The US ‘rebalance’ to the Asia–Pacific has been under way since late 2011. Then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton wrote in October 2011 of a ‘strategic turn to the region…to secure and sustain America’s global leadership’, and President Obama’s speech to the Australian parliament in November 2011 gave a presidential imprint to the policy. So, almost four years later, how’s the US tracking in Asia?

The evidence is mixed. The US is undoubtedly tracking better in Northeast Asia, where assurance concerns amongst Japanese and South Koreans have been quieted, though not resolved. Both countries remain anxious about the threat posed by North Korea and uncertain about China’s ambitions and future. But US actions, including Obama’s affirmation that the Senkakus are protected under the US–Japanese security treaty, have bolstered Washington’s regional profile. And the faltering Chinese economy has suddenly lost some of its 30-year allure, blurring linear predictions about the strength of Beijing’s long-term challenge to the regional order.

Southeast Asia, though, tells a different story. If the US has behaved like an ally in Northeast Asia, it’s behaved more like a peacemaker in Southeast Asia. In large part the difference turns upon the US approach to disputed territories. Washington takes no position on the differing territorial claims in the South China Sea, and so often conveys the impression that it doesn’t stand behind its Southeast Asian allies and partners in their wrangles with China. And those wrangles seem likely to endure despite China’s economic volatility.

In terms of assurance, there’s a delicate balance to strike—on both sides of the relationships. Southeast Asian states want to feel assured that the US will support them, but don’t want to be dragged into a conflict between the US and China. In Washington, there’s a similar dilemma: the US wants its allies to feel assured but doesn’t want to be dragged into an unnecessary conflict by an ally off on a frolic of its own. So it’s also torn between competing objectives. Are its security relationships in Asia sufficiently robust to assure allies of US engagement? And are they sufficiently flexible to ‘tether’ those allies—assuring them that their security needs are fulfilled without recourse to more extreme strategic options or policies of adventurism.

And so to Australia. Does our relationship with the US show more of the Northeast Asian pattern or the Southeast Asian one? I’d argue the Northeast Asian. In some measure that’s because we’ve behaved differently to the US’s Southeast Asian allies and partners, and aren’t claimants in the South China Sea. True, we live too far away from the critical regional strategic contests—those occurring along the Eurasian rimland—for us to be central to those contests. But ANZUS, a treaty concerned with security in the Pacific and not just the defence of Australia, is one of our strongest mechanisms for making a contribution to that broader regional order.

So when we ask how the US is tracking in Asia, let’s keep the focus on the main question: how does the strategic balance—or perhaps more accurately the different strategic balances—look along the Eurasian rimland? The growth in Asian power is changing those balances. And some analysts argue that geographic proximity translates into greater commitment and resolve by Asian players in pursuing gains and running risks. China, for example, is typically said to be more resolute than the US about strategic outcomes close its own shores, and hence a more determined competitor in the Western Pacific. Such perceptions are fatal for the US role in Asia. The US must be seen to be just as resolute in its determination to maintain the current security order as China is to change it.

Of course, the US can argue that its goal is not a strict continuation of the current system. That wouldn’t be realistic. Rather, it seeks more inputs from growing Asian states for an order that would still be stable, liberal and prosperous. That’s sometimes miscast as the search for a ‘responsible’ China. That’s part of it, but it’s also a search for a responsible Japan, a responsible India, a responsible Indonesia and a responsible Australia. In that sense, the ‘rebalance’ isn’t a vehicle designed to restore the US to the position of pre-eminence it enjoyed in the 1990s. Rather, it’s a mechanism for buying time to allow the emergence of a set of more positive Asian actors—though Washington’s not so indelicate as to cast it that way.

Overall, we need to be nuanced in judging the future role of the US in Asia. Its relative strategic weight is not slipping so fast as to encourage its allies and partners to pursue radical strategic repositioning. Still, it is slipping, encouraging perceptions of future orders that turn less upon US pre-eminence. Those future orders are still uncertain—we can discern who the major players will be but not their roles. And that uncertainty, in turn, drives demands for greater assurance from the US—even though its relative strategic weight is contracting. Indeed, such assurance anxieties seem likely to remain a durable feature of the regional security order in coming decades. If we feel anxious about Washington we should remember we’re not alone.

Trilateralism is on the rise across the Asia–Pacific as states seek safety in numbers, diversifying their relations in response to an increasingly uncertain regional security environment. On 8 June 2015, senior foreign affairs officials from Australia, Japan and India, including secretary-level representatives, gathered in New Delhi to explore how the three nations might work together to meet shared regional challenges; maritime security topped the agenda.

The three countries last cooperated on security matters alongside the US in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QSD), which wrapped up in 2008 at the behest of Australia’s newly elected Rudd government due to concern about China’s reaction. That the three have now reconvened security-focused discussions (with potential spin-off naval activities) speaks not only to a shared understanding of China’s rise and the challenges of regional security, but also to their collective willingness to play a greater role in Asia–Pacific security matters.

Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi share a deep personal chemistry. Both are conservative, nationalist, pro-business leaders who came to power pledging to rejuvenate their flagging economies and restore national pride. Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott is cut from similar cloth, and has quickly built close relations with his Japanese and Indian counterparts.

Beyond personal qualities and close relationships at the head-of-state level, there’s a growing alignment of interests, values and concerns among Australia, Japan and India. All share an interest in preserving a peaceful and stable regional order and avoiding a Pax Sinica. All value democracy, freedom and the rule of law. And all are concerned by China’s military build-up, defiance of international law and norms, and increasingly assertive attempts to unilaterally force a shift in the regional status quo.

In a report released by ASPI today, I explore the extent to which the current strategic alignment between Australia, Japan and India offers a sound basis for deepening cooperation to reinforce the rules-based regional order. The paper concludes that an alignment of the political stars, a diplomatic consensus on China, tightening bilateral relations and coalescing strategic, defence and security interests mean that Australia should now lean forward to fortify our trilateral dialogue and cooperation with Japan and India. A coalition of like-minded Asia–Pacific maritime democracies would seek to balance against China, further complicate China’s strategic calculus and encourage Beijing to engage as a responsible stakeholder in the stable and open regional order.

Trilateral cooperation between Australia, Japan and India is intended to support America’s presence in the Asia–Pacific and demonstrate a public commitment to international law, global norms and the established regional order. A focus on diplomatic and military activities is an opportunity to enhance relations, show a commitment to regional security and strengthen the security foundation on top of which diplomatic relations can deepen. Joint exercises demonstrate presence, build interoperability, boost inter-force relations based on trust, confidence and knowledge, and shape perceptions of shared security concerns. The activities pursued by the trio would nurture habits of cooperation between their militaries and solidify both the diplomatic agenda and relations between their heads of state and defence and foreign ministers, so uniting the three nations.

While the strategic convergence between the three is based on a range of complementary factors, our nations are very different beasts, and a range of obstacles will naturally trouble trilateral cooperation. Australia is America’s staunch Anglosphere ally in the Pacific. Japan is a former client state of the US and has an entrenched post-war tradition of pacifism. And India zealously protects its ability to make its foreign policy independently. The interests of the three partners may be broadly aligned, but they’ll rarely, if ever, be homogeneous. The three have different order-building traditions and different strategic visions for the Asia–Pacific; the benefits and risks for Japan and India will be very different from those for Australia. It’s essential that these points of difference are kept in mind as a realistic trilateral agenda is reconciled and realised over the coming years. The success of the trilateral will turn on the trio’s ability to understand the extent to which our interests overlap.

The parley between Australia, Japan and India that kicked off in New Delhi last month is an understandable and appropriate response to the vexed security situation that the three countries face in the Asia–Pacific. The move reflects the region-wide tendency towards tightening bilateral and trilateral security-focused relations, implying that a return to quadrilateral or similar minilateral groupings will be likely to supplement the regional security architecture in the future. Indeed, intensive trilateral engagement between Australia, Japan and India would provide a sound foundation for a return to a collective security mechanism, like the QSD, down the line.

In my first post yesterday I set out the case for a radical reappraisal of our alliance with Washington. My argument doesn’t reflect a neutralist or anti-American disposition. Rather it’s an attempt to advocate a confident post-Cold War realism where national interest and the balance of global power trump neurotic Australian dependency on a great and powerful friend.

In a post-ANZUS world Australia and the US would remain close, linked by language, history and democratic values. Australia would inevitably have more guarded relations with China, an aggressive communist power.

Australia could continue to train and exchange intelligence with the US. It could continue to host critical joint facilities like Pine Gap if the Americans wanted them. And it could continue to acquire high-end US military equipment from US firms.

But Australia would have more freedom to take an independent and pragmatic view of international policy and national interests. It wouldn’t feel obliged to join every war the Americans wanted to fight, but it could join coalitions when it judged its interests were directly engaged.

In a post-ANZUS world Australia would have to be smarter diplomatically and to build forces that would give potential aggressors reason to pause before threatening Australia. The government would have to accelerate the current multi-billion dollar sea, air and land re-armament program.

In fact the US commitment to ANZUS has never been as strong as the Australian commitment. Australia, the smaller and less important power, has relied on the alliance considerably more than the US has relied on it.

Alliance history suggests the Americans push hard for Australian support under ANZUS when it suits their interests but put US national interests ahead of alliance obligations to Australia when it suits them to do so. It’s worth noting, in parenthesis, that the treaty has been invoked only once—when John Howard, heading home from the US after witnessing the 11 September 2001 terror attacks, decided that Australia would support the US to fight terrorism under the treaty.

In his comprehensive 1991 study, Crises and Commitments: the Politics and Diplomacy of Australia’s Involvement in Southeast Asian Conflicts 1948–1965, the historian Peter Edwards notes, among other things, major differences between the US and Australia over Indonesian claims to West New Guinea and over Indonesia’s confrontation with Malaysia in the 1960s.

Australia supported the Dutch decision to exclude West New Guinea from the transfer of the former Netherlands East Indies to Indonesia; the Americans stayed neutral, believing that a friendly Indonesia would be valuable to the West. Edwards argues that Australia ultimately had to no choice other than to accept the incorporation of West New Guinea into Indonesia. ANZUS proved irrelevant.

Indonesia’s confrontation of Malaysia prompted Australia to seek assurances under ANZUS of US support in the event of an Indonesian attack on Australian forces in Malaysia. According to Edwards the Americans agreed to act only in the event of ‘an overt attack, and not in cases of ‘subversion, guerrilla warfare or indirect aggression’. Support would be limited to the use of air and sea forces and logistic support…in other words, the use of American troops was excluded’, writes Edwards. Again, ANZUS didn’t help Australia.

At the same time, Australia found itself under pressure to contribute to US efforts to defend Vietnam from communism. Edwards writes: ‘The United States made it clear…that American support for Australia in the event of a substantial conflict with Indonesia depended partly on Australian support for the American role in Vietnam’. Australia went to war with the US in Vietnam as an ANZUS obligation and between 1962 and 1975 saw 500 troops killed and 3,129 wounded.

In 1999 Prime Minister John Howard asked President Clinton for troops to assist Australia in the East Timor crisis. Clinton refused, but instead delivered diplomatic, logistic and intelligence support and an over-the-horizon seaborne deterrent presence to support the Australian deployment as head of the 17-nation INTERFET force. ANZUS worked—but it didn’t put US boots on the ground.

Australia’s commitment to ANZUS has taken Australian troops to Korea, Vietnam, the Persian Gulf, East Timor, Iraq and Afghanistan. Australia just cannot say ‘no’.

But how would Australia respond in the event of a crisis in US–China relations? Would it stand by its old strategic ally at the cost of its economic relationship with China? Australian politicians prefer to fudge that question.

Australia and the US could be allies without an alliance although a decision to rescind ANZUS would shock the Asia–Pacific region. It’s an old treaty and part of the wider framework of Western alliances. Australia would have to maintain military forces superior to others in the region and compatible with US forces.

A significant cost to Australia could be its loss of access to some high-end US intelligence collections, especially to real-time satellite imagery that’s highly classified. The US might also be less willing to make certain advanced weapons technologies available to Australia.

Australia wouldn’t have to sign onto every war the Americans want to fight, but it could join military coalitions when it felt its interests were directly engaged.

Australia, as now, could probably expect US help when the US perceived its national interests to be at stake. There would questions about extended US nuclear deterrence, but that would be doubtful anyway if China’s nuclear capabilities became competitive with US capabilities.

In a post-ANZUS world Australia would have to play smarter diplomatic and defence games. It would also have to continue to build forces that would give potential aggressors reason to pause before threatening Australia—as it is doing in the current major sea, air and re-armament program now underway.

Looking back, Australia has unquestionably paid its dues under ANZUS. But the strategic situation today bears little resemblance to that of the second half of the 20th century. Australians need to start thinking about whether ANZUS is of continuing relevance to their vital interests in the 21st century.

Ringed as we are by archipelagos, freedoms of navigation and overflight (FON) are extremely important to Australia.

The archipelagic sea lanes (ASL) passage introduced by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) guarantees the non-suspendable right of ships and aircraft to transit through the waters of an archipelagic state, such as Indonesia, Papua New Guinea and the Philippines, provided they use ASLs designated by the archipelagic state. Or, if no such lanes have been designated, transit is allowed along routes normally used for international navigation or overflight.

Only Indonesia has so far designated ASLs. However, these are just a partial designation as the designated ASLs only provide for a north-south transit and there is no east-west sea lane through the Java and Flores seas. Because this is a route normally used for international navigation, Australia, the US and possibly other countries continue to exercise their right of ASL passage through these seas, although this appears contrary to Indonesian regulations.

Unlike the US, Australia doesn’t have a formal FON program, and we rarely follow the US example of formally protesting ‘excessive claims’ to maritime jurisdiction. The US is the only country in the world with a formal FON program. It has three elements: bilateral and multilateral consultations with other governments that may be planning new claims regarded as contrary to international law; diplomatic representations and protests; and operational assertions of rights by US military units. The philosophy of the US FON program is that if claims and constraints aren’t challenged, they may over time be considered accepted by the international community

During the fiscal year 2014, the US conducted operational assertions to challenge excessive maritime claims by the following regional countries: China, India, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Maldives, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Taiwan and Vietnam. The claims by Indonesia challenged by the US included the partial designation of archipelagic sea lanes, and the requirement for prior notification by foreign warships to enter Indonesia’s territorial sea and archipelagic waters.

According to the US Maritime Claims Reference Manual, three claims made by Australia have been protested by the US. These include Australia’s establishment of territorial sea straight baselines and declaration of Anxious, Encounter, Lacepede and Rivoli Bays as historic bays. The US doesn’t recognise these claims and has lodged a diplomatic protest against them. However, while the US routinely conducts FON operations against historic bays elsewhere in the world, it has not undertaken them against the bays claimed by Australia. Secondly, the US has protested Australia’s claim to an EEZ around the Australian Antarctic Territory.

Australia’s final disagreement with the US on FON is our introduction in 2006 of compulsory pilotage through the Torres Strait and the Great Northeast Channel. This regime doesn’t apply to ships with sovereign immunity, but due to difficulties of navigation in the area, USN vessels still routinely take pilots for the passage of the strait. However, in requesting a pilot, a USN ship will note the ‘request is voluntary and not based on the mandatory pilotage scheme’.

A noteworthy FON incident involving Australia and China occurred in 2001.

A Chinese warship challenged three Australian navy ships in the Taiwan Strait heading from South Korea to Hong Kong. The incident occurred about two weeks after a Chinese fighter jet collided with an American spy plane over the South China Sea, sparking diplomatic tensions between Beijing and Washington. The Australian vessels apparently declined to change course, saying they were exercising their right to freedom of navigation in accordance with UNCLOS.

The Australian Government is now believed to be planning a so-called ‘freedom of navigation’ exercise, which would involve an Australian P-3 Surveillance aircraft flying very near artificial islands being built by China in the South China Sea. While RAAF P-3 aircraft have conducted surveillance flights over the South China Sea for decades it isn’t clear what this latest gesture aims to achieve other than being a provocation to China. Australia’s direct national interests aren’t involved with overflight in the South China Sea in the same way as they are with navigation and overflight through the archipelagos to our near North.

Furthermore, China hasn’t made clear which restrictions on navigation and overflight it’s imposing around features it occupies in the South China Sea. When and if it does issue such restrictions, then a diplomatic protest by Australia would be more appropriate than ‘jumping the gun’ now and flying aircraft into a messy legal situation. As well as provoking China, that gesture would be seen in the region as Australia simply acting once again as a ‘deputy sheriff’ to the US in the region.

As the centenary of Anzac Day passes, considerable reflection and reassessment has taken place. Despite changes to the roles Australia and New Zealand play in world affairs, one international relationship has endured—their association with the Commonwealth. This, in fact, has a strategic dimension, one which they can leverage in the 21st century for mutual peace and security.

That’s why we at Commonwealth Exchange produced the report, The Commonwealth’s Call to Duty, whose foreword was written by Rt Hon Dr Liam Fox MP, former Secretary of State for Defence in the UK. The genesis of the report came from a blog post written on this very site.

Importantly, the report doesn’t argue for the creation of a Commonwealth defence force or a security council like NATO. Nor are we undermining US hegemony or Anglosphere ties. Rather in a world of rapidly changing geo-politics, it’s about those traditional Anglosphere defence powers creating opportunities to forge strategic links with emerging and developing Commonwealth economies.

We charted both Australia’s historic and modern connections with Commonwealth partners. Those ranged from Australia’s leading role in the Commonwealth Occupying Force in Japan in 1946 which marked the first time British troops were under full Australian command; the 1st Commonwealth Division in the Korean War in 1951; the Commonwealth’s Far East Strategic Reserve in Malaysia in 1954; then participation in the Commonwealth Monitoring Force in Zimbabwe in 1980.

As for Australia’s modern and future links, it remains a part of the Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA) with four other Commonwealth partners (the UK, New Zealand, Malaysia, and Singapore). The Arrangement holds annual tri-force exercises and is described as ‘particularly well suited to likely future strategic circumstances…as it is a non-provocative form of hedging and confidence building’.

Australia could enhance many of its current ties. For example, one joint think tank study suggested Australia help Canada join the FPDA, install reciprocal defence attachés, establish annual defence minister meetings, and work together sharing expertise on Arctic and Antarctic responsibilities. With New Zealand it was recently acknowledged by both governments that despite the traditional close ties and their annual Defence Ministers meeting (ANZMM) the ‘yearly cycle of talks has become overly driven by process…and our very closeness can at times mean we do not push the limited of effective co-operation’. Australia’s link to Malaysia is also strong with its personnel at the Royal Malaysian Air Force Base Butterworth, but also with regular army and naval exercises. This led the Australian Government to state that ‘there is a strong foundation for this relationship to develop further’.

Of significant interest is the nascent defence partnership with India. A number of Australian commentators have said focusing on being a Pacific power ignores the wider aim of establishing Australia as an Indo-Pacific power. The new bilateral deal will see regular defence ministers’ meetings and maritime exercise, but one leading Indian think tank has said that deeper security cooperation is likely to take a long time to develop.

Not forgetting the AUS–UK relationship, this is underpinned by an annual Foreign and Defence Minister meeting (AUKMIN). However, as another author on The Strategist has said: ‘Wallowing in heritage and history is no substitute for an active and more strategic relationship…it’s in Australia interests to do more with the UK to show that our strategic engagement isn’t just limited to a handful to Asia’s emerging powers’.

Therefore, the idea that Australia was not an active Commonwealth partner in defence is flawed, while opportunities for doing more in the modern era are certainly apparent. The question is how could Australia advance these links as well as create new ones?

Our report’s major proposal is the creation of a Commonwealth Security Forum (CSF) to take place alongside the biennial Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting. It could follow the hugely successful example of International Institute of Strategic Studies’ Dialogue series.

A CSF would provide all Commonwealth nations with the chance to discuss, understand and develop responses to a number of fundamental strategic concerns. It would also allow for private bilateral meetings to take place which could aid Australia in developing the Commonwealth ties mentioned above.

Another recommendation is for the creation of a Commonwealth military scholarship to allow young officers the chance to study in other Commonwealth nations thereby increasing educational understanding, as well as trust and loyalty. The final proposal is to upscale officer exchange programs between Commonwealth nations which will foster greater interoperability and camaraderie between members.

Crucial to the understanding of the Commonwealth strategic concerns is that we are looking ahead, not backwards. Ultimately solutions to the Commonwealth’s pressing defence problems need progressive and modern architecture to deal with them.

The last word should go to Dr Fox: ‘We cannot have too much dialogue or an excess of information in the era of globalisation. It may be that the Commonwealth could be coming of age in the right way at the right time. It is time to be bold’.