Tag Archive for: Australia

Is Australia a pivotal power?

My former ASPI colleague Carl Ungerer has pointed out that Doc Evatt first used the term ‘middle power’ at the San Francisco conference that established the United Nations in April 1945. In a recent op-ed I questioned the accuracy and utility of this label for Australia. My thoughts were prompted by a new international grouping launched last month known as MIKTA on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly by a meeting of foreign ministers of ‘middle-power’ countries. But you’ll have to go the foreign ministry websites of South Korea and Turkey to find out about it, because there’s nothing on the DFAT or the Australian Foreign Minister’s websites.

‘MIKTA’ is an acronym for an informal collaboration platform between Mexico, Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Turkey and Australia. According to South Korea’s foreign ministry:

[a]t the meeting, the five foreign ministers shared the view that in the current situation where challenges facing the international community are becoming more diverse and complex, middle-power countries, which have the willingness and capabilities to contribute to the development of the international community, need to create a cooperation mechanism to address the challenges. They agreed to hold the meeting of middle-power countries’ foreign ministers on a regular basis.

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Australia–Canada engagement and special operations forces

The canvas ‘Five Eyes’, painted by Corporal S, a Special Operations Task Group soldier deployed to Afghanistan, in honour of the enduring friendship of Special Forces Coalition partners.At first glance, the ASPI and CIGI push for Australia to help Canada engage our region to advance its economic interests doesn’t make much sense. Canada is doing nicely already—like in China for example (PDF)—and maybe should be helping us. And, economically, what has Canada—just like the Pythonesque Romans—ever done for us? Just ask the Big Australian: BHP-Billiton! Moreover, our new government seems keener on advancing our economic interests than someone else’s.

Peter Jennings’ argument however, is compelling. It’d be helpful to have another middle power at regional meetings. That’s enough of a shared objective to form the basis of our developing engagement strategy—although others suggest that stronger factors pulling Australia and Canada together are historical legacies and debts of gratitude, or our being similar countries with assumed similar interests (here and here). A consensus from recent events (PDF) is that some practical measures within existing frameworks are needed to advance this common objective rather than creating some new meeting opportunity—ASEAN already has plenty of those. Read more

Antarctica: coming in from the cold?

australian_flag_antarcticaSince the April 2013 publication of my previous post on Antarctica, two events have added further to the picture of Australia’s strategic interests in Antarctica. The first was the release of a new defence white paper and the second a policy statement from the then Opposition but which today becomes the incoming government. The former just marked time as far as Antarctica was concerned, but the latter suggests that we might see some real progress in pursuing our interests on and around the southern continent.

But first the defence white paper. Released on 3 May this year, it added two paragraphs of commentary about Antarctica:

2.76 There is no credible risk of Australia’s national interests in the Southern Ocean and the Australian Antarctic Territory being challenged in ways that might require substantial military responses over the next few decades. The Antarctic Treaty System provides for the international governance and management of Antarctica and sets aside use of Antarctica for peaceful purposes, with a particular emphasis on scientific research and environmental protection. The Antarctic Treaty’s ‘Madrid Protocol’ prohibits any activity relating to mineral resource exploitation other than scientific research, and until 2048 can only be amended by unanimous consent. Australia is a strong advocate of the Antarctic Treaty System and its goals.

2.77 There is, however, increasing international interest in Antarctica, including in Australia’s Antarctic Territory. Australia has forged operational and scientific cooperation relationships with several nations and will continue to monitor the strategic implications of international developments in the Antarctic region. To date, the Antarctic Treaty System has been well respected, but in coming decades it may come under pressure as resources become more scarce elsewhere.

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There’s a price to pay to be a US ally

Australian Chief of the Defence Force, General David Hurley, and U.S. Navy Commander, US Pacific Command, Admiral Samuel J. Locklear III, announce the official completion of Exercise Talisman Saber 2013 during a media conference on board USS Blue Ridge in Cairns, Queensland.

Defence and security have yet to feature in this election. But it should. As ASPI’s Davies and Thomson recently pointed out, the ADF is in a dire position, particularly in relation to the sustainment of forces over the next decade. Sustainment (spare parts, maintenance, modernisation, upgrading) is just as important as the sharp-edged fighting tools of war: ships, planes, tanks and skilled people. The situation’s worrying enough now but it just gets worse in future.

Despite the wishes of the strategically blind, it isn’t possible to effectively provide for the defence of this country at the start of the 21st century with Defence consuming only about 5% of government expenditure and 1.5% of GDP. That we’ve provided inadequately isn’t alarmist, nor is it a myth—it’s a fact recognised by both political parties, but yet to impact on the Australian consciousness. Both parties agree that Australia should be spending 2% of GDP on Defence. This means that we’re spending about 25% less on our defence than everyone agrees that we should. Think about it. Read more

The conflict mineral: coltan mining in DR Congo and Australia

Tantalite-(Mn) (formaly known as Manganotantalite) (MnTa2O6) from Alto do Giz,RN,Brazil. Two crystals (average size=3x4cm)

In recent years the ‘obscure mineral’ coltan—geological name Columbite Tantalite—has become widely known and politicised for being closely connected with the violence of armed groups in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Similar to campaigns about ‘blood diamonds’ in connection to conflicts in West Africa, the term ‘conflict minerals’ became somewhat synonymous with conflict in the DRC. In various campaigns around the world the western consumer use of mobile phones and laptops was linked to the horrific levels of violence, rape and death occurring in the DRC. An Australian scholar, Michael Nest, embarked on a research project to investigate the story of this infamous mineral. His findings can be found in his fascinating book Coltan.

Perhaps most interesting for Australians is Nest’s discovery of the link between Australia and the DRC as leading suppliers of coltan/tantalite to the world market. According to 2008 figures, Australia was the world’s top producer of tantalite (30% of supplies), followed by the DRC (21%), Brazil (14%), China (8%) and Ethiopia (8%). Australia’s production all came from the Wodinga Tantalum mine in Western Australia, which closed in 2008 due to the impact on prices of the GFC and cheap coltan from Central Africa. It reopened in 2011 and then closed again in 2012, due to a ‘softening global demand’. Read more

The Anglosphere and the China Choice

What might an alternative world order look like? Image: Shanghai Pudong

Like many of our readers, I’ve been following the recent discussion of the nature of the Anglosphere with interest. It’s been a lively exchange—and a sometimes wry one—and it sheds some light on aspects of our strategic culture that we usually take for granted. But ultimately I think we’ve been dancing around the key issue while having fun with definitions.

Whether ‘Anglosphere’ is a good word for the established world order is a subsidiary issue which we can leave for another time. The real question is what is happening to the world order, whether we’re likely to see a significant challenge to it in the foreseeable future and what our response should be if there is.

There’s no doubt from the exchange so far that all of the contributors agree that there are plenty of reasons for Australia to value the current world order. After all, it’s left us sitting fat and happy at the top of the heap. As inheritors of the global trading and financial system that’s largely an Anglo-American construct, we’ve successfully traded our way to prosperity. And along the way we’ve learned to love the military doctrine that goes along with it; God bless those Sea Lines of Communication. Read more

‘Lifting not looting’ in Australia–Africa relations

Farming in the rainy season

Australia is fast recognising the opportunities that the African continent represents, with about 200 Australian companies currently operating throughout the continent. Australian business and investment is worth more than $50 billion and diplomatic ties are now established with all African states and organisations. Australia–Africa relations are at a level that has never previously been reached and political co-operation between Australia and African states and organisations is now a tangible reality.

It’s important that Australia’s engagement with African countries be about establishing relations of mutual benefit. There’s a need to move beyond relations based predominately on the relationship of aid-donor and aid-recipient. Historically Australia hasn’t had significant relations with African countries or organisations, but the history of interaction between African states and other western states is one of oppression, extreme violence and the looting of natural resources. The tragic collusion between African political elites and western and non-western partners and beneficiaries has led to the enrichment of a few to the detriment of the many. The ‘many’ are left to live in severely impoverished situations within resource rich states. Although this pattern of exploitation has continued unabated throughout much of the African continent, Australia is entering relations with African states and organisations at a time when democracy and political stability and security in Africa is steadily increasing. Read more

The Southeast Asian emphasis in DWP2013

Singapore skylineDefence White Paper 2013 breaks new ground in a number of areas—but at the big picture level, the most striking aspect of the paper is its revaluation of Southeast Asia. In place of the vague threat of yesteryear, we’re presented with a region of strategic importance to Australia and a set of prospective partners in joint endeavours. At a number of points across the paper, Southeast Asia looms as the new player on Australia’s strategic landscape. It is depicted as ‘central’ to our concerns about the broader Indo-Pacific. And its new status is reflected in the priority accorded to it in Chapter 6 on international engagements, where the authors proceed directly to Southeast Asian linkages after covering the US relationship and the specifics of the ANZUS alliance. Relationships with North Asia come later, and those with Indian Ocean countries later still.

Striking, and novel, in the paper is the identification of Indonesia as a ‘significant regional power’ in the Indo-Pacific (paras 2.8, 2.31, and 3.20). In the opening paragraph of the document it’s listed among the countries that have ‘transformed within a generation’. In the next chapter it’s portrayed as ‘an increasingly influential democratic regional power and emerging global influence’. As our assessment of Indonesia has changed, so too has our view of our own partnership with Jakarta. Our relationship with Indonesia is variously described as ‘our most important defence relationship in the region’ (para 6.28) or some variant thereof. Para 3.17 says that ‘the stability and security of Indonesia, our largest near neighbour, is of singular importance.’ The security futures of Australia and Indonesia are described as ‘intertwined’. Gone, in a change from past practice, is the tendency to group Indonesia alongside other immediate neighbours, such as Papua New Guinea, East Timor and the micro-states of the South Pacific. Read more

A DMO reform recipe – four starting ingredients

ARH2 on Assembly Line February 2004, Marignane FranceWhichever party wins the upcoming Federal election is going to have to prioritise reform of Defence’s procurement processes and capability delivery to address looming problems, including capability gaps, base consolidation and upgrade requirements. It’s also going to have to deal with the increasingly justifiable malaise within Defence-related industry, at both prime-contractor and SME levels. These priorities exist in the context of a 2013 White Paper which failed to deliver the needed clarity on the funding and capability ‘supply side’ required to deliver DCP aspirations, as well as the stuttering Strategic Reform Program within the Department of Defence.

No doubt, the incoming ministerial team will be bombarded over the coming months with long lists of reform suggestions from stakeholders trying to influence their thinking on these matters, and in particular to effect change on the Defence Materiel Organisation (DMO), whose current organisational settings have clearly been the source of discontent for many stakeholder groups (including both of its primary partners—the ADF capability managers and industry). Read more

Giant landing ships and warfighting: Convergence or Divergence?

The Canberra Class Amphibious Assault Ship concept.There has been quite a spirited debate (here and here) about the meaning behind the largest ships ever built for the Royal Australian Navy. In thinking about this further, maybe we should return to more operationally focused thinking. Basically these ships simply provide a sea transport capability, but with the special feature of being able to get the stuff on them off them using organic means.

The LHDs aren’t capital ships, a primary type of ship in a naval fleet able to engage and sink other vessels. They’re not warships in that sense at all, being very vulnerable to almost any form of attack.  Sailing in an area where attacks were possible they’d need to be defended by numerous other vessels—which themselves would need support from accompanying naval tankers and land based aircraft of varying kinds.  Jim Molan has a point when he says that the ADF can ‘use these (LHD) ships to create around them a truly joint ADF that can actually fight and win in sophisticated joint warfighting operations’. Keeping the LHDs afloat in the face of a sophisticated enemy would indeed be a very demanding joint warfare task.

But LHDs (surely) exist for more than just to attract enemy naval and air commanders keen on sinking a large gray transport ship. What is it that’s so important? Read more