Tag Archive for: Australia

ASPI suggests

Physics

To help you delve deeper into the world of strategy and international security, here are this week’s reading picks and podcasts.

Kicking off with Australia, channel your inner defence nerd with all Canberra papers published by ANU’s Strategic and Defence Studies Centre (1968–2010) now available online. Early papers include T.B. Millar on Soviet policies in the Indian Ocean (1970) while later ones include ASPI’s David Connery on Australian crisis policymaking and East Timor (2010).

With Britain’s general election held yesterday, it’s timely to ask, where is the country’s foreign policy headed? Some accuse the UK of retreating from international affairs; others are concerned about its relationship with the EU. For finer analysis, read Chatham House director Robin Niblett on why, despite cuts to defence spending, UK foreign policy isn’t going AWOL and Chatham House associate fellow Richard Whitman on why this election will determine the UK’s place in the world.

Last weekend, the Guardian reported that serious spinal injury from a US air strike in March has led ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi to step down as the organisation’s leader. It’s unconfirmed whether Abu Alaa al-Afri, a senior ISIS official and professor of physics, is now in charge. ABC Radio National spoke to Martin Chulov, the Guardian reporter who broke the story, about the potential leadership change and its implications.

But, bro do you even govern? Physics scholars like ASPI’s Andrew Davies and Mark Thomson might be highly capable at some things, but Daveed Gartenstein-Ross discusses how well jihadi groups govern the territory they control (45mins).

Back in the Asia Pacific, Myanmar is also up for an election this year, and Carnegie Endowment has created a handy fact sheet and timeline of developments. For those curious about reform progress or military politics, Nicholas Farrelly offers an upbeat yet clear-eyed assessment on New Mandala, highlighting some ‘genuinely useful and constructive changes’, particularly in Myanmar’s major government institutions.

Speaking of Southeast Asia, the US State Department just approved the potential sale of missiles to both Indonesia and Malaysia. And, senior navy leaders from the US Seventh Fleet, Singaporean Navy, Royal Malaysian Navy and Indonesian Navy met on board the USS Blue Ridge this week for a two-day exchange of ideas and methodologies for joint responses in the Indo-Pacific.

If you haven’t heard of the Military Writers Guild, start reading this interview with founder US Army Major Nate Finney who shares his thoughts on military writing, work–life–write balance and developing strategic thinking. Meanwhile, Australian Army information operations specialist Jason Logue has a new piece over on Nate’s other blog, The Bridge, on the meaning of ‘narrative’ and Islamic State.

Lastly, in case you were wondering what Andrew Davies can do, spruiking The Strategist is one of his mad skills. #thinktankthuglife

Podcasts

What is jihadi culture? In a new Middle East Week Podcast, terrorism expert Thomas Hegghammer delves into the socio-cultural practices of jihadi militants. Building on his recent talk ‘Why terrorists weep’ (full text here), Hegghammer explains how understanding  the so-called ‘soft matter’ of jihadism is relevant to improving CVE programs (41mins).

With the recent anniversary of the fall of Saigon, CIMSEC’s Matthew Hipple interviews US Navy Captain Peter Swartz (ret), currently principal research scientist at CNA Corporation, on his memories of the Vietnam War, meeting his wife in-country, working for Admiral Elmo Zumwalt Jr and the eventual evacuation of his family in 1975.

America’s AIIB fiasco: the perfect storm (in a teacup)

Constitution_of_the_United_States,_page_1A month ago, Stewart Patrick from the Council on Foreign Relations described the move by France, Germany, Italy and the UK to become founding members of the Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) as a ‘body blow to the US-led international order created in the wake of World War II, which is crumbling before our eyes.’

Few other analysts have been quite as gloomy. Most accounts of Australia’s belated decision to dip a toe in the water suggest the benefits of getting involved will outweigh the costs of not participating. According to that logic, the more Western shareholders with ‘seats at the table’ from the start, the less risk the new bank will adopt opaque governance structures or support Chinese political and business interests. A multilateral commercial bank like AIIB that makes bad lending decisions due to poor procedures would find itself in trouble faster than alternatives like China’s Silk Road Fund. The bank might even give Beijing a responsible stake in international public goods where there’s an $8 trillion need.

Australia’s last-minute scramble to make the AIIB’s cut-off date was inelegant. But while following the herd wouldn’t have burnished our reputation with either Washington or Beijing last month, at least it underlines to both where we sit. Hugh White’s ‘China Choice’ is principally a matter for Washington, not Canberra. There’d be little to be gained in trying to act as a trusted bridge between the two countries: inserting ourselves wouldn’t assist their clear communication but would imply an unhelpful equivalence.

Hugh regards the AIIB’s fairly graceful lift-off as a more significant milestone than do most, especially given America’s awkward effort to prevent it. He calls the AIIB debacle a ‘wakeup call for Washington’ as America’s China consensus slowly unravels. The episode fits the stark choice he sees between the US acknowledging China as an equal and yielding commensurate space or else trying to contain it in order to preserve American primacy.

I’d agree that the AIIB’s launch was significant. Sure, its US$50 to US$100 billion capital isn’t about to dominate international finance flows; America’s Bretton Woods institutions are far from the only basis of US predominance; and even rusted-on allies like Australia have failed to follow the US lead before (Graeme Dobell points approvingly to John Howard’s rejection of the IMF’s harsh medicine during the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis). It’s rare, though, to see so many close friends reject US overtures so quickly and utterly. Beijing’s success attracting donors over Washington’s objections may be ‘mainly symbolic’ but symbolism counts in the race for global influence—zero sum or not.

Still, I’d describe Washington’s ‘AIIB fiasco’ as more of a snafu than a watershed, and expect the upshot will be a case of America doing the right thing—after exhausting every alternative rather than radically changing policy direction.

As the US measures the harm it’s inflicted on itself, some blame the ‘imperial hubris’ of an administration that should have learned not to make such rigid demands after its experience with its Syrian red-lines. But there’s been more hand-wringing than finger-pointing as the chief cause is ultimately a level of gridlock no one can be too proud of. Since 2010 Congress has blocked reforms that would have allowed China to play the larger role it sought in the World Bank and IMF. While that mightn’t have prevented Beijing from wanting to establish an AIIB, it could have at least provided the US with a leg to stand on in opposing its creation. Instead, stymieing the reforms can only have strengthened China’s ‘if you can’t join ‘em, beat ‘em’ logic.

It’s tempting, then, to view the US government as so bitterly divided that it’s ‘on the verge of ceding the global economic stage’ and legitimacy it built at the end of the Second World War to the rising powers. The sharp drop-off in treaties being approved by the Senate during the current administration, reckless intransigence of Tea Party insurrectionaries, and recent spectacles such as sequestration might seem to support that concern. Yet neither US exceptionalism nor robust partisan wrangling are at all unprecedented. Presidents have grumbled about the Senate obstructing the executive’s foreign prerogative since George Washington’s time. The Senate famously rejected Woodrow Wilson’s Versailles peace treaty because it might bind Congress’ war-making powers to League of Nations decisions rather than because it seemed overly punitive. And during the George W. Bush era, the Senate twice refused to approve the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (which the US follows in practice, and might provide useful normative leverage against China’s maritime claims) despite strong administration support.

Although none of those examples offer cause for cheer, they remind us that domestic politics always shape the foreign commitments of democracies, and that US power has continued to grow through periodic past reverses. While it’s unrealistic to expect an end to political dysfunction anytime soon, President Obama has used executive agreements as effective tools to move his agenda forward. And there are signs Congress is getting closer to granting Trade Promotion (‘fast track’) Authority where it really counts: for Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations at the heart of the rebalance.

Rather than hoping the AIIB episode will spur Washington to seek a grand settlement with Beijing, we should expect regular historical jiggling to continue apace—between businesses, unions and parties, among others, domestically, and states, corporations, and competing trade blocs internationally. There we’ll have much to be thankful for, given the importance of accommodating China’s rise, if America’s AIIB-rout encourages it to play its strong hand a bit smarter.

Building natural disaster capacity in the Pacific

HMAS Tobruk unloads two Australian Army LCM-8 landing craft (seen centre right) inside Port Vila, Vanuatu, following the ship's arrival for post-disaster recovery operations. HMAS Tobruk has deployed to Vanuatu on Operation Pacific Assist 2015 following the devastation caused by Tropical Cyclone Pam.Karl Claxton’s recent Strategist post suggests that Operation Pacific Assist to cyclone-damaged Vanuatu could provide an opportunity to ‘reset regional cooperation’. As ‘practical avenues for reviving habits of cooperation’, he suggests that humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) responses may provide an arena where ‘Australia and Fiji could each offer expertise and leadership without tussling for control’. As logical as such sentiments may appear at first glance, his suggestion obscures the fact that technical activities such as HADR are neither empty of political content nor consequence.

Claxton’s attempt to find a way through current political stalemates still has the underlying whiff of ‘Australia must [continue to] manage the South Pacific’. This is unfortunate as his suggestion has merits—technical cooperation can help countries to work around thorny political thickets—but the ability to deliver HADR efforts without a tussle will be difficult in contemporary climes for a number of reasons.

For one, a focus on disaster relief efforts may exacerbate one of the main areas of contention between Pacific Island states and Australia and New Zealand: climate change. Seen as an urgent priority within the Pacific, as expressed most vehemently in the Majuro Declaration, disappointment at a lack of preventive action from both Australia and New Zealand could be compounded by an apparent willingness to engage in the mop up of the consequences of climate change.

More specifically, Greg Fry has talked about the need for Australia and New Zealand to ‘stand back’ and for Pacific Island states to ‘stand forward’ in any revived Pacific regionalism. In disaster response scenarios, the difference in capabilities makes this difficult. Useful HADR resources, including logistical, medical and helicopter capabilities, are concentrated in the hands of a few. Australia, New Zealand and France have the strongest military capabilities based locally in the region, particularly with respect to air and naval assets. But herein also lies a potential option for action.

If Australia and New Zealand are going to seriously commit to building the capacity of Pacific Island states to respond to natural disasters such as Cyclone Pam, then one way is to extend key defence cooperation arrangements such as the FRANZ Arrangement and the Quadrilateral Defence Group, to include those Pacific Island states with defence and police forces. A good start has been New Zealand’s quiet engagement with Fiji over Cyclone Pam. A RNZAF Hercules has transported Fijian disaster response personnel, including military engineers, health professionals and supplies, to Vanuatu. Foreign Minister McCully has called the cooperation ‘a positive development that reflects the steps we have been taking to reengage with Fiji politically and militarily.’

Another option could be the creation of a Disaster Response and Coordination Unit (DRCU) within the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat. Claxton’s notion that Australia and Fiji could jointly contribute to HADR efforts without tussling for control begs the question as to how the Pacific Island Forum could hope to lead such HADR efforts in such a way as to satisfy the agendas of these states—particularly as the Forum does not yet have a body dedicated to that function.

Politics would surely play a role in determining priorities and methods in carrying out such HADR. Technical activities can’t escape this reality. Such a DRCU would therefore be a practical solution with big regional implications. It would contribute directly to the capacity building of regional governments and national disaster management offices to respond to natural disasters and coordinate disaster relief.

The embedding of strong levels of practical support in HADR from metropolitan powers to such a Unit may also indirectly allow Pacific Island states a way to increase contributions to the funding of the Pacific Islands Forum, thereby responding to calls by the Winder Report (the 2012 Review of the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat) for Pacific Island states to up their financial stakes in the institution to further politically embolden member governments. This may help counter the current squeeze on Australian ODA which emphasises aid as a means for advancing the national interest, as well as the likelihood that New Zealand will ‘remain an aid scrooge’ (Wood 2012 in this report).

The creation of a DRCU would have other clear benefits. Situated in Suva at the Forum Secretariat, it would work directly with Fiji’s Black Rock Integrated Peacekeeping Centre (BRIPC)—the integrated peacekeeping and disaster management training facility with a regional focus—providing policy and coordination support. Strengthening Fry’s suggested ‘patchwork architecture of complementary rather than competing’ organisations, the DRCU would collaborate with the Melanesian Spearhead Group, the Secretariat of the Pacific Community, and the Pacific Islands Development Forum. Although Claxton and others have dismissed the MSG’s proposals of a humanitarian and emergency response force, if the proposed regional peacekeeping force is established (and potentially trained at the BRIPC), coordinating the military response could become the joint responsibility of the MSG and the Forum’s DRCU. Such a Unit would be in keeping with the spirit of the new Framework for Pacific Cooperation.

Resetting regionalism through reviving habits of cooperation will only work if the underlying issues are addressed. There is a weariness felt across the region stemming from Australia—and New Zealand’s—assumption of primacy. Fry’s call for a recapturing of the spirit of 1971 is a reflection of Pacific island leaders demanding a voice in regional affairs—a voice as yet without an echo from Canberra and Wellington.

Option J—would you like strategic benefits with that?

Japan Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) submarine Hakuryu (SS-503) arrives at Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam for a scheduled port visit, Feb. 6. While in port, the submarine crew will conduct various training evolutions and have the opportunity to enjoy the sights and culture of Hawaii. (U.S. Navy photo by Cmdr. Christy Hagen/Released)There’s a lot of talk about submarines again this week thanks to the SubSummit conference in Adelaide. Perhaps not surprisingly given the venue, much of the focus was on the local versus offshore build aspect. That’s all fair enough—we’re talking big dollars here, and the size of the program is such that all of the potential stakeholders have plenty of reasons to make their pitch. That’s a good thing—the more the various options are explained the better informed the discussion can be.

Clearly the government wants to keep ‘Option J’—a submarine sourced from Japan—open, which is why it settled on its ‘competitive evaluation process’ to allow for the possibility. Otherwise it would simply run a tender process similar to that for the Collins class for the Europeans to compete. The question then becomes how to weigh the positives and negatives of what are quite different options.

But one of the unfortunate downsides of this debate (in fact most debates) is the tendency to talk down the competition beyond what’s objectively true, thus muddying the waters and detracting from the quality of the discussion. There’s no shortage of criticism of varying quality of Option J out there—in fact it’s hard to find much support. In our new paper released today, we take a look at the case for Option J and find that there are indeed some real strategic positives as well as issues of concern.

Let’s take a look at the critic’s concerns. They fall into several distinct categories. The first are ‘strategic concerns’, with any or all of the following:

  • Australia would be choosing sides in north Asian security and thus would risk being drawn into a future conflict in that region
  • a submarine deal would be to the detriment of Australia’s important economic and security relationship with China
  • Australia would effectively helping Japan to ‘remilitarise’.

We don’t buy any of those arguments. First, Australia would only find itself trapped into north Asian conflicts if it negotiated a submarine deal especially ineptly. If we get the support arrangements we need in place, Japan’s leverage—even if it decided to use it—would be much reduced.

Second, China has shown no tendency to punish Australia for being a forthright critic of its security policies to date, and it’s far from clear that they could effectively punish Australia in any case. Finally, Japan’s moves towards a normalised security posture falls well short of a region threatening militarisation.

We think it’s in Australia’s interests for Japan to be more, not less, engaged in regional security. As American power declines in relative terms, having allies and partners around the region that can carry part of the burden of maintaining order will be increasingly important. That’s probably why it’s widely thought that the US is firmly supportive of a possible Australia-Japan submarine deal.

Because of these factors, Option J has positives that simply aren’t there in the same way with France or Germany. Yes, they’re both like-minded liberal democracies, but neither has the proximity, the inclination or the regional capability to make a lot of difference in our part of the world. On the other hand, the Europeans offer a wealth of experience in arms exports, and both have successfully exported submarine designs to be built in foreign yards. After our experience with the AWDs, that’s a very strong selling point.

The other broad class of criticism are ‘industrial and economic concerns’:

We don’t say a lot about that in this paper. (ASPI has commented here, here and here on these in the past.) But it’s almost certainly right to say that the ‘Eurosub’ option offers more local work.

Nor can we sensibly evaluate from publicly available information the capability issues that might arise, such as the suitability of the Soryu-class for Australian mission profiles and the difficulties that might be encountered in modifying the design for the RAN’s use. That requires government—through Defence—to do its due diligence. Of course, that’s also true of any European option.

Our paper shouldn’t be interpreted as an endorsement of Option J. This isn’t an ‘apples versus apples’ competitive evaluation and the two pathways have qualitatively different strengths. But it’s not right to say that Option J offers little in the way of positives. Apart from anything else, it’d signal a further deepening of the Australia–Japan defence relationship and a further underpinning of the US alliance framework, at a time of shifting major power relations in the Asia-Pacific region.

National security: a surprise present

Surprise—national security agencies are now expected to face a threat growing in capability and intent and the government will reconsider whether they will do so with only slightly less money.

The Prime Minister’s National Security Statement shone a light on a range of counter-terrorism measures and noted the release of the Counter-Terrorism Machinery Review commissioned last August. To the surprise of few, the review reports that our security agencies have identified risks to national security outcomes if their base funding continues to be eroded (by between 1.25 and 4%).

The review’s authors provide an assessment of the impacts of the government’s efficiency dividend (ED) in terms of frontline staff reductions and diminished collection and analytical capabilities. To this end, the report recommends that

the ED be removed from the operational activities of the Australian Customs and Border Protect Services (ACBPS), Australian Federal Police (AFP), Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) and the Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS), and for the ED to be completely removed from the Office of National Assessments (ONA) and Office of the Inspector General of Intelligence and Security (OIGIS).

Read more

Australia not pulling its weight in Antarctica

Antarctic Survey Vessel Wyatt Earp Surveying Newcomb Bay.

Two incidents so far this year have highlighted Australia’s inability to protect its sovereignty and discharge its responsibilities in Antarctica and the Southern Ocean.

In the first incident in January, three foreign fishing vessels were apprehended by the RNZN’s offshore patrol vessel, HMNZS Wellington, illegally fishing in Australia’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the Southern Ocean in breach of the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR). While the vessels were initially detected by an Australian surveillance aircraft, Australia did not itself have the ability to respond to the sighting.

After that incident, NZ Foreign Minister McCully said that countering illegal fishing in Southern waters was ‘not straight forward’ and New Zealand needed the cooperation of other members of the CCAMLR Commission. The environmental action group Sea Shepherd criticised the Australian government for ‘leaving the New Zealand government stranded’. Read more

‘Future submarines’—an Australia soap opera

The Australian Submarine Soap OperaA soap opera typically has a number of common features: forced characters, somewhat unbelievable; a plot in which dramatic events occur frequently but the story itself doesn’t reach any sort of conclusion; a familiar setting with only the occasional foray outside to refresh interest; and a devoted and fixated viewing audience.

Australia’s ongoing attempt to procure a follow-on submarine to the Collins class seems to fit this description. The main characters endlessly circle one another, uttering somewhat meaningless phrases whilst simultaneously professing their devotion to the project and each other. Occasionally one of the cast is sacrificed in order to rebuild the ratings. Dramatic events come and go, but the plot hardly moves. There’s nothing to distinguish today’s viewing from that of two or three years ago, other than a feeble attempt to relate to the concerns of everyday people and the challenges of everyday life. Read more

Introducing ASPI’s 2015 International Conference: Australia’s future surface fleet

PASSEX with HMAS Perth and INS Sahyadri  Along with the submarine replacement program, the size and scope of Army’s future fleet of protected vehicles under Project LAND 400 and the future of the surface fleet are the other big capability choices for the Abbott government. That’s why ASPI will be taking a hard look at both subjects this year, and will run major conferences on both topics. The first, from 30 March to 1 April, will discuss Australia’s future surface fleet. Registration will open in mid-February. In May, ASPI will run a separate event on the future structure of Army and the LAND 400 program.

The future of the Navy’s surface fleet isn’t simply about choosing the vessels. There has been much political, public and media attention on the impact of program decisions on Australia’s naval shipbuilding sector. While the factors determining Navy’s future surface fleet are (or at least should be) shaped by strategic considerations, unavoidably they’ve become entangled with questions of construction. Over the coming weeks, the Strategist will run a series of posts related to the strategic, operational, international and industrial factors involved in decisions about the future surface fleet. Read more

Australia in Asia: time for a ‘dolphin’ strategy

DolphinsIn 1989, when reflecting upon leadership strategies in a new information age, Dudley Lynch and Paul Kordis drew from typified animal behaviour to develop a new model of management. You don’t need to be a ‘shark’, they said, to be a winner. Rather, be a ‘dolphin’: be smart, adaptive, responsive, and look further afield. Interestingly, they subtitled their book ‘Scoring a win in a chaotic world’. They might as well have been writing about the challenges of an ‘Asian century’ for Australia’s diplomacy.

For Australia, the rise of the Indo-Pacific reality has obliged it to look further afield. A rising China is getting more explicit in contesting the regional security system, while America continues to invest considerable attention and resources to its Asian ‘pivot’. Other regional powers, such as India and Japan, are looking more to the Southeast Asian region—and beyond—to further their foreign policy interests. Indonesia’s ascent and Jokowi’s concept of a ‘global maritime axis’ are simultaneously reinforcing the geostrategic significance of Australia’s immediate neighbourhood; they also herald more complex diplomatic relations and power games between Canberra and Jakarta. Collectively, those dynamics push the nexus of regional politics and stability ever closer to Australia’s shores. Read more

Strengthening rules-based order in the Asia–Pacific

A warm working lunch with @AbeShinzo discussing the Middle East situation and other current events The Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague is currently examining China’s South China Sea claims in a case brought by the Philippines. While China isn’t expected to take part in the case—indeed, it missed the deadline to lodge a defence this week—the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has nonetheless released a position paper outlining their legal objections, one of which is that the PCA lacks jurisdiction. A recent US State Department report into the legality of Beijing’s South China Sea claims refuted the validity of the nine-dash line as a maritime boundary. China rejected the US analysis claiming that it ‘ignores the basic facts and international legal principles’.

Human societies can only enjoy peaceful progress under the rule of law; the same is true of international society. If cooperation and orderly behaviour are to be advanced in the Asia–Pacific, we need strong global norms and legal rules to guide and govern relations among states.

The Asian strategic environment is witness to one of the most important power shifts in history—one that might produce a more cooperative Asia or a more competitive one. The biggest strategic question we face is not simply whether the future of our region will be one of war or peace, it’s also about the nature of that peace. Will it be a peace governed by rules and norms or a peace governed by power and coercion? Read more