Defence and security have yet to feature in this election. But it should. As ASPI’s Davies and Thomson recently pointed out, the ADF is in a dire position, particularly in relation to the sustainment of forces over the next decade. Sustainment (spare parts, maintenance, modernisation, upgrading) is just as important as the sharp-edged fighting tools of war: ships, planes, tanks and skilled people. The situation’s worrying enough now but it just gets worse in future.

Despite the wishes of the strategically blind, it isn’t possible to effectively provide for the defence of this country at the start of the 21st century with Defence consuming only about 5% of government expenditure and 1.5% of GDP. That we’ve provided inadequately isn’t alarmist, nor is it a myth—it’s a fact recognised by both political parties, but yet to impact on the Australian consciousness. Both parties agree that Australia should be spending 2% of GDP on Defence. This means that we’re spending about 25% less on our defence than everyone agrees that we should. Think about it. Read more

Like many of our readers, I’ve been following the recent discussion of the nature of the Anglosphere with interest. It’s been a lively exchange—and a sometimes wry one—and it sheds some light on aspects of our strategic culture that we usually take for granted. But ultimately I think we’ve been dancing around the key issue while having fun with definitions.

Whether ‘Anglosphere’ is a good word for the established world order is a subsidiary issue which we can leave for another time. The real question is what is happening to the world order, whether we’re likely to see a significant challenge to it in the foreseeable future and what our response should be if there is.

There’s no doubt from the exchange so far that all of the contributors agree that there are plenty of reasons for Australia to value the current world order. After all, it’s left us sitting fat and happy at the top of the heap. As inheritors of the global trading and financial system that’s largely an Anglo-American construct, we’ve successfully traded our way to prosperity. And along the way we’ve learned to love the military doctrine that goes along with it; God bless those Sea Lines of Communication. Read more

Defence White Paper 2013 breaks new ground in a number of areas—but at the big picture level, the most striking aspect of the paper is its revaluation of Southeast Asia. In place of the vague threat of yesteryear, we’re presented with a region of strategic importance to Australia and a set of prospective partners in joint endeavours. At a number of points across the paper, Southeast Asia looms as the new player on Australia’s strategic landscape. It is depicted as ‘central’ to our concerns about the broader Indo-Pacific. And its new status is reflected in the priority accorded to it in Chapter 6 on international engagements, where the authors proceed directly to Southeast Asian linkages after covering the US relationship and the specifics of the ANZUS alliance. Relationships with North Asia come later, and those with Indian Ocean countries later still.

Striking, and novel, in the paper is the identification of Indonesia as a ‘significant regional power’ in the Indo-Pacific (paras 2.8, 2.31, and 3.20). In the opening paragraph of the document it’s listed among the countries that have ‘transformed within a generation’. In the next chapter it’s portrayed as ‘an increasingly influential democratic regional power and emerging global influence’. As our assessment of Indonesia has changed, so too has our view of our own partnership with Jakarta. Our relationship with Indonesia is variously described as ‘our most important defence relationship in the region’ (para 6.28) or some variant thereof. Para 3.17 says that ‘the stability and security of Indonesia, our largest near neighbour, is of singular importance.’ The security futures of Australia and Indonesia are described as ‘intertwined’. Gone, in a change from past practice, is the tendency to group Indonesia alongside other immediate neighbours, such as Papua New Guinea, East Timor and the micro-states of the South Pacific. Read more

There has been quite a spirited debate (here and here) about the meaning behind the largest ships ever built for the Royal Australian Navy. In thinking about this further, maybe we should return to more operationally focused thinking. Basically these ships simply provide a sea transport capability, but with the special feature of being able to get the stuff on them off them using organic means.

The LHDs aren’t capital ships, a primary type of ship in a naval fleet able to engage and sink other vessels. They’re not warships in that sense at all, being very vulnerable to almost any form of attack.  Sailing in an area where attacks were possible they’d need to be defended by numerous other vessels—which themselves would need support from accompanying naval tankers and land based aircraft of varying kinds.  Jim Molan has a point when he says that the ADF can ‘use these (LHD) ships to create around them a truly joint ADF that can actually fight and win in sophisticated joint warfighting operations’. Keeping the LHDs afloat in the face of a sophisticated enemy would indeed be a very demanding joint warfare task.

But LHDs (surely) exist for more than just to attract enemy naval and air commanders keen on sinking a large gray transport ship. What is it that’s so important? Read more

Whenever I talk about leadership to various audiences, I use two concepts as illustrations.

The first I thought was my concept of risk management, until I Googled it and discovered that others had thought of it too. It solidified in my mind at the conclusion of the theatre strategic shaping operations for the second battle of Fallujah in November 2004. The organisation I headed had achieved so much over about three months and, when on the verge of handing the fight over to the Marines, there was a natural tendency to relax. What I’d learned the hard way over a long operational career was to stay ‘paranoid’—there could always be people looking to hurt us. But the paranoia has to be constructive and so ‘Constructive Paranoia’ as a personal concept was (re-)invented—a concept which generations of soldiers know from bitter experience to be true and have expressed in many different ways.

The second concept is borrowed with permission from the St James Ethics Centre where, as a director, I hang around with philosophers. Simon Longstaff gives an excellent presentation on ‘Constructive Subversion’ as a way of outflanking unthinking custom and practice, the greatest threat to effective leadership that I know. Read more