Whenever I talk about leadership to various audiences, I use two concepts as illustrations.

The first I thought was my concept of risk management, until I Googled it and discovered that others had thought of it too. It solidified in my mind at the conclusion of the theatre strategic shaping operations for the second battle of Fallujah in November 2004. The organisation I headed had achieved so much over about three months and, when on the verge of handing the fight over to the Marines, there was a natural tendency to relax. What I’d learned the hard way over a long operational career was to stay ‘paranoid’—there could always be people looking to hurt us. But the paranoia has to be constructive and so ‘Constructive Paranoia’ as a personal concept was (re-)invented—a concept which generations of soldiers know from bitter experience to be true and have expressed in many different ways.

The second concept is borrowed with permission from the St James Ethics Centre where, as a director, I hang around with philosophers. Simon Longstaff gives an excellent presentation on ‘Constructive Subversion’ as a way of outflanking unthinking custom and practice, the greatest threat to effective leadership that I know. Read more

As mentioned on The Strategist, last week ASPI convened its first ‘Australia–Indonesia Next Generation Defence & Security Forum’ to discuss the state and future of the relationship. I talked about the strategic implications of the US-Sino relationship for the two countries, both individually and in a bilateral context.

How the US and China manage their relations is of key importance for Australia and Indonesia. Greater strategic competition could lead to serious conflict, even war, with devastating consequences. But accommodating any Chinese hegemonic ambitions could easily come at the cost of smaller powers and is therefore neither in Australia’s, nor Indonesia’s interests.

Luckily, US-China strategic relations are characterised by both cooperation and competition. As the new Australian Defence White Paper (DWP) stresses, this situation allows Australia (and I’d add, Indonesia) to avoid binary choices between Washington and Beijing. Our strategic interactions with the two major powers are not mechanistic ‘zero sum games’ in which cooperation with one country automatically comes at the expense of the other. We don’t (yet) live in a Cold War-type Asia and it’s far from inevitable that we’ll enter into such a period any time soon. Read more

The Australia–Indonesia relationship is headed in a broadly positive direction, with the potential for defence and security cooperation to grow. But people-to-people and economic links are surprisingly limited and more needs to be done to build ballast into a relationship often at risk due to misperceptions. These are our personal conclusions after ASPI’s inaugural ‘Australia–Indonesia Next Generation Defence & Security Forum’ in Sydney, 14 to 16 May. With the support of the Department of Defence, we brought together 20 Australian and Indonesian participants from the military, academia, government departments and think tanks for two days of 1.5 track discussion on pressing defence and strategic issues. To encourage frankness, the meeting was held under the Chatham House Rule, so we won’t attribute comments to individuals, rather we’ll offer our own impressions of the meeting.

There were several key themes that emerged from the presentations and discussion. For one, maps made an appearance in several instances—a salient reminder that geography is one of the key forces that necessitates greater Indonesia–Australia cooperation. Some presenters used maps to articulate an Indonesian perspective of our strategic environment and its security challenges. In one case, the visual representation of Indonesia’s archipelagic sea-lanes and their vulnerability to foreign vessels highlighted Indonesia’s need for greater investment in naval capabilities as well as for maritime cooperation.

Several speakers also looked at future prospects for the bilateral relationship. One speaker asked, ‘What should the relationship feel like in 20 years?’, the implication being that national sentiment and the degree of ‘warmth’ each country felt for the other would set the course towards stronger strategic ties down the track. For example, interoperability between our militaries (and even officers serving in each other’s battalions) was proposed as a desirable end. Yet several participants challenged this idea, on the grounds that interoperability entails greater compatibility between our systems than is commonly understood and greater congruence between our respective strategic cultures was still needed. Read more

I’m an old Defence-of-Australia hand, so I’ll offer a perspective which looks at the 2013 Defence White Paper through that prism, and then draw some conclusions.

There are four overall principles that have characterised Defence of Australia policies. The first is the self-reliant Defence of Australia. The new White Paper leaves no equivocation on this point.  Paragraph 3.35 says ‘The highest priority ADF task is to deter or defeat armed attacks on Australia without having to rely on the combat or combat support forces of another country’. The next paragraph elaborates:  ‘Australia’s defence policy is founded on the principle of self-reliance in deterring or defeating armed attack on Australia, within the context of our Alliance with the United States and our cooperation with regional partners’. What’s new here is the reference to the region in the final phrase.

The second policy principle is that there are limits to Australia’s military resources and influence. There are few direct references to this (perhaps it’s taken as self-evident) but there’s little doubt that it’s a central factor.  Paragraph 3.2 reads to the effect that the Government’s responses to security threats and opportunities will have to acknowledge ‘the limits of our capability and reach’. The next sentence is in some ways more telling:  ‘Choices must therefore be made to guide the allocation of finite resources to deal with challenges that are most likely or most dangerous, and where our response can be most effective’. This theme of choice, and by implication difficult choice, recurs throughout the document:  see for example paragraph 7.9. Read more