The way Australia goes to war needs new conventions to give parliament a greater role in the weightiest choice any nation can make.

Creating parliamentary customs or conventions is the only realistic way to touch the prime minister’s almost unfettered power to launch war.

The parties of government—Labor and Liberal—will not give parliament any legal hold over the prime minister’s profound prerogative for war. Convention will have to be created, instead. Much history—both military and political—informs this understanding.

Since federation, war has been a defining element of Australia’s identity and the way we approach the world. In a span of nearly 90 years—from 1914 to 2003—Australia chose to go to war nine times.

The political truth is that prime ministers and governments—creatures of the House of Representatives—are usually fighting the Senate, where the government of the day seldom commands a clear majority. The parties of government will not give the Senate any more power, especially over the war powers.

The Senate experience means that politics pushes against the logic of putting into law the proposal in 2010 from a former Australian Army chief, Peter Leahy, that a resolution of each house of parliament should authorise overseas service. Leahy’s recommendation for parliamentary ratification for military deployments reads:

Both Houses of Parliament should be required to authorise by resolution any decision to commit the Australian Defence Force to warlike operations or potential hostilities within sixty days of the decision to commit forces. Given that the contemporary kinds of conflict tend to run for many years, ADF deployments should then be reconsidered by the Parliament on an annual basis.

A resolution of parliament within 60 days of war or deployment draws on a similar period in the US War Powers Act. Skip by the question of how much the US Congress has checked the president’s war powers to consider Leahy’s equally important call for clear public statements of national interests and strategy. Here his wording shifts from parliamentary resolution to government statement:

For each military deployment, the Australian Government should provide and routinely update a clear statement of national interests and strategy. The strategy statement should include the elements of power to be used, the end state to be achieved, an indication of the exit strategy and likely time frame for the commitment of force.

The many parallels between Australia’s entry into the Vietnam and Iraq wars offer the history for seeking benchmarks the parliament can apply to the executive’s profound prerogative. If not aspiring to legal checks, let’s at least have a good checklist.

Former Australian ambassador Garry Woodard’s examination of how the prerogative worked in deciding to commit in Vietnam and Iraq showed ‘the dominance of the Prime Minister, decisions made in secret by a small group of ministers obedient to him, minds closed against area expertise, preference for party political advantage over bipartisanship, and willing subservience to and some credulity about an ally, the United States’.

As usual, Woodard shows his deep understanding of the Canberra system. The caution also offered by history, though, is that greater parliamentary involvement would not have stopped Australia going to Vietnam, Afghanistan or Iraq. Parliament can give greater transparency about Australia’s march to war and set benchmarks for judging the course of war. But parliament might not curb the war habit.

Wedging Labor on the Vietnam commitment in 1965, the Coalition government rode initial voter enthusiasm for the war to increase its majority in the 1966 election, arguing that Labor’s opposition to Vietnam showed it was weak on the US alliance. Both sides of Australian politics supported the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan and any greater parliamentary involvement would have been an expression of that unanimity.

Iraq divided the parliament just as it split Australia from the very start. John Howard used his prerogative as prime minister with the precision of a master politician. He held his cabinet and party together (Labor was again wedged), and Australia joined the Iraq invasion—lots of alliance loyalty but few smarts in committing early with few questions.

The idea of more smarts and more questions is where a bigger role for parliament comes in.

Australian researcher Peter Mulherin pursues this in ‘War-power reform in Australia: (re)considering the options’, arguing for a new war-powers convention as a small step towards democratising the decision of going to war: ‘While not legally binding, this constitutional convention would represent an agreement by the major parties that overseas combat operations will be properly debated in Parliament.’

Beef up the informal rules that guide the parliament so it can impose informal constraints on the executive’s power. Express what parliament and the people are owed, perhaps codified in a non-binding resolution. Strengthening parliamentary convention would be an improvement on the status quo, Mulherin concludes:

Despite some arguing that legislative reform is preferable, it may also be impossible, given the reluctance of the Coalition and ALP to change the law. Therefore, a new constitutional convention would be an important step towards strengthening debate when Australia goes to war.

In ‘Going to war democratically: lessons for Australia from Canada and the UK’, Mulherin argues that Canada and the UK have taken steps this century to ‘parliamentarise’ their war powers, while in Australia the prerogative remains absolute.

Citing Canada and the UK as comparable parliamentary democracies with close alliance and historical ties, Mulherin lays out a three-step argument about what Canberra can learn from London and Ottawa: ‘(1) a more democratic foreign policy formation is a normative “good”; (2) war-power reform is one way to democratise foreign policy formation; and (3) lessons drawn from the examples of Canada and the United Kingdom may help Australia reform its war-power arrangements’.

So, no law, but stronger conventions in the House of Representatives offering more detailed benchmarks for the powers of review held by the Senate.

Over the past two decades, prime ministers as diverse as Howard, Tony Abbott and Julia Gillard have offered small footholds on which parliament could build. My next column will draw wordage from those footholds to do some convention drafting.

‘For a century, Australian leaders have been engaged in the war game. And just as a game has rules, there are rules for effectively playing the war leadership game.’

— David Horner, The war game: Australian war leadership from Gallipoli to Iraq

Examining how Australia decided to go to war nine times in a span of nearly 90 years—from 1914 to 2003—the military historian David Horner distils 10 rules.

The rules are short and sharp.

Yet like the Bible’s Ten Commandments, Horner’s rules are simple only in their expression. What is asked for is the ultimate test of leaders and it’s devilish in what it demands of the nation. Failure in this game is deadly.

Embracing the ‘cautious recommendations’ of Horner’s The war game, the former Labor leader and defence minister Kim Beazley observes: ‘This is a book of lessons for Australian political leaders on managing wars. An analysis of actual performance against those lessons is humbling.’

After analysing Australian war leadership in the wars from Gallipoli to Iraq, Horner offers these rules.

1. The war leader’s most important decision is whether to commit the nation to war. In the First and Second World Wars, Horner writes, ‘this decision was taken out of the hands of the Australian government’. But in all the wars that followed, from Korea to Iraq, the decision to commit forces ‘became increasingly controversial, raising questions about the process, and whether legislation should be introduced to ensure these decisions are taken by the parliament rather than the executive government’.

In an ASPI interview (audio below), Horner judges:

I’ve come to the conclusion that perhaps there should be some limit on the power of the prime minister and the government to make these decisions. Because, as I said, these are the most important decisions. They result in deaths to Australians. Tragedy for the families. The financial cost to Australia. The cost to Australia’s reputation.

If there was an emergency, the government has to have the capacity to react, straight away. But for so many of the commitments that we have made since the Second World War, it was not absolutely vital that we go into operations straight away, tomorrow. No. There was always a period of time. Maybe there’s a political imperative with our allies to make an announcement. On the other hand, if we had delayed in so many of those commitments, would it have made the difference?

That leads to the consideration, with these decisions being extremely important and far-reaching, whether there should be some mechanism by which the government has to put the decision to the people of Australia through the parliament.

2. War leaders determine the level and nature of the commitment. In the First World War, Horner writes, the decision was taken before the formal outbreak of the war. Robert Menzies’s government was more cautious about this in 1939, while the decisions in Vietnam were incremental. During all the wars from Korea to Iraq, Horner observes, Australia has ‘tried to keep the commitment as small as possible’ while reaping the alliance benefits.

3. The prime minister is not the source of all wisdom. ‘Obviously, expert military advice is important, but so too is the advice of senior ministers with their specific responsibilities.’

4. The government must have confidence in its military commanders. In a democracy, Horner writes, ‘war leadership involves the interaction between the political leaders and their top military advisers’. And, he judges, there’s ‘no perfect model for the civil–military relationship’. The outstanding war leader Winston Churchill ‘drove his military advisers to distraction, but in the end was loath to overrule them’.

5. Ensure that operations are conducted in accordance with government policy. ‘A fundamental of effective war leadership is to ensure that the government’s wishes are followed on the battlefield.’

6. Get access to allied strategic decision-making. ‘Menzies and [John] Curtin struggled with this issue in the Second World War, and it persisted in the later wars. In the invasion of Iraq, the Australians detected that the plans for the subsequent post-invasion phase were deficient, but were unable to change them. The lesson for Australia is to remain constantly vigilant, and a prime task for war leaders is to manage Australia’s role in the alliance.’

7. Australia must gather its own intelligence. Don’t rely on the big alliance partner for all the facts, interpretation and understanding. The message for Australia’s leaders, Horner writes, ‘is not just the need to have effective diplomatic and intelligence agencies, but also for the government to listen to them’.

8. Manage the politics. The power of Australia’s prime minister to wage war depends on their power in parliament. Billy Hughes split Labor over conscription in World War I. In World War II, Menzies fell as prime minister because he ‘failed to manage the politics of his own party in 1941,’ Horner writes. ‘It is just as important to deal with the politics within the party as to deal with the Opposition. [Bob] Hawke understood this as he sought to deal with his party critics in the Gulf War. [John] Howard managed the Coalition’s politicians superbly and gave the Opposition little capacity to manoeuvre in the lead-up to the invasion of Iraq.’

9. Manage the media. Tough censorship and tight control of newspapers worked during the two world wars. Since then, speaking to the voters depends on versions of media ‘management’.

10. War leadership will always take place in an environment of uncertainty. In this game, the other side plays as it wants, and can make its own rules. ‘Intelligence assessments can usually determine an enemy’s or potential enemy’s capabilities, but they are less certain about actual intentions.’

The 10 rules of Australia’s way of war act as guide, not law. Here’s my interview with David Horner on the rules.

Pressure from an increasingly aggressive China and the example of Russia’s war on Ukraine have driven rapid changes in the views of Japan’s people on defence and military cooperation with nations such as Australia.

Launching a new ASPI report, Japan’s security strategy, Ambassador Shingo Yamagami said attitudes in his country had shifted very significantly in recent years.

That view was reflected strongly by the report’s author, ASPI senior fellow Thomas Wilkins.

The two were joined at the launch by Australian National University professor Rikki Kersten, an expert on modern Japanese history who has focused extensively on foreign policy, security policy, the US–Japan alliance and Australia–Japan relations.

Yamagami said that as a diplomat and a national security professional he’d spent the best part of his career examining how Japan could better defend itself against external and internal challenges. ‘Japan has witnessed an increasingly severe security situation, partly as a result of the emergence of a new and more belligerent regional power, coupled with events in Europe.’

Aware of their longstanding defence and security relationship with the United States, many Japanese people spent decades in what the ambassador called ‘a relatively benign state of awareness’ about their nation’s security and the threats from beyond its borders. That allowed Japan to concentrate primarily on economic recovery and growth following the devastation of World War II, while providing the US with bases for the defence of Japan and the peace and security of the region.

In time, Japan’s economy gathered strength to the point where it supported the economic development of many countries, including Australia and China.

‘Yet the legacy of the war years, which led to the loss of 3.1 million Japanese lives, still lingered deep within the national psyche of the Japanese,’ Yamagami said. Having been brought to the edge of the abyss, there was a strong, almost a visceral reluctance to become engaged in any activity that might resemble a proactive defence stance.

Only after lengthy constitutional legal arguments were Japan’s first peacekeepers deployed in 1990 to Cambodia where they worked in tandem with the Australian Defence Force, he said. Members of the Japan Self-Defense Forces were deployed to the Middle East after the first Gulf War in 1991.

Over a decade later, challenges to Japan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity by an increasingly assertive China, North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs and the attempts of China and Russia to undermine the rule of law accelerated a shift in Japan’s collective mindset towards an active, dynamic national security doctrine, Yamagami said.

‘Some might say that what was once considered a glacial change in mindset, as in negative terms, jumped to light speed in the wake of Russia’s egregious and brutal invasion of Ukraine.’

That was borne out by public opinion polls supporting the provision of non-lethal defence equipment to Ukraine and adopting more proactive activities abroad. In May, a majority of respondents to an NHK poll said they agreed with Japan possessing counter-strike capabilities and increasing its defence spending. This remarkable change in mindset was reflected in Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s government agreeing to a substantial increase in the defence budget and fundamentally reinforcing defence capabilities.

‘What has happened to Ukraine has come as a stark reminder of how deterrence must be used to defend the national interest and uphold territorial integrity, sovereignty and the rule of law,’ Yamagami said. Such changes meant that Japan’s forces could now legally help protect Australian and US naval vessels in a conflict.

Yet, said Yamagami, Japan also knew it could not ensure its security by force of arms alone. ‘It has presented an ambitious vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific in which each and every member enjoys security and prosperity.’

Japan revived and had been a driving force in promoting the Quad arrangement with Australia, the US and India, with new initiatives in maritime domain awareness, climate change, disaster relief, cyberspace and infrastructure announced.

‘Japan has been blessed by the strong support Australia has shown in building defence ties with us over the past decade, which recently culminated in the reciprocal access agreement. This is the first such agreement that Japan has signed with any country and is a mark of the respect and trust in which we hold our special strategic partner Australia.’

There was an expectation that the bilateral defence relationship would become a lot more active with much more exercise activity.

The ambassador said that with changes in Japan’s strategic thinking, it was making a much larger, much more dynamic and much more ambitious contribution to regional and global security than at any time since World War II, and ‘when change comes, it is permanent and irreversible’.

The world, he said, stood at a precipice and faced choices between protecting the rule of law or submitting to the law of the jungle. ‘Japan is actively working to keep the beast at bay with the help of like-minded and law-abiding residents of the global village.’

Wilkins outlined the three key elements of Japan’s security strategy covered in detail in his report— diplomacy through the vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific, domestic mobilisation of its security apparatus and defence forces, and the strengthening of alliances and partnerships. ‘The Japan–Australia partnership is a valuable joint mechanism for diplomatic, security, defence, economic and military coordination to the benefit of both parties,’ he said.

The ideal of a free and open Indo-Pacific had been adopted or engaged with by the US, Australia and Asian nations, and stood out as a successful example of Tokyo’s new entrepreneurship in regional order building.

Tokyo recognised that to support this vision in tandem with allies, partners and other willing states, as well as to safeguard its own national security, it must do more.

‘Though Japan remains committed to an exclusively defensive military posture, it has sought to meet intensified regional challenges through the creation of a multi-domain defence force.’

Japan had steadily worked to craft a purposeful and multi-layered security strategy that would permit Tokyo to shape the regional order in line with its values and interests, enhance national and regional deterrence, and allow better responses to regional contingencies, Wilkins said.

‘Much of the credit for this significant achievement should be accorded to the late prime minister [Shinzo] Abe.’

Kersten acknowledged the changes in Japanese policy development but suggested that the nation still embraced a culture of self-constraint. ‘Even former prime minister Abe, with his incredible policy ambition, had to buckle to reality and resort to the self-imposed constraint that attaches to every single Japanese security policy.’

There clearly remained in Japan a gap between policy ambition and public opinion, Kersten said.

Yamagami responded by repeating that public opinion in Japan—’what Japan stands for’—was shifting in response to what was happening in the East China Sea and Ukraine.

Wilkins made the point that Japan had made very sensible and incremental rational responses to a rapidly changing environment. By taking those steps with other nations, Tokyo had provided reassurance that Japan was not just going out there on its own in a very radical or unpredictable direction.

Yamagami said he expected to see a greater exchange of military personnel between Japan and Australia. ‘We would like to welcome more ADF personnel to Japanese bases and we would like to see more Japan Self-Defense Forces personnel coming down to Australia. This will certainly serve as a strong deterrent.’

Kersten said ‘the most astonishing thing’ about the positive trajectory of the Australia–Japan security partnership was that it was trust-based. ‘It’s not utilitarian. We don’t have a strong trading partner who we’re trying to keep happy with a nice little security ribbon tied on top. The relationship had overcome a wartime past that was tough to overcome. It’s not just about trade, it’s not just about security; it’s political, it’s cultural and all these other things are enmeshed together.’

Kersten said Japan and Australia were increasingly collaborative in regional multilateral settings. ‘They came to the table with joint principles and values and objectives and worked together to achieve a jointly desired outcome.’

In terms of where the Japan–Australia relationship could go, Yamagami emphasised the importance of involving the private sector in areas such as biometrics, artificial intelligence and cyber technology—areas where Japanese companies are world-leading and always on the lookout for opportunities in Australia, also involving the US.

Kersten said a renewed joint security declaration should include a clear statement of intent to involve relevant private-sector entities in the joint enterprise of security. ‘This would mark out the new joint declaration as more than just a feel-good anniversary event. It would actually mean something then.’

Wilkins said Japan had much to offer in developing standoff and strike capabilities. ‘That might be something to think about given the shortage of stockpiles that we all face.’

Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister Richard Marles has prioritised the need to bridge the divide between the 2020 strategic update’s warning that Australia could face a major conflict within 10 years and current plans to strengthen the Australian Defence Force over several decades.

In his first speech in the United States since taking office, Marles said the fresh force posture review he’d commissioned was to be delivered early next year in tandem with the report of the nuclear-powered submarine taskforce to identify the optimal pathway to obtaining eight potent submarines for the Royal Australian Navy.

He told the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Washington that the two comprehensive reports would help determine how best to equip and structure the ADF and how to enable it to integrate and operate more closely with the US and other key partners.

Marles said the new government would make the investment necessary to increase the ADF’s range and lethality so that it could hold potential adversary forces and infrastructure at risk further from Australia. This would include longer-range strike weapons, cyber capabilities and area-denial systems tailored to a broader range of threats, including preventing coercive or grey-zone activities from escalating into conventional conflict.

‘We will invest in the logistics, sustainment and depth required for high-intensity warfighting, including guided munitions. This will in turn require deeper engagement with industry to accelerate capability development and strengthen our supply chains.’

He said his priority would be the ‘game-changing’ AUKUS trilateral partnership with the US and the UK that included delivery of the nuclear submarines. ‘For a three-ocean nation, the heart of deterrence is undersea capability,’ Marles said. ‘AUKUS will not only make Australia safer; it will make Australia a more potent and capable partner.’

In planning the submarine acquisition, the government was acutely aware of the obligations of nuclear stewardship, he said. ‘We are focused on the whole enterprise: safely stewarding sensitive technology, building the workforce and industrial capacity to support the capability, and ensuring this initiative sets the strongest possible non-proliferation standards.’

Noting that AUKUS was much more than just a capability program for the submarines, Marles said that good progress had been made on advanced capabilities under AUKUS and that he intended to keep that momentum going. The goal was to supplement and strengthen US industry and supply chains, not to compete with them.

‘A good example is Australia’s guided weapons and explosive ordnance enterprise. This project will not only build Australia’s guided weapons stores; it will establish a trusted second source of critical munitions supply to the US. But doing this efficiently and quickly will require the alliance to work across both government and industry. In tandem with other initiatives and other partners—such as our Loyal Wingman program, hypersonics cooperation, and through AUKUS—we have the ability to build a technological coalition that can maintain our competitive edge.’

Marles said that Australia’s inclusion in the US’s national technology and industrial base was a vital first step towards integration but implementing it would require change. He would propose measures both sides could adopt to streamline processes and overcome barriers to procurement, investment, information- and data-sharing systems, and export requirements. Integration could not come at the expense of robust security to protect sensitive information and technology.

In the years ahead, the US and Australia alliance would need to operate in a much more challenging strategic environment in the Indo-Pacific while contributing to a more effective balance of military power aimed at avoiding a catastrophic failure of deterrence, he said. ‘Events in Europe underline the risk we face when one country’s determined military build-up convinced its leader that the potential benefit of conflict was worth the risk.’

In addition to AUKUS, he said, Australia needed to continue the ambitious trajectory of its force posture cooperation, drawing on its strategic geography and industrial base to maximise deterrence and reduce the risk of conflict. That meant engaging in increasingly sophisticated exercises, bilaterally and with regional partners.

‘We will move beyond interoperability to interchangeability. And we will ensure we have all the enablers in place to operate seamlessly together, at speed.’

The US–Australia alliance was formed in the crucible of war, Marles said, but since the ANZUS Treaty was signed in 1951, the alliance had far surpassed its origins. Driven by the two nations’ geopolitical interests and by their profound commitment to democracy, open economies and free and just societies, it had become a cornerstone of Australia’s foreign and security policy.

Marles said he’d always felt that realists had never quite understood that the treaty was less a piece of paper than it was a network of people—politicians, policy officers, intelligence officials and soldiers: ‘Professionals who grow up working together, serve in each other’s institutions, deploy to combat zones, and come to each other’s aid. Professionals whose commitment to each other depend less on a treaty’s text than on a set of shared convictions.’

Australia and the US had to prepare for a tougher strategic environment with a military build-up occurring at a rate unseen since World War II, he said. That included the development and deployment of new weapons that challenged the nation’s military capability edge, the expansion of cyber and grey-zone capabilities that blurred the line between peace and conflict, and the intensification of major-power competition in ways that both concentrate and transcend geographical confines.

Marles said these trends compelled an even greater Australian focus on the Indo-Pacific. ‘For the first time in decades, we are thinking hard about the security of our strategic geography, the viability of our trade and supply routes, and above all the preservation of an inclusive regional order founded on rules agreed by all, not the coercive capabilities of a few. In particular, we worry about the use of force or coercion to advance territorial claims, as is occurring in the South China Sea, and its implications for any number of places in the Indo-Pacific where borders or sovereignty is disputed.’

Australia knew its security and prosperity could not be achieved through a geographical focus alone, Marles said. ‘Geography can’t deliver resilient supply chains or stop cyberattacks, it won’t halt deglobalisation and the worrying reversals of trade and investment liberalisation, and it can’t arrest the dangerous erosion of the global rules-based order,’ he said.

‘For all its imperfections—and the cynicism that often greets this phrase—this order was put in place after the world’s greatest calamity precisely so states would have a mechanism to resolve disputes via dialogue rather than conflict. That’s something that benefits us all, big states and small, and we accept its weakening at our own peril.’

Marles said it was clear that the threat of climate change was a national security issue and the new government would make dealing with it a pillar of the alliance. ‘It’s a threat from which no one and no country is immune. And it is a threat that demands action,’ he said.

‘When you stand on the shores of our Pacific neighbours, as I have, you understand the intense vulnerability felt by those living on small islands. The Pacific Islands Forum, of which Australia is a member, has been consistent in declaring climate change as the single greatest threat to livelihoods in our neighbourhood—it is an existential threat.

‘Given this reality, the Pacific is the part of the world where the US rightly looks to Australia to lead. And we will.’

Australia would not take that role for granted, he said. ‘Pacific island countries have choices about their partners. And we will work to earn their trust. The Pacific has been clear in saying that geopolitical competition is of lesser concern to them than the threat of rising sea levels, economic insecurity and transnational crime. Australia respects and understands this position. And we are listening. And while we will not ask our partners to pick a side, I am confident that an Australia which collaborates and invests in shared priorities with the Pacific is an Australia which will be the natural partner of choice for the Pacific.’

Marles said the global nature of security explained why Australia was standing with Europe at this crucial time. ‘Russia’s war against Ukraine is not just a brutal attempt to subjugate a sovereign state. It’s a calculated application of violence, intended to roll back the post-Soviet order from one founded on sovereignty and self-determination to one governed by the rule of might and force. Where only great powers are truly sovereign and where the choice of smaller states is to be either a vassal or an enemy. This can’t be allowed to succeed. Only by ensuring such tactics fail can we deter their future employment, in Europe, the Indo-Pacific or elsewhere.’

That was why Prime Minister Anthony Albanese visited Kyiv this month to honour the extraordinary valour of the Ukrainian people and to nail Australia’s flag to a European and global order of sovereign states and free peoples, he said. ‘In this I want to commend the leadership of President [Joe] Biden. Once again, the United States is proving the pivotal power.’

Marles said critics of alliances needed to answer why countries like Australia would be better served going it alone. The alliance with the US afforded Australia capability, technology and intelligence advantages it could not acquire or develop on its own, he said.

‘I want to acknowledge the comments of my counterpart, [US Defense] Secretary Lloyd Austin, who has underlined that it’s not just the fact of our alliances that gives us an advantage; it’s our ability to operationalise them in ways that transcend sovereign boundaries that’s truly unique. In a more contested world, those countries that are able to pool their resources and combine their strengths will not only have a competitive advantage; they will be less vulnerable to coercive statecraft.’

During her recent trip to Malaysia, Foreign Minister Penny Wong said she wanted Australia’s full diversity to be reflected in the Albanese government’s approach to diplomacy.

Not only does that mean better engaging with our migrant story—a timely statement given the recently released census data revealed more than half of all Australians are first- or second-generation migrants—but also incorporating a First Nations perspective in our approach to international relations.

Speaking in the capital, Kuala Lumpur, Wong echoed her election statements about building on the knowledge and experience of First Nations Australia: ‘The time has come for Australia’s full story to be told: our modern diversity and the rich heritage of First Nations peoples.’

Developing a First Nations foreign policy is arguably the biggest development in Indigenous relations in decades. NAIDOC week is an opportune time to ask—what is a First Nations foreign policy, and how does it differ from Australia’s approach in the past?

Much can be gleaned from the highly detailed Indigenous Diplomacy Agenda, launched by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade last year.

The Indigenous Diplomacy Agenda is about shaping the international system by understanding how states distribute power to Indigenous groups, how Australia’s diplomatic network can shape the international system to benefit Indigenous peoples economically and politically, and how Indigenous knowledge and ways of relating with others can be incorporated into Australia’s relations with other nations.

On the last point, this could mean ceasing to view international relations in zero-sum terms, instead moving towards concepts of reciprocity, co-development and mutual respect.

The agenda positions Indigenous affairs at the heart of Australia’s foreign policy, but it is important not to romanticise what this means.

Australia has a complicated and brutal postcolonial story and reckoning with this—demonstrating that we are learning, growing and strengthening democratic values—is a point of shared truth with other colonial nations. Forming a shared truth with our neighbours is a way for Australia to build trust, demonstrate shared values and exercise influence.

Shared truth is important when autocratic regimes are seeking to shift the conversation about human rights. Alongside China, Belarus, North Korea and Venezuela have raised Australia’s human rights record in international forums in an effort to muddy the waters of Beijing’s treatment of Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities.

Coupled with a First Nations foreign policy, Labor’s broader commitments to Indigenous affairs—including constitutional recognition and an Indigenous voice to parliament—have implications for national security, economic trade, development and government corporate policy.

In a national security context these commitments say that Australia cannot rely on influence, particularly in the Indo-Pacific, without demonstrating its commitment to Indigenous rights at home and abroad.

In economic relations these commitments say Australia cannot advance its trade agenda without also elevating Indigenous peoples here and elsewhere.

Australia also cannot promote sustainable development unless Indigenous peoples benefit.

It’s important to note that within the Commonwealth public service, these commitments will not move forward without more comprehensive recruitment and retention of Indigenous diplomats.

How Australia creates a joint narrative with its neighbours might help to solidify the basis for joint action on some of our common security threats, particularly climate security across the Pacific and in Southeast Asia.

Australia excels at capacity building in the Indo-Pacific, which will be key to implementing digital-economy and green-technology initiatives outlined in both the US-driven Indo-Pacific Economic Framework and the European Indo-Pacific Strategy.

An early sign of how Indigenous interests can play a role in strengthening regional ties can be seen in the New Zealand-led Indigenous Peoples Economic and Trade Cooperation Arrangement involving Taiwan, Canada and Australia.

This was an effort to build common economic goals between Indigenous groups but also an attempt to draw Taiwan in from diplomatic isolation. All but 15 countries have cut ties with the island and it is barraged daily with cyberattacks and intrusions into its air defence zone. Taiwanese Indigenous communities are the island’s international relations lifeline—they are Taiwan’s sole representatives to the UN.

This agreement shows, in clear-cut terms, the new posture in embryonic form: repositioning Australia’s relations with our Commonwealth partners—Canada and NZ—based on a central connection with Indigenous pasts and forging new economic and political ties with a nation—Taiwan—that shares a common ideal to advance the rules-based order. What will, and should, follow is cementing this posture in our agreement-making with other Pacific partners.