Recently, I attended the Griffith Asia Institute’s fourth annual Australia-Japan Dialogue in Tokyo. Not surprisingly, a central theme of the workshop was whether Australia–Japan security and defence relations are on the cusp of a transformation, given that 2014 proved to be an active year for the relationship. Foremost was the signing of a new defence agreement during Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s visit in July which opened the door for potential cooperation on Australia’s next submarine. Prime Minister Tony Abbott also called Japan a ‘strong ally’—leading to a fierce debate (including here and here) about the pros and cons of getting closer to Japan.

In both Canberra and Tokyo expectations are high about the strength of the future defence relationship. But it’s not self-evident that the momentum can be sustained. After all, the contemporary history of the defence relationship is one of highs followed by relative tranquillity. And there are at least three issues that will require close expectation management to consolidate the progress made. Read more

Today ASPI has released Waves of opportunity: Enhancing Australia–Indonesia maritime security cooperation. The full report can be found here [PDF].

At the recent East Asia Summit (EAS), Indonesia’s President Joko ‘Jokowi’ Widodo spoke about Indonesia’s new maritime doctrine, the ‘World Maritime Axis’ concept. But what does that mean? Some criticise the term for its negative connotations, as in ‘axis powers’, or ‘axis of evil’. Perhaps it’s more apt to describe it as a ‘pivot’, as the US ‘rebalance’ used to be termed.

The World Maritime Axis highlights that ‘the sea is becoming more important for our future’, wrote Jokowi. Indonesia is increasingly aware of its central location along the sea lanes that connect two strategic oceans, the Indian and Pacific. Hence, Jakarta has warmly embraced the term ‘Indo-Pacific’ not only as diplomatic jargon [PDF], but as strategic comprehension.

But the important shift isn’t just maritime. Rather, it’s how Indonesia views its surrounding geography. Indonesia has traditionally looked north and east toward the Pacific, for economic, diplomatic and strategic reasons in its engagements with ASEAN and the major powers, including the US. The World Maritime Axis aims to give greater attention to the less-understood, but no less important, Indian Ocean in Jakarta’s mental map [PDF].

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Fiji’s declared starting point for talking to Australia about the future of Pacific regionalism is that Australia should leave the Pacific Islands Forum. Australia’s undeclared position—made clear by its actions—is that the Forum is more important than Fiji, but of course Canberra would rather have both.

Such are the tensions to be expected between the South Pacific’s chief status quo power, Australia, and its active and agitated revisionist power, Fiji. As previously noted, Australia and Fiji have set out to shift from duel to dance. The duel will still influence the dance. And in a bizarre way, the scars of the duel might actually aid the discussion Suva and Canberra have pledged to lead on regional architecture.

In the clash between status quo thesis and revisionist antithesis, any true synthesis would be a fascinating if unlikely result. Suva and Canberra may not expect any agreement on regional architecture, but the effort can go in interesting directions. Australia and Fiji have been hacking at each other so hard for so long, it’ll be hard for them just to go back to old diplomatic bromides. Read more

Not having appropriate medical countermeasures (MCMs) to chemical, biological and radiological (CBR) threats, emerging infectious diseases or pandemics is the biggest risk to our health, economy and security. The current Ebola crisis demonstrates that in situations where there’s a limited amount of specific MCMs, Australia’s allies—traditionally, one of our main sources—won’t necessarily guarantee supply. It’s a timely reminder that Australia must be proactive in this area. A cornerstone for any response to a national health emergency will be ensuring our nation’s first responders (military, healthcare and emergency personnel) have an appropriate armamentarium to care for those affected.

MCMs include products such as therapeutics, vaccines, diagnostics and personal protective equipment. But the development of such products is highly specialised and their deployment is complex. Further, in preparing for potential emerging threats in our region, Australia must also consider availability of MCMs for a number of endemic diseases which aren’t considered a global MCM development priority. Read more

It’s a fair bet that the Republic of Somaliland isn’t well known to most Australians. That’s a pity, because it’s certainly an instructive case. Born in a separatist struggle against Mogadishu, the little statelet has received nothing in the way of recognition from the international community, which means—for one thing—that it can’t receive foreign aid. Yet, according to the World Bank, the little Republic has ‘made admirable progress in improving its infrastructure to foster trade’ as well as almost tripling the number of primary schools and increasing five-fold the number of universities on its territory. Neighbouring Somalia, which can get aid, is still ‘in sharp contrast, looking tense and dangerous’.

Is that actually a coincidence though? Some Australian charities have bemoaned stagnating aid budgets in the face of increased defence spending. They claim the Coalition is buying guns and bombs at the expense of the world’s poor. I’m all in favour of controlling defence spending, but that doesn’t mean I think the money saved should go on foreign aid. Because the evidence says it doesn’t work (see William Easterly’s exhaustive review of the economic research here), especially if donated for ‘strategic’ reasons. As with defence spending, the problem lies in the incentives. Read more