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Tag Archive for: ANZUS
Tag Archive for: ANZUS
ANZUS and Asia – part 2: a ‘hub’ far from the centre
The recent SDSC–CSIS report The ANZUS alliance in an ascending Asia (PDF) makes an interesting argument about the US–Australia alliance becoming a ‘central hub’ for American policy in the Pacific. We explained yesterday why we aren’t sold on the geographic/military disposition aspect of the argument. But alliances aren’t all about warfighting, and there’s also political value in having like-minded countries shoulder-to-shoulder in environment-shaping activities and in helping to underwrite a security order that’s to our liking.
Even so, we’d argue that it’s hard to disentangle the politics from the geography. For the US to assure all of the players in the region that it’s prepared to back the established order and protect the interests of its allies and partners, it needs to have a credible military presence. And if, as we argued yesterday, Australia’s geographic role has diminished in wartime due to modern force projection capabilities, its role in the geopolitics of North Asia in peacetime is even less clear.
In East Asia, Japan remains a strategic hub for the US military, with forces there far outweighing those on Guam, even after the planned relocations are completed. They play a key role, not only in deterring aggression in the East China Sea or the Taiwan Straits, but increasingly for contingencies in the northern part of the South China Sea (SCS). In Southeast Asia, the US depends critically on Singapore, not least as the key local logistics ‘hub’ for the 7th Fleet. Establishing and/or upgrading military facilities in the Philippines, Vietnam and Malaysia would be much more relevant for America’s deterrent and war-fighting posture in Southeast Asia—and thus for its ability to reassure allies—than Australia is.
At a time when those allies and partners in close proximity to China are getting increasingly worried about the credibility of US security assurances, promoting Australia as a ‘central hub’, paradoxically located at the safe(r) Pacific rim, will look more like ‘offshore balancing light’. That is, it’ll look like a decreased US commitment to put its forces into zones within reach of China’s growing military arsenal. ‘Don’t worry guys, we’re staying at arm’s length, but we’ll come in if anything happens’ would be a tough sell in Tokyo or Seoul. American support is much more convincing when there are tens of thousands of troops and hundreds of ships and aircraft in harm’s way. Without them, American influence in the region would decline markedly.
So what role can Australia and ANZUS play? The SDSC–CSIS report recommends that the ‘Alliance should serve as a central hub for Asian regional order and architecture.’ That’s an ambitious objective. The authors suggest that ANZUS could be the ‘hub’ for ‘minilateral’ models of security cooperation to add substance to existing multilateral arrangements. But at its heart, ANZUS is a bilateral defence pact to guard against the possibility of external aggression by a major Asian power (originally Japan, today China). It’s perceived as such in the region and that’ll define the willingness of regional partners to participate in such activities. For instance, Tokyo is interested in Australia–US–Japan security trilaterals precisely because the structure provides an additional layer against an assertive China. We expect other major regional players such as India and particularly Indonesia to be much more reluctant; they don’t want to associate themselves too openly with what’s essentially a Western military alliance, as Beijing is at pains to say.
Whether we like it or not, the future of the ‘Asian regional order and architecture’ will very much be defined by the power plays in the East China Sea and the SCS between China, its neighbours and the US. If ANZUS really seeks to ‘shape’ the geopolitical dynamics in Asia it would need to intensify its activities there, rather than at the periphery through minilaterals. But that would put the Alliance squarely in opposition with China who doesn’t want to be part of an ‘ANZUS-led’ regional order but instead demands its own ‘spheres of influence’.
Australia/ANZUS might be able to make a difference but it doesn’t seem that either Washington or Canberra have a particular appetite to use ANZUS in that way. For instance, it seems that the Obama administration is very reluctant to push back against Chinese assertiveness in the SCS. Likewise, nothing practical seems to have come from the Abbott government’s announcement in June this year that it would conduct ‘freedom of navigation’ exercises to protest China’s ‘land reclamation activities’ in the SCS. Apparently, there haven’t been formal talks within an ANZUS context about such exercises, demonstrating that any latent ANZUS potential to shape events there has been underutilised at best. In this sense, we agree with Hugh White, who argues that the ANU/CSIS report ultimately dodged the issue and failed to address the key question of what exactly the Alliance should do in the face of China’s rise.
ANZUS and Asia – part 1: Mahan, Midway and modernity
We read the recent SDSC–CSIS report The ANZUS alliance in an ascending Asia (PDF) with interest. We agree with much of their analysis of alliance strengths and possible points of divergence in the face of growing Chinese military and economic power. But ultimately we don’t see ANZUS becoming ‘a central hub for Asian regional order and architecture’, however defined. Australia may have a role to play, but the crux of the policy challenges lies far to our north.
There are two ways ANZUS might be relevant—through physical geography as a platform for hard power and as a geopolitical player. Let’s start with the former. ANU/CSIS says:
Australia’s geographic location is more important to the United States today than it has been at any time since the Second World War. Australia serves both as a link between the Indian and Pacific Oceans and as a sanctuary from China’s anti-access/area denial capabilities.
That idea has a good pedigree, and the geographic importance of Australia to the US predates ANZUS by 50 years. Admiral Mahan thought the sea lines of communication between North America and Australia to be vitally important for sustaining American interests in the Pacific and that American (and European) outposts in North Asia and the Western Pacific were problematic without maritime supremacy. When American global naval power was nascent (in the Great White Fleet), Mahan thought dividing up the Pacific was the pragmatic approach, with the Western Pacific ‘remaining Asiatic’:
[t]he question awaiting and approaching solution is the line of demarcation between the Asiatic and European elements in the Pacific. The considerations advanced appear to indicate that it will be that joining Puget Sound and Vancouver with Australia…but there are outposts of European and American tenure in positions like the Marshall and Caroline Islands, Guam, Hongkong…
American naval power grew in leaps and bounds thereafter, and by the 1930s the USN could project substantial power into Asian waters. That came to an abrupt, if temporary, end following the Pearl Harbor attack in 1941. In Japanese controlled waters (and under Japanese controlled skies) the USN surface fleet was reduced to hit and run raids such as on the Japanese-occupied Marshall Islands in February 1942 and the later one-way ‘Doolittle raid‘ on Tokyo. Large areas of the Western Pacific being a no-go zone brought Australia to the fore, and as Ian Toll wrote in Pacific Crucible:
The entire Allied strategy in the Pacific depended on two cardinal points: Hawaii must not fall, and Australia must not fall…the new Pacific Fleet chief, Admiral Nimitz, [was ordered] to secure the seaways between Midway, Hawaii and the North American mainland. That was to be his first priority. The second, in only a ‘small degree less important’ was to protect the lifeline between North America and Australia…By those means the allied war machine would be built up in Australasia…
The near disaster at the hands of an expansionist Asian power and eventual salvation through American efforts led to the post-war Australian push for an alliance with the US. In other words, ANZUS was born out of Australian fears and offered the US the geographic advantages conferred by Australia’s ‘Goldilocks geography’—close enough to be a handy jumping point for a conflict with a North Asian power, but not so close to be at risk of being overrun in the early stages.
Seen through that lens, Australia as an in extremis hub of the US alliance structure in the Pacific makes sense. The US needed our geography before—at first because it lacked power of its own and later when its power came under challenge. With the rise of China and its technological challenges to US naval power, it’s tempting to conclude that our moment has again come and that the US will embrace Australia as its military home away from home in this part of the world.
But Australia as a modern military ANZUS hub is neither necessary nor desirable. Nuclear submarines, bombers with global range and ICBMs can now project American power across the Pacific; Hawaii remains well-placed to support US forces and Australia is a long way from North Asia, so any geographic advantage of staging from here is negligible. It takes a long time to project air or maritime power from Australia to the South China Sea, let alone to Northeast Asia.
So Australia represents, at best, part of a ‘defence in depth’ posture for the US military, and a fall-back option. But there are so many American interests in North Asia that much would have to go wrong—as it admittedly did in 1942—to make Australia ‘central’. In that case we’d be central to a significantly weakened United States, and much of the value of the alliance would’ve already been lost. That means that the value of any enhanced role for ANZUS needs to be a political one in shaping the security environment. We’ll return to that aspect tomorrow.
ASPI suggests
If you missed last night’s ASPI event ‘Australia and Indonesia: getting back on track’, Felicity Norman has a cracking rundown of the main themes on New Mandala here (video of the event to follow shortly). Australia isn’t the only country recalibrating its relations with Indonesia; over on The Diplomat, CFR’s Joshua Kurlantzick considers how Jokowi’s upcoming trip to the American capital could reset US–Indonesia ties.
Turning to other emerging powers in Asia, the National Bureau of Asian Research has canvassed views from China, Indonesia and India on the impact of low oil prices on each country’s economy, and environmental and energy security. All three briefs provide largely positive perspectives on falling oil prices: governments can reform price regimes for oil and gas (including Indonesia’s fuel subsidy system), lower energy import bills and explore new initiatives for cooperation within ASEAN and SAARC.
Is the Australian alliance with the US too close for comfort? In a piece that some Canberra-types will find provocative, former Australian Ambassador to Indonesia John McCarthy argues that we’ve now become ‘an American satrap’ and that, if we don’t retain independence of thought and action, the alliance could be a liability in future. Keep reading here.
Intel wonks, former Deputy Director of the CIA Michael Morell has released a book that offers an insider’s perspective of DC’s intelligence community during 9/11, the Arab Spring, the Snowden leaks, and the rise of ISIS. Morell took aim at the politicians and policymakers who he believes politicised the efforts of US intelligence agencies, from drone strikes to interrogation techniques. Naming Senator Dianne Feinstein as bearing ‘significant responsibility’ for the flaws in the torture report by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, which, Morell states, makes ‘errors that even a smart high school student would not make’, has ruffled a few feathers in DC. Feinstein has since responded that Morell’s charges were false, and said that it was ‘unsurprising’ that his response would be as such, considering that his coauthor helped two other ex-CIA officials attempt to justify the agency’s ‘failings’.
Canadian-Ukrainian journalist Chrystia Freeland has penned a personal essay for Brookings that tracks how the ‘nightmare’ that Russia’s Vladimir Putin inflicted upon Ukraine unfolded. She details how Putin’s revisionist version of Soviet history and the political aspirations of the Ukrainian population collided, resulting in the violence today.
It’s worth reading the full testimony of CSIS’ senior advisor for Asia and China expert Bonnie Glaser before the US–China Economic and Security Review Commission for her in-depth take on China’s strategy toward the South China Sea and Southeast Asia’s response. That said, there’s not much good news between the pages: she finds it likelier that China will conclude a Code of Conduct upon completion of its land reclamation activities than at present, and any such agreement won’t be legally binding. Glaser’s testimony ends by urging Congress to send more powerful signals of American concern about Chinese behaviour to the executive and to the rest of the world.
Over on Defense One, David Sterman argues that the maritime arena will join the land as a battleground for future counterinsurgency warfare. He looks at examples of maritime insurgency, such as al Qaeda’s unpleasant track record, and questions whether the US and its allies are prepared to deal with such threats. For more, check out this recently published Congressional Research Service backgrounder on Navy irregular warfare and counterterrorism operations.
Now to this week’s tech picks. First, Chinese web services company Baidu claims to have built a supercomputer which gives software the ability to better understand speech, images and written language. A report released by Baidu earlier this week states that the supercomputer—named Minwa—has beaten Google’s previous records in the area with a 31% improvement. Second, want to play a role in tracking and imaging traveling objects in our solar system? DARPA is inviting the public to brainstorm ideas demonstrating the potential for high-res imaging of objects orbiting Earth.
And finally, what role might the Prince of Wales play in improving the availability of alternative herbal medicines and the instigation of a badger cull in the UK? The answer is not a big one, as what have become known as Prince Charles’ ‘black spider memos’ have been released to the public. The memos, named for Charles’ spidery hand-writing, detail the first-in-line’s lobbying of then-Prime Minister Tony Blair over an extremely narrow set of personal interests, including stopping illegal fishing of the Patagonian toothfish to preserve the UK’s albatrosses, and replacing the Lynx military helicopters.
Podcast
Last week, the Lowy Institute held New Voices 2015 which featured up-and-coming academics, think tankers and policymakers who grappled with Asia’s geopolitics, maritime disputes, US–China strategic competition, Japan–China ties, regional order and Australia’s role. Here’s the podcast recorded after the event featuring New Voices participants Evan Laksmana (CSIS Jakarta), Andrew Kwon (Alliance 21) interviewed by Natalie Sambhi on those issues (37mins).
Video
Chief of Army Lieutenant David Morrison sat down with ABC’s Leigh Sales in one of his final interviews in the job. They discuss fighting ISIS and its ideology, the long-term impacts of military service on mental health, the ANZAC narrative and the fallout from his now infamous ‘zero tolerance’ YouTube clip (9mins).
Terrorism researchers, watch Peter Bergen, J.M. Berger and Daveed Gartenstein-Ross testify at a hearing on the role of social media in terrorist organisation recruitment and what the US government should do to counter online messages. With the video spanning two hours, we recommend you use the transcript tool to skip to your favourite parts!
Hillary Rodham Clinton for Asia
On Sunday, Hillary Clinton took to Twitter to announce that she’s in the race to become President of the United States in 2016. In her time as Secretary of State from 2008 to 2013, Clinton amassed a heft of international experience and focused a sizable chunk of her efforts on the Asia–Pacific. Indeed, her long-read for Foreign Policy in 2011 set out a vision for the US in the region that came to be known as the ‘pivot’—and later the ‘rebalance’. But that was then and this is now. Should Clinton succeed in wrangling the Democratic Party nomination and blaze a trail to the Oval Office, she’ll face an international environment that’s familiar in thematic terms only. The international stage will come with a set of strategic challenges more acute than they are today and were when she left the Obama administration just over two years ago.
2016 isn’t that far away; the strategic rivalry between the US and China will be a defining feature of the Asia–Pacific just as much then as it is now. Some in the Asia–Pacific claim that the rebalance ran out of steam as both Clinton and Kurt Campbell finished up at State and Middle East policy took centre stage under John Kerry. Indeed, the rebalance has struggled to keep the attention of many in Washington DC as the US has juggled a host of issues including Russian chauvinism, instability in the Middle East, the Iran nuclear agreement, the Ebola virus, and prioritising the needs of a war-weary populace still feeling the effects of a global economic downturn. As a consequence, the Asia–Pacific has made do with less American attention in recent years. While it isn’t desirable or practical to perpetuate this state of affairs, we can expect Clinton to quickly muck in to the region’s challenges in an effort to sure up US primacy and reinvigorate the pivot policy she once led.
As images published last week by CSIS’ Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative show, China’s land reclamation activities in the South China Sea are extraordinary. They should sound the alarm inside the beltway, just as they no doubt do in many Asian capitals.
While all eyes have been on Iran, the heavy lifting of admonishing China’s behaviour has been left to newly-installed Defense Secretary Ash Carter. Last Friday, the Secretary told CNN he held grave concerns about China’s apparent militarisation of the South China Sea. Carter’s comments follow those of a number of Pentagon figures like incoming Pacific Command chief Admiral Harry B. Harris who, during a recent speech to an ASPI dinner in Canberra, took China to task for its efforts to build ‘a great wall of sand’. But if US policy in this area is to be effective, the defence/military arm can only do so much; the State Department will need to be more actively, consistently and holistically engaged.
Clinton’s first trip as Secretary of State in February 2009 was to Asia; she visited Japan, Indonesia, South Korea and, finally, China. Later she forged an image as a strong supporter of democracy activist, Aung San Suu Kyi. A Rodham Clinton presidency would drive Asia policy from the top, boosting diplomacy and engagement with states, particularly those in the southeast, likely beneficiaries. Where in some senses Kerry turned away from Asia, a female President Clinton will turn to face it once more. It’s a crucial reorientation.
China’s growing military might and assertive territorial adventurism have many in the region and beyond concerned about what’s to come. If recent experience is anything to go by, China looks set to continue on this path. At State, Secretary Clinton encouraged regional states, including the Philippines during the Scarborough Shoal standoff in 2012, to work ‘collaboratively’ toward the resolution of disputes. As President, Clinton would walk the tightrope as she seeks to reassure allies and maintain good relations with China. Sending the right strategic signals to China that ASEAN states have influential, but not aggressive, friends will be key. While suggestions of an ASEAN maritime patrol force might be many years away, Clinton could throw her energy behind ASEAN-led efforts to conclude a Code of Conduct, as she did during the East Asia Summit in November 2012.
While a US leader can schedule occasional visits to the Asia–Pacific, the White House will always be at 1600 Penn and so enhancing America’s ties with regional allies and partners for the purpose of burden-sharing will be a key and ongoing project for a Rodham Clinton administration. President Obama is well aware of this, having pursed materially deeper and closer defence ties with Japan, and recently worked to cultivate a symbolically-significant closeness with India. Clinton would likely continue to see Australia as a core partner in efforts to preserve American primacy in the region, having previously characterised the relationship as ‘among the strongest of any two countries in the world.’ She reckoned that strong US–Australia relations could help to ‘foster strong healthy relations with China.’ Clinton has also warned Australia on the perils of depending on Chinese trade relations, fearing that it ‘makes you dependent, to an extent that can undermine your freedom of movement and your sovereignty, economic and political.’
Understandably, Hillary Clinton’s campaign will be built around domestic issues like helping working families and clean energy. But it’s worth considering how foreign and strategic policy might play out should the oath of office be taken and a Madam President arrive. A rebooted pivot policy would likely be on the cards, a grand strategy initiative that, led by Hillary Clinton, will likely be closer to its original design.
US Pacific Fleet Commander on China, the rebalance and the maritime domain
China’s assertive maritime claims featured prominently in a speech from US Pacific Fleet commander Admiral Harry B. Harris to the #FSFleet dinner last night.
In noting that overlapping maritime claims in the South China Sea heightened prospects for miscalculation, Harris drew attention to China’s land reclamation activities in the Spratly Islands which have ‘now created over four square kilometers of artificial landmass, roughly the size of Canberra’s Black Mountain Nature Reserve.’ Harris commented on China’s creation of a ‘great wall of sand’, and noted that the ‘scope and pace of building man-made islands raise serious questions about Chinese intentions.’ (See here for satellite images clearly showing China’s efforts, as published by the CSIS’ Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative.)
On how to address the threat, the Admiral urged all states to respect the ASEAN–China Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea and international rules and norms in the maritime domain.
Beyond the South China Sea, Harris also had two messages for Australia: ‘the rebalance is for real and we’ve got the Marines to prove it’, and ‘the future of RAN needs to be decided soon’. On the rebalance, Harris underscored the ‘powerful synergy’ between Australian forces and US Marines training together in amphibious operations.
On future surface fleet matters, Harris warned:
… beyond the new Canberra- and Hobart-class ships—and even the SEA 5000 project which is the subject of this conference—plans for the Royal Australian Navy of the latter half of the 21st century must be conceived soon. These are strategic decisions that only you can make; choices that will have ripple effects in the coming decades; choices that will define your nation’s place in the middle and latter half of this naval century.
While he chose different words, Harris’ speech echoed similar themes to one delivered to the conference earlier in the day by Rear Admiral Christopher J. Paul, Deputy Commander of US Naval Surface Force, as well as to a speech delivered by Admiral Jonathan Greenert, US Chief of Naval Operations, to an audience at the ANU in February.
Harris pulled no punches in his speech at the Australian War Memorial; his comments on China surely rank among the most forthright from a senior American figure. The Admiral turned in a clear assessment of the myriad strategic challenges present in the Indo-Asia-Pacific, and he didn’t shy away from questioning China’s assertive behaviour and the need to resolve with priority questions of Australia’s future maritime requirements.
His remarks will likely be well received in both Australia and in the broader Asia–Pacific, though less so in China. The Australian Government is keen to support continued American primacy in the region by deepening and broadening cooperation with fellow US allies and partners, as the Obama administration has occasionally requested. In part, this reflects an Australian desire to sustain a positive contribution to preserving good order in the Asia–Pacific and the broader international system. It also shows an understanding of the US rebalance being materially underway but with the perception of being politically underpowered. Australia needs to do its part and Harris’ request that Australia play not just a ‘large role in global security affairs’ but instead a ‘leading role’, should serve to deepen resolve in Canberra.
Harris’ frank appreciation of Chinese strategy will be welcomed across the region. As China’s coercive and assertive behaviours have unfolded and ramped-up over recent years, Asia–Pacific states have increasingly questioned American resolve in the region. Harris’ words will reassure states across the region that American commitment remains strong.
At an ASPI dinner last year, Harris spoke of China’s dangerous unilateral declaration of an Air Defence Identification Zone over the East China Sea. This year he focussed on China’s maritime actions in the South China Sea. The light guiding both speeches, however, was the US–Australia alliance, and its role as an ever-relevant and never-more-important contribution to peace and stability in the Asia–Pacific.
Young people today…
A provocative piece by American journalist Eddie Walsh is currently doing the rounds, making some bold claims about how Australians under 40 view the US–Australia alliance.
Based on meetings with ‘dozens’ of Canberra diplomats, think tankers, academics and military officers, Walsh claims that the under 40s could either not see any value or were ambivalent about the US–Australia strategic relationship. He contends that many see Australia becoming a ‘lapdog’ of the United States, constrained as a consequence in our ability to deal with China.
Here at the ANU’s Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, we’re fortunate to interact with a large number of students under the age of 40. They too are comprised of a mix of public servants, think tankers and military officers. Yet Walsh’s findings seem to contrast quite sharply with what we hear from them on a daily basis.
To test our hunch, we ran a short anonymous survey amongst graduate students in our Strategic Studies program, posing the same questions that Walsh asked of his interviewees. The results contrast sharply with his claims; contrary to his findings, 96% of the students we surveyed believed that the US–Australia alliance is of value to Australia, while 68% of respondents disagreed with the proposition that Australia is becoming a lapdog of the United States. Read more
The ‘Indo-Pacific’ places Australia at the centre of the action
The Strategist is giving the White Paper’s newest strategic construct—the ‘Indo-Pacific strategic arc’—short shrift. Peter Jennings suggests it still needs thinking through. Rob Ayson sees it as nothing more than a smokescreen. I’m not sure I can agree with them.
Strategists notoriously crave neat metaphors. This latest one contains echoes of Paul Dibb’s famous ‘arc of instability’ which, with characteristic precision, Dibb used to describe the area to the North and East of Australia (PDF) that ‘stretches from the Indonesian archipelago, Timor-Leste and Papua New Guinea in the North, to the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, Fiji, New Caledonia and New Zealand in the East.’
This degree of precision has thus far been absent from discussions on the Indo-Pacific. The National Security Strategy (PDF) was unduly sloppy in this regard, asserting that ‘use of the term ‘Indo-Pacific’ complements the term ‘Asia-Pacific’—they’re both useful frames through which to view Australia’s national security interests’. Such an approach served only to undermine the sense of coherence that the Gillard government has sought to achieve by releasing a trio of White Papers in such close succession. Read more
ANZUS and the new Defence White Paper
Last Friday’s Defence White Paper (DWP) rightly drew a lot of praise from (most) of the analytical community and the media. Many commentators, including myself, welcomed the more cautious tone regarding China’s military rise and the dismissal of Australia having to choose between Washington and Beijing. Does that mean Australia is less supportive of our US alliance? I’d argue that exactly the opposite is the case. There are several key points that support my view.
First, being more nuanced about China’s military capacity and intentions shows a maturation of Australian strategic thinking which surely is welcomed in Washington. As it seeks to integrate (not contain) China, Washington doesn’t need alarmist rhetoric about Beijing from its allies. It also doesn’t want us to invest in military capabilities such as nuclear submarines or long-range strike assets which would unnecessarily duplicate theirs and send provocative signals to China. Read more
Cutting our cloth – part I
Jim Molan wrote recently that the ADF is ‘…being pushed into a state where its capabilities are at, or will soon be at, a state from which they will not be able to be revived in any reasonable period of time—a situation of terminal decline’. Regular readers of this blog will know that I have no reluctance to argue with Jim, but in this case I think he’s not too wide of the mark. For the amount the government spends, I don’t think we get much of a return in terms of military options available.
It’s not too hard to find examples that support Jim’s contention. Navy has managed to keep a frigate on station in the Gulf for over a decade, but has conspicuously failed to maintain an acceptable level of capability in its amphibious and submarine fleets. Army and Air Force have both managed to do the jobs they’ve been called upon to do, but recapitalisation of the air combat fleet ($15 billion) and protected mobility for land forces (over $10 billion) at the same time as a new submarine fleet (potentially $30–40 billion) and replacement frigates (over $10 billion) is going to be a very big ask in the future fiscal environment we’re likely to see. Read more
Islamist Extremism: potential for greater US-Australian cooperation
This is a shortened version of a longer paper presented to the Alliance 21 meeting in Washington. Abridgment by Kristy Bryden.
Islamist extremism—sometimes also referred to as radical Islamism or jihadism—motivates a diverse global movement that has the potential to affect the peace, prosperity and security of nations world-wide. It is important to clarify the distinction between Islam (a religion), Islamism (political Islam) and Islamist extremism, as one can combat the latter without being at all hostile to Islam.
My Hudson Institute colleague Abram Shulsky, Brookings Institution scholar William Galson and I recently published a study entitled Organizing for a Strategic Ideas Campaign to Counter Ideological Challenges to US National Security (PDF). Among the key recommendations of the study were the creation of: a strategy for countering Islamist extremism; an interagency body to direct the efforts of country teams and combatant commands to implement the strategy; and a new private organisation modelled on the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) to support constructive voices and conduct research.
There’s potential for US-Australian cooperation on this issue. In particular, there’s value in working together on a common threat assessment and in pooling experience to produce common doctrine to counter extremist ideology. This would involve an agreement on: the definition of Islamist extremist ideology; the nature of the national security threat posed by Islamist extremist ideology; the identification of key individuals and groups in the Islamist extremist movement; and finally, a doctrine for countering the ideology. Read more