Tag Archive for: Border Security

‘High rollers’ A study of criminal profits along Australia’s heroin and methamphetamine supply chains

This report helps develop an understanding of the quantum of profits being made and where in the value chain they occur. Australians spent approximately A$5.8 billion on methamphetamine and A$470 million on heroin in FY 2019.

Approximately A$1,216,806,017 was paid to international wholesalers overseas for the amphetamine and heroin that was smuggled into Australia in that year. The profit that remained in Australia’s economy was about A$5,012,150,000. Those funds are undermining Australia’s public health and distorting our economy daily, and ultimately funding drug cartels and traffickers in Southeast Asia.

One key takeaway from the figures presented in this report is that the Australian drug trade is large and growing. Despite the best efforts of law enforcement agencies, methamphetamine and heroin use has been increasing by up to 17% year on year. Falling prices in Southeast Asia are likely to keep pushing that number up, while drug prices and purity in Australia remain relatively stable.

Authors Dr John Coyne and Dr Teagan Westendorf write that, ‘While ever-larger drug busts continue to dominate the headlines, the underlying fact is that methamphetamine and heroin imports continue to rise despite authorities seizing up to 34% of imported drugs’.

As production prices for methamphetamine continue to decline along with wholesale prices, more sophisticated transnational organised crime actors are likely to begin to examine their business models in greater detail. Industrial production of methamphetamine for high-volume, low-profit regional markets like Australia has significant benefits for them.

The data suggests that the more sophisticated transnational organised crime groups will seek to expand their control of the heroin and methamphetamine value chains to include greater elements of the wholesale supply chain as well as alternative product lines, such as synthetic opioids.

The authors note that ‘in the absence of supply reduction, and even with more effective supply-chain disruption, our federal and state governments will need to invest more heavily in demand reduction and harm minimisation.’

People Smugglers Globally 2017

The global drivers for the irregular movement of people, from human security to economics, are growing, not dissipating.

In 2016, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees reported that there were 65.6 million ‘forcibly displaced people worldwide’, 22.5 million refugees and 10 million stateless people.

Globally, there are some 767 million people living below the poverty line. In Africa alone, there are some 200 million people ‘aged between 15–24 and this will likely double by 2045’. While these figures are startling, the fact that in 2016 only 189,300 refugees were resettled highlights the scale of the likely demand for irregular migration.

Much has been said and published on irregular migration from the perspective of the migrant. In the process, it has become politically expedient to homogenise perceptions of people smugglers.

This new ASPI report focuses on people-smuggling syndicates globally.

The report provides a concise analysis of the various people-smuggling syndicates operating in the globe’s people smuggling hot-spots. This authoritative report provides a concise analysis of each people smuggling hot-spot, with accompanying policy recommendations for interventions.

The 2017 independent review of intelligence: Views from The Strategist

Over the past 40 years, Australian governments have periodically commissioned reviews of the Australian intelligence community (AIC). The first such inquiry—the Hope Royal Commission of 1974—was commissioned by the Whitlam government as a way of shedding light on what had hitherto been a shadowy group of little-known and little-understood government agencies. It was also the beginning of a journey that would eventually bring the AIC more into public view and onto a firm legislative footing. The second Hope Royal Commission, in 1983, was partly a response to some dramatic external events, in the forms of the Coomb–Ivanov affair and a poorly judged Australian Secret Intelligence Service training exercise that went badly wrong. But it was also a continuation of the process begun by the previous commission.

Fractured Europe: the Schengen Area and European border security

The simultaneous ‘crises’ of irregular migration and terrorism have demonstrated the continued importance of border security for Schengen member states and the EU as a whole.

The principles of the EU have become closely aligned with the existence of the Schengen Area, which created a distinction between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ borders in Europe; it also created a tension between the goals of European integration and the core Westphalian principle of state sovereignty.

This paper assesses some of the factors behind member states resorting to national over collective action in response to recent challenges, exploring the role of intelligence and institutions such as Frontex, before ultimately arguing for the creation of a European Agenda on Border Security to provide a strategic framework for border security in Europe.

Australian border security and unmanned maritime vehicles

Protecting the sovereignty of our maritime borders has never been more difficult than it is today. Australia must identify strategies for pre-positioning our finite maritime response capabilities in order to be able to respond promptly, effectively and efficiently to risks across our EEZ.

This special report examines the potential for UMVs to expand Australia’s maritime domain awareness and make the ADF’s and Australia Border Force’s risk management strategies more efficient. It provides recommendations for improving the efficiency of Australia’s maritime border security efforts.

Securing the Australian frontier: an agenda for border security policy

This report explores the key border security concepts and emergent policy challenges that will impact on Australia’s border security policy.

Effective border security allows for the seamless legitimate movement of people and goods across Australia’s borders, which is critical to enhancing trade, travel and migration. The provision of border security involves far more than creating a capability focused solely on keeping our borders secure from potential terrorists, irregular migrants and illicit contraband.

Border security policy deals with a unique operating space, in which extraordinary measures (extraordinary in character, amount, extent or degree) are often needed to provide a sense of security at the same time as creating the sense of normalcy that will allow economic interactions to flourish.

Tag Archive for: Border Security

Australia needs a coastguard to meet modern maritime threats

The maritime domain is increasingly contested. From attacks on shipping and undersea cables in Europe to grey zone threats in the South China Sea, risks to maritime security are mounting. China’s use of maritime militias and reports last week of a China-flagged tanker breaking subsea cables highlight the blurred lines between civil and military threats.

With the third-largest exclusive economic zone in the world, Australia must ask itself the question: is our maritime security architecture ready to deal with the increased threats? My new paper Time for a Coastguard with the Australian Naval Institute argues it is not and it’s time to consider setting up an Australian coastguard.

Australia differs from many of its Southeast Asian, Indian Ocean and Pacific neighbours in not having a coastguard. Several agencies execute Australia’s civil maritime functions. Notably, the Australian Maritime Safety Authority coordinates Australia’s maritime search and rescue functions, while the Maritime Border Command (MBC) coordinates and executes Australia’s civil maritime security operations.

MBC is a multi-agency taskforce under the Department of Home Affairs that relies on Australian Defence Force and Australian Border Force (ABF) assets in executing its role. Importantly, the MBC does not have its own assets or personnel; instead, its structure relies on support from the relevant maritime security agencies.

This is an important distinction, as the MBC is often referred to as ‘like a coastguard’ or a ‘de facto coastguard’. However, the similarities are limited: it is fundamentally a coordination body. Staffed primarily by personnel from the ADF and ABF, the MBC directs assets from those forces.

The Defence Strategic Review recommended that ‘Defence should be the force of last resort for domestic aid to the civil community, except in extreme circumstances.’ Relying on the ADF for maritime constabulary work is another example of resorting to it for civil functions.

The ABF maritime unit workforce is about 550 personnel, and it presently has 11 patrol vessels, one large-hull vessel and two fast-response boats. To assist in its maritime surveillance role, the ABF leases 10 Dash 8 aircraft and two helicopters. This is a small civil maritime footprint for a country with the third-largest exclusive economic zone in the world.

There have been reports of billion-dollar warships being used for constabulary functions. The MBC drawing on Royal Australian Air Force aircraft is just as inappropriate—for example, when $250 million P-8A Poseidon aircraft designed for anti-submarine warfare are needed for supplementing ABF aerial surveillance. Not only is this uneconomical, but it will not be feasible in the event of regional crisis or conflict. The National Defence Strategy is clear that the ADF must be focused on high-end warfighting.

Compounding the MBC’s over-reliance on the ADF is the structure and capabilities of the ABF’s maritime element, which has regularly struggled to meet government-directed targets for sea patrol days and aerial surveillance hours, among other issues.

Maritime security trends in the region suggest these pressures will only intensify, placing more strain on the current structure.

The ABF, as a law enforcement organisation, has been unable to develop the expertise needed to maintain maritime capabilities and execute complex maritime operations. In most regional countries, these responsibilities fall to a coastguard paramilitary organisation.

Despite the secrecy surrounding Australia’s maritime border operations, there has been enough anecdotal media reporting to show that the structure has not worked effectively. This includes reporting on concerns around professionalism, maintenance issues and capacity.

The ABF is a civilian law enforcement organisation that lacks the capability, flexibility and training to manage the nature of grey zone and hybrid maritime threats that Australia will likely face. This is a different level of threat than traditional law enforcement and will require different capabilities and skillsets.

The answer is not simply bolstering the maritime unit of the ABF through increased funding. The structures of the ABF maritime unit are not such that they could readily support such an increase in capability, as it was not designed or trained to undertake the full burden of civil maritime security roles in the absence of the ADF.

The MBC multi-agency command structure relies on ADF skillsets that could not easily be replaced by a bolstered ABF maritime unit. A complete restructure would be required—a coastguard.

Given the reduction in warning time for crises and the increasing complexity of maritime security threats, it is time to rethink Australia’s maritime security structure.

My paper Time for a Coastguard advocates for a layered defence model, including the establishment of a coastguard to address Australia’s civil maritime security and maritime home defence. This would enhance our capabilities while relieving pressure on the RAN and ADF.

We must address Australia’s maritime security structural issues now to strengthen our maritime resilience.

Border security: lessons from a fractured Europe

Brexit, and the US presidential election result, provided tangible evidence that migration and border security policies are becoming increasingly politicised in Western democracies. Public policy dialogue on migration and border security has become ever more polarised into a zero sum game in which debates on both issues descend into a binary ‘secure’ or ‘insecure’ ultimatum.

Today, ASPI’s Border Security Program is releasing two reports (Fractured Europe: the Schengen Area and European border security and Drawing border security lessons from Europe’s Schengen experiences) that have been developed to broaden the depth of this dialogue through a case study of Schengen.

Described as ‘one of the major achievements of European integration’, and once seen as a model for the future, the Schengen Area is at a critical point in its history. The simultaneous crises of irregular migration and terrorism have each placed unprecedented pressure on open borders and the free movement of people, goods and services and made border security a political priority for the European Union nations.

Established in 1995, the Schengen Area is a 4,312,099 square kilometre ‘zone’ embracing 26 European nations and around 420 million people, which abolished border controls to allow the free and unrestricted movement of people, goods, services and capital. Those controls were replaced with common rules for controlling external borders and fighting criminality with a common judicial system and strong police cooperation.

The Special Report Fractured Europe: the Schengen Area examines why member states are resorting to national over collective action in their response to the current challenges. A picture emerges of a Europe in which Brussels has struggled to maintain the security of the external EU border while national capitals prioritise the security of their own borders.

In the context of growing national populism, efforts to achieve solidarity in the face of common challenges haven’t been forthcoming. Ultimately, the EU needs a European agenda on border security and consensus from member states on its outcomes.

The Strategic Insights report, Drawing border security lessons from Europe’s Schengen experiences, argues that those responsible for Schengen’s external border security face impossible expectations that they can manage extraordinary challenges, such as 2016’s mass migration surge, without additional resources and powers.

The report provides observations and recommendations based on the Schengen experience for Australian border security policymakers, including the following:

  • While border management has a strong national and domestic security nexus, policy professionals should view border security as one of the many operational and policy levers available to disrupt threats and risks coming through the border.
  • In the current threat and risk environment, nation-states have little choice but to securitise border management, but this needn’t translate to the securitisation of migration. Governments should establish public information campaigns to promote public dialogue on ‘securitising borders versus securitising migration’.
  • Border security policies shouldn’t be developed in isolation from other national and domestic security strategies.
  • The prevention of mass migration crises globally and regionally should be central to all sovereign states’ national strategies. At the core of this work should be policies focused on addressing the drivers of mass migration. Australia needs to develop strategies for dealing with emerging regional migration challenges, including those associated with climate events (especially for Papua New Guinea) and persecution (such as of Rohingyas in Myanmar).
  • Governments should enhance their capacity to co-design harmonised border facilitation and security policies.
  • The parliamentary joint committees on intelligence and security and law enforcement should consider reviewing legislative impediments to the sharing of national security, criminal and financial intelligence.
  • Australia should examine ways to facilitate ASEAN member states’ consideration and harmonisation of the economic and security dimensions of any future ASEAN Economic Community border arrangements. At the very least, Australia should encourage ASEAN states to maintain the frameworks and capacity to implement extraordinary border controls for short periods in the face of future risks and threats.

One strong lesson learned from the Schengen Area experience is that border, national and domestic security policymakers need to work together to identify the most efficient and effective strategies to disrupt threats and risks, whatever they may be. Such decision-making must also be underpinned by a comprehensive understanding of threats and risks, free from political interference in operational decision-making. With such an understanding, policymakers can selectively apply measures if and when needed.

In Western liberal democracies, it appears that for the time being ‘standing in front’ of this wave of anti-migration sentiment is unlikely to win you elections. However, this politically and emotionally charged environment shouldn’t prevent policy dialogue that argues the facts, even if it goes against populist sentiment. ASPI’s latest border security reports take an analytical perspective to the problem that sets aside the current rhetoric.

National security wrap

Image courtesy of Flickr user Kent MacElwee.

The Beat

Financial crime targets Oz superannuation

AUSTRAC has just released a risk assessment on Australia’s trillion dollar (PDF) superannuation sector. The key findings show that fraud is the overwhelmingly predominant crime, and is often enabled via cybercrime. AUSTRAC’s  recommendations (PDF) urge super funds to bolster internal controls against financial crime and to increase their suspicious matter reporting. AUSTRAC estimates that financial crime costs Australians some $8.6 billion a year.

In related news, last Friday ASIC revealed that it’s rolling out artificial intelligence—‘supervised learning algorithms’—to catch criminals in the financial services sector. ASIC’s new digital capability will analyse company announcements and trading patterns, aiming to detect suspicious market activity that reveals insider trading.

Cyberheist hits UK bank

Cybercriminals made off with £2.5 million from 9,000 Tesco Bank customers last week. Bank officials reacted quickly by guaranteeing full repayment to affected customers. Although banks routinely contend with cyber threats, this unprecedented heist saw cybercriminals directly withdraw funds from accounts, constituting the ‘first mass hacking of accounts at a western bank’. UK Home Secretary Amber Rudd has pledged that the UK will do more to tackle financial crime, which she described a ‘national security threat’.

CT Scan

Global Terrorism Index

The Institute for Economics & Peace released its Global Terrorism Index 2016 on Wednesday. The report shows that 2015 saw a record number of countries experience their highest levels of terrorism in the past 16 years (despite 10% fewer total deaths than 2014, the deadliest year on record). The report attributes that largely to the expansion of ISIL affiliates across the globe. But the report notes that ‘terrorism is a highly concentrated form of violence’, with 72% of deaths from terrorism occurring in only five countries, ‘Iraq, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Pakistan and Syria’, and that 74% were attributable to only four groups, ‘ISIL, Boko Haram, the Taliban and al-Qa’ida’.

Terrorism in the age of Trump

With Donald Trump securing the presidency last week, pundits have begun to unpack what it means for US national security policy. Trump’s been big on ‘defeating ISIS’ and focusing the military on the counterterrorism mission. On the campaign trail the President-elect also made some controversial comments about the use of torture. The Atlantic’s Siddhartha Mahanta sat down with former FBI officer Ali Soufan to discuss ‘torture and counterterrorism in the age of Trump’. Soufan cites concerns about the impact on CT cooperation with security partners in the Middle East of Trump’s vitriolic campaign, as well as the loss of trust within the American Muslim community.

Control orders pass Senate

Controversial amendments to Australia’s counterterror laws were passed by the Senate last week. The amendments lower the age which existing control order regimes can be applied from 16 to 14.

Checkpoint

Northern triangle gets its triforce

Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras are teaming up to launch a new militarised tri-national border force. The organisation will operate along 600km of shared borders between the three countries, and will seek to tackle organised crime in Central America’s infamous Northern Triangle. Among the initiatives is a centralised warrant system that will enable security forces to apprehend gang members who cross borders after committing crimes. Cities in the Northern Triangle are some of the most dangerous in the world, with homicide rates and refugee emigration skyrocketing in recent years.

EU border controls prolonged

The EU has agreed to allow five Schengen Area member states (Germany, Sweden, Austria, Denmark and Norway) to extend their temporary border controls for another three months. On the prospect of returning to unrestricted travel, Slovak Interior Minister Robert Kaliňák commented that ‘Although we are not there yet, the situation is improving’. But that assessment on Europe’s border woes might be optimistic, as a recent WSJ article notes that the EU’s struggling to reform its migration laws to incorporate border security checks for European-born jihadists returning from the Middle East.

First Responder

Climate change in the age of Trump

Australia ratified the Paris Climate Agreement last Thursday. After last week’s US election, analysts are concerned that Trump’s presidency could be disastrous for climate policy, citing the incoming Administration’s stated desire to withdraw from the Agreement. Trump already appears to be heading in a worrying direction, with sources claiming he’s selected Myron Ebell as head of the Environmental Protection Agency’s transition. Ebell’s a high profile figure on energy policy and has a track record of questioning climate change and its impact. There’s some cause for optimism though. Brookings’ Nathan Hultman explains that, while Trump has bashed the Paris Accords, reversing the majority of regulatory policies already put in place would require a lengthy legal process, and that ‘failure to enforce would invite additional lawsuits’.

Designing resilience

The Georgetown Climate Center has released its latest report, Rebuilding with Resilience: Lessons from the Rebuild By Design Competition After Hurricane Sandy (PDF). The report assesses six infrastructure projects designed to ‘make our communities more resilient to future climate impacts and other environmental changes, as well as to social and economic stressors’. Financial constraints were often an issue, and the report recommends designing projects to be ‘progressively implemented over time as funds become available or as the impacts of climate change become more severe’.

Global warming and mass migration—a strategic problem

Sep 4, 2015: Refugees on the Hungarian M1 highway on their march towards the Austrian border

The refugee crisis currently confronting Europe is the harbinger of things to come.

An unpredictable cocktail of prolonged drought and civil war in Syria has generated over six million internally displaced people, with another four million seeking refuge in Turkey, Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan and Egypt. Over one million Syrians are banging on the gates of Europe, not to mention tens of thousands of Iraqis, Iranians and Afghans. While some of them are ‘economic refugees’ seeking better lives for themselves and their families, the vast majority of the refugees are fleeing persecution and war.

As Robert Kagan has noted, those refugee flows, together with the terrorist attacks in Paris, threaten the cohesion of Europe, and with it the cohesion of the trans-Atlantic community: the West. The historically strong centrist parties are under pressure as right wing nationalism grows. Politically and economically, the European Union is in trouble.

Media commentary often suggests that upwards of 200 million people may need to be resettled as a result of climate change. This figure is generally attributed to Oxford Professor Norman Myers, though in recent years it has been discredited. As the Intergovernmental Panel on climate Change (IPCC 2014) has noted, there’s no reliable methodology for estimating the population movements that might result from global warming. Consequently, there’s no authoritative indication of the size or dynamics of potential ‘climate refugee’ flows.

Nonetheless, the World Bank and the IPCC have both drawn attention to the impacts on human security—health and relocation—that may result from global warming. The demand for resettlement could well be in the tens of millions.

In the absence of persecution, ‘economic refugees’ and ‘climate refugees’ aren’t covered by the 1951 UN Refugee Convention. The international lawyers tell us that there are no conventions, protocols, frameworks or agreements that enable individual states or the international community to provide protection to such people who cross international borders in search of help.

The UN Refugee Convention was a response to the human tragedy that was WWII. It was an entirely appropriate humanitarian response to events that, while not entirely unprecedented, were certainly unforeseen.

But with global warming, the international community finds itself in an entirely different situation. The migration of significant numbers of people, both within and across borders, is an inevitable consequence of a global temperature increase above 2 degrees centigrade—an increase that we already know will be exceeded. Resettlement pressures would almost certainly be amplified by other humanitarian issues, such as local conflicts, famine, floods and freak weather events that could affect hundreds of thousands of people at a time.

Instead of wrapping itself around the axle of legalities—a time-honoured way of shelving problems—the international community needs to address the climate migration question preemptively. It’s less a question of tweaking old conventions than it is one of creating new solutions to new problems. Unusually, time is on the side of action. Australia has an important part to play at both the strategic and diplomatic levels.

At the strategic level, we have a lot at stake. Notwithstanding its relative aridity, Australia looks like a vast and significantly under populated continent, particularly when viewed from the Indian sub-continent and densely populated nations like Indonesia. If, as predicted, temperature increases in north Africa, the Middle East and the Arabian Peninsula affect human habitability, it would be unsurprising were the international community to regard Australia as a major contributor to resettlement. And even if migration flows were restricted to the tens of millions, Australia could face almost irresistible pressure.

At the diplomatic level, there’s much that Australia could do.

First, it could lend its diplomatic weight to those nations urging reform of the UN. This isn’t to suggest that the UN be abolished or superseded, but rather that it be adapted to deal with contemporary and prospective issues. The UN and its agencies are the key institutions supporting the effectiveness of a rules-based international system. Global warming is a problem already crying out for a global rules-based solution.

Second, it could encourage both the strengthening and the refinancing of the UNHCR. To take just one example: it would be easier and kinder to begin now the managed resettlement of the Pacific communities that are already subject to rising sea levels than to deal with a catastrophe after the event. Prime Ministers Turnbull and Keys were totally upstaged by President Obama when he singled out the Pacific Island leaders for a meeting at the Paris climate change conference. As with other climate changed related matters in the last couple of years, Australia has again been caught flat-footed.

Third, through modest investment now rather than massive future expenditures to manage disaster relief, Australia could work with countries such as the ASEAN members (especially Burma, Indonesia, and the Philippines), India and Papua New Guinea and Pacific Island countries such as Fiji both to mitigate the affects of climate change and to put in place early adaptation measures. Agronomy, soil science, marine science, hydrology, urban design, and innovative structural design are just some of the areas in which Australia could work with its neighbours, to their benefit as well as our own.

Quite rightly, the Prime Minister has been talking up Australia’s innovation potential. Policy and program innovation in climate change isn’t just an economic imperative. It’s a strategic one.