the Kazan Declaration clearly align with the principles of the GSI. One of these is the acknowledgement of the equality of the ‘legitimate and reasonable security concerns’ of all countries. The phrase appears anodyne, but it is lifted directly from Xi’s GSI, where its significance is clear from context.

Beijing initially deployed this phrase to justify Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, based on the allegedly ‘legitimate and reasonable security concern’ that an independent Ukraine posed a security threat to Russia. China could offer similar justifications for its claims over Taiwan and adjacent Japanese territories or its contested maritime claims in the South China Sea.

That’s just the start. In current Chinese usage, the term ‘legitimate and reasonable security concerns’ refers not only to conventional security issues to do with territory and sovereignty, nor even to non-traditional security concerns around climate, energy, water, pandemics and the like. It also includes the CCP’s concerns around its own security, which it equates with the national and international security interests of China. What is to be preserved here is the power and standing of the party.

Concern for regime security has long featured in CCP foreign policy thinking, but the international implications of this concern have only fully emerged under Xi. This began with a heightened focus on regime security at home. Starting in 2014, Xi transformed Beijing’s approach to internal security by drafting a National Security Framework which, as analyst Sheena Chestnut Greitens points out, is China’s first-ever national security strategy.

The Xi administration also introduced tough new security laws, systematically purging and restructuring the national security system and working to perfect a massive ‘sentinel state’ apparatus capable of preserving the power and status of the party indefinitely. Now, Greitens argues, Xi is applying China’s domestic security framework to foreign policy with a view to reshaping the regional and global security order, ensuring the party’s domestic grip remains as secure abroad as it is on home soil.

It follows that ‘legitimate and reasonable security concerns’ refers, among other things, to the security interests of the CCP regime and the overlapping cluster of security initiatives that flow from party concerns. These initiatives include silencing dissent outside its borders through transnational repression and forcing national governments into line through economic coercion.

This security setting led the party’s official representatives to issue guidelines to Australia’s federal government—the Fourteen Grievances—about what can and cannot be said about the CCP in Australian media and by think tanks and government. Even after relations stabilised, party authorities tracked individuals and communities in Australia by activating surveillance systems initially designed to secure the party’s grip on China.

Recognising regime security as a right of nations would essentially legitimise economic coercion, transnational repression, censorship and covert interference of this kind.

As rights of authoritarian parties are unrecognised in international norms and institutions, elevating the security concerns of a Leninist political party to the level of nation states is no easy matter. But, as Xi reminds us, prevailing norms and institutions are up for grabs in times of ‘great changes unseen in a century.’ Democratic states need to preserve the equal sovereignty of nations, as distinct from regimes.

Reset Pax Americana: the West needs a grand accord

The world is trying to make sense of the Trump tariffs. Is there a grand design and strategy, or is it all instinct and improvisation? But much more important is the question of what will now happen, as new possibilities emerge from the shock effect of the tariff announcements and from subsequent moves and counter-moves.

For many, the United States is behaving erratically and imprudently, not least by lashing out at its allies and partners and by confusing financial markets. It’s risking its credibility by engaging in what appear to be irrational and self-harming actions that have already generated systemic financial shocks. Confidence in US leadership and economic rationality is being shaken.

To judge what might happen next, one must see the through-line—namely, Trump’s long-held grievance about what he sees as unfair global economic arrangements and widespread freeriding on the US, and his willingness to deploy all instruments of power to set this right. For Trump, the functioning of the global financial and trading system has seen the US incur the costs of entrenched trade deficits, hollowing out of the US industrial base and overvaluation of its currency, a consequence of the reserve status of the US dollar and US Treasury bonds.

At the same time, the cost of underpinning global security since 1945, through the so-called Pax Americana, has been borne disproportionately by the US taxpayer, who now carries US$36 trillion in federal debt. For the first time in its history, the US is spending more on debt interest than on defence. Meanwhile, allies and partners, with few exceptions, have minimised their defence spending wherever possible.

It is clear that Trump will no longer tolerate a situation where other countries gladly consume the security that the US produces, at significant cost to US taxpayers, without contributing materially to that security and while enjoying the prosperity it brings.

Bargains regarding prosperity and security are often intertwined. The 1944 Bretton Woods agreement was negotiated at a time when the postwar security order was being shaped. The deal ended in August 1971, when President Richard Nixon suspended the US dollar’s convertibility to gold and introduced a 10 percent import tax to compensate for ‘unfair exchange rates’—overvaluation of the US dollar. In September 1985 in what became known as the Plaza Accord, the US agreed with leading western economies that the US dollar would be devalued in a managed fashion to tackle a mounting US trade deficit. All the while, the US kept up its end of the bargain in protecting allies and partners.

We should not be surprised that from time to time, the US might deploy its enormous strategic and financial power to reset the terms of global prosperity and security. Whether by design or otherwise, we appear to be in another such moment.

Through the shock of the Trump tariffs, the US has created for itself an extraordinary opportunity to restructure the global trading and financial system, with two twin objectives in mind. These are to increase the relative gains from that system for Americans and to reallocate the costs of Pax Americana, so that they are borne more by allies and partners and less by US taxpayers.

To this end, the US should pursue a new global agreement, which might be called the Pax Americana Accord. It should bring all issues to the table in the process, so we are not dealing later with other, related shocks—say, with US currency or debt issues—or with doubts over US alliance commitments.

The best way to do this, in a way that would take maximum advantage of the opening that the tariff shock has created, would be for Trump to call an urgent meeting of what might be termed the ‘G7+’. This would not be a meeting whose objective would be to craft and issue a worthy but forgettable communique. Terms would be set out and agreed in outline, under the threat of total trade war. The details could then be hammered out over the remaining balance of the 90-day pause period.

The G7+ would consist of the US, Germany, Japan, Britain, France, Italy and Canada (as G7 members), along with India, Brazil, South Korea, Australia, Mexico, Indonesia (representing itself and the rest of Southeast Asia) and the European Union (in its own right and also representing the 24 non-G7 EU members). The G7+ would represent 67 percent of global GDP. Others, such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Switzerland, Argentina, the United Arab Emirates and Israel, could sign on to the new accord at a later date, as might Taiwan.

The meeting would agree the broad outlines of a Pax Americana accord, which would ultimately address and, as necessary, resolve the following issues:

—US chronic trade deficits and US complaints about tariff and non-tariff barriers to its exports;

—China’s deliberate manufacturing overcapacity, which is creating global trade and financial imbalances, unacceptable supply chain dependencies and a dangerous capacity for rapid war production, all endangering the security and economic resilience of the US and its allies and partners;

—China’s re-exports to the US by way of countries such as Mexico, Vietnam and Indonesia, which would have to be blocked, lest China evade what will be crippling US tariffs and other trade barriers (if a US-China deal cannot be separately done);

—Technological de-risking in relation to Chinese goods and services, to prevent China from gaining security advantages by passing high-risk technology into foreign economies;

—The enduring role of the US dollar as the world’s reserve currency, a global public good that the US provides;

—Long-term funding of the US Treasury, whereby US debt underpins global security (by paying for US military capabilities, another global public good) but where others who consume that security also enjoy income returns as debtholders and are not liable for the recapitalisation of those capabilities;

—US concerns about its industrial base, the strength of which also underpins global security and so represents another global public good;

—Defence spending of US allies and partners, most of which will need to build greater capacity to defend themselves without having to rely on US forces, at least in the early stages of a war;

—Potential for co-production of defence capability, in which allies and partners make larger contributions to US development programs; and

—Strategic reservation of critical minerals and other tangible assets by US allies and partners and the granting to the US of concessional access to these assets.

This is an ambitious agenda. A Pax Americana accord would address US trade grievances but more importantly would better spread the costs and risks of global security. It would reset the terms of Pax Americana such that it could be sustained. The US would be reassured about its strategic solvency, and allies and partners would take an active stake.

This would require negotiation of complex deals and arrangements. Achieving it would mean treading a narrow path. Careful and precise execution would be required, especially to reassure financial markets, which are always inclined to lose their minds during periods of uncertainty. If only we had a modern-day James Baker, the driving force behind the 1985 Plaza Accord. With the mandate of Reagan, who set the direction without managing the details, Baker deployed US power through velvety diplomacy in pursuit of US interests, knowing that US allies and partners would always prefer to deal with America, even when it was having a bad day. Has their attitude changed from Baker’s time? We are likely to find out over the next 90 days.

China will have to brought into any accord at some point. The underlying problems that have led us to this point are largely a consequence of Beijing’s strategy of concentrating industrial power in China. This has stunted development of a services-based economy in China, distorted global trade and supply chains, hollowed out Western industrial bases, delayed the industrialisation of the Global South and created national security and economic resilience risks for the US, its allies, partners and others.

Through a concerted strategy, as sketched out here, global trade could be rebalanced such that China would have to divest itself of overcapacity, including to the benefit of less developed countries.

By reallocating the costs of Pax Americana, the US would gain more financial and strategic resources to deal with the risk of China’s growing power and its strategic ambitions. It would be sustainably solvent, sitting at the centre of a reformed global system of prosperity and security. That would be worth the volatility of recent days. Whether we have arrived here through great cunning or as a consequence of instinct and improvisation does not matter much. What matters is the art of getting the deal done.

Seabed sensors and mapping: what China’s survey ship could be up to

Civilian exploration may be the official mission of a Chinese deep-sea research ship that sailed clockwise around Australia over the past week and is now loitering west of the continent. But maybe it’s also attending to naval duties.

These could have included laying or servicing seabed acoustic sensors and possibly detailed mapping of parts of the ocean floor to support future submarine operations.

Open-source tracking data enables such educated guesses to be made, without discounting the possibilities of economic and scientific data-gathering.

The ship, Tansuo Yi Hao (Exploration 1) took a similar route around Australia in January 2023, investigating 1100km of the Diamantina Trench over 34 days. China’s state media later said this was the first time the bottom of the trench had been reached. The ship carries a crewed submersible, the Fendouzhe (Striver), capable of long-duration forays to the seabed in depths exceeding 10,000 metres.

As in 2023, rather than proceeding directly home from New Zealand, where it was conducting joint activities with a partner institution, the ship has again undertaken a long deviation around Australia. Its transitory presence in the Bass Strait and inside Australia’s 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) was nonetheless permissible under international law, as long as the ship undertook no commercial survey activity and maintained continuous passage, showing ‘due regard’ to the coastal state.

However, speculation quickly grew that Tansuo Yi Hao could be gathering intelligence on Australia’s seabed cables. When questioned by media about its presence, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese said he ‘would prefer that it wasn’t there’.

Tansuo Yi Hao subsequently stayed mostly outside of the EEZ as it traversed the Great Australian Bight. Nor did it appear to loiter before reaching the Diamantina Trench, about 1100km off the Western Australian coast and well beyond Australia’s maritime jurisdiction.

Given the inherently dual-use nature of China’s marine scientific research assets, it would be prudent to assume that Tansuo Yi Hao and the submersible are subject to some level of military tasking. They belong to China’s Institute of Acoustics, which according to its own website has ties to the armed forces, dating back decades.

Sending a survey ship around Australia is less obviously coercive than similarly deploying a naval task group, as Beijing did in February and March, and China’s survey vessels are more common near Australia than generally known. But the passage is a further demonstration of China’s growing strategic reach and interest in operating beyond the first island chain.

According to automatic information system data from Starboard Maritime Intelligence, Tansuo Yi Hao has paused daily for 12 to 17 hours over the Diamantina Trench since 6 April. This is consistent with the reported underwater endurance of Fendouzhe of up to 15 hours. During that time, Fendouzhe could have deployed new devices or serviced acoustic arrays already on the seabed near the trench. The sensors could gather valuable military intelligence about signatures of ships that pass them.

The Diamantina Trench is too far away to be of obvious use for monitoring the approaches to HMAS Stirling, Australia’s sole submarine base and the main hub for future combined Australian, British and US submarine operations under AUKUS. It is also too deep for submarine operations. However, China reportedly has developed deep-sea surveillance networks that can operate in the extreme pressures of ocean trenches and use acoustic characteristics of the trenches to detect sounds from as far away as 1000km, including from passing ships and submarines. Listening devices are said to be attached to a seabed cable that is connected to a small buoy that in turn serves as a battery power source and relay for satellite communications. Around a decade ago, two arrays were reportedly laid in deep sea trenches near Guam and near Yap, an island in the Federated States of Micronesia. Since then, China’s sensing technology has continued to advance at an impressive pace.

The survey ship’s return visit to the Diamantina Trench after two years could be associated with a need to service or replace equipment and collect data gathered since 2023. Unfortunately, Australia has very limited capabilities for monitoring the seabed beyond its continental shelf, so it would likely be none the wiser if Tansuo Yi Hao deployed seabed devices during its current visit—or two years ago, for that matter.

To be sure, China’s deep-sea survey expeditions have economic and prestige motivations, which may even be preponderant. However, it would be foolhardy to discount the possibility that Tansuo Yi Hao and other specialised survey vessels are also used to support China’s naval ambitions.

China’s navy is probably interested in seabed mapping for its own future submarine operations, and while submersibles are able to map only limited areas, with emerging technologies they can do so in impressive detail.

In the public domain at least, it remains unclear whether Chinese submarines have previously operated south of Australia. But Tansuo Yi Hao’s two recent survey expeditions, taken together with China’s recent warship transit south about Australia, suggests Beijing’s strategic interest in Australia’s southern seaboard is rising. This is no surprise given the growing strategic importance of HMAS Stirling.

Australia must understand that China is paying it greater attention, in strategic terms, as a result of the AUKUS initiative and the developing footprint of the US force posture here. This is likely to motivate a more regular Chinese maritime presence in our vicinity, comprising not only military assets but dual-use capabilities such as survey ships. Assuming otherwise would be akin to burying our heads in the sand.

No, it’s not new. Russia and China have been best buddies for decades

Maybe people are only just beginning to notice the close alignment of Russia and China. It’s discussed as a sudden new phenomenon in world affairs, but in fact it’s not new at all.

The two countries have been each other’s most important diplomatic partner since no later than 2002, according to my research. Throughout this period, Russia has been central to China’s building of an alternative world order.

Based on the structured way the Chinese foreign ministry publishes incoming and outgoing diplomatic visits, I built a database that covers the presidential periods of Hu Jintao (2002–2012) and Xi Jinping (2012–present). My clearest finding was the dominance of Sino-Russian exchanges. The graph below shows the trend in Russia-China visits.

Russia-China visits (ministerial or higher) listed by the Chinese foreign ministry. Source: author.

This decades-old habit of intense interactions remained stable after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Beijing and Moscow’s similarly bleak view of the international order cannot be undone by a few trips of some eager European ministers to China or a few ill-thought-out US concessions to Russia.

The intimate nature of president-to-president ties is clear. Beyond the period covered by the database, there has been a state visit in one direction or the other every year since 1999. Since Russian President Vladimir Putin took office in 2000, a Russian president went on a state visit to China every even year, and every uneven year a Chinese president went to Russia. The exceptions are Xi’s extra visit to Moscow in 2015, officially called mere ‘attendance’, for the World War II victory parade. And there were no visits either way during the Covid-19 pandemic. Both Hu and Xi made their first foreign visit as president to Moscow.

There is no other country that has a diplomatic relationship with China like this. Russia is the top outgoing destination during Hu Jintao’s and Xi Jinping’s presidential terms. Russia was the top source of incoming visits for Hu’s two terms; it ranked second or third for Xi’s first two terms and, so far, for his third term, too. Few foreign officials have led delegations to China as often as Putin and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov.

My data shows that Russia has been China’s most important diplomatic partner throughout the governments of Hu and Xi. Observers are right to point to the personal relationship Xi and Putin have developed—one that includes birthday phone calls. However, the empirical data shows that interaction was equally intense when Dmitry Medvedev was president of Russia and under the supposedly less assertively nationalist Hu.

Beyond diplomatic visits, Russia is fundamental to Beijing’s alternative world order. It has always been an important member of international groupings that Beijing began constructing from the 1990s onwards, including the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.

China’s views on international order have developed a more global perspective over the years. Starting with the East Asia Summit and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation nearer to home, China now reaches the entire developing world through groupings such as BRICS+. Russia was always there—often to back up Beijing’s camp.

Now this expanding horizon is reaching Europe.

China’s long-term solution for what it still stubbornly calls ‘the Ukraine crisis’ overlaps with elements of Russia’s view of regional order. Within days of 24 February 2022, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi presented a ‘Five-Point Position’ that called for the formation of a ‘balanced, effective and sustainable European security mechanism’.

Wang linked the conflict’s ‘complex historical context’ to the ‘principle of indivisible security’. This Cold War-era idea evolved into a phrase first used by the Soviet Union and now by Russia to claim that NATO expansion infringes on its sovereignty. Chinese officials, too, have since 2022 repeatedly described US Indo-Pacific policy as a ‘NATO of the Asia-Pacific’ that risks triggering the same ‘disaster’ as NATO supposedly did in Europe.

At his press conference following the parliament meeting in Beijing, Wang said no third party could influence the friendly ties between China and Russia. The data backs him up. The relationship has been at the core of Chinese efforts to strike out in the world.

Despite massive historical differences between the Sino-Soviet split and today, the data shows that the practical situation on the ground is durable and sustainable. China’s diplomatic ties with Russia have not quantitatively increased or decreased significantly since February 2022. In contrast, my data shows that after 2014 diplomatic interactions between China and Ukraine declined.

Xi—who has called Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky only once—told Putin during his most recent state visit in 2023 that Russia and China were driving ‘changes unseen in a hundred years’, which he links to his Chinese Dream.

In Xi and Putin’s world, there may be room for Donald Trump. But there is no place for the rules-based international order that many countries depend on. Western capitals and Washington pundits need to realise this is not a whim; Russia has consistently been China’s most important diplomatic partner.

Myanmar’s scam centres demand ASEAN-Australia collaboration

China’s crackdown on cyber-scam centres on the Thailand-Myanmar border may cause a shift away from Mandarin, towards English-speaking victims. Scammers also used the 28 March earthquake to scam international victims.

Australia, with its proven capabilities to disrupt cybercrime networks, should support the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ efforts to tackle this kind of transnational organised crime. Doing so would also help ease pressure on Australian policing and cyber capabilities, which deal with thousands of cybercrime reports each year.

Myanmar’s border regions, particularly around Myawaddy, are infamous for scam compounds. Victims—often lured by fake job ads on social media—are trafficked to these sites. Upon arrival, they’re forced to hand over their IDs and mobile phones, and are then forced to engage in love scams, crypto fraud, money laundering and illegal online gambling. The United Nations estimates around 120,000 people are trapped in Myanmar alone, with another 100,000 in Cambodia and unknown numbers in Laos, the Philippines and Thailand.

For years, Chinese authorities ignored this criminal enterprise. But when Chinese actor Wang Xing disappeared, a viral plea from his girlfriend on microblogging site Weibo triggered action. Within hours, Xing was released, sparking outcry on the social media from families of 1800 missing Chinese nationals believed to have been trafficked.

Xing’s rescue highlights the power of grassroots mobilisation but also exposes the systemic law enforcement failures on the border. While Nay Pyi Daw tolerates these scam centres, the operations persist due to selective enforcement from authorities in neighbouring China and Thailand, leaving the power networks behind them unscathed.

After public pressure, Chinese President Xi Jinping took action and met with Thai Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra in February. Following the high-level meeting, Thailand immediately cut electricity, internet and gas supplies to five towns known for harbouring cyber-scam centres. However, these efforts remain largely performative as Myanmar junta-allied actors also position themselves as part of the crackdown, such as Saw Chit Thu‘s  Border Guard Force, despite its complicity in scam compounds. While more than 7000 people have been released, far more remain trapped. Syndicates continue to evolve, securing alternative electricity sources, switching to Starlink satellite connections, and potentially relocating their operations elsewhere.

China’s shifting approach towards Myanmar complicates matters. Its increased support for Myanmar’s military regime pushed the cyber-scam syndicates into areas controlled by the junta and its allied ethnic militias. Criminal activities accelerated and diverted their recruitment to English-speaking targets.

China’s response is also inherently reactionary and limited, doing little for victims in other countries such as Cambodia and Laos. While China’s diplomatic influence has led to some progress, victims from other countries, such as the Philippines and Indonesia, lack similar leverage to pressure host governments.

This calls for a more holistic and coordinated regional approach. It should focus on preventing modern slavery and combatting cyber and cyber-enabled crimes, and should include ASEAN as well as partners such as Australia.

ASEAN has a rudimentary structure to facilitate intra-regional intelligence sharing, joint investigations and coordinated rescue operations. ASEANAPOL and INTERPOL’s Singapore-based operations support coordination among regional police forces. While this has led to many arrests and seizures of assets, the overall effort falls short of dismantling criminal enterprises.

Last year’s launch of the ASEAN Computer Emergency Response Team was a positive move, strengthening the region’s ability to address cybersecurity incidents. But efforts to dismantle cyber-scam networks in Myanmar remain limited due to protection from junta-backed militias.

This situation should prompt greater Australian involvement. Australia’s offensive cyber capabilities helped disrupt cyber-crime networks, such as Lockbit and ZServers. In November, the Australian Federal Police, working with Philippine authorities, took down a major scam syndicate in Manila under Operation Firestorm, seizing digital evidence to trace Australian victims and disrupt global fraud operations.

With thousands of Australians falling victim to scam operations, Australia’s cybercrime-fighting efforts should prioritise taking down overseas scam networks. This could be done by strengthening skills and capabilities of cyber detectives and offensive cyber operators in the region, for instance through capacity-building workshops and mission-specific training. However, the government should also be prepared to use its political and economic heft to pressure host nations that allow such criminal activities, using tools such as ministerial interventions, attributions and cyber sanctions.

The Fifth ASEAN Digital Ministers’ meeting earlier this year stressed the need for international collaboration on implementing additional measures to prevent cross-border scams. While the roles of China, Japan, the United States and Russia were mentioned, Australia is not yet engaged. This is an opportunity for Australia to increase its collaboration with ASEAN, especially in the wake of the recent Myanmar earthquake, which scammers exploited through fake clickbait donations and malicious links.

Australia has committed to provide $2 million for Myanmar’s disaster response. Yet, targeted initiatives to address cyber scams would bolster defences against transnational cybercrime and create a safer global environment.

In trade, nothing can replace the US consumer. Still, Asian countries look to each other

How will the US assault on trade affect geopolitical relations within Asia? Will nations turn to China and seek protection by trading with each other?

The happy snaps a week ago of the trade ministers of China, Japan and South Korea shaking each other’s hands over progress on a trilateral trade pact suggested that possibility.

The three, from nations with deep historic antipathy towards each other, said an agreement would create ‘a predicable trade and investment environment’, and they promised to speed negotiations.

There had been no discernible progress on the proposed trilateral deal since negotiations were launched in 2012. That this was the first ministerial meeting since 2019 points to the challenge ahead.

Asian nations have been active—some would say hyper-active—in pursuit of trade deals. The Asian Development Bank counts 77 preferential trade agreements among the nations of the Asia-Pacific region (including Australia) and a further 109 agreements signed with nations outside the region. Its research shows the agreements provide little help to export volumes.

About 56 percent of Asia-Pacific trade is within the region, which is only slightly less than the internal trade of the European Union. However, the intra-regional trade share has shown no growth since 2005 and has in fact slipped since 2020, despite the spread of trade deals.

Asian nations hit by US tariffs will certainly seek sales elsewhere. However, the first link in the supply chains that bind together enterprises across the region remains China’s subsidised manufacturers while the prize market remains the ravenous appetite of the US consumer.

There have been big changes in Asian trade patterns over the past decade. China has become more self-sufficient, particularly since 2018, when Donald Trump launched his first round of tariffs.

China’s President Xi Jinping responded in 2020 with his Dual Circulation Strategy, under which China would remain open to world markets but would seek economic self-reliance and import substitution in strategic sectors.

An analysis by Hinrich Foundation shows the success of this import-substitution drive. For every $100 of GDP growth over the past decade, China has had to import only $12.50 of goods and services, whereas in the decade to 2013, it needed $21.50 of imports for every $100 of GDP growth.

China’s imports are increasingly concentrated among a handful of countries, led by Russia, Vietnam, Brazil and Australia. Hinrich estimates that countries representing less than 10 percent of the global economy have supplied two thirds of China’s import growth over the last decade.

China sought, in particular, to become less dependent on the United States as both a market and as a supplier. The US share of China’s exports fell from 20 percent in 2018 to 12 percent last year, while the US share of China’s imports dropped from 8 percent to 6 percent.

While China’s direct trade with the US has fallen, its trade with Southeast Asia has increased. China’s share of Southeast Asian exports rose from 12 percent to 16 percent over the past decade, while its share of the region’s imports went from 16 percent to 24 percent.

Rather than exporting finished goods to the US, China is selling components to such countries as Vietnam, Cambodia and Malaysia, which then sell finished goods to the US.

The US has provided most of the growth for Southeast Asian exporters, with its share of their sales rising from 9 percent to 15 percent over the past decade.

There has been no growth in the US share of Southeast Asian imports, which has held steady at around 6 percent for most of the past 20 years.

The US has also become much more self-sufficient over the past decade as a result of the surge in its oil and gas production following the development of fracking technology.

However, US imports of manufactured goods have continued to rise. Estimates by Council on Foreign Relations fellow Brad Setser show the US trade deficit in manufactured goods has almost doubled since the 2008 global financial crisis to about 1.3 percent of global GDP.

In the same time, China’s manufacturing surplus has almost tripled to 1.7 percent of global GDP. Other Asian countries have become intermediaries in the flow of manufactured goods from China to the US but have not replaced it.

There is no other market like the US consumer. US household spending in 2023 reached $19 trillion, double the level of the European Union and almost three times that of China.

The huge imposts on US imports from China, Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand and Indonesia will increase the cost and slow the flow of goods to US consumers, but there are no obvious markets to replace them.

Whether the tariffs act as the catalyst for the reindustrialisation of the US—an objective of both Republicans and Democrats—remains to be seen.

Tag Archive for: China

The FT’s Demetri Sevastopulo on Trump’s tariffs and the disappearing Chinese general

The United States-China tit-for-tat tariffs have been escalating faster than the bids at a Sydney house auction in the early 2010s. ‘Trade war’ is the headline. But does Donald Trump have a strategy to decouple, or is he angling for a grand bargain? Either way, Xi Jinping is making it clear that China has a vote (even if its people don’t).

Demetri Sevastopulo, the Financial Times’ US-China correspondent, explains the possible plays behind the numbers, the rival points of leverage in the brewing trade war, the implications for US partners and allies, the competition for influence within the Trump administration, and the latest on TikTok and Taiwan.

Demetri also gives us a real-time analysis of his latest scoop in the FT, revealing the purging of the PLA’s number two general, He Weidong.

Stop the World: Authoritarianism and the future of Hong Kong with Kevin Yam and Ted Hui

In the latest episode of Stop the World, David Wroe speaks to Kevin Yam and Ted Hui, two of Australia’s most prominent exiled Hong Kong democracy activists. 

Kevin is a research fellow at the University of Melbourne Law School and a commentator on China and Hong Kong. Ted Hui is a lawyer who was previously a member of Hong Kong’s legislature before he was forced to leave in 2020.  

David, Kevin and Ted talk about the current state of democracy in Hong Kong and how authorities are applying the sweeping national security law that was imposed on the region by Beijing in 2020. They also discuss the recent mass sentencing of pro-democracy activists under the national security law, including the case of Australian man Gordon Ng who was sentenced to smore than seven years in jail. 

With four Australian judges remaining on Hong Kong’s Court of Final Appeal, they also discuss whether there is value in foreign judges remaining on the court, or if they are legitimising an authoritarian regime, and examine the Australia-China relationship and the impact it has on Canberra’s position on Hong Kong. 

Guests:

Kevin Yam  

Ted Hui  

Stop the World: Japan’s security, partnerships and regional strategic outlook with Narushige Michishita

In this episode of Stop the World, we bring you the penultimate episode in our special series recorded from the sidelines of the ASPI Defence Conference ‘JoiningFORCES’.

This interview is all about Japan and regional security. Dr Euan Graham, Senior ASPI Analyst speaks with Narushige Michishita, professor at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS) in Tokyo and Japan Scholar with the Woodrow Wilson Center’s Asia Program. The conversation covers Japan’s perspective on the strategic outlook in the Indo-Pacific, the role of the US-Japan alliance and the evolution of the Australia-Japan relationship. Euan and Michishita also discuss Japan’s major investments in defence, including a promise to increase defence funding by 60 percent, and opportunities to increase regional cooperation on security, including through AUKUS.

Note: This episode was recorded on the sidelines of the conference, so please forgive the less than perfect audio quality.

Guests:

⁠Euan Graham⁠

⁠Narushige Michishita

Mapping China’s data harvesting and global propaganda efforts

ASPI has released a groundbreaking report that finds the Chinese Communist Party seeks to harvest user data from globally popular Chinese apps, games and online platforms in a likely effort to improve its global propaganda.

The research maps the CCP’s propaganda system, highlighting the links between the Central Propaganda Department, state-owned or controlled propaganda entities and data-collection activities, and technology investments in Chinese companies.

In this special short episode of Stop the World, David Wroe speaks with ASPI analyst Daria Impiombato about the key takeaways from this major piece of research.

Mentioned in this episode:
Truth and reality with Chinese characteristics

Guests:
David Wroe
Daria Impiombato