In an age of increasingly competitive multilateralism, success will go to those countries best able to diversify their interests and manage a wide range of bilateral relationships. This will be no small challenge for Australia. We have a small and dramatically over-stretched diplomatic service and a tendency to think we carry more impact in foreign capitals than is really the case. Imagine, though, if an opportunity arose to build closer ties with an Asian country that is substantially democratic, with a largely free press, has a close defence association with the United States and significant economic potential of interest to Australian resource companies. There is such a country: Mongolia. Tomorrow, September 15, will mark the 40th anniversary of diplomatic relations between Canberra and Ulaanbaatar. In an ASPI Policy Analysis published today, Mendee Jargalsaikhan—a PhD student in politics at the University of British Columbia and a fellow of the Mongolian Institute for Strategic Studies—makes the case for Australia and Mongolia to strengthen their ties.

On defence and security, Mendee argues that the two countries would benefit from a closer exchange on North Asian security, noting that Mongolia has particularly close relations with both North and South Korea. He argues that peacekeeping training should become a focus for defence cooperation, and points out that Mongolia has deployed more than 6000 personnel to international peacekeeping operations, with 400 currently deployed with the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan.

When Mongolian Prime Minister Batbold visited Australia in February last year, a joint statement was issued saying that ‘Australia and Mongolia share common strategic interests and objectives in the Asia–Pacific region’. It makes sense to start exploring what can be made of these common interests and objectives. As Defence designs its own pivot to the region, it should establish a stronger connection with Mongolia. As a small first step towards closer strategic engagement, Defence should consider cross-accrediting its attaché in Seoul to Ulaanbaatar, as is already the case with Australia’s ambassador in South Korea.

Peter Jennings is executive director of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute.

The recent Senate committee report ‘Procurement procedures for Defence capital projects’ was naturally of great interest to us, concerned as it was with our core business. We weren’t dispassionate observers of the process either; we put in a submission and tendered some of our relevant work, and we appeared before the committee on occasion.

The Committee grappled with some of the perennial issues that surround Defence projects, and (in our view) through their recommendations put their finger squarely on the biggest challenges that face the Department:

The key recommendations deal with much needed organisational change directed at achieving the correct alignment of responsibilities and functions of relevant agencies, and providing them with the skills and resources they need to fulfil their obligations. They underscore the importance of Defence becoming a self critical, self evaluating and self correcting organisation.

In many ways, and as the Committee recognises, these observations are following a well-trodden path, behind many reviews of the acquisition, support and general management practices of the Department, including those by Kinnaird (2003), Mortimer (2008), Rizzo (2011), Cole (2011) and Black (2011). The alignment of responsibilities, functions and resources has been a common theme in those reports. The degree of contestability and rigour within the capability development process has been a subject that ASPI has visited in the past as well. Read more

The term ‘Indo-Pacific’ has recently slipped into the lexicon of Australian policymakers, in quiet supplement to ‘Asian Century’ and ‘Asia–Pacific Century’, with little questioning as to what this semantic shift actually means and achieves in strategic terms.

There’s nothing wrong with placing Australia in the spotlight and geographic centre of these two oceans and vast surrounding region; it cements Australia’s identity and role as a potential key actor in this emerging epoch, yet I would suggest that there is limited utility in defining Australian interests so broadly.

If you accept the broad concept of the ‘Indo-Pacific’—and there would be many that would stumble at this first hurdle—it would be hard to refute the importance of what happens both on land and within the maritime domain encapsulated by its vast boundaries (from the shores of East Africa to the western seaboard of the United States). What is of primary importance when defining our own region and area of strategic interest is our ability to influence and shape what happens within that region, and create favourable outcomes.

Key to this is presence, and presence credibility. Two core tools that enable states to project successfully are reflected in both the strength of their diplomatic representation (and overseas presence), and military strength and capabilities (including actual and perceived ability to have and sustain overseas presence). Geographically characterising and increasing Australia’s strategic region as the ‘Indo-Pacific’ would require quantum shifts, on both these fronts, in both will and capacity; two things that prima facie under the current environment look unlikely to happen. Read more

In the 2009 Defence White Paper, the Government expected the ADF to carry out a number of tasks. In addition to its core war fighting roles, there were a number of secondary tasks, including missions that involve an overlap of responsibility with other government agencies. In this category were a range of activities; protecting our offshore estate; contributing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities for border protection; assisting civil authorities protect major events and deal with counterproliferation; supporting emergency response efforts for natural disasters within Australia and our neighbourhood; and providing marine search and rescue.

The rationale was that the ADF possesses a range of specialised capabilities on a scale and of a kind available from no other Australian agency and that humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations need to be closely integrated with efforts by civilian agencies.

Sometimes the ADF would be expected to be the lead agency—in circumstances where there might be a need to demonstrate a willingness and capacity to employ military force, or where its substantial level of capacity is required in circumstances that are beyond that of other agencies. In other cases, the ADF will take a more secondary role. The evacuation of Australian nationals from foreign trouble spots might be one such case. Read more