Tomorrow ASPI will release Gen Y jihadists: preventing radicalisation in Australia, our latest STRATEGY paper. This publication is the result of a major study by a team of contributors into the threat and nature of Islamist inspired terrorism in Australia and provides a series of policy recommendations based on its findings.

Gen Y jihadists follows reports that more than 100 Australians have left to fight for Islamic militant groups in Syria and Iraq and that the number of high-risk terrorism threats being monitored by Australian authorities had more than doubled. The paper includes a database of individuals identified from media reporting that are alleged to have left Australia to fight for groups like Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), as well as other individuals that have come to the attention of the authorities. The database includes 39 people categorised as foreign fighters, 20 of which have been killed.

The database shows that there’s no archetype of an Australian jihadist. Australian foreign fighters come from a diversity of backgrounds, and there’s a wide range of influences and factors that appear to contribute to their decision to take part in a conflict half a world away.

However, one recurrent factor was the presence of an influential mentor that encouraged or facilitated the person to make hijrah (migration). This finding mirrors reports from other Western countries pointing to the influence of ISIL ‘shepherds’ in encouraging their often young and disengaged ‘sheep’ to make the journey to join the Caliphate. Australian shepherds have operated from inside Syria and Australia, making contact with recruits both in person and online.

Former actor in the television series Underbelly, Mohammad Ali Baryalei, was considered to be the most senior Australian member of ISIL before his reported death in Syria in October 2014. He was believed to be an ISIL recruiter and reportedly facilitated the travel of at least 30 Australians fighting in Syria and Iraq. Counterterrorism officials now consider 23 year old Neil Prakash—a former Buddhist who converted to Islam—to be the top Australian recruiter for ISIL. He has featured in high profile ISIL recruitment videos and is understood to be named in a list of key contacts for aspiring ISIL foreign fighters.

Some ISIL supporters are believed to be recruiting within Australia. Abdul Nacer Benbrika, currently serving his jail term for directing plans for a foiled 2005 terrorist attack, is believed to have recruited budding violent extremists from within prison walls—several of his visitors went on to join ISIL.

Australians haven’t only been recruiting for ISIL. Forty year old disability pensioner, Hamdi Al-Qudsi, is currently charged with working from Sydney to recruit seven Australians to join extremist groups including the Syrian-based extremist group Jabhat al-Nusra. Al-Qudsi’s recruits allegedly include former ADF soldier Caner Temel. Another key Jabhat al-Nusra figure is Mostafa Mohamed, a former extremist preacher in Australia believed to be a top official and spokesperson for the organisation in Syria. Authorities have deemed him a ‘magnet’ for foreign fighters and he’s been likened to Anwar al-Awlaki, who was al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s prolific recruiter and mentor before his death in 2011.

The role of the key Australian shepherds isn’t limited to recruiting. There have been reports that some of the most influential Australian foreign fighters have ordered attacks on Australian soil. It’s alleged that Baryalei ordered Sydney-based Omarjan Azari to commit an on-camera killing of ‘any random unbeliever’ in Australia. Similarly, authorities believe that Prakash played a central role in the foiled Anzac Day attack this year.

Also commonly represented in the Gen Y jihadists database are individuals that make hijrah but don’t ascend to the ranks of Prakash or Baryalei. Those individuals include people like Jake Bilardi and Adam Dahman, both 18 year olds were reportedly killed carrying out suicide bombings (see here and here).

Many Australians have also helped to spread ISIL’s propaganda. The ‘Ginger jihadi’ Abdullah Elmir, for example, appeared in two ISIL videos including one that made direct threats to Australia. Others have been involved in unofficial propaganda through posting on social media, including former university student, Suhan Rahman, who called for others in Australia to ‘spill blood’.

It’s clear that any Australian who joins extremist groups in Syria and Iraq could play a role in luring more individuals to the cause. But while any foot soldier can become a recruiter, it’s the higher-ranking recruiters, like Neil Prakash and Jabhat al-Nusra kingpin Mostafa Mahamed, that are likely to pose the greatest national security risk. It’s those individuals that are believed to be facilitating the travel of new recruits and ordering plots on Australian soil.

The Gen Y jihadists database identifies many Australians who are believed to be pulling the strings in Islamic militant groups, as well as a significant number of others who have been drawn by the extremist siren song.

Register for ASPI’s Gen Y jihadists: preventing radicalisation in Australia publication launch and panel discussion here.

For 64 years the ANZUS alliance has been the holy grail of Australian national security policy—the alliance on which Australia relies in the event of an armed attack which it can’t repel alone.

But there are questions as to the  alliance’s long-term value as the United States faces seemingly chronic and recurring political, economic and social malaise, and as the economic and military power of China rises in an increasingly multipolar world.

Is ANZUS approaching its use-by date? And would abandoning ANZUS substantially and adversely affect Australia’s long-term strategic circumstances, relevance and reputation?

These are difficult, perhaps even heretical, questions given that Australia has relied for so long on American power. But there’s now a clear case for a radical reappraisal of Australia’s adherence to the treaty.

No Australian government wants to address these issues publicly. Both the government and the electorate want the security benefits of the ANZUS treaty and the economic benefits of the lucrative and growing economic relationship with China. Australia thinks it can have both.

There would be gains and losses if Australia moved to terminate its ANZUS obligations: gains in terms of national autonomy, maturity and international policy flexibility, and losses in terms of regional influence, access to high-end US intelligence, and to some US military technologies. National defence would become significantly more complex and expensive. Australia should plan for and manage these contingencies rather than confront them unprepared.

The 2009 Defence White Paper (DWP) estimates that the strategic primacy of the US declines after 2030—only 15 years in the future. (The 2013 white paper was more circumspect). But even if the US remains the world’s greatest superpower after 2030, its approach to ANZUS could be affected profoundly if its declared military rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region intensifies strategic competition with an increasingly aggressive China.

The US might become unwilling or unable to meet even qualified security guarantees to Australia. China might seek to put pressure on Australia to put its economic relationship with Beijing ahead of its alliance commitments to the US.

Australia might be unable to maintain a Washington–Beijing balance based in the recent words of Defence Department Secretary Dennis Richardson on friendship with both and alliance with one.

It might find itself increasingly alone surrounded by expansionist Asian giants—one of the most abiding fears in the Australian political consciousness. It might also, as the 2009 DWP suggests, find a hard-pressed US ally seeking Australian assistance in handling more regional crises and a belligerent China demanding that it desist.

How then to avoid snubbing the US or kow-towing to China? One way would be to depart the ANZUS alliance now on good terms with the US and without Chinese pressure. Australia could remain a close US partner outside the alliance, able to calculate its national security interests and to act as an independent agent without treaty obligations. In some ways this might enhance regional respect for Australia.

The treaty in fact provides only qualified security guarantees. Article III commits the parties to consult together whenever the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the parties is threatened in the Pacific. Article IV, the key action article, says:

Each party recognises that an armed attack in the Pacific area on any of the parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes

A lawyer could drive a truck through these words. Compare them with the action clause (Article 6) of the earlier North Atlantic Treaty (NATO) which declares that ‘an armed attack on one or more of the parties is deemed to an armed attack on the territory of any of the parties…’. An obligation to consult and to act in unspecified ways in accordance with unspecified constitutional processes hardly matches an obligation to regard an attack on one as an attack on all.

The 2009 DWP says ‘Australia would only expect the United States to come to our aid in circumstances where we were under threat from a major power whose military capabilities were simply beyond our capacity to resist’. It acknowledges that the treaty doesn’t commit Australia or the United States to specific types of actions, but ‘it does provide a clear expectation of support’.

But how is Australia’s ‘capacity to resist’ to be judged? And how is the level of ‘support’ to be defined and assessed? The only clue is the assertion that ‘for so long as nuclear weapons exist, we are able to rely on the nuclear forces of the United States to deter nuclear attack on Australia’. That assumption of protection under US extended nuclear deterrence might prove unduly optimistic in the event of a global confrontation between Washington and Beijing.

So what are the limits of the alliance security guarantees and what’s their value in a changing world? Have successive Australian governments since the early 1950s been right to pay the ANZUS treaty insurance premium in Australian blood and treasure in Korea, Vietnam, the Persian Gulf, Iraq and Afghanistan? Under what circumstances can Australia rely on US military assistance if it comes under armed attack given demonstrated US reluctance to assist Australia militarily when asked? In part two, I’ll consider some answers.

Consider the Trans-Pacific Partnership as an economic hard power weapon.

The TPP can’t deal out death like the US 7th Fleet. But a lot of the language used about the TPP is more geopolitics than geoeconomics.

The TPP is an attempt to shape Asia’s strategic environment, a hedging device and a major expression of the US rebalance. The TPP is about boosting US power and excluding China’s power. The TPP is zero sum – members are supposed to win and non-members miss the benefits. Plenty of hard power in all that.

As previously argued, the TPP is about who rules and who writes the rules.

That was the proposition Barack Obama put in his State of the Union address, and repeated in his interview with the Wall Street Journal:

If we don’t write the rules, China will write the rules out in that region.

As an expression of US rule making, what will the TPP mean for Asian geopolitics if it comes into existence? Let’s make a few big assumptions. Assume the US Congress does give approval to the TPP fast-track. Japan and America would then quickly resolve their bilateral arguments.Tokyo and Washington are ‘very close to a deal,’ according to Yoshiji Nogami, former Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, and now president of the Japan Institute of International Affairs.

It’ll be a remarkable achievement if the US and Japan can agree on a deep and broad free trade agreement. China is a potent force, indeed, if it can produce such a deal between the world’s first and third biggest economies.

The joke used to be that the last free trade deal in Asia would be between Japan and the US, because it would be the hardest to get. Steven Wong, of Malaysia’s Institute of Strategic and International Studies, says he’s had to abandon that jest. Now he says the last free trade deal in Asia will be between the US and China.
With the TPP, the Asia-Pacific will have its first mega cross-regional free trade agreement. Obama will have delivered on his promise to be a Pacific president, whatever you think of the worth of the TPP.

Nogami told the Asia Pacific Roundtable in Kuala Lumpur that this new economic order will have significant geopolitical impacts:

Beyond the scope of economic benefits, this has important implications for political and security circumstances in this region.

The win-lose equation has some price tags. A study quoted by Nogami estimated the TPP would deliver gains of US$105 billon to Japan and US$77 billion to America by 2025; the loss for China is estimated to be $35 billion.

The direct Chinese pushback to the TPP would be the proposed Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, which includes everyone but the US.

Yoshiji Nogami says the TPP is much more ambitious and beneficial because it’s a higher quality deal than can be achieved with the RCEP:

One problem with the RCEP is it is seen as some sort of alternative to the TPP, with lesser standards, lower standards. That’s not going to boost the RCEP. If you have a regime with lesser standards, if you have a regime which is not so ambitious, who is going to push a sub-standard agreement in the face of higher standards? The economic response is that countries which promote the TPP will have no major incentive for pushing a sub-standard product.

Steven Wong told the Roundtable that economic partnership agreements like the TPP are:

The most important foreign policy instruments in the Asia Pacific region. This may seem like a bold claim to make given the many traditional and non-traditional sources of tensions and potential flashpoints throughout the region. While there are some awesome attempts to address these concerns, nothing yet approaches the sheer expansiveness and depth of economic partnership agreements. They are the most visible and tangible manifestations at managing inter-state relations.

Wong thinks economic partnership agreements carry potent symbolic value that may be ‘more important than their actual substance.’ On this reading, see regional economic integration as ‘creating zones of influence.’ Wong says the Asia Pacific will need to deal with ‘multiple partnership regimes.’ The power balance is shifting and complicated—and competing trade deals reflect the contest.

Some economists see the TPP making more sense as a power play than as good economics. The Australian economist Ross Garnaut disputes the claim that the TPP sets the gold standard. Because it excludes China, India and Indonesia, he says, issues of preference and exclusion will loom large:

The TPP will systematically discriminate against non members through preferential arrangements. Members of TPP will put up barriers to trade with excluded countries that they won’t have with included countries. There will be limits on the proportions of value-added that can come from the excluded countries. And so we’ll end up with two sets of value chains in the region – one for members and one for non-members. One unintended consequence could be that to be an efficient producer of a lot of products, you will have to become part of the excluded countries, because you will not then be forced to exclude low-cost components from China, India and Indonesia.

Getting Australian–Indonesian relations back on track is a politically sensitive issue and weighing it up may not be the prudent thing to do while there is still a lot of anger in the heart of many Australians and Indonesians.

But now I have been asked to answer the question: what will the state of bilateral relations be beyond the Chan–Sukumaran executions?

In my previous writing I stressed the need for the two countries to be able to see things from the other person’s point of view and reminded myself of the time when I was undergoing training to become a diplomat. We were told to cultivate the habit of two-handedness, to be able to say: on the one hand, this is how I see the issue, and on the other hand, you may have a point that I must consider.

However the more important question for Australia is, I believe, how will it live with a richer and more confident Indonesia? As part of ASEAN since 1967, Indonesia has benefitted from the external security and stability. As a result its economy is now one of the emerging economies. Indonesia’s economic output was $706.6 billion in 2010, up from just $95.4 billion in 1998 when the nation was embroiled in the Asian Financial Crisis.

In 12 years going up from $95.4b (1998) to $706.6b (2010) then to $1 trillion in 2013. Economic and political reform in the world’s fourth most populous nation made that possible.

Another important question is, how will Australia live with Indonesia situated in an East Asia that has become both the new political centre of gravity and a centre of struggle among rival major powers? And the only tool Indonesia can wield to deal with this situation is an over-structured regional architecture—partly built by ASEAN over the past two decades—and comprising a multiplicity of forums and platforms for dialogue.

As part of ASEAN, Indonesia has both contributed to and benefitted from the external security which helped promote its internal stability. Since 1967, ASEAN has been constructive in its role to maintain sub regional and regional peace and stability.

But Indonesia’s current geopolitical environment is both fluid and increasingly difficult to manage—and becoming more unpredictable by the day.

Nationally speaking, Indonesia needs economic growth, and for that to happen it needs continued internal stability and external security borne from the cooperation of all its neighbours. For Indonesia, putting its domestic political and economic houses in order will be the foundation of its foreign policy. It is important for Australians to appreciate that Indonesia—in fact, our region—is going through an uncertain period.

Australia needs Indonesia as a partner. Indonesia equally needs Australia both as a partner and as a collaborator in its regional architecture building. It is better to look to the future, rather than be prisoners of the past.

That is why I believe that both sides should not let themselves become bogged down by the wounds of recent controversy. But there could be more friction in future.

During the years that I served in the foreign ministry and dealing with Australia, I learned that indeed, in this age of information, countries scrutinise each other. That is a fact of international life.

But the developed countries of the West are doing most of the scrutinising, as the developing countries are more often distracted by their own domestic problems. Observation breeds criticism, and when officials express their views on issues through the mass media, they tend to address the gallery and to play to the grandstand. This generates a lot of heat without shedding light on the issues to be addressed. If Western countries over-scrutinising Indonesia’s situation means putting themselves on a pedestal, reactions from Indonesia will be less manageable and relations will become more difficult.

Governments and their leaders are of course important, but there are other players, such as the media which is sometimes part of the problem. By providing information and commentary on issues, the media shape public perception. Politicians and public officials must deal with these perceptions that are often stripped of nuance and reduced to their most simplistic forms. The traditional media have always tended to be sensational, but today the most sensational of them all are the social media. So much misperception, so much prejudice and so much hatred is being perpetrated through social media.

The impact of irresponsible media reportage and commentary is further complicated by the cultural traits of peoples. It is my impression that we Indonesians are a more emotional people compared to Australians and other Westerners who are more cerebral in their approach to issues.

We tend to deal with others on a heart-to-heart basis, while Australians do it head-to-head. So in the case of a controversy such as the recent executions, statements coming from Australia, which were meant to be simply sensible and practical, were received in Indonesia as hard hearted and cold blooded.

Responsible and knowledgeable people on both sides of our relations need to keep their emotions in check and to look for the right ideas to rebuild the relationship.

It would greatly help the relationship if we spent more time learning about each other instead of debating who is right wrong. And there should also be a more robust manifestation of mutual respect. While we are so unlike each other in terms of culture and traditions, the fact remains that we are neighbours—we are stuck with each other.

One of the most prudent things we can do is to invest in cross-cultural communication—in a way that shows respect for one another’s views. We can disagree while still showing respect for the person we disagree with. We must avoid the blame-game and refrain from speculation. Above all, we must avoid inflammatory language. We must shun megaphone diplomacy.

We must do more to promote our social-cultural relations. Our cooperation in the field of education must continue. At the same time we must make our economic partnership work for our peoples. They must feel and enjoy the benefits of that partnership.

We must work together to form a robust regional architecture through the ASEAN-led processes, especially the East Asia Summit.

These are the ballasts of our bilateral relations. If we keep on enlarging and strengthening them, if we keep on learning about each other and showing respect for each other, our bilateral relations will grow from strength to strength in all the years ahead.

A month ago, Stewart Patrick from the Council on Foreign Relations described the move by France, Germany, Italy and the UK to become founding members of the Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) as a ‘body blow to the US-led international order created in the wake of World War II, which is crumbling before our eyes.’

Few other analysts have been quite as gloomy. Most accounts of Australia’s belated decision to dip a toe in the water suggest the benefits of getting involved will outweigh the costs of not participating. According to that logic, the more Western shareholders with ‘seats at the table’ from the start, the less risk the new bank will adopt opaque governance structures or support Chinese political and business interests. A multilateral commercial bank like AIIB that makes bad lending decisions due to poor procedures would find itself in trouble faster than alternatives like China’s Silk Road Fund. The bank might even give Beijing a responsible stake in international public goods where there’s an $8 trillion need.

Australia’s last-minute scramble to make the AIIB’s cut-off date was inelegant. But while following the herd wouldn’t have burnished our reputation with either Washington or Beijing last month, at least it underlines to both where we sit. Hugh White’s ‘China Choice’ is principally a matter for Washington, not Canberra. There’d be little to be gained in trying to act as a trusted bridge between the two countries: inserting ourselves wouldn’t assist their clear communication but would imply an unhelpful equivalence.

Hugh regards the AIIB’s fairly graceful lift-off as a more significant milestone than do most, especially given America’s awkward effort to prevent it. He calls the AIIB debacle a ‘wakeup call for Washington’ as America’s China consensus slowly unravels. The episode fits the stark choice he sees between the US acknowledging China as an equal and yielding commensurate space or else trying to contain it in order to preserve American primacy.

I’d agree that the AIIB’s launch was significant. Sure, its US$50 to US$100 billion capital isn’t about to dominate international finance flows; America’s Bretton Woods institutions are far from the only basis of US predominance; and even rusted-on allies like Australia have failed to follow the US lead before (Graeme Dobell points approvingly to John Howard’s rejection of the IMF’s harsh medicine during the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis). It’s rare, though, to see so many close friends reject US overtures so quickly and utterly. Beijing’s success attracting donors over Washington’s objections may be ‘mainly symbolic’ but symbolism counts in the race for global influence—zero sum or not.

Still, I’d describe Washington’s ‘AIIB fiasco’ as more of a snafu than a watershed, and expect the upshot will be a case of America doing the right thing—after exhausting every alternative rather than radically changing policy direction.

As the US measures the harm it’s inflicted on itself, some blame the ‘imperial hubris’ of an administration that should have learned not to make such rigid demands after its experience with its Syrian red-lines. But there’s been more hand-wringing than finger-pointing as the chief cause is ultimately a level of gridlock no one can be too proud of. Since 2010 Congress has blocked reforms that would have allowed China to play the larger role it sought in the World Bank and IMF. While that mightn’t have prevented Beijing from wanting to establish an AIIB, it could have at least provided the US with a leg to stand on in opposing its creation. Instead, stymieing the reforms can only have strengthened China’s ‘if you can’t join ‘em, beat ‘em’ logic.

It’s tempting, then, to view the US government as so bitterly divided that it’s ‘on the verge of ceding the global economic stage’ and legitimacy it built at the end of the Second World War to the rising powers. The sharp drop-off in treaties being approved by the Senate during the current administration, reckless intransigence of Tea Party insurrectionaries, and recent spectacles such as sequestration might seem to support that concern. Yet neither US exceptionalism nor robust partisan wrangling are at all unprecedented. Presidents have grumbled about the Senate obstructing the executive’s foreign prerogative since George Washington’s time. The Senate famously rejected Woodrow Wilson’s Versailles peace treaty because it might bind Congress’ war-making powers to League of Nations decisions rather than because it seemed overly punitive. And during the George W. Bush era, the Senate twice refused to approve the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (which the US follows in practice, and might provide useful normative leverage against China’s maritime claims) despite strong administration support.

Although none of those examples offer cause for cheer, they remind us that domestic politics always shape the foreign commitments of democracies, and that US power has continued to grow through periodic past reverses. While it’s unrealistic to expect an end to political dysfunction anytime soon, President Obama has used executive agreements as effective tools to move his agenda forward. And there are signs Congress is getting closer to granting Trade Promotion (‘fast track’) Authority where it really counts: for Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations at the heart of the rebalance.

Rather than hoping the AIIB episode will spur Washington to seek a grand settlement with Beijing, we should expect regular historical jiggling to continue apace—between businesses, unions and parties, among others, domestically, and states, corporations, and competing trade blocs internationally. There we’ll have much to be thankful for, given the importance of accommodating China’s rise, if America’s AIIB-rout encourages it to play its strong hand a bit smarter.