Misinformation and disinformation have come to curse all national issues involving major political decisions. This was true of the Covid-19 pandemic with its mask mandates and lockdowns, and of recent elections.

As we approach the 14 October polling day, it’s clearly also true of the Voice to Parliament referendum. False narratives, accusations and counteraccusations are rampant online, making it sometimes difficult for voters to establish facts.

The most important safeguard against disinformation and misinformation is you—the reader, viewer and listener. And that starts with having a good understanding of what misinformation and disinformation are, what they look like, where information comes from and why groups might manipulate that information to interfere in the referendum. Without inoculating ourselves against these modern plagues as best we can, we can’t engage with confidence in a fair and informed debate.

You’ve likely already come across false information about the referendum, whether you’ve noticed it or not. Politicians have been accused, by opponents and others, of peddling misinformation. ASPI has also detected groups of inauthentic social media accounts, likely sponsored by the Chinese Communist Party, amplifying narratives that could be used to spread division and exacerbate confusion.

Not all false information is spread deliberately or with malign intent. Misinformation refers to false or inaccurate information that is spread without intent to mislead or cause harm. Sometimes, individuals or groups may believe they are spreading the truth and helping others.

Disinformation is information spread with the deliberate intent to manipulate, damage or mislead. Sometimes the intent is obvious, such as to direct criticism or anger towards a group or to sway a vote. Other times, the goal is bigger or longer term, such as spreading division in a population or distracting people from other issues that deserve greater scrutiny. People may also be motivated by financial gain. US radio host and conspiracy theorist Alex Jones made millions from his program, InfoWars, by repeatedly denying the 2012 mass shooting at the Sandy Hook Elementary School.

Both forms of false information can cause harm. In the early stages of the pandemic, misinformation about unproven health treatments, such as drinking sanitiser, made people sick. The barrage of conflicting information created a confusing online environment that, in the longer term, reduced public trust in mainstream media and institutions.

The confusion, division and mistrust create a more fertile ground for deliberate and malign disinformation to gain purchase and cause harm, such as the conspiracy theories spread by actors linked to the Chinese government that claimed Covid-19 originated in North America.

Online consumers and voters have access to resources designed to help counter false information. Australia has multiple fact-checking centres, such as RMIT Fact Lab and AAP Fact Check (though people should be cognisant of the claims of political bias in some of these initiatives).

On the referendum process, the Australian Electoral Commission keeps a register listing prominent pieces of disinformation and detailing its response. The AEC, which is strictly apolitical, is not responsible for fact-checking claims made about the ‘yes’ or ‘no’ cases.

But authorities cannot irradiate every falsehood. A healthy and fair debate depends on all of us spotting false information—deliberate or not—and reducing its impact by avoiding spreading it. This latter point is critical; just as misinformation spreads because people are prone to bias and limited attention, purveyors of disinformation deliberately prey on these vulnerabilities. We tend to share appealing falsehoods because they hit us on an emotional level—targeting our biases—or because we don’t spend the time to carefully assess what we’re seeing.

No individual, regardless of passion and dedication, can be expected to grasp all the information on any topic. Even if we care deeply about an issue like Indigenous representation in our constitution, it often takes a back seat to our everyday lives, whether that’s the footy, our favourite TV shows or wrestling with the rising cost of living. There’s only so much time in the day.

People therefore become easily satisfied with what is put before them. When we see news that aligns with our beliefs, we’re more likely to embrace it without examining its authenticity. Deliberate spreaders of disinformation will seek to frame their message in a way that exploits this behaviour.

A recent Recorded Future report identified malign influence narratives targeting the Voice and found that many were based on race, religion or ideology, indicating they were designed to influence voters who hold strong pre-existing views.

Similarly, influence actors might seek to flood the information environment, taking advantage of people’s tendency to accept information that is more prevalent, or to go along with what they perceive to be the majority or popular opinion, especially in their own social groups. These are commonly used heuristics when we don’t have the time to dive deeply into the information ourselves.

Flooding is a technique also used to distract and overwhelm consumers of information. When we see and hear many conflicting and confusing views on a topic, we tend to switch off and become indifferent to the issue or lose motivation to seek out facts. This tactic has been effectively used by Russia during its invasion of Ukraine. Alternative narratives, such as portraying the invasion as a ‘denazification’ mission, continue to muddy the waters.

We should be alive to these risks, particularly before we share information. We should ask ourselves: From whom is the message coming and where else has this message been shared? What is the likely motivation of the messenger? Does it contain information that is verifiable, and how trustworthy are the sources of information underpinning the statement? Is it missing some important context? And does it try to provoke a response by making emotive and spurious connections such as to apartheid, the Jewish community, or a communist or global conspiracy?

Sober consideration of these questions can help identify instances in which someone is trying to manipulate you or is inadvertently misleading you. Most importantly, we should approach the topic with humility, recognising we may be the victims of false or misleading information, and be willing to change our minds if presented with credible arguments and evidence.

For further information regarding what the vote will mean, visit the Australian government’s website on the Voice.

Australia and France have made significant strides towards repairing their diplomatic relationship in the nearly two years since Australia’s cancellation of its submarine contract with French company Naval Group. Technically, they are close neighbours, sharing a long maritime border in the Pacific. While French President Emmanuel Macron didn’t drop by Canberra during his ‘historic’ Pacific tour last month, his visit reinforced that a committed and energised France can complement Australia’s efforts in the region.

In addition to announcing new environmental initiatives, including to protect rainforests, Macron made a powerful statement denouncing malign Chinese influence in the Indo-Pacific, describing a ‘new imperialism appearing, and a power logic that is threatening the sovereignty of several states—the smallest, often the most fragile’.

Franco-Australian cooperation has bilateral benefits, but just as importantly enhances both countries’ roles as development and security partners for the whole Indo-Pacific. Individually, each state has much to contribute to the region: Australia as an active middle power and France with its significant naval strength. If both Canberra and Paris want to strengthen the regional order and mitigate the effects of strategic competition, they should find ways to jointly cooperate with Southeast Asia—the self-declared epicentre of the Indo-Pacific.

Southeast Asian states are looking for reliable partners amid intensifying US–China strategic competition. According to the 2023 State of Southeast Asia survey, the region’s most trusted partner for hedging against the uncertainties of this strategic rivalry is the EU, though there’s scepticism about its capacity and political will for global leadership. With Macron’s vision for his country as a puissance d’équilibre that keeps regional powers in balance and a clear Indo-Pacific strategy, France has shown that it’s willing to do more in the region. As a ‘resident nation’ (une nation residente) in the Indo-Pacific, France’s Minister of the Armed Forces Sébastien Lecornu has declared to the region that ‘your stakes are our stakes’ (vos enjeux sont les nôtres).

For its part, Australia is one of only four countries with a comprehensive strategic partnership with ASEAN. Canberra’s ‘strategic equilibrium’ narrative aligns well with France’s stance. Deepening ties with Southeast Asia and working to help it achieve its development priorities with partners such as France would give credence to Australia’s words on ASEAN centrality. For Southeast Asian countries that are hesitant to explicitly take a side in US–China competition, further cooperation could build Australia’s credibility as an Indo-Pacific partner.

However, Southeast Asia is a crowded and contested space, and Australia and France have so far identified few reasons for close bilateral coordination there. That’s despite the fact that they have a significant Southeast Asian presence already, both diplomatically (Australia has 16 posts in the region and France 11) and as development partners (Australia has committed $1.2 billion in aid to the region in 2023–24 and France contributed $1.3 billion in 2020).

The key is for Canberra and Paris to play to their strengths. Maritime security is of enduring interest to Southeast Asia and the wider Indo-Pacific, particularly where trade routes are concerned. Australia and France could build on joint transits in the South China Sea, the last of which occurred in 2021, and on their mutual interest in maritime domain awareness and supporting Southeast Asian efforts to counter illegal fishing.

Southeast Asia’s leaders often call for strengthening of ASEAN centrality and thus ASEAN-centric architecture. The ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting and its working groups is an ideal place to do this, given that France is an ADMM observer and Australia is a member of ADMM-Plus.

Another critical area is climate change. In July, Australia committed $50 million to support Indonesia’s green-energy transition and Western Australia pledged to take further steps to support Jakarta’s nascent electric vehicle industry. At the January 2023 France–Australia ministerial consultations, the two countries articulated other ASEAN priorities on which they could work more closely, such as connectivity and economic cooperation.

Aside from Southeast Asia-wide cooperation, deepening trilateral engagement between Indonesia, Australia and France would have benefits. As the only Indo-Pacific states with territory in both the Indian and Pacific Oceans, the three countries have a special stake in the region. In France’s case, a ‘powerful strategic intimacy’ is emerging between Jakarta and Paris based mainly on Indonesian defence acquisitions from French manufacturers. Paris’s burgeoning defence relationship with Jakarta was demonstrated most recently with a deal to supply fighter jets and submarines to the Indonesian military.

At the recent Australia–Indonesia leaders’ meeting in Sydney, Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese endorsed plans to upgrade bilateral defence ties to the treaty level. Greater maritime capacity in the Indonesian navy, supported by French capability and Australian training, would allow Jakarta to do more with its partners. There’s also value in exchanging views trilaterally on maritime security, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (particularly how the FRANZ Arrangement between France, Australia and New Zealand could engage Indonesia), and environmentally resilient infrastructure.

This would not necessarily need to start at, or grow to, the official or ministerial level to be useful. A Track 1.5 or Track 2 dialogue is a more feasible and less complicated starting point for the grouping. In proposing such as dialogue, Australia must be aware of how it would fit within the already crowded minilateral space in the region and Indonesia’s appetite for engaging with it. But it could give Australia an opportunity to address Indonesian concerns about its strategic outlook since the announcement of AUKUS in the context of a security dialogue with France, which is perceived as being more independent of the US alliance system.

Of course, Australia and France have other commitments to the Indo-Pacific and in other parts of the world. Still, when it comes to supporting Southeast Asia, two heads working together are better than one.

The western Indian Ocean—home to the island states of Mauritius, Madagascar, Seychelles and Comoros, as well as the French territories of La Reunion and Mayotte—occupies little space in Canberra’s strategic imagination. But it still has the potential to affect Australia’s strategic interests. In a new report by the Asia-Pacific Development, Diplomacy & Defence Dialogue (AP4D), we identify France as a critical partner for Australia to multiply its impact in the far western fringe of the Indo-Pacific.

Australian interests are engaged in this subregion in important ways. It is a source of maritime insecurity, including transnational crime, and is an arena for strategic competition in which the US, India, China and Russia are all active players. While the balance of power in the western Indian Ocean has been favourable, or at least benign, to Australian interests for a long time, growing Chinese influence and the potential for changes to the status of Diego Garcia (which hosts a US military base) might present strategic risks for Australia to manage. Moreover, with Australia hosting the Indian Ocean Conference for the first time in 2024, as well as pursuing bids to host COP31 in 2026 and to secure a UN Security Council seat in 2029–30, it’s important that Canberra actively build deeper relations with a broad range of small island developing states.

Australia is a generally well-regarded actor in the western Indian Ocean. However, its modest presence and contribution in the subregion seem conspicuous to island states that view Australia as a natural Indian Ocean partner. They see Australia’s recent step-up in the Pacific and they still remember—and cite—Australia’s aid contributions in the lead-up to its last UN Security Council term (2013–2015).

But the reality is that Australia can’t substantially boost its presence or engagement in this distant part of the world right now—not with the fiscal pressures it faces at home and the uncertain strategic environment it’s navigating in the Pacific and Southeast Asia.

That’s where partnerships become even more important.

Australia should see France’s (and the EU’s) significant presence in the western Indian Ocean as an opportunity to boost its own influence on shared interests and capabilities. As well as its overseas local territories of Reunion and Mayotte, France has resident missions in Mauritius, Madagascar, Seychelles and Comoros. In 2020, it contributed about $695 million in official development assistance. France also maintains a resident military presence of 2,000 personnel, five naval units and four aircraft. Australia, meanwhile, has just one small post in Mauritius covering the entire subregion, equipped with only a small direct aid budget.

There are five broad areas where collaboration with France in the western Indian Ocean could help advance both countries’ strategic interests and make a positive contribution to Indo-Pacific stability.

First is playing an active role in fostering Indian Ocean and Pacific island connections. Covering both main working languages (English and French) of the two regions, Australia and France are well placed to help facilitate dialogue and build capacity to confront the challenges small island states face. As Rory Medcalf has noted, an ‘oceans forum’ could join up these two maritime regions on ‘issues such as fisheries management, health security, infrastructure, climate change and the common problem of how to manage pressures from great powers’.

Second is strengthening Indian Ocean regional architecture. As much as possible, Australia should seek to channel greater coordination with France through existing regional institutions, especially the Indian Ocean Rim Association. This will help boost the association’s centrality and generate broader regional participation. Australia should also consider formalising its relationship with the Indian Ocean Commission by becoming an observer. This would boost Australia’s status as a partner to the group and be a clear signal to France of Australia’s intent to contribute practically to the region.

Third, Australia should consider making modest strategic contributions to French-led and EU-led development programs, especially those focused on maritime security and safety. Australia has previously provided this kind of support in the subregion through the Australian Maritime Safety Agency. So, Canberra could consider how AMSA or the Australian Transport Safety Bureau could make niche contributions to capacity building by working with French counterparts.

Maritime domain awareness could also be a useful area for collaboration. France and the EU are already significant contributors to improving maritime domain awareness in the Indian Ocean (especially through the CRIMARIO II initiative). One possible avenue could be to work together to enhance the fusion centres in the western Indian Ocean: the Regional Maritime Information Fusion Center, based in Madagascar, and the Regional Operations Coordination Center, based in Seychelles. In particular, Australia should consider how its experience with the Pacific Fusion Centre could be shared with Indian Ocean counterparts.

Fourth, given the significant transnational crime issues in the western Indian Ocean, especially drug trafficking and illegal fishing, it is important to build the law enforcement capacity of developing states with large exclusive economic zones. The Australian Border Force and Australian Federal Police, working with the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, could consider how they could work with French counterparts to enhance the ability of western Indian Ocean states to identify and prosecute transnational crime.

Finally, disinformation is a significant concern in the western Indian Ocean island states. There have been several documented instances in recent years, and the EU already supports training and capacity-building aimed at countering disinformation in the subregion. Australia could explore opportunities to work with France, the EU, civil society and local and international media to complement these efforts, focusing on raising awareness of disinformation and developing skills to recognise and counter it.

Strategic contributions to French- and EU-led initiatives would increase Australia’s influence. They would also create greater diversity in Australia’s key Indian Ocean partnerships beyond India—which is important given concerns in some parts of the region about New Delhi’s influence.

Australia’s support would benefit France, too. Australia can convey aligned messaging with a different voice, without the historical baggage that France and others (like the UK and US) carry. And in complex times, aligning messages and efforts has never been more important.

Southeast Asia’s energy transition is coming to life as the development of green technologies accelerates across the region. Securing critical minerals will be crucial to this process, and Australia should work with Southeast Asia to realise their mutual goals in this area.

If Southeast Asian countries pursue policies in accordance with the Paris agreement to limit global temperature rises to 2°C, the market size for green technologies in the region is projected to increase from just under US$5 billion in 2020 to nearly US$20 billion in 2030 and US$50 billion in 2050. Several Southeast Asian states have introduced national agendas and policies to address the impact of climate change and increase their energy security through renewables. Some also see the energy transition as an opportunity to pursue more sustainable economic growth by becoming players in the electric vehicle and battery supply chains.

Critical minerals are essential components of many clean-energy technologies. More critical minerals are used to build solar farms, wind farms and electric vehicles than fossil-fuel-based alternatives, and the growing demand for green technologies in Southeast Asia will amp up the pressure on governments to provide a robust and resilient critical-mineral supply chain.

Mining and processing critical minerals for exports could bring immense revenues to Southeast Asian states and help them establish themselves in regional supply chains for green technologies. A strong mining and refining sector would also attract investment in green energy manufacturing, such as battery production. By building these sectors, Southeast Asian states would not only have a secure supply of critical minerals domestically, but also stand to benefit in the market, helping them reinvest further in their energy transition.

Some Southeast Asian states have already begun to invest in refinement and processing. Indonesia, for instance, has leveraged its position as the world’s biggest nickel producer to set up domestic processing facilities, even going as far as enacting protectionist bans on the export of unprocessed nickel ore.

The region could be a major player in supplying critical minerals and developing key supply chains. ASEAN already accounts for 46% of global nickel production and 34% of tin production. Indonesia and the Philippines are two of the world’s largest producers of nickel, which is used in batteries and electrolysers. Rare-earth minerals, a critical component for producing certain types of electric vehicle motors and wind turbines, are a major export for Myanmar.

But in contrast to their abundant resources, Southeast Asian economies’ capacities to refine and process critical minerals are mixed. The region contributed only 2% of global aluminium output in 2020 and 3% of smelted and refined copper. However, it is picking up the pace when it comes to producing and refining rare earths. Between 2015 and 2020, Southeast Asia’s share of global raw rare-earth production surged from 0.6% to nearly 10%, and the region went from providing 2% of rare-earth refining and smelting to around 14%. Raw nickel, tungsten and manganese production also grew significantly.

Southeast Asia also possesses significant capacity in advanced downstream production using critical minerals. Malaysia and Vietnam are the second- and third-largest manufacturers of solar panels in the world, and Singapore is a research and development hub for these technologies.

Australia is also a significant player in supplying critical minerals. In 2021, half of the world’s lithium came from Australia. It is also the second-largest producer of cobalt and the fourth-largest producer of rare earths. Australia’s new strategy for its critical minerals sector aims to develop a downstream industry for processing and refining minerals onshore to ensure resilient and diversified supply chains. While this will help promote sustainable growth in the country’s domestic manufacturing and industrial sectors, Australia must also comply with the highest environmental, social and governance standards. The recent controversy over Australian rare-earth mining company Lynas’s operations in Malaysia further emphasised the need for Australia to develop its own processing capacity and reduce its reliance on foreign facilities.

Southeast Asia and Australia have areas of shared interest in developing their critical-mineral industries. Both are investing in critical-mineral supply chains by developing onshore processing, aimed at preventing bottlenecks in the supply chain. Like Australia, ASEAN emphasises the importance of environmentally friendly and socially responsible mineral development practices. These shared goals can serve as the foundation for future cooperation.

Yet collaboration on critical minerals hasn’t featured in recent initiatives between Australia and ASEAN, including the ASEAN–Australia comprehensive strategic partnership and the recently concluded free trade agreement between ASEAN, Australia and New Zealand. The Australia–Vietnam Enhanced Economic Engagement Strategy includes some minerals and mining initiatives, but its primary focus is on facilitating Australian coal and mineral exports to Vietnam.

Given Australia’s technological advantages, Canberra should consider providing support to Southeast Asia to help it develop environmentally friendly and socially responsible mining and refining practices. Capacity building is another possible area of cooperation. Southeast Asia is anticipating a rush of investment in extracting critical minerals, but many governments are not well equipped to handle, guide and regulate this level of activity. Australia could assist with investment screening and monitoring to ensure businesses comply with environmental and governance standards.

Since Australia is also looking to develop its downstream industry, it should consider embedding its critical minerals projects, when suitable, into existing supply chains in the region. An example would be establishing joint ventures to produce electric-vehicle batteries, which can leverage the comparative advantages of Australia and Southeast Asian states. Critical-mineral resources in Australia and Southeast Asia are complementary. Southeast Asia has an advantage in nickel, tin and bismuth production, which Australia doesn’t currently consider critical minerals. Australia is a major source of rare-earth elements, manganese and cobalt, which Southeast Asia doesn’t produce at scale. This complementarity can facilitate further cooperation.

Of course, there are challenges to be overcome. ASEAN hasn’t issued an official definition of critical minerals, while Australia has listed 26 minerals as critical. This discrepancy might create bureaucratic hurdles. Both Australia and Southeast Asia hope to attract foreign investment to develop their downstream industries, so a certain degree of competition is unavoidable. The resources development sector in Southeast Asia is rife with corruption and lacks accountability and transparency. This issue is especially prominent in countries with weak rule of law, where it will be a struggle to regulate investment and mining activities. And in areas prone to internal conflict like Myanmar, armed groups could capture mining production and use profits to entrench their power. But if Australia does its due diligence when considering cooperation, it shouldn’t be discouraged. This is a major opportunity for Canberra to strengthen its strategic relationship with the region.

We need to address the elephants in the room. Yes, elephants. There are eight of them—each state and territory, and they are competing at the expense of improving Australia’s innovation economy and strategic objectives.

The defence strategic review (DSR) has highlighted the need for a truly national approach to Australia’s security in the face of deteriorating strategic circumstances. This calls for new approaches, new technologies and new markets for these technologies. Critically, the DSR calls for increased domestic manufacturing, and the capacity to ‘rapidly translate disruptive technologies into ADF capabilities’.

In the period 1995 to 2020, as noted by Harvard University, Australia’s economic complexity ranking declined from 55th in the world to 91st. This decline is important as it illustrates the type of jobs available to Australians, which impacts on the talent that the country can develop and can attract. Ultimately it impacts Australia’s ability to meet national economic and security targets.

The Australian government is currently seeking to halt this decline and to rebuild a manufacturing base through the National Reconstruction Fund (NRF). This initiative seeks to address economic and resilience challenges, including renewables and low emissions technologies, and defence capability. The DSR has reinforced this need.

There are, however, pressures in Australia preventing it achieving this goal. The first is the propensity for multiple states to want to host technological developments for their own parochial, rather than national, purposes. This has repeatedly resulted in similar organisations being established in multiple states for addressing the same problem. The result is a dilution of the overall national effort. The second, which accentuates the effect of the first, is that in many areas of innovation, Australia is too small a market to be cost effective in comparison with international competition, and is starting a long way behind. Competition between states in many priority areas for innovation will therefore only dilute the overall national effort.

While competition is generally recognised as good, the literature on technology clusters and the ‘spill-over’ effects of clustering shows that having multiple related high technology activities occur within a geographically constrained area is most effective. Benefits include industrial efficiency, workforce development and availability, knowledge transfer, and invention intensity.

The bottom line is that unless Australia can limit this interstate jostling, the benefits of the NRF and the objectives of the DSR are unlikely to be realised to the extent that the relevant ministers desire. The national manufacturing base will not be significantly reconstructed, Australia will not commence an inexorable climb up global complexity rankings, and national resilience will not improve. Most importantly, Australia’s ability to deter conflict will be inhibited.

The federal government needs to get these elephants (the states) talking to each other in meaningful and tangible ways. The National Cabinet needs to coordinate more on innovation and, where there is a significant gap in a certain area, consider empowering a single state to have the coordination role for the overall national good.

One way to overcome this and its pernicious effects is to implement a model of ‘coordinated federalism’ on innovation. At its core should be the establishment in each state of specific centres of excellence for the ‘national priority areas’ in the NRF initiative and in AUKUS Pillar 2. These centres would oversee and publish technical and commercial standards and other benchmarks for new technologies, and products that flow from those technologies. They would have physical demonstration facilities and assist departments on public policy and trade initiatives. They would be useful training centres and have common facilities against which new manufacturing flowsheets can be tested, varied and validated.

These centres would become the kernel for the establishment of technology-based clusters. They would be able to engage with organisations and institutions in other states but would be free of the direct competition that currently inhibits inventiveness, saps innovation energy, and dilutes national effort. Importantly, the centres would interface with the incoming Australian Strategic Capability Accelerator for maximum industrial and capability impact.

This proposal is not revolutionary, nor is it a backflip on past work. It does not seek to compromise or reduce current state efforts on existing, mature industrial ecosystems or the projects where public-private capital partnerships have already formed. It would not redistribute current technologies or organisations.

This model has been successfully implemented in other countries, and there are multiple developing areas and new horizons where such a model could be applied in Australia: critical mineral processing, space domain awareness, biotechnology, synthetic biology, waste processing, semi-conductors, super-capacitors, and nanoscale robotics, just to name a few. The length of the list of critical technologies to the national interest means that there will be more than enough to go around.

If Australia truly aspires to new horizons and wants to cross new frontiers, interstate politicking is a headwind it simply must overcome. But if it does, Australia can more efficiently develop new technologies and applications, grow the national economy, and build the resilience it will need into the future.