Tag Archive for: Australia

China’s failed first attempt to stymie the Pacific Policing Initiative

It wasn’t the perfect start for the endorsement of the Pacific Policing Initiative (PPI) on Wednesday at the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) Leaders Meeting.

The Pacific-owned and led initiative aims to increase coordination and cooperation across the region as well as provide new training centres of excellence and deployable forces to regional crises. But concerns raised about the motives of the PPI, and Chinese attempts to influence perceptions of the initiative, failed to stymie the program or reduce its potential to deliver truly valuable assistance to the region.

Prior to the endorsement by PIF leaders, the PPI had received strong backing from several prime ministers, including Fiji’s Sitiveni Rabuka and Tonga’s Hu’akavemeiliku Siaosi Sovaleni. But then, in the midst of the forum, two other key leaders voiced concerns around the initiative’s potential to lock China out of the security space in the region. For a moment, there was uncertainty around how the PPI would progress.

Ni-Vanuatu prime minister Charlot Salwai said the Pacific needs ‘to make sure that this PPI is framed to fit our purposes and not developed to suit the geo-strategic interests and geo-strategic denial security postures of our big partners’. Director General of the Melanesian Spearhead Group, Leonard Louma, made similar comments.

The PPI is first and foremost an initiative for the Pacific by the Pacific that addresses key security needs. It responds to several statements from the region, including the Boe Declaration, PIF 2022 Communique and the 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific, which call for a family first approach to peace and security and regional solutions to regional security problems. The Pacific has a real need for policing cooperation, both to combat transnational crime and to address the capacity challenge the small island states face in training and maintaining their own security forces.

Greater interoperability and coordination between police across the region reduce the space and need for other external partners like China. Done right, the PPI would reflect the more principled approach desired and increased capacity for PIF members to collectively take care of their own security, something that every Pacific nation is striving for.

China, however, which is still attempting to increase its security presence across the region, would like the initiative to be perceived negatively.

Reporting on the PPI had been building prior to the PIF. The Sydney Morning Herald reported just before the meeting that the intent of the pact was to exclude China from the Pacific’s security architecture. This was promptly picked up by the Chinese Communist Party state media outlet, the Global Times, who accused Australia of pushing the initiative to exclude China.

But the Global Times has a history of trying to undermine Australia’s partnerships in the Pacific. Moreover, the statements in the article are patently overblown. The article includes the claim that the PPI ‘will grant Australia effective veto power over any possible security pact between China and the [Pacific island countries], according to the Australian report’. There was no such claim in the Sydney Morning Herald article, or anywhere else that we can find. There is no provision in the PPI agreement that undermines the sovereignty of Pacific nations or prevents engagement with China.

Multiple Pacific leaders, including PM Salwai, have visited Beijing in the months leading up to the PIF. China would likely be seeking to influence Pacific leaders on the PPI during these visits. Furthermore, Solomon Islands, who is set to host the PIF next year, reportedly attempted to remove Taiwan as an observer and development partner of the PIF. This move, in isolation, doesn’t reflect the values shared by many Pacific countries, particularly when three countries in the region maintain diplomatic ties with Taiwan. But that does not mean it is a move taken purely in isolation to other considerations.

In publicly airing a debate over geopolitics, the focus was temporarily lost on the Pacific’s real and pressing needs, and the positive architecture Australia can foster in the region. If China has its way and the PPI fails, it would ultimately hurt the development of the region.

The PPI will likely face further criticism from China, as will other initiatives that are emerging. The South Pacific Defence Ministers’ Meeting have a directive to develop a Pacific Response Group, which is a Pacific-led initiative to improve military coordination for humanitarian crises. Much like the PPI, better responses from within the region will mean less need for external partners.

Security cooperation in the Pacific cannot escape the spectre of increasing competition. Australia should lead the way in ensuring that Chinese machinations won’t impact important regional initiatives. Acknowledging competition and concerns over China doesn’t undermine Australia’s other, legitimate motives. Ignoring it, however, could lead to more awkward situations that damage Australia’s image. And when there are concerns raised by Pacific leaders, they should be addressed through open and honest dialogue.

Australia can, and should, do better than China. Both in terms of the support it provides, and in being honest and sincere in its engagement with the region to ensure that competition and influence from outside isn’t hurting its own development.

Australia’s national security community needs to become more culturally diverse

Australia’s national security community must do more to advance the culturally and linguistically diverse (CALD) make-up of its workforce, because increasing the diversity of perspectives in thinking would improve Australia’s strategic acumen.

As a nation, Australia is considered by many to be a multicultural success story, with more than 250 ancestries represented and 350 languages spoken in Australian homes, according to the last census. Our cultural diversity has enriched the political, social and economic landscape of Australia and its interactions with the rest of the world.

The national security community has benefited from the intercultural and multilingual skills possessed by many CALD Australians by allowing them to help Australia navigate an increasingly complex international environment. This is why Foreign Minister Penny Wong in a recent address at the Australian National University (ANU) called our diversity a ‘national asset’.

In order to better capture this capability, the Australian Public Service (APS) Culturally and Linguistically Diverse (CALD) Strategy announced in April provides a pathway for ensuring that government, including national security-related agencies, can better integrate the perspectives, knowledge and skills of CALD Australians to achieve better outcomes.

Despite these advantages, the available employment data suggests that CALD Australians are underrepresented in the national security community.

The strategy highlights that no APS agency has CALD representation at the senior executive level proportional to its cultural diversity at lower levels. The primary stated reasons were discrimination, unconscious bias and racism. Similarly, a 2019 survey of members of the International Studies Association showed that scholars of colour reported greater rates of feeling unwelcome and experiencing harassment. One scholar of colour felt that the situation was so dire because ‘there’s no way for women, scholars of colour and other underrepresented minorities to have a chance at leadership.’

Greater representation across the APS matters, not only because it allows the federal government to be better reflected by its own population but because it is a key tool in formulating more effective government strategy. Diverse high-performing teams tend to be stronger, create better policies, discover critical research conclusions, show better critical thinking skills and make better decisions. In doing so, they create positive iterative cycles with others, enabling them to make better decisions themselves.

Doing the opposite, however, worsens blind spots when responding to current and emerging security threats in Australia and the Indo-Pacific. What is rational to us might be completely irrational to another, and vice versa.

Before the APS CALD strategy, this effort was executed in a varied and uneven manner, often subject to change. As outlined, many organisations undertook their own actions, but more needs to be done to increase public accountability and their overall effectiveness. As a means to increase the awareness, importance and value of this view, the wider national security community should use the APS CALD strategy as a model to increase the transparency of their own cultural diversity initiatives.

There are several ways in which the broader national security community can build on existing programs aimed at addressing the unique challenges faced by many CALD Australians.

The first is through data collection. Data is needed to comprehensively understand the issues around CALD underrepresentation in the national security community. Current proxies, such as country of birth and first language spoken, alone are inadequate in fully understanding the cultural and linguistic diversity of Australian workplaces.

Tailored programs are needed next. CALD-related initiatives created in response to the findings of data analysis need to be introduced. This includes sponsorship, mentoring and leadership programs that are specifically focused on addressing the barriers faced by CALD individuals in national security. One promising initiative is the National Security College and ASPI’s joint WiNspire mentoring program, which has paired ANU students from CALD backgrounds with emerging or established female leaders in the national security community.

Finally, the integration of an intersectional lens. All national security programs aimed at increasing CALD inclusion need to adopt an intersectional approach. Intersectionality refers to the different aspects of a person’s identity that may expose him or her to overlapping forms of discrimination. For example, the discussions at the regularly held Women of Colour Public Sector Leadership and Allyship Summit offer a space to hear the challenges faced by CALD women in Australian public sector workplaces.

To be an effective security actor in the region in the future, Australia must increase the diverse perspectives in its strategic thinking. Poor representation in the national security community, including of CALD Australians, not only harms national security performance; it can also send the wrong message to our international security partners and be perceived as hypocritical to the values of equality and fairness that we proudly advocate.

Australia’s history and culture is diverse, and it stands to gain significantly from greater CALD representation and inclusion. In doing so, it can only improve the outcomes we want from our national security and intelligence agencies.

Biosecurity for food security

This week is Australia’s inaugural National Biosecurity Week (NBW). The event serves as a vital reminder of the importance of safeguarding our nation’s unique ecosystems and agricultural industries from harmful pests and diseases, underscoring our collective responsibility to preserve Australia’s natural heritage for future generations. Biosecurity is a fundamental enabler for Australia’s food security, a critical but often overlooked element of our national security, and it is time for it to be treated accordingly.

Australia’s biosecurity system is one of the most formidable yet largely unseen and unappreciated elements of our national defence, one that even has the power to compel great powers into compliance when conducting exercises in Australian territory. Most of us interact consciously with the system only when we re-enter the country and fill out our incoming passenger declarations. This interaction represents the tip of a system that cuts across every level of government and society.

It is this tip that is safeguarded by biosecurity arrangements designed to halt exotic pests and pathogens from breaching Australia’s borders. Producers and governments face costs in a breach, and prices rise. We see this now with recent egg purchase restrictions due to the H7 high pathogenicity avian influenza outbreak, which is likely to cost industries and governments more than $100 million. When the primary driver of domestic food insecurity has been the cost of living, that financial impact ultimately increases food prices that only expand the cohort of food-insecure Australians, leading to suffering and discontent.

Varroa mite, fall armyworm, foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) virus, Xylella fastidiosa, and citrus canker are only the best known among many pests and pathogens that threaten Australian primary production. Australia suffers about 40 new pest incursions every year, and some intruders, like fall armyworm and varroa mite, are now here to stay. Others, such as FMD and Xylella, have been kept out, but should they breach our borders, their impact would be devastating to livestock and plant production industries and the broader economy. The range of exotic pathogens beyond our borders is significant, and many are unheard of by most Australians. They remain unfamiliar because of a combination of luck and a biosecurity system under increasing pressure; the recent incursions of fall armyworm and varroa mite demonstrate that vulnerability.

It is this system that protects and enhances much of Australia’s national power through the protection of our way of life and hundreds of billions worth of economic benefits to the Australian economy. By underpinning our food security, it underpins fundamental pillars of social order, sustainability and national security. To safeguard it, Australia’s biosecurity arrangements must be fiercely protected and enhanced.

But taking biosecurity for granted surrenders to the strategic naivety that has left the world ill-prepared for crises previously considered preventable. A global pandemic, war in Europe, the spectre of nuclear war, kinetic war between Middle Eastern powers and increasing climate threats are all features of our contemporary reality. These threats demand that we avoid strategic missteps by not ignoring the factors that enable them and avoid the agonising between government and industry over what constitutes sustainable resourcing that is leaving the biosecurity system’s future in the balance. That uncertainty is stifling progress on implementing the 2022 National Biosecurity Strategy, a document released with the endorsement of the Australian government and all states and territories.

A strategic and coordinated approach matters because the system protects our heavily trade-oriented agricultural industry’s contribution to global food security via a production surplus far above domestic demand. However, this surplus is also the source of a misguided assumption that Australian food security is guaranteed.

Food security is defined by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization as: ‘when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life.’ Under these terms, the Foodbank Hunger Report 2023 found that 36 percent of Australians faced food insecurity in 2023, underscoring the socioeconomic factors at play. Similarly, the number of food-insecure people worldwide has increased since 2020, driven by conflict, climate shocks, economic downturn, growing inequality and Covid-19. Complacency in addressing food security will only drive strategic challenges that contribute to instability and armed conflict.

In this way, the system is equally affected by the same pressures as Australia’s defence organisation. It bears a similar responsibility to protect Australia’s national interest. It therefore must be valued as such and should become subject to the same conventions: that is, to fund the system as a percentage of GDP that reflects its true value to our economy, our environment, our food security and our way of life.

There will always be many competing priorities, but if we are serious about returning to fundamentals to enhance Australia’s national power, our biosecurity system must be accepted as a pillar of our national security.

From thought bubble to AUKUS

The AUKUS quest for nuclear-powered submarines is a thought bubble that turned into a huge project, driven by ambition and beset by anxiety.

Canberra’s instant political consensus is a striking element of how quickly the bubble became policy. The Labor-Liberal unity ticket was set at the moment the AUKUS vision was announced by Australia, the United Kingdom and United States. The three-year anniversary will come next month, September 15.

The distance covered was emphasised by Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister Richard Marles when he told Parliament on 12 August: ‘When we came to power, AUKUS was really not much more than a thought bubble, but since then we have been turning it into a reality.’ Marles says the thought is sailing along an ‘actual pathway’, steered by the Australian Submarine Agency, established on 1 July last year.

Some thought! Some bubble! Yet a lot more reality must be traversed. Even the believers see an extraordinary journey—the Optimal Pathway, an outline plan for project execution, stretches out to 2053, with the first Australian-built AUKUS submarine due in ‘the early 2040s’.

As the AUKUS voyage reached or approached two official milestones, in Canberra the Academy of Social Sciences in Australia held a symposium on the assumptions and implications of the strategic partnership on 15 and 16 August. The academy’s two-day effort did a fine job of examining how far the thought bubble had floated.

The milestones were the signing of a naval nuclear propulsion treaty providing the legal basis for AUKUS and the creation of an AUKUS trade zone for exchange of defence goods and technology.

Marles signed the nuclear propulsion treaty in Washington on 5 August, describing it as ‘a foundational part of the legal underpinning’ of building the nuclear-powered submarine. The trilateral agreement will operate until 2075. The pact allows the transfer of nuclear propulsion plants to Australia, makes Australia responsible for ‘management, disposition, storage, and disposal of any spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste’ and gives an Australian indemnity to the US and Britain for any ‘liability, loss, costs, damage or injury’ from nuclear risks.

The treaty gives Britain and the US the right to terminate AUKUS and demand the return of nuclear material and equipment. The termination clause can be used if Australia seeks to reprocess nuclear material, builds a nuclear weapon or breaches its obligations to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the International Atomic Energy Agency. As part of its non-proliferation pledge, Australia is negotiating a treaty with the IAEA to meet its Article 14 comprehensive safeguards obligations.

The other milestone is that from 1 September, AUKUS will have a new framework allowing freer trade of equipment and expertise. The exemptions remove licencing requirements for most controlled goods, technologies and services.

The AUKUS zone will have licence-free trade for 70 percent of defence exports from the US to Australia that are subject to arms traffic regulations, and 80 percent of defence trade under US export regulations. The deal eliminates the need for 900 export permits covering Australian exports to the US and Britain, valued at $5 billion annually. Taking lessons from the AUKUS effort to cut red tape, the US has also set out principles to build the Indo-Pacific defence industry base.

The Academy of Social Sciences symposium looked at the political, legal, strategic and economic aspects of the nuclear-powered submarine.

While Canberra has made a treaty commitment to store AUKUS nuclear waste, Maria Rost Rublee said Australia was yet to build a nuclear culture and create a social licence for storage. The Melbourne University international relations professor said that if Australia couldn’t build that culture, the US and Britain would not transfer the technology. ‘This weighs heavily on Australian minds,’ she said.

What constituted appropriate safety and risk for long-term storage of military-grade nuclear waste from nuclear-powered submarines, she said, was not just a technical issue but a social and political decision. ‘This is not going to be easy. The technical and geological problems can be solved,’ Rublee said. ‘There have been many proposals around the world for nuclear waste storage. All of them fail for lack of social licence.’

The government declaration that Australia’s storage would be on defence land couldn’t avoid issues of community consent and understanding, Rublee said, pointing to the many failed attempts around the world to establish long-term nuclear storage sites. Rublee noted those unsuccessful efforts had created an acronym for the storage failure: DADA. The DADA cycle is to Decide on a site, Announce it, then Defend it against community resistance that eventually leads the government to Abandon it.

Canberra’s treaties and optimal pathways will have to undergo many versions of that DADA test. The next column by this author will report on how the Academy discussed the submarine Australia needs and the Asia-Anglosphere dimensions of AUKUS.

Kiribati’s upcoming presidential election: a chance for a reset

Kiribati’s polls have closed, and the results are in. There won’t be a president for several weeks, but, regardless of the outcome, Australia will be hoping for a fresh start.

When parliament is formed, it must put forward at least three presidential nominations for another public election. Incumbent President Taneti Maamau was re-elected to parliament and is likely to seek to keep the presidency.

The Kiribati people voted, first and foremost, on issues affecting their daily lives, including climate threats and economic development needs. However, as Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong has said, we are in a ‘permanent contest’ with China over influence in the Pacific. How governments are navigating that contest is increasingly affecting voters across the region.

The Australia–Kiribati bilateral relationship has been in decline, but the election will provide an opportunity for a reset. For the sake of the ongoing development assistance that Australia is hoping to provide our near region to ensure its stability, Canberra must find a way to move forward with any incoming President through more dialogue and greater transparency on our own activities, starting with an invitation to visit our capital at their earliest convenience. The relationship has been challenged by a series of disagreements that Maamau has aired publicly, asserting himself domestically and internationally. If he does return as president, Australia must do more to show we are listening to these concerns.

In 2020, Maamau’s party lost its majority of seats, but he returned for a second term as president based on a campaign that addressed local issues and steered clear, where possible, of concerns about cutting ties with Taiwan and the growing relationship with China. This year, shying away from geopolitics may be more difficult, as the people of Kiribati now find themselves with the Chinese paramilitary, the People’s Armed Police, on the ground in their small island nation.

The presence in Kiribati of the force (revealed only in February this year) concerns the Australian government, which has struggled to respond. The minister for international development and the Pacific, Pat Conroy, said there should be ‘no role’ for China in policing the Pacific islands and offered instead to send Australian police. But such broad comments could risk alienating Pacific countries by disregarding their sovereign decision-making. Australia should be more open about the real risks that come with Chinese police in the region, including their use in suppressing Chinese dissidents, collecting biodata and conducting mass surveillance.

Overenthusiastic and unsubstantiated posturing could jeopardise Australia’s relations in the region; Kiribati has recently shown reluctance to allow other forms of assistance from Australia. For example, it blocked support from the Pacific Media Assistance Scheme.

Maamau’s government signed a memorandum of understanding with Australia in February 2023 ‘nurturing cooperation’ across a broad range of sectors, including economic reform and maritime security. However, any talk of a stronger agreement or treaty has been put on ice. More recently, Maamau was quick to downplay any discussion of Kiribati signing a treaty similar to the Falepili Union between Australia and Tuvalu. A new government could see a shift in Kiribati’s approach to those larger agreements, but transparency and time for proper consultation across groups will remain the key.

Fortunately, Australia has been able to continue with the delivery of a new barracks, headquarters and radio system regardless of the tension. Even if the relationship has soured, Canberra understands that it’s important to continue to support lasting and meaningful development for the country.

Another point of tension is the breakdown of independence in Kiribati’s judicial system after Australian David Lambourne, a long-serving High Court judge in Kiribati, was removed and later deported. Some believe this move was meant to make the opposition’s life more difficult before the election.

Incumbent opposition leader Tessie Lambourne is the partner of David Lambourne. More importantly for the people of Kiribati, she is a former dedicated and decorated civil servant who has filled the role of secretary in many government departments and was Kiribati’s final ambassador to Taiwan before the switch to recognising the People’s Republic of China in 2019.

David Lambourne was removed in ‘proceedings that violated international standards’, according to a United Nations Human Rights special rapporteur, who also voiced concerns over Kiribati’s judicial independence. The change is part of a larger trend of declining public transparency.

Kiribati, like all Pacific island countries, is seeking to solidify its identity, values and place in the region and the world, and each country must navigate those waters in the way that makes most sense to it. Kiribati’s temporary withdrawal from the Pacific Islands Forum in 2022 forced the organisation to ensure that the country’s voice was heard. Similarly, Maamau’s public criticism of AUKUS boils down to resentment that Australia did not consult Kiribati. The criticism reminds partners that Kiribati wants to be seen as an equal and will do things its own way.

A good partner understands those concerns, and Australia has made positive steps to demonstrate that. Canberra will be hoping that it can use the presidential election as a chance to start afresh, even if it is with a returning Maamau. But Australia must also continue strong public consultations about initiatives and support and keep encouraging transparency from all governments and partners in the region, ensuring that the contest for influence doesn’t get in the way of helping our Pacific family.

Australian superannuation can be a source of national security capital

Australia needs to invest more heavily in defence and national security, yet the government is struggling to match rhetoric with reality in the May federal budget.

The budget showed that Australia is pushing back the necessary investment and injection of additional resources to bolster a sovereign defence industry and workforce. One potential solution is to use the A$3.5 trillion that Australians hold in superannuation savings—which is 140 percent of Australia’s $2.5 trillion annual gross domestic product.

There is growing engagement with this idea within the Australian government. Both Treasurer Jim Chalmers and Defence Industry Minister Pat Conroy have publicly supported the use of superannuation funds to invest in defence capabilities. Similarly, the Defence Strategic Review (DSR), the National Defence Strategy (NDS) and the Integrated Investment Program (IIP), while not outright identifying superannuation capital pools, have emphasised the role of the investment community that superannuation funds belong to in supporting Australia’s national security.

There is a compelling case for directing private capital into national security, particularly as the government navigates the strategic necessity of investing in advanced technology leadership while domestic cost of living challenges continue to intensify. Incentivising private capital investment into national priority areas isn’t new to the government. However, to date, the main focus areas have been in sectors such as housing or green energy.

While the funding of the defence industry is often politically contentious, it is important that nuance is given to this narrative and the government takes a forward-leaning role in identifying areas of national security more broadly that need private capital support, such as advanced manufacturing and dual-use technologies.

The primary duty of super funds is to maximise returns for their members, as their capital is the sum of individual Australians’ hard work and savings for their future retirement. As baby boomers retire, priorities are now shifting to low-risk investments. Therefore, the challenge is to ensure that projects are attractive to suitable superannuation investors.

The Housing Australia Future Fund (HAFF) is an interesting case study of the problems of thinking that superannuation is a pool available for government policy initiatives. Due to the strict requirements necessary to meet members’ needs, there were issues with engagement with the HAFF. Even industry superannuation funds have historically struggled to participate despite their political and ideological alignment with the present Labor government and self-interest in housing.

This is a subtle point missed by many: approaching the superannuation industry and asking chief executives of companies that are trustees of regulated superannuation funds to support an initiative is largely meaningless. Neither bank nor superannuation fund CEOs can tilt the rules of their organisations away from prudence and safe custody, no matter how often they are asked or how interested they may be in government projects.

Australian superannuation funds are governed by several pieces of legislation, which together provide a framework for the operation, management and standards of the funds. They are regulated by the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission and the Australian Taxation Office. The regulations subject funds to various risk requirements to ensure the security and stability of members’ investments. Compliance with those requirements is essential for maintaining the trust and confidence of members and regulators and the integrity of the system.

The funds have discretion over the investments they choose or reject within the laws and rules of their investment thesis and strategy. This siloed approach is logical, given the scale of assets under management and the diversity of expertise required to manage the funds, but it does create additional complexity for those seeking to engage, especially if the opportunity does not fit neatly into a single bucket. This is likely to be one of the key challenges for government-sponsored projects seeking backing of superannuation funds, as they are often not restricted to a single investment category.

Navigating superannuation funds’ processes and policies to meet the risk and return requirements on investments is important, but investment opportunities must also be shaped to meet investors’ requirements. For example, while funds can invest at their discretion, many also have environmental, social and governance (ESG) investment policies that may restrict or prohibit investments in specific industries or companies involved in controversial activities, such as weapons manufacturing.

While there are challenges in using superannuation funds for defence investment, there are ways to resolve them. Understanding industries that are dual-use and serve national security writ large is an important distinction in the Australian narrative.

First, governments looking to mobilise superannuation funds to invest in national security must understand that any investments made by a fund must come from the bottom up through the investment process, not top-down through management strategy or influence. If the government wants to effectively leverage private capital (including superannuation funds) in its strategic projects, then it must develop a way to understand what projects have the best chance of making it through those processes and facilitate them.

Second, many defence capabilities rely on manufacturing that broadly benefits national security, such as advanced production of semiconductors or processing critical minerals. Those industries are dual-use: while they support defence capability needs, they are commercially viable and essential for maintaining Australia’s quality of life. For the Australian government, navigating ESG and other investment filters requires a strong knowledge of the investment process and could be resolved through dual-use technology projects.

Third, one option is to create an Uplift Project Office to coordinate engagement with the investment community and government departments tasked with executing strategies that support the whole-of-nation efforts needed to meet national-security goals as outlined in the DSR.

The government already has access to knowledge from a world-class, prudent and scaled investment process through Australia’s sovereign wealth fund, the Future Fund. The Future Fund is not a superannuation fund; it is a sovereign wealth fund that is independently managed to strengthen the government’s long-term financial position through profitable investments. This should be used as an investment template to familiarise the government with the processes and requirements associated with mobilising private-sector capital for national-security-related investments.

Therefore, the Uplift Project Office should sit under the minister for defence to ensure that national-security priorities are embedded in the office’s bottom-up activities and align with complementary top-down activities under the newly established IIP. An advisory council made up of senior individuals actively working across Australian, US and British investment sectors should also be established to assist in setting up and running the Uplift Project Office .

Australia has one of the world’s largest underutilised pools of capital sitting in its superannuation funds. The 2024–25 federal budget needs to provide more to meet the goals of the NDS and IIP. There is a window of opportunity for the Australian government and private capital to work hand in hand to reconcile investment requirements with national-security imperatives. Doing so will be key in ensuring Australia is fortified for the future.

Kishida’s departure is not all bad news for Australia

At face value, the impending resignation of Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida next month might worry Australian policy pundits who favour continuity. But a new leader, set to be elected on 27 September, may be empowered to launch bolder reforms on national security policy in ways that Kishida presently is not. That would ultimately benefit Japan’s regional security partners, including Australia.

Kishida’s 14 August announcement that he would not seek re-election as president of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the position that makes him prime minister, is not surprising. His party has suffered political funding scandals, and Japan’s economic performance is only middling. These factors saw support rates for both Kishida and the LDP plunge to a record low of in June, leading Kishida to judge that he would not have enough party support to remain as leader.

Nonetheless, he will leave office with a relatively successful foreign and defence policy record. Kishida enhanced the US–Japan alliance, revived Japan–South Korea bilateral relations and trilateral activities with the United States, and upgraded the Australia–Japan relationship to a quasi-alliance. On defence, he overhauled Japan’s security posture, championing major funding increases and force structure changes, including the procurement of long-range strike weapons, mobilising support with the adage ‘Ukraine may be the East Asia of tomorrow’.

Australia wants that trajectory to continue, so it needs Kishida’s successor to be bold on policy and, ideally, politically durable. Similar to when former prime minister Yoshihide Suga resigned in 2021, there are concerns that a return to revolving-door leadership could stall Japan’s ambitious defence reform agenda and blunt its regional foreign policy edge.

Notwithstanding that risk, Kishida’s departure could yet prove beneficial for Australia if his successor is empowered to tackle difficult policy challenges.

It’s true that the leadership change comes at a time when Japan has become increasingly central to Australian regional strategy, marked by the elevation of the strategic partnership in the 2022 Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation. Kishida implemented crucial defence and foreign policy initiatives, improving practical cooperation between the two countries. If these efforts are stalled, it may perpetuate the views of some in Australia’s policy community that Japan is incapable of moving faster or undertaking ambitious policy reform.

On the other hand, Kishida’s ability and willingness to make difficult policy trade-offs has waned significantly with his declining political fortunes in office. Some also argue that Kishida pursued security policy reforms for reasons of domestic political survival, rather than his own beliefs. Indeed, despite overseeing a revolution in Japanese national security, he may be better remembered for implementing the strategic vision and policy agenda of Shinzo Abe rather than his own. If Kishida had stayed on and failed to revive his public and party standing, his policy ambiguity and dwindling influence could have complicated complex decisions such as Japan’s potential engagement with AUKUS.

For Australia, then, what matters is the extent to which Kishida’s successor can make bold national security policy decisions, rather than simply stay the course.

Many potential candidates have substantial national security experience, including former defence minister and LDP secretary general Shigeru Ishiba, and former foreign minister and current LDP Secretary General Toshimitsu Motegi. The list also includes cabinet ministers Taro Kono, Yoshimasa Hayashi, Ken Saito, Sanae Takaichi and Yoko Kamikawa, as well as such other influential politicians as Kato Katsunobu, Shinjiro Koizumi, Takayuki Kobayashi and Shigeharu Aoyama.

Some public surveys place Ishiba at the head of the pack. But the sheer volume of potential candidates and complex LDP factional dynamics means the race is hard to pick.

On national security, conservatives like Ishiba, Takaichi and Aoyama are quite forward-leaning, arguing for bold amendments to Article 9 of the constitution and for transforming Japan’s defence-oriented policy. Ishiba, for instance, has questioned the concept of ‘minimum necessary force’ derived from the constitution’s prohibition of maintaining ‘war potential’, asking whether the minimum threshold for deterring North Korea should be the same for China.

Meanwhile, moderate realists such as Motegi, Kono, Kamikawa, Koizumi and Kobayashi would likely inherit Kishida’s foreign policy brand, balancing defence investments and enhancements to the US–Japan alliance against stable relations with China. Kono, for instance, is known both for his unusual bluntness in framing China-related security challenges and his straight talking on tricky alliance issues.

Whoever replaces Kishida, Canberra and Tokyo will keep working closely with each other and with Washington to manage the deteriorating strategic balance in the region. The key variable for Australia will be the capacity of Japan’s new leader to act swiftly and decisively on policy implementation.

NATO and its Indo-Pacific partners should cooperate to increase arms output

NATO and its four Indo-Pacific partners should cooperate and coordinate to ease a munitions shortage by increasing production of basic supplies, such as artillery shells, and further easing rules that restrict trade in more sophisticated weapons. Cooperative action is all the more necessary as support for Ukraine empties ammunition stocks and as NATO and its Indo-Pacific friends look warily at the risks of wars erupting simultaneously.

Russia’s full-scale assault on Ukraine since 2022 has made clear to NATO, Japan, South Korea and others that their post-Cold War demilitarisation and reduced capacity for production of ammunition and weapons have left them vulnerable.

NATO’s four Indo-Pacific partners are Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea, collectively called the IP4 (and until recently known as the Asia-Pacific partners, or AP4). The grouping is loose and informal and based on shared geopolitical outlooks. The AP4 countries have all responded firmly against the war in Ukraine and are making efforts to limit Russia’s aggression that are laudable, given their distance from the conflict. They also share similar interests in their own region, with Australia, New Zealand and South Korea supporting Japan’s ambition for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific.

NATO and the IP4 need a more thorough platform of coordination and cooperation on key security matters. This is particularly important, because there are no plans for an Indo-Pacific alliance in the style of NATO. The most pressing issue is munitions production, in which the IP4 countries severely lag behind adversaries in the region: China, Iran, North Korea and Russia. Not only would the IP4 be able to support each other; they could also expect reciprocal help from NATO members.

Amid the shortage of supplies, making basic ammunition is an obvious opportunity for cooperation. Scarcity is so dire that NATO states have been unable to send Ukraine all that it needs, and even the EU has allocated funds to double annual shell production among its members. This may still not be enough to counter Russia’s robust war economy.

So NATO members and the IP4 must intensify efforts. It is in their mutual interest to increase cooperation, especially on munitions and arms that are not subject to such tight export restrictions and secrecy requirements as advanced weaponry is. Meanwhile, for the long term, easing restrictions between like-minded countries for transfers of more advanced weaponry, such as air defense systems, may be especially important for the Indo-Pacific region.

Among the many lessons of the war in Ukraine is that conventional artillery is still important in land warfare. Ukraine urgently needs more artillery and ammunition for it. A similar situation could emerge on the Korean peninsula if the truce that has endured since the end of the Korean War broke.

Meanwhile, Russian aerial bombardment of Ukrainian cities has destroyed critical infrastructure. Defense systems, such as the US Patriot surface-to-air missile system, have been both crucial and scarce. This would also be an issue in a conflict in the Taiwan Strait or elsewhere in China’s vicinity and could make or break defensive efforts.

Japan has eased its restrictive export regime to indirectly supply Ukraine with domestically made Patriot systems. It is also considering easing restrictions on exporting explosives needed for artillery shells. Australia is likewise looking to increase its defense production over the long term, including missile development cooperation with the US. South Korea has increased its arms exports to Europe, and sees the trend continuing. New Zealand is small and has a very limited defence industry, but its potential, could be used optimally by coordinating with NATO and the rest of the IP4.

Beyond words: Australia must act to protect civilians in Gaza and Lebanon

As regional tensions escalate threats to civilians across the Middle East, our leaders need to take concrete steps to prevent further civilian harm.

Those steps should include an immediate embargo on arms and arms components destined for Israel, an affirmation of the existence of the Palestinian state, and expanding targeted sanctions to include Israeli leaders who are responsible and who call for continued unrestricted warfare in Gaza.

Prime Minister Anthony Albanese affirmed last month, alongside his counterparts from Canada and New Zealand, that ‘the situation in Gaza is catastrophic. The human suffering is unacceptable. It cannot continue.’ Many Australians agree, watching in horror over the past 10 months as attacks in Gaza continue to intensify: so-called ‘safe zones’ are declared and then revoked amid a persistent looming threat of famine, and a record number of aid workers have been killed, including Australian Zomi Frankcom.

Across Australia, people continue to take to streets, harbours and university campuses to demand an end to civilian suffering. As regional tensions escalate, prompting urgent calls for Australians to leave Lebanon, people are asking, ‘How is this still happening? Are we really doing enough to make it stop?’

As protection practitioners, we know that statements condemning civilian harm are necessary, as illustrated in the outpouring of condemnation following the 7 October Hamas attack on Israel last year. Calling out civilian harm and reminding all parties to the war, including Israel, of their legal obligation to spare civilians during hostilities are critical elements of the political pressure that must continue to be exerted. Yet words are not enough. Australia’s efforts to use its leverage to mitigate the escalating violence that is now extending to Lebanon must include timely and concrete actions.

Our allies know that, and we need to follow suit. In the wake of the landmark ICJ advisory opinion that found Israel’s occupation and annexation of the Palestinian territories to be unlawful, many countries have already taken concrete steps to prevent further violations of international law. Beyond upholding our international legal obligations, concrete action is essential to exert the necessary pressure for a lasting ceasefire and to de-escalate tensions that are threatening civilians across the region.

Those steps follow earlier actions taken by a host of countries, including South Africa, which led a coalition of states to bring a case against Israel to the ICJ, and such EU states as Norway, Ireland, Spain and Slovenia, all of which have recognised Palestine as a state. The new British Labour government is reported to be reviewing arms export licences to Israel, following Canada and the Netherlands, which have stopped shipments of weapons.

Australia can and should take stronger action to protect civilians in Gaza, Lebanon and the wider region, putting practical action behind Albanese’s affirmation that ‘The protection of civilians is paramount and a requirement under international humanitarian law. Palestinian civilians cannot be made to pay the price of defeating Hamas. It must end.’ This has only become more urgent following the assassination last month of Ismael Haniyeh, the lead Hamas ceasefire negotiator, and the increasing fear of retaliatory actions that could spark a regional war, dramatically increasing threats to civilians across the region.

As a middle power, Australia has a critical role to play in upholding the rules-based order and the necessary protections for civilians provided in international humanitarian and human-rights law. We need to be clear in amplifying our democratic and human-rights-based values, which include respect for academic freedom and the right to peaceful protest. And, to be taken seriously, we need to act to protect those legal standards and values when situations like Gaza threaten their erosion. Granting continued impunity in the Israel–Gaza crisis increases threats for civilians everywhere.

There are clear steps that Australia must take. That means an immediate embargo on shipments of arms and arms components, including dual-use exports that can be used for civilian and military purposes. Recent Senate estimates revealed continuing exports from Australia to Israel related to military activities. Even since the assault on Gaza escalated in 2023, the Department of Defence has renewed or signed almost $100 million in contracts with Israeli-owned companies such as Elbit Systems.

In the Netherlands, a court recently ordered the Dutch government to block similar kinds of exports to Israel, highlighting the risks of breaching international law if they were to continue. Aligned with its policy that continues to affirm a two-state solution, the Australian government needs to align with EU allies and others in recognising that two states exist, affirming the existence of Palestine alongside Israel. Australia can build on sanctions announced by Foreign Minister Penny Wong last month by extending restrictions to Israeli leaders who continue to support unrestricted warfare in Gaza, as we have in other conflicts involving breaches of international law—for example, against Russia over its invasion of and ongoing attacks on Ukraine.

Through timely, concrete action, Australia can demonstrate its commitment to protecting civilians in Gaza and the wider region and its respect for the international legal obligations arising from the ICJ ruling. Such actions align with our important role as a middle power, reinforcing our legitimacy through a consistent approach with like-minded countries to defending the rules-based order and protection for all civilian populations.

The UN cybercrime convention: a victory for state sovereignty

On 8 August, UN member states agreed to what was once deemed implausible: a universal cybercrime convention. A Russia-led effort to challenge existing Euro-centric standards for law enforcement cooperation turned into an agreement that preserves human rights protections instead and focuses on actual cybercrimes.

But the new convention, which still awaits adoption by the UN General Assembly, may come at a price, as binding treaties and state sovereignty appear to surface as the guiding principles of global cyber governance.

In December 2019, when the idea for ‘a comprehensive international convention on countering the use of [information and communication technology] for criminal purposes’ was presented to the General Assembly, the international community was sharply divided. Russia, China and most Southeast Asian countries were among those that cast the 79 votes in favour, while 60 delegations (including Australia, most European states, Japan, Britain and United States) voted against.

Australia and likeminded partners have always argued there was already a legal mechanism in place: the Budapest Convention. Agreed under the purview of the Council of Europe in 2001, it facilitates cooperation between law enforcement agencies on cybercrime issues for joint investigations, sharing and recognition of digital evidence, jurisdictions and extraditions. The Budapest Convention also contains an agreed set of core cybercrimes and cyber-enabled crimes. It includes safeguards for human rights and other fundamental freedoms and a review mechanism and facilitates access to technical assistance.

This was now all going to be duplicated or, worse, hollowed out in the process of creating a UN convention. Indeed, throughout its negotiation process, attempts were made to broaden the remit of cybercrime. For example, China proposed criminalising the ‘dissemination of false information … that could result in serious social disorder’, while India advocated for criminalising offences related to ‘cyber terrorism’.

The problem with the Budapest Convention is that it’s in name and spirit a European convention. While non-members such as Australia, Brazil, Fiji, Nigeria, Philippines and Tonga are among the 76 states that are party to the treaty, it was too easy to dismiss as non-inclusive and non-representative. Russia, itself a former member of the Council of Europe, never signed it. Moscow cited a lack of respect for state sovereignty, because it would allow for cross-border law enforcement operations without the consent of that state. Other states, such as South Africa, followed this narrative.

But while the new UN cybercrime treaty isn’t perfect, it’s far from a slam-dunk victory for Russia and China. In fact, Russia, Iran, and Egypt continued to hold strong objections until the very last moment. Perhaps this is the strongest indicator of success in holding back attempts of further state repression in the digital realm.

In an early draft, Russia proposed various controversial points, such as an expanded list of crimes that would be criminalised and an erosion of democratic and human rights safeguards. While considered during negotiations, these offences did not make it into the final text.

Iran, with backing from Russia, called for seven rounds of voting to remove paragraphs that contained human rights safeguards. For instance, Iran sought the removal of an article allowing states to deny mutual legal assistance if they have reason to believe the investigation is discriminatory on the basis of a person’s sex, race, language, religion, nationality, ethnic origin or political opinion. The vote resulted in a resounding defeat: 102 against and only 23 in favour.

The strongest critique to the UN convention comes from civil society organisations and the tech industry. They believe that the convention is too broad in scope and could be misused for surveillance and repression by authoritarian states seeking prosecution of alleged criminals residing in foreign jurisdictions. Industry fears it could be compelled to hand over data against terms and conditions and the laws of their home jurisdictions. Others point out that the convention could allow states to prosecute whistleblowers and cybersecurity researchers.

Despite these shared concerns by industry and civil society, liberal-democratic governments conceded for the sake of global consensus.

The cybercrime convention will be presented to the UN General Assembly this year and, upon endorsement, will be opened to member countries for signature and eventual ratification. To come into force, it requires at least 40 signatories by 31 December 2026.

It remains to be seen whether that will be achieved in the time available. The US has made no such commitment, although it ‘welcomed the Committee’s adoption of the convention.’ Australia’s ambassador for cyber wrote that the convention first needs to be adopted (by a majority) in the UN General Assembly ‘before Australia will consider becoming a party to the Convention.’ Iran, in its final statement, said to ‘maintain reservations and objections on certain provisions and terms.’ Moscow only acknowledged the outcome, with Russia ‘as the inspirer and leader of the negotiations.’ Beijing has not issued a statement yet.

For decades, cyberspace was thought to be most effectively governed through collaborative multistakeholder interactions, in which governments, civil society, industry and the technical community would take responsibility for their share of the domain. The experience of the UN cybercrime convention, however, shows government-led proceedings take precedence and that cyber sovereignty is the rallying concept around which states find consensus.

In the long run, this may pave the way for other government-to-government treaties on issues such as critical infrastructure protection, state-on-state cyber operations during peacetime and ethical principles of AI. While this would provide authoritarian states with opportunity to strengthen control over the internet and related technologies, for liberal democracies sovereignty becomes the strongest line of defence against cyber-enabled transnational repression and undue foreign interference.