I read with great interest a recent article by Paul Dibb titled ‘How to plan for [an] ADF without [a] territorial threat’. I am of the 1986 Dibb Report and subsequent Beazley White Paper generation. At Staff College in the early 90’s we pawed over every comma and full stop in those documents looking for some divine guidance. And of course I served in an Army that was very much shaped by those policy tablets.

Professor Dibb’s judgment about Army is dismissively short—just one sentence: ‘it (a maritime strategy) demands a change to Army, with more focus on our Region of direct strategic concern.’ I would have hoped for something better, even allowing for the demands of newspaper editors.

However, it seems in 2015 we are back to the future. Does one conclude from that single sentence that there’s a need for a policy shift or does it suggest that Army’s force structure has been in some way warped by the last 15 years of operations and as a consequence of this apparent retro shift to a maritime strategy needs an urgent re-shape? If so—what?

I thought most defence thinkers in Australia have been talking about a maritime strategy since the early 90’s. Or does it mean that a recalcitrant Army has again failed to digest the critical elements of a maritime strategy and continued to pursue, as I have previously written, some heretical ‘heavy’ armoured force.

Army’s thinking demonstrated in its writing and rhetoric over the last 20 years has been framed around a maritime strategy. What, for heaven’s sake, are the Canberra-class LHD ships about if not to operate within and support a maritime strategy?

I fear that Professor Dibb’s article may echo the thoughts of the writers of the White Paper. If that’s so—sadly those who have drafted the policy advice to Government and recommended the consequential force structure priorities have not learned a thing from the last decade or so.

One hopes that the Minister’s recent comments which seem to reinforce a ‘steady as we go’ approach to defence policy isn’t the end of the intellectual investment by the new ministers.

The fundamental question above all is: does the Army’s force structure resulting from the White Paper process align with the Government’s intent and vision for Australia and its role in the world? If the continuous shipbuilding strategy results in an uncritical bias in defence spending which over the forward estimates creates an inherent imbalance in the ADF’s force structure the forthcoming White Paper like the last two should be condemned.

It’s worth repeating that a balanced force should be a ruler against which policy and capability decisions can be tested. The current air package deployed to the Middle East is a wonderful example. It’s self-reliant, balanced and capable—and importantly, of a scale that meets Australia’s means. Self-reliant because it can see, sustain itself, and shoot. Balanced because it has the force elements necessary to prosecute the tasks given to it by government—and not limited just to either seeing, or sustaining or shooting.

It’s capable because as a package it’s not a liability to others in the coalition but gives government a range of policy options over time based on policy grounds not capability deficiencies.

Those investment decisions aren’t easy, but let’s be clear: the Army has really lived off the operational funding it has received over the last decade or so to put the real edge on its current capability. A capability that has delivered much for successive governments both close to home (Professor Dibb’s region of direct strategic concern) or further afield. That edge isn’t funded and will therefore decay quickly.

Yes, there’s been some spending on new capabilities, but this in overall terms has been a replacement strategy which has held the army steady in relative capability terms. The underlying force structure remains fundamentally a ‘fitted for but not with’ force. That’s like an Air Force without EW self-protection for its aircraft!  If Army’s  capability enhancements are being progressively pushed further and further beyond the current forward estimate period the capability gap created will be increasingly more difficult to close. The gap must be  recognised and explicitly acknowledged by Government and then closely managed.

As I have asked before, why do we continue to have these type of discussions around Army’s force structure?

The explanation lies in the policy tension that still exists between Australia’s role as a ‘middle power’ and our national security . Simply put, the policy schools of thought are either a set of priorities based on a more global role for the country in world affairs, or the more traditional thinking which says we need to return to a narrower set of priorities closer to home.

Why does that matter to Army? Because the potential force structure options are different in some policymakers eyes. Closer to home is perceived as ‘lower risk’ and as a consequence later phases of LAND 400 can be shifted further right and the number and type of vehicles can be open to semantic debate. Army’s size and its harder edge can also be ‘worked’ to create the fiscal head room for other capabilities and expenditure priorities.

That’s where the new White Paper needs to be crystal clear. A retro maritime strategy isn’t about an ADF with a land force as a one line afterthought.

The last decade or so has demonstrated the nature of the tasks that are likely to arise for the Army over the coming decades. If the Government now sees this period as an exception then it needs to clearly articulate why this is the case and not just echo the views put forward by its policy advisors.

Some recent contributors to The Strategist have championed the M4 over the EF88. Army is satisfied with the M4 for select Special Operations Command combatants. However, there’s no such a thing as the ‘perfect weapon’.

A recent article in the The Atlantic reported that the M4 as ‘the rifle that today’s infantry uses is little changed since the 1960s—and it is badly flawed.’ Every weapon has trade-offs—the M4 and EF88 included. Army has great confidence in the EF88 as the best general purpose weapon system available.

The new generation EF88 is substantially lighter that its predecessor. Ergonomically, it possesses a much better centre of gravity than the F88. By virtue of its cheek weld and ribbed butt-plate, it allows far better purchase when firing from the shoulder—with or without body armour and helmet.

Trials have indicated its revised trigger guard have made the weapon much easier to employ during both deliberate and combat shooting. The fluted barrel, revised gas plug and folding cocking handle have also enhanced the handling of the weapon.

The EF88’s grenade launcher is side opening and is one of the lightest available commercially. The extended rails on the top and side of the weapon allow several configuration options based on the mission and the operator’s preferences. As for length, the carbine version is shorter than the M4 by some 60 mm and the grenade launcher version is some 38 mm shorter than the M4A1 equipped with a grenade launcher.

Without revealing commercially sensitive information, extensive testing involving the firing of around half a million rounds has confirmed that the EF88 is a superior weapon in terms of reliability and maintainability—obvious essentials on the battlefield. Numerous trials have confirmed the EF88’s superior accuracy and lethality—two features which will be exponentially improved with the imminent roll out of new, state-of-the-art target acquisition equipment recently approved by Government.

The selection of the EF88 negates the requirement to requalify the ADF in a new weapon system. Instead, Army has been able to invest this training effort in enhancing its combat shooting capability with the EF88. The ADF’s supply, support arrangements and facilities will readily absorb the transition from F88 to EF88—as will its current and emerging vehicle, aviation and amphibious platforms.

Army has a long-standing collaborative relationship with Thales, which is offering a dynamic growth path to ‘future proof’ the rifle. Some of the features of this growth path include: a discrete attachment that will allow ambidextrous firing; a suppressor; reality based training ammunition, independent firing of the grenade launcher; and a central power unit.

Army identified a range of important considerations when selecting the ADF’s new assault rifle. The first of these was the need to avoid retraining the ADF in a new primary weapon system—unless the capability benefits offered by a new system clearly outweighed this cost. Avoiding such a penalty would allow Army to focus its weapon training on advanced marksmanship and combat shooting, as opposed to qualifying on a new system. Furthermore, it would negate having to retrain the ADF’s small arms maintainers in a new fleet.

Second, Army needed to ensure that its supply, support and storage of the new weapon system didn’t degrade its enduring readiness requirements—or those of the other services. Restocking the entire supply chain with new weapons, parts, specialist tooling, building new facilities and ranges, investing in new ammunition contracts, while disposing of legacy fleets, is a significant undertaking that could unhinge some of the ADF’s key readiness requirements.

Third, Army recognised that no capability acquisition occurs in isolation. Selecting a new weapon system could create numerous integration issues across existing/emerging vehicle, rotary/fixed wing and amphibious platforms. Indeed, an imprudent acquisition decision could produce myriad adverse capability ramifications for decades.

Finally Army sought a supplier who was commercially and technically reliable and who would collaborate with Army in ‘future-proofing’ the weapon throughout its life span. In Army’s experience, capability development is best served by cooperative and trusting relationships between capability manager and manufacturer. Finally, let’s not forget that successive governments have astutely designated small arms as one of our nation’s Priority Industry Capabilities.

The EF88 is the most robust and best general purpose assault rifle available. It delivers the ADF a lighter, more ergonomic, modular, reliable, accurate and lethal weapon.

Imagine you’ve joined the military, and are being issued your uniform and gear. The surly man behind the counter shoves a pile of stuff at you, including two pairs of boots, and tells you to move on. You see that the boots are not your size, so you object. ‘We treat everyone the same here,’ is the response. ‘Stop complaining and move on.’

That would be absurd, wouldn’t it? Giving everyone the same sized boots would just be daft, if for no other reason than it would undermine the effectiveness of the force. The military would never do something so silly, right? Wrong. The fact is that the ‘one size fits all’ approach is rife—admittedly not for boots, but for all sorts of equipment that matters.

The ‘we treat everyone the same’ justification is particularly common—and pernicious—in the case of female members of the military. The use of this supposed ‘standard of equality’ is often just not properly thought through, or else is a disguised way of saying ‘women don’t belong here, they don’t match up’. But the idea that having women in the military inevitably involves lowering standards confuses gender blindness for gender neutrality.

The military has been a male-dominated profession for so long that it’s sometimes difficult to see that what seem like neutral standards are in fact very much male-centric standards. Genuine gender neutrality starts by focusing on what military effectiveness actually entails and works backwards to equip and enable both men and women to achieve those outcomes, even if that means that in some respects men and women are equipped differently or even trained differently. (The current approach equips and trains in accordance with flawed proxies for military effectiveness that have come to be largely taken for granted.) And a more nuanced and sensitive approach shouldn’t end at gender lines: body size, body shape, and left or right handedness are just a few more of the differences that characterise human beings that ought to be taken into consideration in an ‘outcomes based’ approach to military equipment and training. What does that mean in practice? I’ll just mention three examples: backpacks, body armour and rifles.

It’s probably not escaped your attention that male and female bodies are shaped somewhat differently. Many backpack manufacturers offer packs designed to match female physiology, with shoulder straps designed to reflect women’s narrower shoulders, hip-belts curved to follow the shape of a woman’s hips, and so on. Yet military-issue backpacks, including those used in the ADF, are of a standard design and are issued regardless of the troop’s gender. Sure, they’re adjustable, but a woman isn’t simply a small-statured man! A pack that takes male physiology as its start and end point is unlikely to be an optimal fit for a female.

Likewise with body armour. Despite becoming a standard part of individual military equipment in the US for around four decades, it was only last year that the US Army became the first military force in the world to announce that body armour designed with the female form in mind would be introduced, as part of their new ‘Soldier Protection System’ (SPS). Decades late, but at least they got there, right? But wait; industry reports indicate that the revised requirements for the SPS have, in fact, dropped the requirement that a ‘female fit’ version of the body armour be produced. So once again we’re back to ‘we treat everyone the same here’. And again private industry is showing us what ought to be—Tyr Tactical has recently announced the launch of its new body armour system which is available in both male and female cuts.

One last example: rifles. I’ve addressed this issue previously, but it seems worth reiterating that the F88 Austeyr is a classic case of ‘we treat everyone the same here’. I recently observed some members of the ADF undergoing combat-focused firearms training. Among the 12 trainees under instruction there was one particularly tall male and one small-statured female, both of whom struggled to employ the F88 effectively due to the fact that the length of the rifle is not adjustable (unlike the AR-15/M4 family of rifles used by the US military and Australia’s special forces). I cringed at the awkwardness on display as the trainees practiced shooting around cover from their non-dominant side. This is difficult enough in general, without having to also deal with the F88’s propensity to eject scalding hot brass into the shooter’s face. The ‘enhanced’ version of the F88 now entering service goes some way to addressing this, though it’s a solution that remains less than ideal. But the length of pull issue has not been addressed, and indeed, given the basic design of the rifle, cannot be addressed. That Defence has continued to pour money into tweaking what is fundamentally a design unsuitable for modern combat defies the logic of military effectiveness. Given that the obvious alternative, the AR-15/M4 family of rifles, could be purchased for significantly less, it also defies economic logic. That’s a fact that hasn’t escaped our cousins across the Tasman Sea—the NZDF has announced that it’s joining the growing number of military forces which are ditching their Steyrs for AR-15 pattern rifles.

The ADF stands with most militaries in developed countries in its approach to dealing with difference among the men and women who serve in its ranks, but that’s nothing to be proud of. We should be doing better. One might hope that if the moral imperative to rethink this issue isn’t compelling to those who make the decisions, then at least the drive for military effectiveness might be.

At ASPI’s Army Future Force Structure Conference the week before last, one theme was particularly recurrent: the ‘operating environment’ that the army is now working in is increasingly dangerous. In particular, we frequently heard that lethal weapons such as improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and RPGs necessitated much higher levels of protection in the next generation of vehicles being procured under project LAND 400. After years of hard and dangerous work in Afghanistan and Iraq, this sounds hard to argue with. Especially if you think of those threats as part of the environment.

Therein lies the problem. If large IEDs and anti-armour RPGs are a permanent immutable character of the landscape like sand, hills, wind or rain, then they’re fundamentally inescapable, predictable and enduring, and we must withstand them. But in reality, they’re actually the tactics and technology of a determined enemy who we should be trying to defeat. If IEDs are part of the environment, rather than weapons of the enemy, you’re always going to favour protection over mobility and firepower. We’re basically saying it’s rainy outside, bring a raincoat. But we can’t fight the rain, or persuade it to desist, or cut of its supply, or remove it from its support base, or anything else we might hope to do to defeat insurgents or terrorists like the Taliban, IS or al Qaeda.

It’s sounds almost as though we’ve given up on winning, and hence resorted to tactics (and technology) of survival in a difficult environment, rather than victory over an enemy. Sadly, no amount of protection will ever be enough to ensure that we ‘survive the first hit’, as the objective was described last week. While rain and hail can be surprisingly heavy, we still have a comfortable upper-bound. Not so for IEDs, where a bigger bomb will always be possible—and ultimately lethal. Unlike sailing adventures or mountaineering, a survival narrative in warfare shouldn’t be enough on its own. It has to be part of a narrative that includes a possible victory. Allowing the enemy to blend into the environment conceptually as well as physically doesn’t help with that at all.

Lest I be drawn into accusing the Army of choosing big and heavy armoured vehicles on the basis of a defeatist ‘survival’ strategy, it’s worth pointing out another force at play in vehicle acquisitions. Several officers at the conference pointed out that much of our armoured vehicle fleet, particularly the M113, was designed over half a century ago. The other services have had several generations of ships and planes in this time, and the Army is increasingly desperate for anything that’s better than what they currently have. They’ve done the bulk of the operations, so why should they have the fewest capital upgrades? As one put it, the answer to any LAND 400 question is yes. Tracks? Yes. Wheels? Yes. 20 tonnes? Yes. 30 tonnes? Yes. 30mm cannon? Yes. 25mm cannon? Yes. No-one is willing to say no to anything for fear of appearing difficult to please, and winding up left for even longer with what they already have.

But that doesn’t diminish the probability that we’ll wind up with something sub-optimal. We’re still likely to end up with a vehicle optimised to withstand a specific common attack, and not optimised to win a campaign as a whole. Mobility has been sacrificed. Major General Gus McLachlan acknowledged that the new CRVs wouldn’t be ‘C130 transportable’, and wouldn’t be able to swim as the ASLAVs do.

Size is increasing too; one officer lamented to me that all the Combat Reconnaissance Vehicle (CRV) choices on offer were bigger in profile (hence easier to target) than most of the Main Battle Tanks of WWII. He’d rather have a good chance that the first shot misses and return fire before the second comes than present an easy target and survive the hit. My feeling is that the environmentalisation of the threats has possibly trumped concerns like these. If the environment is rainy, you need a raincoat first. Other tools for the job come second.

Overall, the preponderance of the ‘survival’ narrative in a dangerous ‘environment’ is probably a good cause to question the nature of the tasks we ask the Army to perform. As was frequently repeated at the conference, the Army seeks to provide ‘options to government’. But shouldn’t those options always include victory? If we intend to put soldiers in harm’s way, they ought to be equipped to operate in their environment and defeat their enemy. Those two are different. If the enemy is now the same as the environment, we’re close to admitting we never intend to defeat them in the first place. Simply being present to endure the attacks of an enemy we aren’t willing or able to defeat isn’t an ‘option to government’ that the army should optimise its structure to provide.

In my role to lead and prepare an Army to serve its nation, my career experience has developed in me a profound commitment to the value, indeed the necessity, of joint, inter-agency, coalition and allied operations, as the best and most sustainable way to pursue our nation’s interests.

This is because of the extraordinary skills, and potential for greatness, resident within our people, especially when we team across the boundaries of a diverse national and regional community.

The Army has an important contribution to make to this team, bringing many unique and useful capabilities. Important, although not always preeminent; context is all.

Unsurprisingly, as a Chief of Army, I am not an adherent to the false god of ‘high tech war’, that declares armies redundant, so banal is this analysis. Lieutenant General HR McMaster speaks in his usual compelling manner on this topic in his recent essay, Change and Continuity: the Nature of Future Armed Conflict.

Like all of you I dread war, and would welcome quick, clean, bloodless, decisive clashes, but when Shakespeare wrote, ‘Cry Havoc! And let slip the dogs of war’, he reminded us that these dogs, elsewhere alluded to as Famine, Sword and Fire, have a will of their own.

A war started is not necessarily a war ended; home by Christmas an illusion. War can slip readily out of the control of any of its belligerents. On land, at sea or in the air, cyber and space domains, war can all too easily spill over the convenient boundaries and timelines we so desire of it. An adversary on the defensive is an adversary looking for another domain in which to attack. This violent clash of wills doesn’t necessarily end when or how we choose.

In the deeply human and political tragedy that is war, in the last resort, violence often comes to a dramatic, exhausted or lingering close on land, because that is where we live.

However, this is no easy pass, the Australian Army should always be able to explain to the government and the people its role and utility, within a wider team effort, in defence of our nation and its interests.

Army’s priorities are:

• support to operations: because it’s why we exist;
• support to our wounded, injured and ill: because it’s the right thing to do and it rebuilds lives and human potential, for Army and Australia;
• modernisation of the Army: because I want to ensure our people have the best chance of coming home; and
• cultural renewal: because ethical soldiers working as a team are our most powerful weapon.

Today, I am going to concentrate on the third priority, modernisation. But before I do, let me make a few comments about the others.

Support to operations is obvious but has many deep implications. We fight joint, certify and deploy joint, command and control joint, increasingly employ joint doctrine and many of the most powerful asymmetric effects we can apply are uniquely joint. And these joint forces team with interagency, coalition and allied partners.

Recent adjustments to organisational and command arrangements within the ADF, announced in the First Principles Review, reflect the importance of strengthening the centre and enabling next steps in our joint development. I am very excited by the possibilities for the ADF of these changes and suspect historians will look back on this decade as the ‘tipping period’ in building joint forces characterised by deep environmental expertise.

The Australian Army’s 2014 Future Land Warfare Report, identified five trends that will likely shape future war: crowded, connected, lethal, collective, and constrained, these trends are also converging. These are not simply big or pervasive changes—they broadly outline our future operating environment and will transform the ways we think, operate, cooperate and contribute as an army.

The Army doesn’t and shouldn’t have the luxury of choosing the type of war or security operation in which we might become involved. That is a decision for government. But we have to structure for and be competent in land joint war fighting, our unique contribution to national capability. Everything else we might be called upon to do is less difficult.

Today we see terrorism, intra-state conflict, great power positioning, state instability, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief all at play and all affecting Australia or its interests.

Because of life’s inherent uncertainties, I want the joint force to be as capable as we can afford, and I’m delighted at the quality of the air and naval forces Australia is building. We will always be stronger working together.

Our modernisation effort supports Army’s contribution to a broad range of operations. The following are three examples of issues we might consider in how Army does so:

First, the Army contributes to developing Australia’s key international security relationships, building confidence, and promoting common strategic understanding and interests. The Defence White Paper is likely to reinforce the importance of this ADF role and I look forward to working with our partners throughout the Indo Pacific Region, to align effort, build capacity and enhance cooperation.

Second, the Army contributes to deterring, and if required, defeating coercion of, or attacks on, Australia and its interests, particularly access to trade and commerce, the lifeblood of an island continent. This includes denying an enemy the freedom to operate within our extended approaches.

The ability of our Army to contribute to a strategic deterrence effect as part of our maritime strategy will increase with the development of an amphibious capability centered on two Landing Helicopter Dock ships. How Army, as part of a broader team, might support a maritime posture and the potential for the Army to contribute to access and area denial in the approaches to Australia needs also to be carefully considered.

Third, the Army makes a substantial contribution to the headquarters that might be expected to lead operations aimed at assisting or maintaining the stability of states within our extended approaches.

In the next 10 years, the Army will see substantial investment in protection and mobility, with projects focused on mission command systems, the introduction of protection from blast for our fleet of light, medium and heavy trucks and the replacement of our combat reconnaissance vehicle and armoured personnel carrier.

These projects combine to deliver vehicles that are more than replacements for their predecessors—they provide protected weapon systems, which are also a hub for communications, information, sustainment and fire support, enhancing the capacity of a ground force to absorb surprise and achieve tactical success in an era of democratised lethality.

Understanding the broad parameters of future land warfare environments, and the operating concepts applicable to them, can produce valuable insights to focus our development and enhance the Army’s strategic utility and tactical effectiveness in the defence of our nation and its interests.

This post is an edited version of the speech Lieutenant General Angus Campbell delivered at the ASPI Army’s Future Force Structure Options Conference on 25 June 2015.