Tag Archive for: Australia

India and Philippines speak different strategic languages. Australia must be multilingual

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The ‘emerging axis’ of autocratic powers epitomised by China’s support for Russia’s war against Ukraine is, as Australia’s top intelligence chief Andrew Shearer recently said, one of the most troubling strategic developments today.

And just as those axis nations—which also include North Korea and Iran—have as many strategic differences as commonalities, countries such as Australia that are worried by, and looking to counter, this malign axis should understand that they’ll need to accept and work with a range of approaches from partners.

This reality was underscored by remarks made at ASPI-hosted events in recent weeks by India and the Philippines—two key regional players who are dealing with China’s assertiveness in their own ways but whom are both important partners to Australia.

First, India. The emerging giant’s stance on the axis is the more complicated. India has had a long strategic partnership with Russia, going back to the early Cold War. Yet it has an equally long history of disputes with China. This has included not just the contest over their unsettled border but also tensions stemming from Beijing’s support to Pakistan and its barely disguised efforts at undermining India on a variety of issues such as refusing to allow India to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group which governs transfers of civilian nuclear technology and material, and refusing to back India’s efforts to promote UN Security Council reforms as well as India’s quest for a seat on the Security Council.

So where does that leave India with respect to the new axis? At the Raisina Down Under summit, which ASPI co-hosted with India’s Observer Research Foundation, India’s External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar answered by explaining that the three biggest countries of the Eurasian landmass formed a strategic triangle. This was, he reminded the audience, basic geometry learnt in all schools.

It was in India’s interests, he said, that it ‘never allow two sides to come to a point where the third is utterly disadvantaged’.

‘And I would even argue going beyond that,’ he continued, ‘at a time when … Russia’s relationship with the West is very badly damaged and Russia is turning more and more towards Asia, it’s useful in Asia that we give Russia more options … The more broadly Russia is engaged by Asian countries, frankly, that will allow that much more political, diplomatic flexibility for everybody concerned.’

The implication was that it is a better Indian strategy to tolerate Russia’s aggression and lawlessness, and to engage with both Russia and China through groupings such as the BRICS—which also includes Brazil and South Africa—than leaving India’s Eurasian strategic peers to pursue their no-limits partnership unchecked and without giving Moscow some kind of off-ramp.

Jaishankar’s further implication is that this is not just in India’s interests but the broader region’s and the West’s as well. Of course, whether this undermines the rules-based order intended to protect smaller and weaker states, and whether it’s a convenient excuse for India given its reliance on Russian energy and defence equipment, are both fair questions.

Still, India’s approach can clearly offer strategic balance. Better to have India there than not, Jaishankar is effectively saying. India, he pointed out, is neither Western nor anti-Western.

Our challenge is not to pressure New Delhi to pick a side. We should remember that China represents as much or more of a military and political threat to India as it does to any other country. It’s a principal reason why New Delhi invests in relations with Canberra and Washington, and why it participates in the Quad. We also know New Delhi is genuinely concerned by Russia’s growing closeness to China and by the two authoritarian states’ ‘no limits’ partnership.

The Philippines, by comparison, is a smaller player whose main goal right now with respect to China is to preserve its sovereignty. The strategic priorities it articulates are shaped accordingly. Speaking to an ASPI audience in Melbourne just days after the Raisina event, Philippines Secretary of National Defense Gilberto Teodoro Jr stressed the importance of calling out coercive action by China and the need for like-minded partners to do so together. There were no geometric metaphors—just a demand that the threat be clearly understood and responded to.

The Philippines has its own backstory: a treaty ally of the United States against both the Soviet Union and China during the Cold War, and a more recent history in which the mercurial leader Rodrigo Duterte harmed his countries’ interests by trying unsuccessfully to find a modus vivendi with Beijing.

Despite the different approaches, these are both very important partners to Australia. It’s worth noting their common strategic assessments and their emphasis on collective action. We know that limiting our reading of strategic challenges to ‘major power competition’ is wrong. Collaboration among regional powers, including smaller ones, is critical to what Foreign Minister Penny Wong calls ‘strengthening influence, leverage and sovereignty’.

Australia and likeminded countries such as the US and Japan need to assure India, the Philippines and others in the region—with all their varied approaches to the China challenge and the growing axis—that it is in their interests and the region’s to work with us.

The foundation is mutual interest rather than strategic altruism, as Ashley Tellis once characterised it. This doesn’t make it transactional however. Rather it is based on core principles of territorial integrity, democratic sovereignty, individual freedoms and national security. It might be useful for all sides to acknowledge this.

Northern defence is getting more talk than action

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There is a glaring disconnect between policy and practical action in the Northern Territory.

Focusing the Australian Defence Force on Northern Australia is a straightforward decision. The Defence Strategic Review, National Defence Strategy and Integrated Investment Plan all highlight the necessity of deterring potential adversaries from projecting power against Australia through our northern approaches. These documents also emphasise the need for a well-connected and resilient network of bases to enhance the ADF’s operational capabilities in the north.

But transport and port infrastructure still look inadequate, ADF forces in the Northern Territory are decreasing, not building up, and it’s not clear that the area has Defence and civilian capacity to cope with demanding military contingencies. This needs to be tested.

Australia and the United States have made significant investments in the Royal Australian Air Force’s Tindal base, near Katherine in the Northern Territory, recognising its strategic importance in the Indo-Pacific region. Australia has committed to further upgrading infrastructure and enhancing capabilities at Tindal, including for airfield operations and logistics support. Meanwhile, the US has bolstered its presence through initiatives such as increased deployment of aircraft and personnel, consolidating Tindal as a critical hub for regional security operations.

Despite these investments, questions remain about whether the base and connective transport and logistical infrastructure are sufficiently networked to ensure a robust response capability in the face of evolving geopolitical challenges. For example, it’s uncertain whether there are enough suitable trucks available to move fuels from Darwin to Tindal during periods of high operational tempo, or, without a rail link to the base, how munitions and other items can be brought from Adelaide to Tindal.

The ADF has recognised the need for enhanced training areas in the Northern Territory, spending significantly to ensure personnel are prepared for diverse operational scenarios. This includes expanding existing training facilities and developing new sites that exploit the region’s unique geographical features, allowing for more effective live-fire exercises and joint operations. However, the challenge remains that fewer, not more, Australian soldiers will be in the Northern Territory to fully use these enhanced training areas.

The Darwin-based 1st Brigade was once the most lethal formation in the Australian Army. In 2019, it was stripped of its tanks, armoured vehicles and mechanised designation as part of the army’s restructuring efforts.

All Darwin-based helicopters will have left by the end of 2024. The army is concentrating helicopters in Townsville.

In September 2023, the government announced army restructuring. The 1st Brigade was designated as a light combat brigade focussed on agility and deployment in the littoral environment. The Townsville-based 3rd Brigade was designated as an armoured brigade suiting amphibious operations with the Royal Australian Navy. Most of the army’s new amphibious vessels will be based in Townsville. The 1st Brigade’s amphibious vessels will be based in the already crowded HMAS Coonawarra in Darwin.

The army’s long-range fire capability, deterring potential adversaries from projecting power against Australia through our northern approaches, will confusingly be based in Adelaide. This is despite road and rail infrastructure between Adelaide and Darwin remaining unacceptably vulnerable to weather disruption. Moving by air is hardly an answer since airlift capacity never seems sufficient even in exercises, and Australia barely has any merchant shipping to call on.

The Royal Australian Navy has several vessels based in Darwin, including the Armidale-class patrol boats and the soon to commissioned Arafura-class patrol ships. The versatile Arafuras will bolster the navy’s capabilities in northern waters. However, the navy has limited moorings and options for supporting and rearming vessels in Darwin, Australia’s most northern deep port. Thus, the ships would all have to travel great distances from likely combat zones just to be combat ready once more.

There is a clear gap between the Northern Territory policy in the National Defence Strategy and action. While the US strengthens its presence and capabilities in the Northern Territory as part of its force posture initiative, Australia’s action is spending on bases and training areas.

There can be no doubt that Defence faces logistical and workforce challenges in the Northern Territory, and policy to address these comes with a price tag. Arguably, this is why, during a meeting in Hawaii earlier this year, a senior Australian defence official told US Army Pacific representatives that there was neither room nor industry-support capacity for them to preposition equipment in the Northern Territory.

For years, Defence has suffered from cultural resistance to being in the Northern Territory. It’s time to move beyond that.

The next step in continued implementation of the National Defence Strategy should be to hold a nationally coordinated, simulated stress test of the region’s Defence and civilian capacity to withstand a range of contingencies. The simulations should involve desktop exercises that access datasets from industry, state and the territory government. In addition to testing legal frameworks, strategic reserves, logistics and transport infrastructure, and force posture, attention should be directed to questions of time and space for responses.

 

Acquiring trust, not sovereign datasets, is the key to effective AI regulation

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Building public trust is vital to creating effective artificial intelligence (AI) regulation in Australia—not sovereign large-scale datasets. The assertion that AI regulation would be ineffective without the existence of large-scale sovereign datasets​​​​—as recently argued in the Strategist—is flawed.  

Public trust in AI systems is low in Australia. Only 34 percent of Australians are willing to trust AI systems, according to research by the University of Queensland and KPMG. For AI to flourish, Australians need confidence that their data will be safe in the hands of those who will use it to build and improve AI systems, and that these systems will be deployed safely, securely and responsibly. Regulations function to protect users’ rights, and to apply standards and boundaries that encourage responsible innovation. If well crafted, they should be adaptable to the evolving nature of AI. This assurance of trustworthiness is what will pave the way for greater AI development and adoption by businesses and consumers alike. 

The recent Strategist article, ‘Sovereign data: Australia’s AI shield against disinformation’, argues​​ that large sovereign datasets are essential for combating disinformation and ensuring trustworthy AI, and that AI regulation in Australia would be ineffective without first establishing such datasets. ​​There are several problematic assumptions underlying this argument and assertions that deserve greater scrutiny.

An assertion that the success of AI regulations is dependent on the data used in particular AI models overestimates the influence of dataset control on regulatory success. Even the highest quality source data can’t stop an AI being misused—but strong and enforceable regulatory frameworks can. Effective AI governance focuses not just on the source of data but also on how AI systems are deployed and managed.

National sovereignty of data is neither appropriate nor desirable for all AI. Sovereign control of data can be beneficial in specific contexts such as national security and critical infrastructure. But the idea that datasets—whether Australian-generated or otherwise—need always be kept, owned and controlled within Australia overlooks the many cases in which higher-quality data and AI expertise are better sourced from abroad. For example, if developing an AI model for semiconductor chip design, it would be unwise not to collaborate with Taiwan, a global leader in chip manufacturing.

Global datasets are critical in the many cases in which Australia does not have a representative dataset to call upon, cannot generate one that aligns well to the function, or is simply working on projects that require global data analysis—such as climate research. For example, translating foreign languages into English requires datasets from native speakers abroad, as Australia’s multilingual data is limited.

Likewise, there are many cases where the international community has more advanced capabilities than Australia—a fact we can’t ignore. Image datasets such as CIFAR-* and Imagenet for computer vision, object and facial recognition have already undergone intense public scrutiny and bias analysis by researchers and activists online that make it difficult to hide potential manipulation. But there is no such thing as unbiased data. The trick is identifying the degree to which biases have been introduced in datasets and determining whether there are any risks that need to be managed to make it appropriate for Australian uses. This is best done by building trusted international partnerships with shared standards for quality and accountability​​.

It’s also incorrect to assume that bigger datasets are inherently better. In fact, better is better when it comes to data—cleaner, truthful, secure, appropriate and representative for the purpose. Viral mis- and disinformation and uneducated opinion can generate large amounts of data—scale can dilute good data rather than protect it. ​And such disinformation can just as easily be created ​from AI using​ large, sovereign datasets as it can from non-sovereign datasets.

Not all AI systems rely on data that raises privacy concerns. For instance, AI models that use meteorological data to investigate air quality trends or to predict rain, use data that is neither personal nor inherently sensitive. The regulatory focus in such cases should be on ensuring the accuracy and reliability of the data rather than its geographic origin, if regulation is even needed at all.

In an effort to support domestic AI innovation and manage the risk of overregulation, the Australian Government is taking a risk-based approach in its AI regulation. The Department of Industry, Science, and Resources has done commendable work gripping up the issues, laying a solid foundation that addresses key concerns such as safety, rights protection and alignment with international regulations in its proposed mandatory guardrails for high-risk AI settings. However, refining certain aspects will further strengthen this framework.

The current definition of ‘high-risk AI’ is too broad, risking overregulation of low-risk systems, which could stifle innovation. A clear, tiered regulatory approach that distinguishes between different levels of risk will promote AI adoption without burdening businesses unnecessarily.

Regulations must also account for the global nature of AI development. Foreign developers of products used in Australia should be held to the same standards as domestic developers to prevent unfair advantages, while AI systems—whether developed locally or abroad—must meet high standards for safety, transparency and accountability. Failure to comply should result in enforcement, to build public and business trust in the regulatory system.

Overall, Australian regulation must be responsive, evolving alongside the technology itself. Regulating a field as dynamic and wide-ranging as AI will require ongoing adaptation, and iterative updates that learn from past experience.

​​Sovereign datasets may have limited roles in specific sectors, but they are far from the cornerstone of effective AI regulation. In shaping its AI future, Australia must prioritise trust over territorial control of data. The real key to effective AI regulation lies in building public confidence through clear, consistent rules that keep pace with technological change globally. They should protect rights, promote transparency and foster responsible innovation—regardless of geographical location of the data or the developer. ​​​

Norway’s defence minister tells ASPI why the security of our two regions is linked

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For two countries so geographically far apart, Australia and Norway have surprisingly aligned strategic perspectives. This has underpinned a burgeoning defence industry partnership and unprecedented reciprocal visits by defence ministers last month. ASPI hosted Norway’s defence minister, Bjorn Gram, during his time in Canberra to exchange views on the security outlook and the development of an integrated defence industrial base.

Gram shares the view once espoused by Arthur Tange, the public servant who transformed Australia’s security settings during the Cold War, that ‘a map of one’s own country is the most fundamental of all defence documentation’.

For Norway, geography dictates a perennial focus on what Gram called the ‘high north’, around the Arctic, Barents and North Atlantic regions. This has long meant maintaining a watchful but, where possible, nonconfrontational relationship with Russia, with which Norway shares a border and agreements over fisheries and access to the Norwegian island of Svalbard.

But the geopolitical map of the high north is transforming at the same time as climate change reshapes its topography. As sea ice recedes, Chinese and Russian fleets could start moving more easily between the Pacific and Atlantic. Gram expressed concern that China might try to exploit the whip hand it holds over Russia in their ‘no limits’ partnership to acquire military technologies and access that Moscow has withheld. This raises particular concerns in the Arctic, given its vital role in undersea warfare and nuclear stability—topics that Canberra has a direct interest in, too.

Gram’s time in Australia coincided with his prime minister’s visit to China to mark the 70th anniversary of diplomatic relations. In words familiar to Australian ears, Gram also stressed the importance of maintaining cooperation with China on global issues, such as trade and climate change, while remaining vigilant to security threats and always putting the national interest first.

Detailing some of those threats, Gram criticised China’s economic and technological support for Russian aggression against Ukraine, as well as North Korea’s direct transfer of arms. He also noted the public warning by Norway’s intelligence and security services that China was among the countries targeting Norway with cyber-attacks and other malign activities.

The rhyming tones of Oslo’s and Canberra’s statecraft include recent defence reviews in both countries that reached remarkedly similar conclusions and enjoy similarly broad-based political and public support. Like Australia, Norway is increasing defence spending, which will reach 2 percent of GDP this year and more than double in the next decade. And, like Australia, Norway will skew spending, at least initially towards growing the navy as part of a wider program of force expansion and integration. In the same vein, Norway is increasing its commitments to NATO, just as Australia is strengthening its core alliances and wider security and technology partnerships.

This alignment in strategic perspectives underpins an uptick in bilateral defence cooperation, which is presently focused on expanding the manufacturing of precision munitions. Norwegian company Kongsberg is establishing maintenance and production facilities in New South Wales for the Joint Strike Missile, which will be used by the Royal Australian Air Force, and the Naval Strike Missile for surface warships. Both are vital components of Australia’s Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordnance (GWEO) program. Kongsberg has already opened a facility in South Australia for maintaining missiles and NASAMS air defence systems. Gram said the door was now open for other areas of potential collaboration under GWEO, perhaps including production of rocket motors.

Gram stressed that Norway–Australia defence industry cooperation ‘is not one way only’. Kongsberg has many Australian subcontractors in its supply chain, and he foresaw more such opportunities. Another example is the contract of South Australian company PMB Defence regarding supply of batteries for Norway’s diesel submarines.

Raising horizons, Gram hoped Norway and Australia could explore cooperation in space capabilities. Kongsberg Satellite Services is establishing ground facilities in South Australia as part of a global satellite telemetry, tracking and control network. Over time, this could help the ADF in operating sovereign intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance satellites.

Looking ahead, the Nordic model of total defence, which Norway shares with Denmark, Sweden and Finland, could be a helpful guide for Australia to accelerate preparedness, build resilience and mobilise industry and the population behind the concept of national defence. There are parallels worth exploring in the transformation of the Australian Army to support littoral manoeuvre and the expansion of the Norwegian Army from one mechanised brigade to three flexible brigades.

Both Gram and his Australian counterpart, Richard Marles, have emphasised that bilateral defence industry cooperation is underpinned by growing strategic linkages between the Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic regions.

As a tangible demonstration of these links, a Norwegian frigate will join a British-led carrier strike group on deployment to the Indo-Pacific next year. Moreover, like Australia, Norway is deepening defence partnerships with Japan and South Korea, both of which Gram visited on his way to Australia. Gram also supports NATO playing a greater role in this region in such areas as strategic communication and countering hybrid threats.

Tange’s map reminds us that the tyranny of distance will always circumscribe the bonds between two distant friends, but the defence interests of Australia and Norway have arguably never been closer.

Afghan women’s vulnerability must be a priority issue for Home Affairs

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An unacceptable pattern is emerging in the way the Department of Home Affairs deals with visa applications for vulnerable Afghan women.

The Taliban celebrated the three-year anniversary of its takeover of Afghanistan in August with a military parade and a new set of vice and virtue laws making it illegal for women to speak outside the family home. The extremist group has been progressively cracking down on defenders of women’s human rights.

But Home Affairs has been requesting Afghan families remove their vulnerable female relatives from humanitarian visa applications. It also recently denied the application of a women’s human rights defender whose application was proposed by an Australian citizen more than two years ago.

When the Australian Federal Police was moved out of the Home Affairs portfolio, the department seems to have considered its responsibilities under Australia’s National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security were transferred as well. They were not. The National Action Plan (NAP) prioritises the rights of women and girls in situations of armed conflict, including through humanitarian protection.

On their Afghanistan Update webpage, Home Affairs says that ‘members of identified minority groups (such as women and girls, ethnic minorities and LGBTQI+) who are referred by the UNHCR or proposed by a close family member in Australia’ will be given priority processing.

A locally engaged employee (LEE) of the Australia government, who spent 14 years working on the multinational base in Tarin Kowt and at the Australian Embassy in Kabul, shared correspondence with me showing Home Affairs asking his family to remove his mother from their humanitarian visa application in July.

The 68-year-old woman has depended financially and psychologically on her son for years. Rental agreements from Afghanistan and Pakistan—where she is living in limbo, having fled her home in Afghanistan—have been provided to the department, as have receipts for medical care.

The woman also depends on her son for her physical security. Her only son still residing in Afghanistan was imprisoned by the Taliban because of his brother’s links to Australia. If she were forced to return to Afghanistan, she would have no mahram (male relative or guardian) to accompany her and no one able to rent a house and pay her expenses.

Still, according to communication between Home Affairs and the LEE’s local member of parliament, the department determined that his mother did not meet the dependency criteria for the visa application. These criteria have not changed in the past three years.

Similarly, the department asked a Hazara family to remove their 23-year-old unmarried daughter from their family reunion application that was proposed by a family member residing in regional Australia.

Under the current gender apartheid regime of the Taliban, an unmarried 23-year-old faces many specific challenges in addition to the threats posed against her family. She also faces different threats than those faced by older women. Without the presence, protection and support of her family, this woman faces the increasing and serious threat of forced marriage and sexual abuse if imprisoned for breaking the laws restricting the movement and rights of women. She will not be allowed to work, rent a house or even use her voice in any public space.

Australia’s National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security is designed to ensure that all relevant government departments implement the suite of UN Security Council resolutions on Women, Peace and Security, as well as General Recommendation 30 of the Committee on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and other international legal obligations relating to conflict and insecurity.

In General Recommendation 30, CEDAW reinforced and complemented the international legal protection regime for refugees, articulating the obligation to ensure responses to conflict and instability are gender sensitive. UN Security Council resolution 2122 recognises the need to better respond to analysis of the ‘impact of armed conflict on women and girls’. But it is CEDAW that specifically call for states parties, including Australia, to provide durable solutions for women and girls who are displaced.

General Recommendation 30 has an entire section dedicated to the unique vulnerabilities women and girls face when they are forcibly displaced, obliging states parties to ‘address the specific risks and particular needs of different groups of internally displaced and refugee women, subjected to multiple and intersecting forms of discrimination, including women with disabilities, older women, girls, widows, women who head households … women belonging to ethnic, national, sexual or religious minorities, and women human rights defenders.’

Despite Australia’s current representation at CEDAW, Home Affairs last month denied a humanitarian visa application to a woman who was the co-founder and program director of an Afghan woman’s rights organisation. She and her organisation received threats from the Taliban because of the work they did advancing women’s rights, and women in similar circumstances have been disappeared.

The woman ran a range of women’s rights programs including a tertiary education scholarship for young Afghan women that was supported by the Ford and Carnegie Foundations. She has been in exile in Pakistan for three years facing increasingly dire living circumstances and is no longer able to renew her Pakistani visa.

Yet, Home Affairs denied her on the basis that she was not facing sufficient persecution in her country of origin, or she had somewhere else to go, among other things. This is simply not true.

Home Affairs has faced multiple crises since the Taliban retook control of Afghanistan, and it is important it provides visas to address humanitarian issues in the Middle East, too. However, there is no excuse for such flagrant denial of Australia’s obligations to protect vulnerable Afghan women and girls through our humanitarian migration program.

The women of Afghanistan are now profoundly vulnerable—financially, psychologically and physically. This issue must be at the forefront as the department processes visa applications.

Why informed discussion on AUKUS is good for everyone

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The Australian government needs to lead the narrative on AUKUS. If it doesn’t, others will.

More and better-informed discussion about AUKUS is a good thing. The Australian public deserves continued healthy debates about what AUKUS, and the significant increase in defence spending outlined in the National Defence Strategy, mean for them, their communities, the economy and the Indo-Pacific region.

AUKUS leaders have described the partnership as a once-in-a-generation opportunity to promote peace and security throughout the Indo-Pacific. The subtext of which is to deter China from unilaterally altering the status quo in its favour. For AUKUS to deliver on its big promise, and for the Australian people to accept AUKUS’ price tag of hundreds of billions of dollars, the government needs to clearly explain what AUKUS will deliver, and why it’s important. And they will need to do so continuously because the stakes are too high if they fail.

A case in point is the recent sharp disagreement between lauded Australian Labor Party elders and advocates of AUKUS. The latest episode emerged around the security agreement’s three-year mark last week.

The debate reflects careful strategic thinking and decades of public service on both sides. These significant divergences in opinion should not be dismissed. There is value in discussing the issue of capability gaps, Australia’s sovereignty, the fiscal weight of the agreement, and the difficult trade-offs it will require, including around acquisition of other capabilities or other public goods. Momentous policy decisions like such as AUKUS demand rich and even heated discussions because no individual or group can claim a monopoly over what’s best for Australia’s national interests. To claim otherwise would be a disservice and an act of hubris that would be damaging to the tradition of Australia’s democratic discourse.

The government can play a powerful role before intellectual divergences could harden into political factions. Should the government vacate its responsibilities to promote the agreement, an environment that risks disenfranchising the very people essential for AUKUS’ success can emerge. At worst, an information vacuum would be ripe for exploitation by Chinese and Russian influence operations. Australia has already suffered from such tactics in the past.

AUKUS has an estimated 30-year time horizon to achieve a fully operational sovereign nuclear powered submarine capability, with eight boats in service. This equates to at least 10 election cycles in Australia, eight in the US, and six in Britain, during which AUKUS will be on voters’ minds. No policy is immune to political change, and neither is AUKUS. Support for the partnership will need to withstand competing priorities including housing, climate, health, education, unemployment and immigration.

The good news is the government has a positive story to tell about how AUKUS will benefit Australia including notable progress to date.

The AUKUS Optimal Pathway was announced just 564 days ago, on 13 March 2023. Since then, Australian Defence Force and Australian defence contractors have started studying at US and British submarine training schools and are embedded in their shipyards. Other Australians are training on visiting US nuclear-powered attack submarines. This will continue to expand over coming years, providing the backbone of Australia’s sovereign AUKUS workforce.

The Australian government has also established over 4000 science and technology university placements at 16 institutions across the country to build out this capability. Each country has agreed to personnel exchanges to support this growth. This transfer of knowledge and expertise will provide advances in education, technology and business competitiveness for the Australian community.

Australian industry will benefit from the reforms brought to streamline defence trade, information and technology sharing. These steps will enable co-development, co-manufacturing and co-delivering of advanced capabilities. The resultant path from groundbreaking research to commercialisation will help ensure our most innovative researchers and companies won’t have to leave Australia to grow.

A prime example of what is possible is the government’s bold entry into the quantum technology industry. Separate to the AUKUS endeavour, but sure to benefit from reduced barriers to cooperation, the government announced earlier this year an almost $1 billion investment in PsiQuantum to build the world’s first fault-tolerant quantum computer in Brisbane. This investment, which demonstrates Australia’s commitment to drive innovation and boost economic growth, will create 400 highly skilled local jobs, establish partnerships with local industries and fund university placements, transforming the industry.

The US has quickly followed suit with its own US$500 million investment in PsiQuantum, building a quantum campus in Chicago. Likewise, Britain announced £100 million for five new quantum research hubs. AUKUS partners are investing in groundbreaking quantum technologies that will support national security and directly benefit people’s lives through better healthcare and clean energy.

The issues that demand discussion will not be settled anytime soon. The domestic debate over AUKUS and Australia’s increased investment in advanced defence capability will intensify and change, shaped by domestic and international issues. The government’s preferred approach of limited public discussion is not suitable for the scale of this venture.

AUKUS is an immense undertaking that will reshape Australia’s strategic calculus, lethal capabilities and defence industrial base for decades to come. There is an immutable responsibility on the current government to take the public into its confidence and openly discuss the costs and benefits of the endeavour.

Australia’s national threat response requires inter-governmental coordination

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Cooperation between federal and subnational Australian governments on national security must continue to evolve in the face of the complex terrorism, espionage and foreign interference threats. 

The tensions exemplified by Canberra’s unprecedented 2021 decision to revoke Victoria’s Memorandum of Understanding with Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative in 2019—culminating in the enactment of the Foreign Relations (State and Territory Arrangements) Act 2020—highlight the misalignments that can occur. Establishing cohesive national security policies necessitates collaboration across all levels of the Australian government, particularly in light of ongoing developments such as AUKUS. 

Australia’s political system, shaped by its unique blend of US federalism and the British Westminster system, allocates sovereignty between the national and state governments. This federal structure has distinct advantages: it allows for policy diversity, accommodates varied regional perspectives, and enables state and territory (S&T) governments to tailor policies to local needs. However, this system also has its pitfalls, particularly regarding national security. The potential for divergence between federal national security and S&T economic priorities can lead to inconsistencies and national security vulnerabilities. 

Despite these challenges, a cooperative approach between federal and S&T governments offers several benefits. A unified strategy enhances national security and reassures public trust in the federation and Australia’s democracy. Collaboration creates a more formidable defence against external threats. It presents a unified stance to authoritarian regimes that would otherwise benefit from the creation of disunity and division. It ensures a proactive approach to addressing national security vulnerabilities and mitigating risks. 

A coordinated response to the AUKUS agreement, which involves substantial investments in South and Western Australia’s defence infrastructure, demonstrates how federal and state cooperation can bolster national security while promoting regional economic benefits. 

Historically, there have been instances in which S&T have pursued international relations that diverge from federal policy, creating friction. For example, Mark McGowan, then premier of Western Australia, visited China in April 2019. During this visit, McGowan focused on strengthening economic ties and promoting trade opportunities between Western Australia and China. This visit was controversial in the context of Australian foreign policy. The Australian federal government, particularly under then-Prime Minister Scott Morrison, was wary of China’s growing influence and activities in the region, particularly its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Some saw McGowan’s visit as challenging the federal government’s stance on China, which was increasingly critical of Chinese influence and involvement in Australian affairs. The federal government was concerned that state-level engagements with China could undermine a unified national approach to managing relations with Beijing and address issues like foreign interference and security. 

This challenge isn’t just about the S&Ts and their diplomatic efforts. The federal government, including the national intelligence community, must understand the drivers behind subnational diplomacy and play a proactive role in managing and guiding these engagements to ensure they align with national security priorities. 

The COVID-19 pandemic empowered S&Ts to make decisions independently of the federal government. While federal policies often address national concerns, they often fail to align with the immediate economic needs of individual states. For instance, the then-Victorian premier Dan Andrews criticised the federal government’s veto of its engagements with China, viewing it as neglectful of local economic interests. Similarly, Mark McGowan criticized federal figures for misjudging China’s importance to WA’s economy. Such tensions reinforce the necessity for a national security strategy that integrates federal and state priorities. 

S&Ts pursuing foreign policies independent of national policies risks creating security vulnerabilities. Authoritarian regimes may exploit federal systems to weaken national unity and erode democratic trust. As observed with Victoria’s MoU, foreign entities may view subnational agreements as opportunities to bypass or undermine federal policies. Such actions can create confusion and weaken the overall effectiveness of national strategies. 

A unified approach is essential for national security policies to succeed. Initiatives such as AUKUS require coordinated efforts from both federal and state governments. Additionally, programs like the US Force Posture Initiative, which includes several states, necessitate cohesive planning and execution. Effective national security strategies hinge on all levels of government working together to address emerging threats and challenges. 

Existing efforts to enhance cooperation, such as the Centre for Counter-Terrorism Coordination and the National Counter-Terrorism Plan, illustrate what can be achieved when federal and S&T governments work together.  

These initiatives provide a platform for sharing intelligence, coordinating responses and developing joint strategies—and they offer lessons for further improving cooperation. For example, increasing state involvement in national intelligence briefings and establishing dedicated channels for subnational diplomacy could improve coordination.  

As ASPI argued in our report last year on subnational diplomacy in the US alliance, the federal government should consider setting up a new branch within the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade that focusses on subnational diplomacy and further consider appointing an Ambassador for Subnational Diplomacy. Granted, these measures could face challenges such as resource allocation, coordination with existing diplomatic structures (such as DFAT State Offices), and potential conflicts with federal foreign policy. Still, in spite of the challenges and the effort required, these initiatives could further bridge gaps between federal and state governments. 

A strong and unified approach to national security requires robust cooperation between federal and state governments. By enhancing coordination and communication, Australia can navigate the increasingly complex security challenges it will continue to face in the coming years. The success of national security initiatives depends on the kind of partnership in which S&T are not just recipients but active participants in national security policy. 

Fuel under fire: insights from the 2024 Defence Fuel Symposium

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The 2024 Defence Fuel Symposium, held in early September in Canberra, highlighted the urgent need for a strategic overhaul of Australia’s fuel security in response to increasing global instability. 

The rules-based international order that has helped maintain stability in the Indo-Pacific for decades is under threat. China’s rapid military expansion, coercive pressuring of neighbours such as the Philippines in the South China Sea, and aggressive words and actions regarding Taiwan have raised tensions and increased the risk of conflict. Simultaneously, climate change presents a profound threat, demanding a fundamental shift in how we manage our national fuel supply and reserves. 

Fuel security is crucial for the Australian Defence Force (ADF). Without it, the ADF goes nowhere fast. To operate, it requires reliable access to the right fuel in the right quantities and right locations at the right time. While efficiency has been the focus for a long time, a shift towards effectiveness of fuel supply is now imperative. 

As early as 2008, Australia’s liquid fuel vulnerability was identified as a strategic concern. This was further emphasised by the 2013 report on liquid fuel security. This report exposed our reliance on imported crude and declining domestic refining capabilities. Although the 2017 Defence Fuel Transformation Program made strides in addressing safety and resilience of the fuel network, the strategic landscape has evolved significantly since its inception. 

Since 2012, Australia has lost six of its eight sovereign oil refineries, leaving us dependent on imported crude oil. The globalisation of our economy and reliance on a rules-based order exposes the fragility of our fuel supply chains.  

Our sea lines of communication, vital for economic and military needs, pass through maritime chokepoints such as the Strait of Malacca and highly contested waters such as the South China Sea. These areas, which handle over a third of global trade, are increasingly threatened by geopolitical tensions and the risk of disruptions from military actions, piracy or blockades. The Ukraine war, global energy disruptions and the Houthi attacks on shipping routes in the Red Sea give a sense of what impact those actions would have if conflict were to occur in the Indo-Pacific. Similarly, the 2021 urea shortage, which disrupted diesel supplies and negatively affected the transport sector, exemplifies our vulnerability to external disruptions most acutely and shows what would happen in a moment of global crisis. 

Given these global challenges, policymakers must consider the value of resilience. The current strategic environment demands enhanced preparedness. Any disruption to oil transport through critical maritime chokepoints could lead to significant delays, increased costs and the need for costly security measures and possibly naval resources. 

Australia’s domestic force posture, which includes resilient bases in northern Australia, faces growing pressure from increased fuel demand and potential forward staging of allied forces. Despite efforts, our fuel reserves have not met the International Energy Agency’s 90-day minimum requirement since 2012. 

These external challenges are then compounded by domestic ones. Limited road networks in northern Australia leave RAAF Base Tindal and ‘bare bases’ Sherger, Curtin and Learmonth—which have no permanent ADF presence but which can be rapidly activated in a crisis—reliant on fuel delivered by roads. These roads are vulnerable to wet season closures and dry season road melt, increasing operational risks. Moreover, additional fuel storage doesn’t mitigate the risks of supply shock if demand surges due to disruptive weather, regional unrest or direct military threats. 

For these reasons, renewable energy and alternative fuels are essential for enhancing capability and should be evaluated based on specific platform needs. Advances in battery and hybrid propulsion systems, already adopted by commercial ships, could be applied to Naval support vessels. The Army’s Bushmaster electric vehicle prototype demonstrates the potential for electric power in military applications, highlighting the need for more prototype testing across ground platforms. 

With aviation consuming two-thirds of Defence’s fuel, developing sustainable aviation fuel (SAF) is crucial. The recent SAF test by the RAAF Roulettes is promising, but industry needs a steady demand to justify investment in ramping up sovereign production capability. Countries like the US and Britain have led the way in using alternative fuels, enhancing operational capability and reducing fossil fuel dependence. Australia should follow by certifying alternative fuels for the ADF, enhancing interoperability with coalition partners. 

Producing fuel domestically is also a strategic necessity for achieving net-zero targets, supporting the agriculture sector, reducing reliance on imported oil, and utilising the new northern fuel storage facilities. As shown elsewhere, sovereign biofuel production requires joint ventures, low-interest loans, grants, streamlined approvals, increased research and development funding, long-term supply agreements, government-funded training and tax incentives. 

The evolving global landscape necessitates reducing reliance on imported fuel, diversifying sources across ADF platforms and strengthening strategic fuel reserves. Investment in research and development for renewable energy and alternative fuels would extend their capabilities and positioning Australia as a leader in clean energy technology. 

With legacy platforms set to operate beyond 2050, balancing sustainability with operational feasibility is key to meeting net-zero challenges. 

The 2024 Defence Fuel Symposium reinforced that fuel is a capability, not a commodity. Strengthening industry partnerships, enhancing interoperability and prioritising innovative, cost-effective solutions are key to ensuring Australia’s defence fuel network can adapt to modern demands. 

Cables under the sea: Pacific island countries need integrated electricity grids

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Australia should supercharge the development of Pacific Island Countries (PICs) and contribute to their lasting economic security by investing in inter-island electricity grids and diversified energy sources.

A green energy project in Vanuatu completed this August demonstrates the opportunity—and the need for action on a much larger scale.

Pacific islands suffer from poor electricity access and reliability, with as few as 60 percent of households connected. Local energy production depends on fossil fuel imports, whose vulnerability to price shocks and supply disruptions poses a disproportionate economic burden on PICs. Fuel for electricity generation often exceeds 10 percent of GDP of multiple states, and shortages sometimes leave communities subject to prolonged blackouts.

Despite the necessity of reliable energy supply for economic development, the sector receives only 3 percent of aid to these countries. Governments struggle to pay for the rest.

Nonetheless, many PICs have committed to reaching 100 percent of renewable energy by 2030, and that ambition has become a focus of what little aid goes to the sector. The Asian Development Bank and the United Nations Development Programme are investing in decentralised, small-scale sources of electricity generation—such as off-grid solar—then in some cases linking them via intra-island microgrids. These are necessary first steps for building energy access, but such decentralized sources can’t fully meet the Pacific’s energy needs.

The Vanuatu Energy Access Project is an example. Commissioned by the Vanuatu government and the Asian Development Bank, it built a transmission line between two towns on the island of Espiritu Santo and a hydropower plant on another island, Malekula. But Malekula’s grid access increased only from 8 percent to 14 percent and national diesel imports were barely dented.

The project’s localised improvement on energy access highlights a need for a new energy development paradigm led by Australia: the establishment of inter-island, nationally encompassing grids that could integrate and diversify local generation while enhancing efficiency, resilience and economic progress.

Connecting isolated sources to a national grid would enhance the reliability and extend of electricity supply. A national grid would also standardise energy regulations, utility fees and maintenance operations across an island chain.

Australia should also support diversifying Pacific islands’ sources of green energy through development finance. The islands variously suit using wind, solar, hydro and copra oil for cheap, renewable generation, decreasing fossil fuel dependence.

Connecting variety of generation types to a national grid would also mitigate the intermittency of renewable energy production. When one form of production is unavailable, households can access alternatives through the grid. Achieving power-sharing between communities and islands is vital to securing reliable access to cheap energy for the Pacific.

A vision for integrated, diversified energy development furthers Australia’s goal of being the partner of choice in the Pacific. China is manoeuvring aggressively for influence in the Pacific under the guise of development, signing secret security deals, penning predatory loans and undermining good governance. As Pacific leaders call for collective action against climate change, this new development vision that Australia could pursue would enable to provide attractive counteroffers to China’s development model and build goodwill in the region.

However, tropical island geography complicates energy development endeavours, with population centres often separated by tens or even hundreds of kilometres of jungle or ocean. Integration and power-sharing would require long cable connections over land and under the sea.

Such obstacles are not insurmountable. In August 2024, the Australian government approved the Australia-Asia PowerLink, which is intended to carry solar-generated electricity from Australia to Singapore through a 4300km subsea cable.

Conceivably, Australia could fund a similar energy export model in the Pacific Islands where national grids transition into green energy export markets. Internationally integrated renewable energy grids will stop haemorrhages of Pacific wealth to foreign diesel suppliers, stimulate economic activity, and promote PIC unity and cooperation across the vast oceans between them.

20 years after the first Australian meth epidemic, another is upon us

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Australian communities are teetering on the edge of a second methylamphetamine crisis that, if not addressed urgently, will lead to widespread health and safety issues.

To deal with this emerging epidemic, the Albanese government must formally recognise the findings of the latest Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission (ACIC) report on wastewater monitoring, released in July 2024, and demonstrate a commitment to decisive action.

Methylamphetamine, a potent synthetic stimulant, has a profound impact on the central nervous system of the human body. It induces heightened wakefulness, intense euphoria and increased physical activity. It poses serious health risks, including cardiovascular problems, neurotoxicity and addiction. The widespread use of methylamphetamine significantly affects Australian communities through elevated rates of crime, social disruption and an increased burden on healthcare systems.

Australia’s first methylamphetamine epidemic began in the early 2000s, with a marked increase in both the availability and use of crystal methamphetamine, commonly known as ‘ice’. The crisis peaked around 2014 to 2015, when the drug’s purity and consumption rates soared, leading to widespread public health and safety concerns.

During the first epidemic, police drug seizure data, arrest records, health reports and drug user surveys underpinned our knowledge of the scope and scale of the problem. Today, Australia has a much more effective early warning system for illicit drug epidemics: the ACIC National Wastewater Drug Monitoring Program. And this canary in the coal mine is warning us.

The wastewater monitoring program is a comprehensive surveillance initiative that systematically analyses samples to detect and quantify a range of contaminants, including pharmaceuticals and illicit substances. These samples are examined to determine the concentration of drug metabolites, from which estimates of population-scale consumption are derived based on wastewater volume, population size and substance metabolism. The program monitors trends in the use of 12 licit and illicit substances. Wastewater analysis provides essential insights for law enforcement, health agencies and policymakers, enabling them to tailor drug demand reduction and harm mitigation strategies. Continuous wastewater analysis provides the necessary quantitative data to ensure policy responses can adapt to evolving drug market trends and effectively address the impact of drug abuse on communities.

The report indicates a significant rise in methylamphetamine consumption over the past two years, with peak levels observed in regional areas across all states and territories. Western Australia, South Australia and Queensland report notably high levels. Furthermore, the December 2023 results showed the highest average consumption in capital cities since the program’s inception in 2016. Australia now ranks among the highest globally for illicit stimulant use. Its per capita consumption of methylamphetamine is second highest among 30 countries. This highlights the drug’s prominence in the Australian drug market.

This latest report emphasises the pressing need for more effective strategies to deal with the escalating challenge of methylamphetamine use in Australia.

On the supply side, the volume of methylamphetamine entering the country is staggering, with the Australian Federal Police and international partners seizing up to 49 tonnes of illicit drugs in the 2022–23 financial year. Yet, despite these seizures, consumption continues to grow. From August 2023 to April 2024, Australians consumed 17 percent more methamphetamine than in the year before and more than double the amount of cocaine.

The potential profound social and economic impacts of a second methylamphetamine epidemic, including heightened crime rates, health issues and the strain on marginalised communities, highlight the need for a significant policy shift and increased international collaboration.

The Australian approach to addressing illicit drugs is guided by its National Drug Strategy 2017–2026. It’s built on three main pillars. The first is demand reduction, which focuses on decreasing the desire for drug use through prevention and education. The second is supply reduction, which aims to limit availability of drugs by disrupting trafficking and production. The third is harm minimisation, which seeks to reduce the adverse health and social impacts of drug use on individuals and communities.

The Commonwealth Law Enforcement International Engagement Methylamphetamine Disruption Strategy complements this by focusing on four key areas:

—Understanding the global drug landscape;

—Enhancing law enforcement and border security cooperation;

—Developing targeted capacity-building initiatives; and

—Boosting advocacy and political engagement.

Despite all this good work, based on best practices, there is now clear data that we are on the verge of a second methylamphetamine epidemic and that our current approaches have not been effective at preventing this.

While health and law enforcement agencies are dedicated to implementing the National Drug Strategy, they often lack the capacity and capability to respond to emerging trends effectively. It’s time for these agencies to come together and think outside the box. We need a new, potentially more innovative strategy to tackle the growing challenge of methylamphetamine.

Before taking any policy action, it’s crucial for the government to acknowledge the existence of a problem, as this provides the foundational understanding required to develop a targeted and effective response. The Albanese government must formally recognise the implications of the latest Wastewater Monitoring Report and commit to taking action.

Tag Archive for: Australia

US and Australian Women and Space Event with AWDC

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On the evening of November 14th, ASPI DC and Australian Women in DC (AWDC) were thrilled to host a lively event on US and Australian Women and Space: New Frontiers for Business and Government.

At a time when most everyone in DC, and beyond, is consuming a diet of election outcomes and political appointments, it was great to step back and discuss the importance of space as a domain for innovation and development in defense, science, and communications.

A big thank you to Paula Trimble, US Space Force Space Development Agency; Jeremy Hallett, Space Industry Association of Australia; and Lisa Wood, BAE Systems, Inc. for generously sharing their time, expertise, and advice on what makes a great mentor and exciting career. Thanks also to our moderator Nerida King of ASPI DC and AWDC who drew these connections together.

Some key takeaways that resonated with our audience as they chatted over Australian wine and seasonal food:

  • The US must collaborate with its allies and partners on space. It is impossible for any one company or business to keep up with technological change required.
  • Space development is integral on the world stage—from responding to global challenges like great power competition, communications failures, climate change and natural disasters—down to the personal level, like navigating oneself with GPS.
  • President-elect Trump’s role in establishing the US Space Force in 2019 and close connection with Space X entrepreneur Elon Musk ensures the sector will continue to attract interest in the US.

Thanks to everyone who joined and made it such a successful (and topical) event!

AUKUS as an Avenue for Tech Diplomacy

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On 7 May, ASPI DC’s program lead for Defense Industrial Base, Trade, Technology, and Innovation, Bronte Munro, led a conversation on AUKUS and tech diplomacy with Partner and Chair of The Asia Group’s Australia Practice, the Hon. Arthur Sinodinos AO, Partner and Lead of the Europe and Eurasia practice at Denton’s Global Advisor’s, Albright Stonebridge Group, Ambassador (ret.) Philip T. Reeker, and Minister Defence (Director USA) at the British Embassy in Washington DC, Mark Newton.

The conversation, which took place at the Special Competitive Studies Project (SCSP) AI Expo for National Competitiveness and alongside the Ash Carter Exchange, focused on AUKUS as an avenue for tech diplomacy. Tech diplomacy is the practice of collaborating across sectors and across countries to shape the role of technology in our lives and in our world. It is where the fields of business, technology and foreign policy intersect to effectively shape how technology is used.

Panellists highlighted how the industry- government collaboration that AUKUS requires offers not only a robust means for likeminded partners to accelerate innovation in emerging technologies to counter China’s technological advancements, but to ensure unified leadership in standards setting and best practice.

They also underscored the importance of understanding that securing high-tech involves not only being the leaders in its development, but in its commercialisation and the establishment of the rules and norms that govern its use cases. Tech diplomacy is key to building an ecosystem that supports commercialisation, builds trust in technology and protects national security interests. Critically, it requires collaboration between likeminded partners, such as Australia, the US and the UK.

AUKUS Trilateral Initiative

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On the 20th and 21st of March, ASPI DC convened with the Center for New American Studies (CNAS) and the Centre for Grand Strategy at Kings College London (KCL) its second trilateral AUKUS Initiative. This Track 1.5 event brought together high-ranking officials and industry representation from across the United States, Australian and UK governments to discuss the AUKUS announcement, and was concluded with a dinner attended by Australian Ambassador to the United States, Kevin Rudd, who gave a speech.

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