We can do much more with the reserves.

The Australian Defence Force reserves are an underutilised resource with great potential to contribute to Australian security.  

The 2023 Defence Strategic Review (DSR) warned that Australia is experiencing its most challenging circumstances in decades, while the ADF rapidly works to adapt to new technology and iterations of combined arms. Leveraging the civilian skill sets, education and experience of reserves across all services will allow Australia to take full advantage of existing capability that might not be available in full-time military service.  

This evolution could take place over three broad areas of contribution: combat, specialist roles and domestic support. 

Combat capability

Research has found a lower expectation of and bias against Australian reservists as opposed to full-time ADF members, potentially leading to inconsistent standards of training and combat effectiveness. Australia may be in a similar predicament to that found by a review by Britain into its own reserve forces, who were used neither effectively nor cost-efficiently in a failure to capitalise on their potential. The Australian Army’s reserve forces have been underutilised in combat roles in recent conflicts in Afghanistan and the Middle East, in contrast to the US’s leveraging of reserve capability. More than 1 million US National Guard members have been deployed to combat theatres since 2001, and members have recently been used in drone operations and intelligence analysis during the war in Ukraine. 

There’s an opportunity for ADF reservists to become more widely used in combat roles either in complementing regular ADF capability or as reserve units deployed to combat and peacekeeping operations. This can be achieved through standardised training curriculums, higher expectations of reserve skill and capability, and increasing combat specialisation. 

For example, army reserve units in certain locations can specialise their training to provide combat capability in particular arenas or unique skill sets, such as littoral warfare or autonomous platforms. Reserves’ use of HIMARS has been recently suggested, while civilian drone operators have begun working for military contractors in the Middle East. A precedent for reserve deployment and specialist training exists within Rifle Company Butterworth, which has seen army reservists complete jungle and urban combat training in Malaysia and Singapore, as well as supporting regional contingency operations and relationship building with military partners. Similar opportunities exist in the Royal Australian Air Force and the Royal Australian Navy to operate autonomous systems or support aerial surveillance and maritime patrols through the Pacific Maritime Security Program. 

These evolutions in capability can be facilitated through changes to recruitment and the role of reservists as part of a refined total workforce model. Certain demographics can be further targeted through tri-service initiatives mimicking the Ready Reserve Scheme or current accelerated training programs. 

Specialised skill sets 

The ADF is seeking to exploit new technologies to maintain asymmetric advantage in an advancing technological era. The Army is looking to implement capabilities such as artificial intelligence, biotechnology and autonomous systems, as outlined in its Robotic and Autonomous Systems Strategy and 2020 Accelerated Warfare Statement. The air force has added to a focus on air power to ensure Australian access to and capability within the space domain through the use of cutting-edge technologies. Pillar 2 of AUKUS will further technological capability within the navy through the use of quantum computing, artificial intelligence and machine learning to address threats in the maritime domain. The navy is also expanding its domain further from Australia’s shores through the planned nuclear-powered submarine capability, while the army’s structure has been reformed towards Australia’s north and shifted towards littoral and long-range strike potential. The chief defence scientist has emphasised the need to get advances in technology into the hands of personnel as fast as possible. Specialist reservists could assist. 

Reserves have deployed to Australian operations in Iraq and Afghanistan as specialist, such as nurses and lawyers; those deployable roles could expand to focus on new technologies and war-fighting domains, such as space and cyber. In these evolving areas of combined arms, there’s potential for reservists to gain experiences and education exceeding those of the regular ADF, in areas such as academic research, policy development, linguistics and the use of future technologies. Research has shown that reservists have unique professional and life experiences, skills and abilities compared to full-time service members, and that capability is ripe for leveraging to bolster Australia’s security. 

Civilians with particular skill sets can be recruited to meet the ADF’s needs through specialist classifications or officer roles not requiring full-time service or leadership taskings, taking an approach similar to the one recommended to the Australian Public Service in competing with the private sector for unique skill sets. In meeting the challenges of the future, the ADF will have a particular need for expertise in areas such as artificial intelligence, cybertechnology and quantum computing and will compete with other employers for those skills. 

Domestic service

The final area in which reserves can contribute to ADF capability is domestic support. The DSR outlined how enhanced domestic security and response capability will be required from the army reserves, but, with increasing tri-service numbers and training, reservists rather than their full-time counterparts could take primary responsibility for the domestic response to natural disasters and crises. That shift would allow the full-time ADF further capacity to focus on war-fighting training and conflict response and could be achieved through improved reserve training and unit specialisation in supporting domains. That could include training in disaster preparedness, firefighting and infrastructure defence. 

Australia is joining the US and Japan in developing systems for shielding territory from air and missile attack. The news comes as the Department of Defence and Royal Australian Air Force are under pressure to move faster in implementing such a capability. 

‘Today, we announce our vision to cooperate on a networked air defence architecture among the United States, Japan and Australia to counter growing air and missile threats,’ Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio and President Joe Biden said in a joint statement this month as Fumio visited Washington. 

They also noted that Japan may be able to participate in advanced projects under Pillar 2 of the AUKUS security pact between Australia, Britain and the United States, and that the US, Japan and Australia could collaborate on autonomous air systems, particularly collaborative combat aircraft. Finally, at a US-Japan bilateral level, the statement highlighted joint development of the Glide Phase Interceptor to counter high-end, regional hypersonic threats. 

There’s a lot in there for Australia to think about as it moves towards releasing its 2024 National Defence Strategy and an accompanying update to the Integrated Investment Program (IIP). The first thing to think about is integrated air and missile defence (IAMD). 

In an earlier article I argued that Australia had fallen behind in IAMD. Last year’s Defence Strategic Review identified the capability gap, noting that a layered IAMD system—comprising a battle management system, command and control network, sensors and interceptor batteries—must be delivered urgently. ‘Defence must reprioritise the delivery of a layered IAMD capability, allocating sufficient resources to the Chief of Air Force to deliver initial capability in a timely way and subsequently further develop the mature capability,’ it said. 

Now, the announcement for a US-Japan-Australia partnership will hopefully encourage Defence and the government to prioritise IAMD in the IIP. If Australia is to pursue capabilities for its strategy of deterrence by denial, it must focus on more than strike and power projection. We must hold a shield as well as a sword. 

We saw an IAMD system impressively in action on 14 April, when the one wielded by Israel, supported by US, British and French forces, decisively defeated an Iranian attack by long-range drones, cruise missiles and ballistic missiles. Had Israel lacked such a capability, it might have suffered high casualties and extensive damage. Australia should learn the lesson and act quickly.  

Australian efforts to develop IAMD capability have dragged on. Lockheed Martin is leading the development of project AIR 6500 Phase 1 which is a joint air battle management system that will sit at the centre of the eventual IAMD capability. It’s a good first step, but the IAMD system must be deployed quickly, rather than be delayed by unnecessarily high performance objectives. The emphasis must be on minimum viable capability, not one perfect system to rule them all (eventually, at enormous cost). That message was in the DSR. 

If Australia’s strategic outlook were not rapidly deteriorating, a more leisurely approach to developing IAMD could be justified. But we lack time, with assessments that China could attempt to seize Taiwan as early as the second half of this decade and prompt conflict with the United States. 

The quickest and safest path to deploying an operational IAMD capability is by military–off–the–shelf (MOTS) acquisition of the battle management system, command and control network and interceptor batteries. Australia could simply buy a range of systems now available and operationally proven, such as Lockheed Martin’s MIM-104 Patriot and longer-range THAAD. Alternatively, we could improve the short-range NASAMS system that Norway’s Kongsberg is delivering for the army. It uses AMRAAM interceptors but can accept integration of other, farther-flying munitions, such as the AMRAAM-ER with a range of 70km and Raytheon’s SkyCeptor with a range of 200km. 

So Australia has a range of MOTS options to choose from. AIR 6500 could progressively evolve from an initial array of MOTS systems, providing a stronger IAMD capability later. Those advances would be important, particularly as the Chinese Rocket Force gains in sophistication.  

They could be quickly introduced as part of the trilateral US-Japan-Australia IAMD effort. Japanese cooperation with AUKUS Pillar 2, particularly any that addresses hypersonic threats, might also contribute to bolstering Australian IAMD capability. 

Hypersonic threats and the risk of increasingly sophisticated long-range missiles adaptable to both nuclear and conventional attack should also present a requirement for the US, Japan and Australia to work together to counter strategic risks as part of an effort to strengthen US extended nuclear deterrence. 

Originally published on 9 August 2023.

In the latest issue of Australian Foreign Affairs, the Lowy Institute’s Sam Roggeveen makes assertions about the priorities of China’s nuclear targeting of Australia, as well as what he claims will be Australia’s missile targeting of Chinese territory. I consider much of what he has written to be wrong.

In ‘Target Australia: Is the alliance making us less safe?’, Roggeveen asserts that the basing of US B-52 bombers at the Tindal airbase near Darwin will make the site a priority nuclear target of China because the bombers could strike China’s nuclear missile silos and bases, early warning radars and nuclear command and control facilities. But the distance from Tindal to military targets in the south of mainland China is over 4,500 kilometres and the B-52’s operational speed is subsonic (900 km/h). This means that it would take in the order of five hours to reach key military targets in China’s south. And flying from Tindal to Beijing would take more like eight hours, providing China with plenty of warning.

In contrast, the joint US–Australia intelligence facility at Pine Gap near Alice Springs will be by far China’s most important and time-urgent nuclear target because of its ability to give the US instant, real-time warning of a Chinese nuclear attack, the precise number of missiles, their trajectory and their likely targets. There’s nothing novel about Pine Gap being identified by potential nuclear adversaries as a priority target. In the late 1970s, it was made quite clear to me during talks in Moscow that Pine Gap was a priority Soviet nuclear target. And in 2016, I was warned: ‘In the event of nuclear war between Russia and America, you Australians will find that nuclear missiles fly in every direction.’

The fact is that the KGB had detailed evidence in the late 1970s from two US spies, Andrew Lee and Christopher Boyce, with access to the Pine Gap ‘intelligence take’ of its key role—together with the joint facility at Nurrungar near Woomera—in detecting and tracking Soviet ballistic missiles and listening to the USSR’s military communications. We can assume that the Russians will have briefed China about Pine Gap, which now includes the space-based infrared detection capabilities of the old Nurrungar base, being a much more time-urgent target than Tindal. Roggeveen asserts that China would not strike Pine Gap because of its important role in US nuclear deterrence. That is not my view: we’re not talking about deterrence and nuclear arms control here but a decision by China to use nuclear weapons. Tindal would not be targeted with the urgency that Roggeveen claims.

Roggeveen asserts that Australia’s acquisition of Tomahawk cruise missiles ‘can be interpreted only one way: Australia wants the capability to strike targets on Chinese soil’.  I don’t know how Roggeveen’s imagination jumped to this conclusion. But the 2023 defence strategic review recommends that Australia’s concept of defence have ‘a focus on deterrence through denial, including the ability to hold any adversary at risk’. That does not include striking China’s territory, which would be a dangerous gamble by Australia. But attacking China’s military bases in the South China Sea and contingently in the South Pacific certainly should be included in our future targeting doctrine if—as Roggeveen accepts—there’s a likelihood of a ‘Chinese military assault on Australia’.

Deterrence theory holds two alternatives: deterrence by punishment and deterrence by denial. Deterrence by punishment gives priority to destroying the enemy’s territory, military bases and key population centres. By comparison, deterrence by denial requires Australia to hold potential adversaries’ forces and forward-based military structure at risk from a greater distance rather than waiting for them to operate in a threatening way in our immediate approaches.

My colleague and a former deputy secretary of Defence, Richard Brabin-Smith, and I wrote an ASPI report in 2021 titled Deterrence through denial: a strategy for an era of reduced warning time. We argued that Australia needed to acquire highly accurate, long-range missiles. In this way, we could deter military actions against Australia’s interests with less dependency on warning time than in the past. Holding a potential adversary’s forces at risk from a greater distance would influence the calculus of enemy costs involved in threatening Australian interests directly. For this we need to acquire long-range anti-ship strike missiles, cyber capabilities and area-denial systems.

Any credible future enemy operating directly against us will have highly vulnerable lines of logistics support back to its home base in North Asia. The closer it comes to our strategic approaches the more vulnerable its logistic support will become. If a potential adversary such as China develops—as it already has—several military bases in the South China Sea (or in the South Pacific in future), Australia must be able to destroy them if necessary.

Nowhere in the defence strategic review or in our own writings is there a suggestion that Australia needs to be able to strike mainland China. Attempting such deterrence by punishment would be extremely provocative and dangerous given China’s military capabilities. And no commentator in their right mind would suggest such a high-risk defence policy. The idea of being able to inflict unacceptable punishment on China is not within the realms of credible Australian defence policy.

There are further sweeping assertions by Roggeveen that the AUKUS relationship will increase the likelihood that Australia will be locked automatically into fighting alongside the US should Beijing go to war over Taiwan ‘or for another reason’. It will, of course, be important that we assert our absolute sovereignty over the missions to which we commit our future nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs). When Britain decided to buy US Trident missiles for its ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), London made clear that it would not be subordinate to Washington’s nuclear targeting priorities. Washington confirmed the UK’s sovereignty in formal writing to the British government in this vital regard.

If a future Australian government agrees, our Virginia-class SSNs will be able to use 2000-kilometre-range anti-ship missiles to strike China’s forces in the Taiwan Strait. That could be done from the safety of deepwater trenches east of the Philippines without detection.

As to other roles for our SSNs in a Taiwan contingency, we should consider discussing with Washington our capacity to deny the narrow straits of Southeast Asia to China’s overseas trade (it imports 80% of its oil through the Malacca Strait). That would be an important, independent military role for Australia, but without the potentially high cost of losing our relatively small number of military assets in a direct war over Taiwan.

Roggeveen is correct when he states that the US would be unlikely to subordinate nuclear-related missions to Australia’s submarine fleet. Even so, he observes that Australian SSNs might encounter Chinese SSBNs during future operations. In the Cold War, we regularly operated against the Soviet Navy in close-quarter operations that were greatly valued by Washington. UK SSNs trailed Soviet SSBNs for prolonged periods at distances as close as 500 metres and practised what was coyly termed contingency ‘target acquisitions’. In any such future occurrences, we would need ironclad rules of engagement reflecting our national sovereignty targeting priorities.

However, the main problem with Roggeveen’s article is that he focuses entirely on the dangers of resisting and deterring China without comparing that approach with the dangers of not resisting and not deterring China. That is not a prudent approach to making Australia’s security policy.

Roggeveen concludes that it’s not in Australia’s strategic interests to be drawn into a war over Taiwan. But neither is it in our interests to see a US defeat in such a war precipitating the acquisition of nuclear weapons by, say, Japan and South Korea. And neither is it in our interests to see Taiwan’s vibrant democracy crushed by the brutal military occupation of the People’s Liberation Army. There should be no place for such value-free judgements in the formulation of Australia’s defence policy.

During the recent pro-Palestine and pro-Israel protests in Sydney and Melbourne, many Australians have demanded an end to the conflict in Gaza, lawfully exercising their freedom of speech. A small number of protestors, however, have behaved in a way that is incompatible with Australian values and laws. Traditional media and social media understandably highlight extreme behaviour at protests and the growing cost of security. We, the authors, condemn violent behaviour and racist abuse, but not the protests.

News outlets and social media continue to bring the world a front-row view of the unspeakable horrors of the Israeli–Hamas conflict. This imagery is often disseminated to evoke shock and emotion. Beyond Gaza and Israel, the war has brought to the forefront deeply divisive sentiment, which has included legal democratic expression but also racial vilification, hate speech and even violence.

There’s no room in Australia for political and ideologically motivated violence. It’s not easy for Australia’s law enforcement and intelligence agencies, which must be clear-eyed about immediately dealing with these issues while treading a careful path to safeguard the right to free speech and thought that is crucial to the health of our democracy.

Australia is a diverse nation with equally diverse opinions and perspectives regarding the conflict.

For many in the Palestinian and Israeli diasporas, this war has a profoundly personal dimension. These communities are directly connected through friends and family caught up in the war. Even people without a personal link, including those from Australia’s Jewish, Muslim and Arab communities more broadly, feel connected to the conflict.

Over several weeks, citizens of open democratic societies globally have exercised their right to publicly express their views on the war.

Outside the Arab world, protests have occurred in major cities across Europe and the United States. In Australia, citizens have vocally expressed their sentiments with pro-Palestinian and pro-Israeli demonstrations in major cities. If protestors cross the line to hate speech, law enforcement agencies should pursue those who’ve committed criminal offences. However, the demonstrations have mostly allowed those involved to express their perspectives and frustrations publicly.

A key element in preventing terrorism is ensuring freedom of expression. Australians have divergent views on the war and some disagree with the government’s stance. That’s okay because Australia is a democratic nation. It would be wrong to ignore these differences. But it would be equally wrong to over-securitise how we deal with legitimate and legal expression of thought.

Since 2001, Australia has listed Hamas, in its entirety, as a terrorist entity for financial sanctions under Part 4 of the Charter of the United Nations Act 1045 in implementing UN Security Council resolution 1373. This listing doesn’t mean Australians can’t protest against the Gaza conflict. It doesn’t prevent Australians from debating whether Israel’s actions in Gaza are proportionate. Nor does it prevent Australians from expressing support for Israel and Israeli victims of the Hamas attacks.

Preventing anti-Semitism and preserving public safety have been used to justify the anti-Palestinian decisions of various governments. In some cases, these decisions have worsened social tensions, especially between Jewish and Muslim communities.

In Europe, several countries have banned pro-Palestinian protests and slogans. Even before the beginning of the Israel–Hamas war on 7 October, Germany had restricted pro-Palestinian demonstrations. Since then, education authorities in Berlin have told schools that they could ban students from wearing the Palestinian Kufiya scarf and ‘free Palestine’ stickers.

German Chancellor Olaf Scholz has also used the recent surge of anti-Semitism in Germany as an excuse to harden the country’s immigration policies. In an interview, he stated: ‘We must finally deport on a large scale those who have no right to stay in Germany.’

In France, local authorities are banning pro-Palestine protests on a case-by-case basis.

Policies like this risk undermining the democratic right to peaceful assembly and freedom of speech. At such times, freedom of expression, free from hate speech and vilification, serves as a pressure valve for communities.

To increase social cohesion amid the ongoing horrors of the Israel–Hamas war, Australian state, territory and federal governments must do more to show that they stand in solidarity with the victims on both sides of the conflict, as well as the Israeli, Palestinian, Jewish and Muslim communities more broadly. It must provide citizens with opportunities to express their political perspectives on the war as long as that’s done in accordance with Australian laws.

For example, if an Australian jurisdiction supports a group establishing a condolence book for the victims of the 7 October attacks, it should also support a group with a condolence book for the war’s non-combatant victims. If a pro-Israeli demonstration is allowed to go ahead, so too should an anti-war demonstration.

Australian democracy ensures that people can act, speak and think freely, as long as that doesn’t stop others from doing the same. It also provides for equality before the law. And it ensures that communities are safe and secure and that governments are transparent, responsive and accountable. The Australian government makes foreign policy decisions, and universal suffrage ensures that it’s answerable to the electorate.

While there’s no end in sight to the turmoil of the Israel–Hamas war, what can be controlled is governments’ responses on the domestic front. The peaceful exercise of freedom of speech in democratic countries, including Australia, is needed more than ever during this polarising conflict. Rather than deciding which side is right or wrong, the opinions and viewpoints of all citizens, whether pro-Israel or pro-Palestine, must be respected.

In an ASPI report released today, we argue that geopolitical challenges, notably Beijing’s growing power and coercive behaviour, justify a greater effort to elevate and sustain the important relationship between Australia and South Korea.

Changes led by President Yoon Suk-yeol, who aspires to make South Korea a ‘global pivotal state’, challenge the view that Seoul lacks the bandwidth to tackle security beyond the Korean peninsula. Initiatives like the South Korea–US–Japan trilateral launched by the three leaders at Camp David in August show that Seoul is willing to take steps to strengthen its security partnerships even if that risks upsetting Beijing.

Australia is also looking to achieve more with South Korea, overcoming years of underperformance and inconsistency in bilateral relations. Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister Richard Marles told an audience in Seoul last week, ‘As mature liberal democracies, I’m convinced the strategic defence relationship between Australia and South Korea can go from strength to strength and is full of opportunities to deepen it even further. I’m visiting here for the second time in a year to act on that conviction.’ It’s a shame that the response to Hamas’s attacks against Israel prevented Foreign Minister Penny Wong from joining Marles in Seoul last week, but hopefully the annual Australia–South Korea 2+2 foreign and defence ministers’ meeting can take place later this year.

Our report makes six recommendations to boost collaboration between Australia and South Korea, both bilaterally and with a wider set of regional partners. These recommendations span the three pillars of 2021 Australia–Republic of Korea Comprehensive Strategic Partnership: strategic and security cooperation; economic, innovation and technology cooperation; and people-to-people links.

Under the strategic and security pillar, Australia and South Korea should explore ways to incrementally knit together the longstanding Australia–US–Japan trilateral, which includes the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue between foreign ministers and the Trilateral Defence Ministers’ Meeting, with the nascent Camp David trilateral (see Figure 1). This process mustn’t be rushed and should start with engagement between officials rather than ministers. One option would be to invite Australia as a guest to the annual Trilateral Indo-Pacific Dialogue, a senior-official-level meeting for coordinating implementation of national Indo-Pacific strategies, especially as they apply to Southeast Asia and the Pacific island countries.

Figure 1: South Korea’s and Australia’s engagement in major regional minilaterals

As well as increasing military interoperability and joint exercises, defence industry collaborations like Hanwha Defence’s armoured vehicle centre of excellence in Geelong should be supported by Australia’s forthcoming defence industry development strategy, which requires a broad definition of sovereign capability focused on the resilience of supply rather than Australian ownership.

Cooperation under the economic, innovation and technology pillar of the partnership is key to countering Chinese coercion, which Australia and South Korea have both experienced. Both countries have responded to coercion by diversifying their trade relationships and improving supply-chain resilience in sectors like critical minerals and technologies. In this context, Australia and South Korea should support collaboration relevant to the advanced capabilities stream of the AUKUS agreement, focusing on defence-relevant technologies in which both countries are among the leaders in publishing high-impact research (see Table 1).

Table 1: Defence-relevant technologies on which Australia and South Korea should collaborate^a

Notes:
a. The technologies in this table were chosen because they are listed as defence-relevant technologies in ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker. However, only the technologies that fulfilled the following two criteria were chosen: China ranked first in terms of proportion of high-impact research, and South Korea and Australia ranked in the top 10 countries in terms of proportion of high-impact research output.
b. The technology monopoly risk metric seeks to highlight concentrations of technological expertise in a single country. It incorporates two factors: how far ahead the leading country (in this case, China) is relative to the next closest competitor, and how many of the world’s top 10 research institutions are located in the leading country (China). This metric, based on top 10% research output, is intended as a leading indicator for potential future dominance in technology capability (such as military and intelligence capability).
Source: Critical Technology Tracker, ASPI, 2023.

Canberra and Seoul could also do more to capitalise on their complementary strengths in space technologies, including small satellites. South Korea launched its first commercial-grade satellite in May 2023 and ranks highly in satellite-related research according to ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker. Northern Australia’s advantageous geography makes it the perfect location for cooperation on space launches and co-development of small satellite technologies with applications such as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; missile early warning; and communications.

Drawing back the lens to capture wider priorities, the two countries should play a leadership role in the Indo-Pacific region’s clean-energy transition, including through technical and development assistance focused on green hydrogen. This would also help address South Korea’s reliance on Australian coal and gas, and assist both countries meet their 2050 net-zero-emissions targets. By working together, they could support the development of regional supply chains for critical minerals used in clean-energy technologies, such as lithium, further improving resilience to Chinese coercion.

The people-to-people pillar of the partnership probably receives the least government attention, but it is vital and evolving rapidly. South Korea’s soft-power ascendancy includes the attraction of Hallyu (the ‘Korean wave’) to many Australians, which has driven interest in South Korea and the expansion of Korean studies in Australia. South Korea was the third most popular destination for Australians participating in the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade’s New Colombo Plan program in 2023. In contrast, Yonsei University is the only South Korean university to host an Australian studies centre. DFAT could craft an ‘Australia now’ campaign that engages Korean Australians who are famous or leaders in their field, including in the K-pop industry, as cultural ambassadors to address the imbalance and promote interest in Australia among the South Korean public.

The convergence of Australian and South Korean strategic interests on the challenge posed by China underpins recent progress in the bilateral relationship and lays the foundations to go further. The right investments now could help insulate this crucial strategic partnership from the risk of backsliding if there’s a change in the political wind—an approach that sounds familiar as Prime Minister Anthony Albanese visits Washington.