The Prime Minister’s statement to the Parliament yesterday on Australia’s Afghanistan strategy continues to demonstrate planning for a relatively quick ADF exit from Uruzgan province. Any international pretence about nation building in Afghanistan has long been abandoned in favour of a pragmatic acceptance that the situation there is about as good as it is going to get.

Australia can claim some part of the credit for four positive outcomes in Afghanistan. First, and as PM Gillard said, ‘today, international terrorism finds no safe haven in Afghanistan’; well yes, for as long as the drones and special forces continue their operations. Second, as long as the US remains engaged, the Taliban won’t be able to take power in Kabul again unless it’s through some politically negotiated and internationally acceptable power-sharing agreement. A third positive is that Afghanistan, and Uruzgan province with it, has its best chance probably since the 1970s to handle its internal security challenges. These aren’t perfect outcomes but Strategist readers will understand that pursuing perfection is the enemy of peace. That’s why Gillard and Obama are wise to resist any call to keep going for just one or two more fighting seasons in order to show that counterinsurgency, or counter terrorism (‘regular’ or ‘lite’) strategies can work. They can’t. Read more

In a recent post, Peter Jennings and I argued that if Australia won a seat at the global decision making peak body, the UN Security Council, we’d benefit from picking some signature issues where Australia could contribute most effectively to solutions to pressing international problems.

Our suggested to-do list included leveraging our expertise to help build the UN’s capacity to help stabilise countries at risk of failing; highlighting Timor-Leste’s continuing needs; championing global opposition to the use of Improvised Explosive Devices; promoting efforts to strengthen maritime security, such as counter-piracy (see ASPI’s latest report on this issue); and developing cooperative measures to address information security.

Now we’ve won our fifth two year term on the Council, (proving wrong those naysayers that predicted our ties with the US, and strong support for Israel would spell defeat), we’ll need to respond to a whole host of global issues. Read more

Australia has less room to maneuver in balancing between Washington and Beijing than many analysts suppose.

Much of the commentary on Australia’s management of its relationships with the United States and China is framed around the idea that having to choose between our traditional ally and our largest trading partner would be against our interests. Books such as Hugh White’s China Choice are premised on the idea that Canberra can act as an ‘honest broker’ between the two powers, lest their relationship deteriorate to the point that we are someday forced to choose between them. Back in 2004 the then Foreign Minister Alexander Downer indicated that Australia would not necessarily choose to join the US against China in a war over Taiwan should the dispute ever escalate that far.

More recently, the decision to rotate a small force of Marines through Darwin, prompted business leader Kerry Stokes to accuse Canberra of ‘taking sides’, while the respected analyst Michael Wesley queried the decision on the grounds that it may limit our strategic choices.

In fact there is no choice and has not been for decades. Read more

We will know around Friday afternoon whether Australia has been successful in winning its bid for a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Having just returned from a trip to New York, the vibe I picked up there was cautious, perhaps even a little worried, about our chances. Our rivals for the seat, Finland and Luxembourg, have run effective campaigns and are not be underestimated: the outcome could be nail-bitingly close. Anthony Bergin and I wrote last week about why it’s very much in Australia’s interest to hold a seat on the Security Council. We are a middle power with global interests and being able to steer the UN—imperfect as it is—along tracks important to us is no small benefit. But good strategists also consider the down side risks: what happens if we lose the bid?

First up, recrimination will be the order of the day. A loss will mean that this weekend’s media will be full of astonished pundits expressing wonder about how it is that two of Europe’s minnows beat us to the seat: ‘Luxembourg, are you serious?’ It will be like losing the World Cup bid to Qatar. No attention will be paid to the fact that our competitors were campaigning for years before Australia started its bid. As the world is seen from New York, no one owes Australia a free lunch no matter how consequential we think we are. Although the Opposition has endorsed the bid in a low key way, a loss will lead to predictable charges of mismanagement. Some might wonder why the Prime Minister was bought so strongly and publicly into the last weeks of the campaign. Read more

I read with interest Robert Ayson’s take on the mending of relations between the United States and New Zealand. Rob believes that New Zealand is the prodigal son from the Good Book, welcomed home by the doting parent despite the other son’s (Australia’s) resentment. But there are three parables in Luke Chapter 15. And given the Land of the Long White Cloud’s heavy dependence upon four-legged beasts who are white and woolly, perhaps it might be appropriate to rehearse the parable of the lost sheep (Luke, 15: 4-7). The finding of the lost sheep is a metaphor for a sinner’s repentance; the lesson being that there is more rejoicing in heaven over one sinner who repents than over ninety-nine righteous persons who do not need to repent.

This message of a sinner’s repentance can also be found in the parable of the lost coin (Luke, 15: 8-10). And if Professor Ayson re-reads his own parable of the prodigal son I’m sure he will find a similar theme there too. The younger son tells his father than he has ‘sinned against heaven and before thee, and am no more worthy to be called thy son’ (Luke, 15: 18-19).

All three parables make the same point: that the sinner who repents may be washed in the blood of the lamb. None says anything about sinners who don’t repent. Since New Zealand shows no sign of abandoning its anti-nuclear policy, perhaps we have to look for its ‘repentance’ in other areas. A case could be made that New Zealand has attempted to help carry some of the weight in Afghanistan and more so in the South Pacific. And Washington certainly has no pressing need to bring nuclear-armed vessels into New Zealand’s ports. But the return of strategic cooperation seems likely to be on a case by case basis.

On a final point, I would say that Rob is wrong if he believes that Australia resents—and opposes—New Zealand’s return. It is in Canberra’s interest to have Wellington on board in relation to common strategic interests, and for New Zealand to bring what weight and influence it can to shared positions. The brutal truth though, is that it can’t bring much weight—so it’s very much in Canberra’s interest, as in Washington’s, to know when and where Wellington sees itself as indulging in ‘riotous living’ (Luke, 15:13) and when and where it sees itself as a strategic player.

Rod Lyon is a non-residential fellow at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute.