Forty years ago Australia decided to engage China. We should now embark on a similar path of engagement with Africa. Africa is on a growth trajectory that’s enabled it to become the world’s fastest-growing continent.

I recently returned from Zambia where ASPI teamed with South Africa’s Brenthurst Foundation to convene the second Aus–Africa Leadership Dialogue, after the first iteration in 2013.

Australia and Africa can work together across infrastructure, trade, education and broader security cooperation.

There’s been the recent opening of an Australia Africa Chamber of Commerce and the establishment of a Government Advisory Group on Australia–Africa Relations. There’ll be a ‘Doing business in Africa’ conference in Melbourne next month. We’ve got 200 Australian mining companies involved in over 700 projects in Africa.

Our relations with Africa aren’t about aid, they’re about investment, trade and people-to-people links.

Africa will have billion people by 2050. We need to change the narrative so we conceive of Africa as a rich continent, and one of opportunity.

Unfortunately Africa’s image is one of inefficiency and strife and therefore many think it’s better for Australia to focus on Asia.

Let me set out some possible areas of cooperation outside of the security domain, which will be the subject of a separate post.

In the area of health, the Ebola outbreak revealed that the World Health Organization needs a deployable, international volunteer medical corps for handling health crises.

Australia should be working with Africa to promote a voluntary multinational corps ready on short notice when the next health emergency arises. Australian companies in Africa can assist in future campaigns that focus on basic health and hygiene in the workplace and home.

Forty percent of Africa’s working age population is between 15 and 24. There’s a real need for entrepreneurship amongst youth in Africa. Several of Australia’s higher education institutions have entrepreneurship programs, but Africa has been off their radar.

Australian business can work with African researchers on how bigger companies can outsource to smaller companies to get younger people into the value chain.

Natural disasters act as a huge handicap on the development of many African countries. Australia can help in operational capacity. In Botswana, for example, the NSW Rural Fire Service has successfully trained fire fighters and established a coordinated firefighting model in bush fire prone Botswana. We have engineering companies that can assist in developing more resilient infrastructure.

In the area of road safety, Africa possesses only 2% of the world’s vehicles but contributes 16% to the global deaths. Australia could be working with African researchers and governments to understand the factors behind these figures.

In sports diplomacy we could expand our sporting scholarships and friendly matches to foster good will on the continent.

Many African countries have underfunded, but creative entertainment industries. Through our movie makers there’s opportunities to work with Africa to tell some great stories.

A memorandum of understanding was recently signed by our Foreign Ministry and a new body, the Australian Fashion Chamber, a peak body for designers, to promote our creative industries overseas. We could showcase the work of our designers in Africa and work with African designers to open doors to trade and investment.

Australian agriculture research and expertise can help improve productivity along food and agriculture chains in Africa. Australia has long confronted drought and water management issues. We know the challenges of producing crops that can withstand the elements. There’s a tremendous opportunity for Australia to export this knowledge to help build African capacity. Australia can contribute to African diets by applying our business services. Better food packaging, for example, can reduce food waste.

In the area of energy security, Australia’s pretty good at publishing our energy resources and plans; we could assist in African energy planning to ensure right long-term transparent investment framework is there. We can share how we develop energy supply chains: from power stations, transport of power to customers, through to the retailers who buy wholesale electricity and package it with transmission and distribution services for sale.

The blue economy concept is about marine economic activity as a driver of sustainable growth and development. The African Union has produced 2050 Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy.

Oceans will become an economic force this century, driven by new technologies that make it economically viable to tap marine resources and demographic trends fueling the search for food security and alternative sources of minerals and energy. Australia’s well placed to advance the blue economy working with Africa.

There’s plenty of opportunities for Australia to contribute to the development of the blue economy agenda (PDF) in Africa, whether it be by providing good data to better manage data-poor fisheries, helping with aquaculture systems, mapping wave-energy resources, and assisting with dredging science for port developments.

An Australian company, Carnegie Wave Energy, has just signed a memorandum of understanding with the Seychelles to investigate wave power and micro-grid opportunities.

Much of East Africa’s offshore oil and gas potential is at a depth of around 3500 meters. Australian company Woodside has experience developing gas resources at such depths (PDF). Australia and Africa should work together to take advantage of the opportunities offered by innovating in the blue economy.

The African proverb says it all: ‘if you want to go fast, go alone; if you want to go far, go together.’

The ANZUS study released this week by SDSC in conjunction with CSIS (PDF) says a lot of interesting things about the US alliance, but it seems to evade the hard issue at the heart of the strategic choices confronting both Australia and America today: what order do we wish to see in Asia in the Asian Century, and what role should America aim to play in it?

The SDSC–CSIS paper certainly raises this question, in commendably clear and direct terms:

Ultimately, US and Australian grand strategy must return to first principles: what is the regional and global order we seek; what are the ways and means we have to achieve and sustain that order; and how then does our strategic approach to China fit in?

But it provides no answer. The closest we get is this passage from what appears to the CSIS-drafted section of the paper:

Chinese leaders should be reassured that the United States and Australia are committed to integrating Beijing into an international order that permits it to take a larger leadership role, as long as doing so does not undermine regional security or weaken rules and norms vital to a peaceful order.

That doesn’t help much. It doesn’t tell us what kind of order is needed to uphold regional security and what rules and norms that requires. And it doesn’t address the really critical question about who gets to decide these things, and at what cost.

This passage seems to imply that America decides—perhaps with Australia’s help—what kind of order is acceptable and what role is acceptable for China to play in it. But can we take this for granted? China’s rise poses big questions for Asia’s strategic future precisely because it’s now powerful enough to contest US preferences on these questions. America and its allies can no longer assume that they can dictate the regional order or the terms of their relationship with China. These now have to be negotiated with China—or fought over.

So America and Australia each have to decide what elements of the regional order are negotiable with China, and what elements are not. We can’t assume that the two allies will reach the same conclusions. For example, Americans may decide that US primacy is the only acceptable basis for order in Asia, whereas Australians might decide that a strong US role short of primacy might be good enough.

That would mean America would be willing to confront and if necessary fight China to preserve primacy, while Australians would not. This is not an abstract question: it is exactly what would be at stake if a clash occurs, for example, over the Senkakus or Taiwan.

If Washington decided to fight China in such circumstances, it would be because they saw that as essential to preserving US primacy in Asia—which would be right—and that preserving US primacy was worth a war with China—which might not be right. Conversely, if Australia decided not to support America militarily—which is at least a clear possibility—it would show that we didn’t think US primacy was worth a war with China.

So there are very real potential differences between Australia and America over what aspects of the future regional order are worth fighting China over, and that points to the possibility of fundamental differences in the two countries’ strategic objectives. This is what threatens the future of the alliance.

The SDSC–CSIS paper seems to assume that these differences will be resolved, so that American and Australian objectives in Asia will remain as closely aligned in future as they have been in the past. The same assumption that is made by the two governments, of course. But that doesn’t make it right. And if it turns out to be wrong, then the practical measures and policy ideas proposed by the paper will mean nothing.

Tomorrow ASPI will release Gen Y jihadists: preventing radicalisation in Australia, our latest STRATEGY paper. This publication is the result of a major study by a team of contributors into the threat and nature of Islamist inspired terrorism in Australia and provides a series of policy recommendations based on its findings.

Gen Y jihadists follows reports that more than 100 Australians have left to fight for Islamic militant groups in Syria and Iraq and that the number of high-risk terrorism threats being monitored by Australian authorities had more than doubled. The paper includes a database of individuals identified from media reporting that are alleged to have left Australia to fight for groups like Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), as well as other individuals that have come to the attention of the authorities. The database includes 39 people categorised as foreign fighters, 20 of which have been killed.

The database shows that there’s no archetype of an Australian jihadist. Australian foreign fighters come from a diversity of backgrounds, and there’s a wide range of influences and factors that appear to contribute to their decision to take part in a conflict half a world away.

However, one recurrent factor was the presence of an influential mentor that encouraged or facilitated the person to make hijrah (migration). This finding mirrors reports from other Western countries pointing to the influence of ISIL ‘shepherds’ in encouraging their often young and disengaged ‘sheep’ to make the journey to join the Caliphate. Australian shepherds have operated from inside Syria and Australia, making contact with recruits both in person and online.

Former actor in the television series Underbelly, Mohammad Ali Baryalei, was considered to be the most senior Australian member of ISIL before his reported death in Syria in October 2014. He was believed to be an ISIL recruiter and reportedly facilitated the travel of at least 30 Australians fighting in Syria and Iraq. Counterterrorism officials now consider 23 year old Neil Prakash—a former Buddhist who converted to Islam—to be the top Australian recruiter for ISIL. He has featured in high profile ISIL recruitment videos and is understood to be named in a list of key contacts for aspiring ISIL foreign fighters.

Some ISIL supporters are believed to be recruiting within Australia. Abdul Nacer Benbrika, currently serving his jail term for directing plans for a foiled 2005 terrorist attack, is believed to have recruited budding violent extremists from within prison walls—several of his visitors went on to join ISIL.

Australians haven’t only been recruiting for ISIL. Forty year old disability pensioner, Hamdi Al-Qudsi, is currently charged with working from Sydney to recruit seven Australians to join extremist groups including the Syrian-based extremist group Jabhat al-Nusra. Al-Qudsi’s recruits allegedly include former ADF soldier Caner Temel. Another key Jabhat al-Nusra figure is Mostafa Mohamed, a former extremist preacher in Australia believed to be a top official and spokesperson for the organisation in Syria. Authorities have deemed him a ‘magnet’ for foreign fighters and he’s been likened to Anwar al-Awlaki, who was al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s prolific recruiter and mentor before his death in 2011.

The role of the key Australian shepherds isn’t limited to recruiting. There have been reports that some of the most influential Australian foreign fighters have ordered attacks on Australian soil. It’s alleged that Baryalei ordered Sydney-based Omarjan Azari to commit an on-camera killing of ‘any random unbeliever’ in Australia. Similarly, authorities believe that Prakash played a central role in the foiled Anzac Day attack this year.

Also commonly represented in the Gen Y jihadists database are individuals that make hijrah but don’t ascend to the ranks of Prakash or Baryalei. Those individuals include people like Jake Bilardi and Adam Dahman, both 18 year olds were reportedly killed carrying out suicide bombings (see here and here).

Many Australians have also helped to spread ISIL’s propaganda. The ‘Ginger jihadi’ Abdullah Elmir, for example, appeared in two ISIL videos including one that made direct threats to Australia. Others have been involved in unofficial propaganda through posting on social media, including former university student, Suhan Rahman, who called for others in Australia to ‘spill blood’.

It’s clear that any Australian who joins extremist groups in Syria and Iraq could play a role in luring more individuals to the cause. But while any foot soldier can become a recruiter, it’s the higher-ranking recruiters, like Neil Prakash and Jabhat al-Nusra kingpin Mostafa Mahamed, that are likely to pose the greatest national security risk. It’s those individuals that are believed to be facilitating the travel of new recruits and ordering plots on Australian soil.

The Gen Y jihadists database identifies many Australians who are believed to be pulling the strings in Islamic militant groups, as well as a significant number of others who have been drawn by the extremist siren song.

Register for ASPI’s Gen Y jihadists: preventing radicalisation in Australia publication launch and panel discussion here.

For 64 years the ANZUS alliance has been the holy grail of Australian national security policy—the alliance on which Australia relies in the event of an armed attack which it can’t repel alone.

But there are questions as to the  alliance’s long-term value as the United States faces seemingly chronic and recurring political, economic and social malaise, and as the economic and military power of China rises in an increasingly multipolar world.

Is ANZUS approaching its use-by date? And would abandoning ANZUS substantially and adversely affect Australia’s long-term strategic circumstances, relevance and reputation?

These are difficult, perhaps even heretical, questions given that Australia has relied for so long on American power. But there’s now a clear case for a radical reappraisal of Australia’s adherence to the treaty.

No Australian government wants to address these issues publicly. Both the government and the electorate want the security benefits of the ANZUS treaty and the economic benefits of the lucrative and growing economic relationship with China. Australia thinks it can have both.

There would be gains and losses if Australia moved to terminate its ANZUS obligations: gains in terms of national autonomy, maturity and international policy flexibility, and losses in terms of regional influence, access to high-end US intelligence, and to some US military technologies. National defence would become significantly more complex and expensive. Australia should plan for and manage these contingencies rather than confront them unprepared.

The 2009 Defence White Paper (DWP) estimates that the strategic primacy of the US declines after 2030—only 15 years in the future. (The 2013 white paper was more circumspect). But even if the US remains the world’s greatest superpower after 2030, its approach to ANZUS could be affected profoundly if its declared military rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region intensifies strategic competition with an increasingly aggressive China.

The US might become unwilling or unable to meet even qualified security guarantees to Australia. China might seek to put pressure on Australia to put its economic relationship with Beijing ahead of its alliance commitments to the US.

Australia might be unable to maintain a Washington–Beijing balance based in the recent words of Defence Department Secretary Dennis Richardson on friendship with both and alliance with one.

It might find itself increasingly alone surrounded by expansionist Asian giants—one of the most abiding fears in the Australian political consciousness. It might also, as the 2009 DWP suggests, find a hard-pressed US ally seeking Australian assistance in handling more regional crises and a belligerent China demanding that it desist.

How then to avoid snubbing the US or kow-towing to China? One way would be to depart the ANZUS alliance now on good terms with the US and without Chinese pressure. Australia could remain a close US partner outside the alliance, able to calculate its national security interests and to act as an independent agent without treaty obligations. In some ways this might enhance regional respect for Australia.

The treaty in fact provides only qualified security guarantees. Article III commits the parties to consult together whenever the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the parties is threatened in the Pacific. Article IV, the key action article, says:

Each party recognises that an armed attack in the Pacific area on any of the parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes

A lawyer could drive a truck through these words. Compare them with the action clause (Article 6) of the earlier North Atlantic Treaty (NATO) which declares that ‘an armed attack on one or more of the parties is deemed to an armed attack on the territory of any of the parties…’. An obligation to consult and to act in unspecified ways in accordance with unspecified constitutional processes hardly matches an obligation to regard an attack on one as an attack on all.

The 2009 DWP says ‘Australia would only expect the United States to come to our aid in circumstances where we were under threat from a major power whose military capabilities were simply beyond our capacity to resist’. It acknowledges that the treaty doesn’t commit Australia or the United States to specific types of actions, but ‘it does provide a clear expectation of support’.

But how is Australia’s ‘capacity to resist’ to be judged? And how is the level of ‘support’ to be defined and assessed? The only clue is the assertion that ‘for so long as nuclear weapons exist, we are able to rely on the nuclear forces of the United States to deter nuclear attack on Australia’. That assumption of protection under US extended nuclear deterrence might prove unduly optimistic in the event of a global confrontation between Washington and Beijing.

So what are the limits of the alliance security guarantees and what’s their value in a changing world? Have successive Australian governments since the early 1950s been right to pay the ANZUS treaty insurance premium in Australian blood and treasure in Korea, Vietnam, the Persian Gulf, Iraq and Afghanistan? Under what circumstances can Australia rely on US military assistance if it comes under armed attack given demonstrated US reluctance to assist Australia militarily when asked? In part two, I’ll consider some answers.

Consider the Trans-Pacific Partnership as an economic hard power weapon.

The TPP can’t deal out death like the US 7th Fleet. But a lot of the language used about the TPP is more geopolitics than geoeconomics.

The TPP is an attempt to shape Asia’s strategic environment, a hedging device and a major expression of the US rebalance. The TPP is about boosting US power and excluding China’s power. The TPP is zero sum – members are supposed to win and non-members miss the benefits. Plenty of hard power in all that.

As previously argued, the TPP is about who rules and who writes the rules.

That was the proposition Barack Obama put in his State of the Union address, and repeated in his interview with the Wall Street Journal:

If we don’t write the rules, China will write the rules out in that region.

As an expression of US rule making, what will the TPP mean for Asian geopolitics if it comes into existence? Let’s make a few big assumptions. Assume the US Congress does give approval to the TPP fast-track. Japan and America would then quickly resolve their bilateral arguments.Tokyo and Washington are ‘very close to a deal,’ according to Yoshiji Nogami, former Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, and now president of the Japan Institute of International Affairs.

It’ll be a remarkable achievement if the US and Japan can agree on a deep and broad free trade agreement. China is a potent force, indeed, if it can produce such a deal between the world’s first and third biggest economies.

The joke used to be that the last free trade deal in Asia would be between Japan and the US, because it would be the hardest to get. Steven Wong, of Malaysia’s Institute of Strategic and International Studies, says he’s had to abandon that jest. Now he says the last free trade deal in Asia will be between the US and China.
With the TPP, the Asia-Pacific will have its first mega cross-regional free trade agreement. Obama will have delivered on his promise to be a Pacific president, whatever you think of the worth of the TPP.

Nogami told the Asia Pacific Roundtable in Kuala Lumpur that this new economic order will have significant geopolitical impacts:

Beyond the scope of economic benefits, this has important implications for political and security circumstances in this region.

The win-lose equation has some price tags. A study quoted by Nogami estimated the TPP would deliver gains of US$105 billon to Japan and US$77 billion to America by 2025; the loss for China is estimated to be $35 billion.

The direct Chinese pushback to the TPP would be the proposed Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, which includes everyone but the US.

Yoshiji Nogami says the TPP is much more ambitious and beneficial because it’s a higher quality deal than can be achieved with the RCEP:

One problem with the RCEP is it is seen as some sort of alternative to the TPP, with lesser standards, lower standards. That’s not going to boost the RCEP. If you have a regime with lesser standards, if you have a regime which is not so ambitious, who is going to push a sub-standard agreement in the face of higher standards? The economic response is that countries which promote the TPP will have no major incentive for pushing a sub-standard product.

Steven Wong told the Roundtable that economic partnership agreements like the TPP are:

The most important foreign policy instruments in the Asia Pacific region. This may seem like a bold claim to make given the many traditional and non-traditional sources of tensions and potential flashpoints throughout the region. While there are some awesome attempts to address these concerns, nothing yet approaches the sheer expansiveness and depth of economic partnership agreements. They are the most visible and tangible manifestations at managing inter-state relations.

Wong thinks economic partnership agreements carry potent symbolic value that may be ‘more important than their actual substance.’ On this reading, see regional economic integration as ‘creating zones of influence.’ Wong says the Asia Pacific will need to deal with ‘multiple partnership regimes.’ The power balance is shifting and complicated—and competing trade deals reflect the contest.

Some economists see the TPP making more sense as a power play than as good economics. The Australian economist Ross Garnaut disputes the claim that the TPP sets the gold standard. Because it excludes China, India and Indonesia, he says, issues of preference and exclusion will loom large:

The TPP will systematically discriminate against non members through preferential arrangements. Members of TPP will put up barriers to trade with excluded countries that they won’t have with included countries. There will be limits on the proportions of value-added that can come from the excluded countries. And so we’ll end up with two sets of value chains in the region – one for members and one for non-members. One unintended consequence could be that to be an efficient producer of a lot of products, you will have to become part of the excluded countries, because you will not then be forced to exclude low-cost components from China, India and Indonesia.