Tag Archive for: Australian Army

Army and armour—moving the debate forward

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An ASLAV from the 2nd Cavalry Regiment fires its 25mm Bushmaster cannon during a night live-fire practise at Mount Bundey training area during Exercise Eagle's Run.In a recent blog post my colleague Karl Claxton took the opportunity to frame the issues around the Defence Minister Kevin Andrew’s recent Land 400 announcement. Sadly, Karl echoes an old complaint:

Most commentators have been hostile toward the project from its inception a decade ago. The key complaint arises from a disconnect between strategic guidance in the 2000, 2009 and 2013 white papers, directing that equipment acquisitions be prioritised around what’s needed to prevent attacks against Australia and contribute to stability in our immediate region, and LAND 400’s focus on platforms for high-intensity contemporary and future operations including amphibious assault.

Armour and the Australian Army must be one of the most uninformed policy and capability debates in recent Australian defence history, and let’s face it, we have had some absolute classic defence force structure debates over the decades. In this case I want to put down some facts which may help us navigate our way through what’ll inevitably be an emotional rollercoaster for enthusiasts from both sides of the argument. Read more

Reader response: the rifle debate

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Dr Deane-Peter Baker raised some interesting points in his article about the firearm presently used by the Australian Army. His post provides a good starting point for a more robust discussion about the topic. The F88 is a capable weapon. But the issues raised in Baker’s article, such as its lack of railing systems for modifications, inability to be easily fired in an ambidextrous manner, and lack of an adjustable buttstock, are things that we should look to correct in any future procurement.

Still, Baker’s post needs to be read within a wider context. The conclusion—that we should acquire the M4—is itself contentious. The M4 certainly meets the standard discussed above but the weapon’s primary operator, the United States, is certainly not content with it, albeit, not for those reasons.

As a point of entry to the discussion, consider the Battle of Wanat in 2008. During that encounter, over 200 Taliban fighters attacked a position held by the US Army and supporting troops from the Afghan National Army (ANA). Coalition forces sustained a worryingly high number of casualties, and the engagement was the subject of later analysis which drew the following conclusion about weaponry (see pp.219–220 of the report): Read more

War in Iraq and the need for a parliamentary debate

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RAAF F/A-18F Super Hornet aircrew depart for morning sortie.

Cracks are already starting to show in the Government’s strange haste to commit Australian troops and aircraft to war in Iraq, and the equally confused messaging about how we are meant to respond to the raising of the domestic terror threat level.

Because of the institutionalised horror calling itself the ‘Islamic State’ that has taken root in Iraq and Syria, and because of Australia’s evident complicity in destabilising the region following the invasion in 2003, it’s not enough to stand back and leave it to the locals to fix the violent mess we helped create. We do have an obligation to help restore stability in Iraq; the question is, what constitutes the most effective and appropriate kind of help? On that score, the Australian Greens strongly disagree with the Abbott/Shorten unity ticket that a new war in Iraq will resolve the hideous aftermath of the last one.

It’s important that the Government immediately drop the façade that this is a strictly humanitarian endeavour, and call it what military commanders and Administration officials in the US are calling it: a war. Abbott’s ‘no boots on the ground’ commitment was jettisoned after less than a fortnight; we now have more than 600 pairs of boots arriving at al Minhad airbase in the UAE, headed for grounds unknown. Similarly, President Obama’s commitment that the 1600 inbound US troops would be there as ‘advisers’ now apparently extends to ‘close combat advising’ all the way to the front line. Read more