Tag Archive for: ADF

Together, northern Queensland cities can offer great Defence potential

Northern Queensland has a pivotal role to play in the future of Australia’s defence industry, but its cities and local governments must work together to fully realise the potential. Collectively they have more to offer than any of them has alone.

The region can support the three armed services far beyond what it has traditionally done for them: providing bases and training areas. Its strengths in geography, demography and resilience make it unusually well suited to building a logistic and industrial support base for Australian Defence Force operations.

The catalyst for north Queensland attracting more military presence and associated business is Defence’s spending plan, the 2024 Integrated Investment Program (IIP). The emphasis on Australia’s north in the IIP and accompanying National Defence Strategy points to a new priority and focus.

There is already a strong military presence in northern Queensland: the army’s largest barracks, the navy’s patrol boat base, and some of the air force’s main training areas and two of its bases for mounting offshore operations. Historically, though, the region’s private and public sectors haven’t sufficiently understood how these arrangements fit within the broader defence and national security strategy.

The region must consider its assets collectively. Currently, each city or region identifies and advocates for its own bespoke investment opportunities—as, for example, in Townsville’s Unlock the North submission to the state and federal governments.

In future, similar submissions could be combined for those projects or opportunities that benefit the entire region, with delegations and representations made as collective entities. For example, political advocacy meetings with the minister for defence could be attended jointly by mayors from Cairns, Townsville and Mackay to present a united front and demonstrate collective capability.

This approach will encourage Defence investment across northern Queensland and ensure a good return on it.

The IIP outlined spending of billions of dollars on equipment that will be kept in northern Queensland. This includes the army’s huge investment in armoured vehicles and helicopters, the navy’s expanded patrol boat fleet and a renewed requirement to upgrade northern bases. Army landing ships built under project Land 8710 are likely to be based in northern Queensland.

The plan for supporting and maintaining this equipment is less certain—and therein lies an opportunity for the region. By demonstrating that it has the capacity to take on this role, the region can encourage industry to locate key support capabilities close to the equipment. This would improve logistics and cut costs for both industry and Defence.

Northern Queensland’s key strength is geographic resilience, especially if its cities can support one other. It faces some of Australia’s regions of interest—the South Pacific, Hawaii and the US west coast—and is the obvious place from which to mount ADF operations into the Pacific. Its cities are well positioned to provide the base for deployed forces, offering well-serviced logistics hubs with robust supply chains and local manufacturing capable of sustaining ADF operations. Also, the cities are dispersed around the region; should the support capacity of one become disrupted, others can keep operations running, using fast transport networks across rail, road, sea and air.

The population of northern Queensland is often overlooked as a strength for the region. The area between Rockhampton and Cairns has more than 500,000 people, comparable to Newcastle, which has a significant and growing defence industry hub. Similar depth of defence activity could be supported in northern Queensland. The region’s workers in manufacturing, maintenance, heavy machinery and agriculture have strong technical skills that can be rapidly pivoted to supporting Defence equipment.

Northern Queensland also has many veterans who have remained in the area after leaving navy, army and air force service—8 percent of the people of Townsville, for example—who can offer their experience. Additionally, an increasing number of professionals are relocating to Queensland’s northern coast, chasing better affordability, a family-friendly lifestyle and an unmatched climate.

The advantages of the region work best when they are considered as a collective. For example, the army’s decision to concentrate its helicopters in Townsville presents an opportunity best exploited by the entire region. The maintenance workforce, from the engineers to the refuellers and mechanics, need a training pipeline for service personnel and contracted civilians. Townsville alone cannot provide this training, but the region can use existing aviation training organisations in Cairns. Northern Queensland can create a system that can support the army’s aviation maintenance from recruitment and training to employment.

Land 8710 is a similar example. Its vessels will need maintenance and support, which Cairns and Townville should provide collectively. If either city tries to become the sole base of operations and sustainment, it is unlikely to attract the necessary investment, to the detriment of both the ADF and northern Queensland.

The region has a strong, diverse and resilient network that can provide infrastructure and a firm industrial base to support Defence. Plans announced so far will attract significant investment in northern Queensland, but unless there is collective action these opportunities will not take full advantage of the region’s potential. Any logistician can tell you that shortened lines of communication, resilient supply points and a well-positioned workforce are cost-savers and force enablers. Northern Queensland can provide all this, if its cities and local governments can combine their strengths and work together.

Northern deterrence demands full use of civilian infrastructure

Australia’s National Defence Strategy presents a central challenge to the ADF: deterring adversaries from projecting power through our northern approaches. To do this effectively, the ADF must maximise use of civilian infrastructure, particularly in northern Australia, where the local economy cannot always sustain necessary facilities alone.

A strong example of what needs to be done is making the most of Horn Island, in the Torres Strait.

In the 1980s and 1990s, the ADF mapped and assessed infrastructure across northern Australia. This initiative included extensive aerial surveys, satellite imagery and ground assessments, producing detailed maps of roads, bridges, ports, fuel storage, communication networks and more. Collaboration with government agencies and local stakeholders was key to ensuring accurate and valuable data, bolstering military readiness and community development.

However, by the late 1990s, shifting defence priorities and a focus on joint operations reduced these critical assessments, leaving gaps in our understanding of the infrastructure landscape that must now be addressed.

This landscape is rapidly changing with government and private infrastructure investment in northern Australia. And some old facilities—like those in Weipa, where dredging of the port will cease—are being decommissioned as commercial operations shut down, while others are nearing the end of their operational life.

Historically, Horn Island was a key military outpost, with two runways, ammunition storage and defensive installations. Today, it mainly supports regional commercial flights under the management of the Torres Shire Council. Its proximity to Papua New Guinea—makes it an ideal location for a forward military base.

Horn Island already has Jet A-1 fuel, commonly used by the RAAF, and a bulk fuel storage capacity of 600,000 litres at its pier. This infrastructure could be expanded to ensure the island remains self-sufficient during prolonged military operations, reducing logistical dependency that could hinder operational effectiveness and enhancing local resilience.

One of Horn Island’s most significant advantages is its ability to improve the capabilities of Cairns and Townsville within a unified northern defence posture. While Cairns serves as a naval hub for patrol boat operations, Horn Island could act as a forward support base, extending these vessels’ operational range and endurance. Using Horn Island for resupply and maintenance, patrol boats from Cairns could sustain longer missions in the Torres Strait and other northern waters. Its airfield could also extend the ranges of both crewed and uncrewed aircraft.

Maintaining Horn Island’s civilian airfield is commercially justified, but enhancing it may not be. The types of infrastructure that Defence could use for military purposes would no doubt also bolster community resilience across the Torres Strait Islands. But who would pay for such improvements?

The issue applies to much of northern Australia’s infrastructure. The ADF cannot reasonably be expected to alone pay for infrastructure development throughout northern Australia.

As a first step, the ADF must recommence systematic data collection on the region’s infrastructure. A comprehensive understanding of the infrastructure landscape is essential for ensuring operational readiness and resilience. By mapping existing facilities and assessing their capabilities, Defence can identify gaps and determine how best to enhance the strategic use of these assets.

Regular use of such infrastructure will not only enhance the ADF’s readiness but will also contribute to the viability of essential services in northern Australia. These benefits reinforce the argument for investing in upgrades, ensuring that Defence commitments align with local community needs.

The Australian government must adopt a holistic approach to the ADF’s requirements, prioritising ongoing maintenance of critical infrastructure that can support both military and civilian demands, especially in areas where commercial viability is limited. Such foresight is not merely a matter of defence strategy; it is an investment in the social and economic fabric of northern Australia.

By leveraging civilian infrastructure, Australia can significantly enhance its military capabilities and deterrence. The time for action is now, and a collaborative effort among Defence, government and local communities is required.

Satcom future in doubt, industry left adrift as Defence cancels project

Secure satellite communication is a key requirement for ADF ability to undertake joint and integrated operations in a multi-domain operational environment. Known as satcom, it forms the informational backplane and foundation of modern warfare. Without this critical space support, military forces in the air, sea and land domains are deaf, dumb and blind. They cannot fight.

So it was crucial that Australia pay for secure and resilient satcom capability to replace commercial satellites that are at or close to the ends of their operational lives. Defence Joint Project 9102 (JP9102) was to be based initially on three to five communications satellites in geosynchronous orbit (GEO) at 36,500km above Earth’s surface. It was to offer nationally independent satcom for the ADF.

On 4 November, the government scrapped JP9102. The move has generated uncertainty about the future of a critical ADF capability. There is also anger in the Australian commercial space community over the negative signals the decision sends about government support for the space sector.

The government justified cancelling JP9102 thus:

…with the acceleration in space technologies and evolving threats in space since the project’s commencement, Defence has assessed that a single orbit GEO-based satellite communications systems would not meet strategic priorities …. As such, Defence has decided to cease its current procurement activity with Lockheed Martin Australia for a single orbit GEO-based satellite communications system …. Instead of a single orbit solution, Defence must instead prioritise a multi-orbit capability increasing resilience for the Australian Defence Force.

Certainly, relying on satellites in a single, geostationary orbit is no longer enough for the ADF. Yet the decision to cancel JP9102 can be challenged. For example, why did the government simply did not rescope the project to bring forward acquisition of low earth orbit (LEO) and medium earth orbit (MEO) satellites, thus opening greater opportunities for Australia’s commercial space sector to participate? This could have occurred in a timely manner would complement Lockheed Martin’s delivery of the three to five GEO satellites under the original contract.

As it now stands, Defence has indicated that its strategy going forward is to continue to rely on existing architecture. The Defence Department statement says ‘… Defence’s current satellite communications capabilities support the immediate needs of the organisation.’

But there is risk in this, because the existing satellites are expiring. Defence notes that the ADF uses a hosted ‘…payload on an Optus C-1 satellite, ultra-high frequency channels on Intelsat IS-22, a commercial satellite; and proportional access to the US Space Force’s Wideband Global SATCOM system (WGS) network, which Australia gained by paying for WGS-6’, one of the satellites in the system.

Defence indicates that Optus C-1 will reach the end of its life in 2027—that is, in three years. The satellite has already had its life extended and has had its GEO orbit altered to extend it further. But it wanders in its position, so it isn’t very useful for anything other than naval forces. The authoritative source Gunter’s Space Page also notes that IS-22, launched in 2012, is designed to serve for 18 years, so it will expire in 2030. WGS-6, launched in 2013, is designed for 14 years, so it will reach the end of its service life in 2027.

The WGS constellation is being replaced by more sophisticated versions of these satellites in a program called Protected Tactical Satcom (PTS). If Australia wants access to PTS services, it will again need to pay the United States somehow. As with WGS, it would run the risk that the US would take bandwidth priority in a crisis.

PTS satellites are due to be launched between 2028 and 2029, just as Australia will lose its current GEO satcom services. So, any delay by government in deciding on what will replace JP9102—be it in LEO or indeed using several orbits—will present the risk of a capability gap emerging. Sticking with JP9102 as it was, and introducing LEO and MEO components together would have avoided the risk and preserved Australian control over a critical capability.

With the cancellation of JP9102, the government must quickly declare its new plan. Simply stating that Australia will ‘continue to rely on existing satellite communications’ isn’t good enough when that capability won’t last long and when getting results from a new project will take years.

The government cannot kick this can down the road to the 2026 National Defence Strategy and its associated spending plan, the Integrated Investment Program. There simply isn’t time. The project will need to be declared and go out for tenders, then any bids must then be reviewed, a prime contractor chosen and adequate funding provided before the satellites can be made and, finally, launched.

Ideally, Australian companies should be allowed to compete. But the way that JP9102 has been handled by government—following last year’s cancellation of the civilian project National Space Mission for Earth Observation—hardly inspires confidence in government commitment to the Australian commercial space sector.

That’s the biggest disappointment in the cancellation of JP9102.

Recruitment now focuses on the ADF, not each service. That’s a mistake

The Australian Defence Force is missing an opportunity in shifting the focus of its recruitment drive away from the three armed services and onto the ADF as a whole. By doing so, it’s failing to make use of services’ separate traditions as attractions to potential recruits.

The former chief of the defence force General Angus Campbell told Senate estimates in February that the ADF was 4,308 personnel below its approved strength. In that context, ADF Careers in July launched its new recruitment campaign—Unlike any other job. Spruiking the benefits of joining the ADF, the flashy campaign splashed across social media.

But there’s a problem: people don’t join the ADF; they join one of the services. They join either the Royal Australian Navy, Australian Army or Royal Australian Air Force, each of which has unique traditions, service life and a proud history of defending Australia.

The recent career advertisements, while slick and well produced, fail to tap into the core motivations that have driven Australians to serve for generations. Joining the navy, army or air force isn’t just a career move; it’s a commitment to a legacy of service and sacrifice.

The July 2024 ADF careers campaign came 12 months after the decision to rebrand recruiting from service specific—navy, army, air force recruiting—to ADF Careers. The amalgamation of the service recruiting functions, while an efficient use of resources, represents a wider trend within the Department of Defence of reducing the influence of the individual services.

The erosion of the authority of the service chiefs has added to a more bureaucratic structure and slower decision-making. But it’s the loss of service identity in the recruiting process that will be most problematic for an ADF attempting to grow to its greatest numbers since World War II.

This issue is not without precedent. The Canadian Armed Forces, in a well-meaning effort to streamline and modernise, unified the navy, army and air force into a single entity in 1968. The result was a loss of identity and tradition, which contributed to a decline in morale and recruitment. It took Canada more than four decades to reverse that decision; it officially reinstated separate branches in 2011. The lesson is clear: when military institutions distance themselves from their traditions and core values, they risk losing the very qualities that attract people to service in the first place.

Australia’s military has, until now, been largely immune to such missteps. The navy has its proud maritime legacy linked to battles such as the Leyte Gulf or Savo Island, the army its deep ties to land campaigns such as Gallipoli and Kokoda, and the air force its history of contributing to air superiority in theatres ranging from Europe to the Pacific. Those traditions are not just history; they’re living parts of what it means to serve. While it’s important for the ADF to adapt to modern challenges, it must do so without losing the traditions that make each service unique.

The recruitment shortfall in the ADF today isn’t due to a lack of attractive offers. Defence salaries are competitive, benefits are strong and the opportunities for career advancement are significant. But none of that will resonate with young Australians if the message of service is diluted. What the current advertisements fail to communicate is the sense of purpose that comes with wearing the uniform. That message, embedded in the traditions of the navy, army and air force, is what will inspire a new generation to enlist.

Canada’s decision to reverse unification of its services in 2011 was more than a symbolic gesture. It was an acknowledgement that the essence of military service lies in the identity that comes with being part of a distinct organisation. Reintroducing the separate services helped to restore the pride and tradition that had been lost. For Canada, the price of unification and efficiency had been the erosion of the very things that gave the military its soul. By reinstating the navy, army and air force as separate entities, Canada not only boosted morale but also reconnected its armed forces to the traditions that had historically been their source of strength and purpose.

The ADF should heed that example. The ADF’s strength lies not only in its modern capabilities but in the traditions that have shaped its identity. Young Australians aren’t just looking for jobs—they’re searching for meaning and purpose. They want to be part of something that matters.

If the ADF is to reverse its recruitment decline, it needs to shift the narrative. The focus must return to the traditions and values that make the navy, army and air force unique.

As Australia faces an increasingly complex strategic environment, the importance of a strong, capable and motivated defence force can’t be overstated. The lessons from Canada’s failed unification experiment are clear. When military institutions lose sight of their traditions, they risk losing their identity—and, with it, the ability to attract and retain the people they need. For the ADF, the path forward is not to abandon tradition in favour of efficiencies under the motto ‘One Defence’ but to find a way to honour the past while preparing for the future.

Northern defence is getting more talk than action

There is a glaring disconnect between policy and practical action in the Northern Territory.

Focusing the Australian Defence Force on Northern Australia is a straightforward decision. The Defence Strategic Review, National Defence Strategy and Integrated Investment Plan all highlight the necessity of deterring potential adversaries from projecting power against Australia through our northern approaches. These documents also emphasise the need for a well-connected and resilient network of bases to enhance the ADF’s operational capabilities in the north.

But transport and port infrastructure still look inadequate, ADF forces in the Northern Territory are decreasing, not building up, and it’s not clear that the area has Defence and civilian capacity to cope with demanding military contingencies. This needs to be tested.

Australia and the United States have made significant investments in the Royal Australian Air Force’s Tindal base, near Katherine in the Northern Territory, recognising its strategic importance in the Indo-Pacific region. Australia has committed to further upgrading infrastructure and enhancing capabilities at Tindal, including for airfield operations and logistics support. Meanwhile, the US has bolstered its presence through initiatives such as increased deployment of aircraft and personnel, consolidating Tindal as a critical hub for regional security operations.

Despite these investments, questions remain about whether the base and connective transport and logistical infrastructure are sufficiently networked to ensure a robust response capability in the face of evolving geopolitical challenges. For example, it’s uncertain whether there are enough suitable trucks available to move fuels from Darwin to Tindal during periods of high operational tempo, or, without a rail link to the base, how munitions and other items can be brought from Adelaide to Tindal.

The ADF has recognised the need for enhanced training areas in the Northern Territory, spending significantly to ensure personnel are prepared for diverse operational scenarios. This includes expanding existing training facilities and developing new sites that exploit the region’s unique geographical features, allowing for more effective live-fire exercises and joint operations. However, the challenge remains that fewer, not more, Australian soldiers will be in the Northern Territory to fully use these enhanced training areas.

The Darwin-based 1st Brigade was once the most lethal formation in the Australian Army. In 2019, it was stripped of its tanks, armoured vehicles and mechanised designation as part of the army’s restructuring efforts.

All Darwin-based helicopters will have left by the end of 2024. The army is concentrating helicopters in Townsville.

In September 2023, the government announced army restructuring. The 1st Brigade was designated as a light combat brigade focussed on agility and deployment in the littoral environment. The Townsville-based 3rd Brigade was designated as an armoured brigade suiting amphibious operations with the Royal Australian Navy. Most of the army’s new amphibious vessels will be based in Townsville. The 1st Brigade’s amphibious vessels will be based in the already crowded HMAS Coonawarra in Darwin.

The army’s long-range fire capability, deterring potential adversaries from projecting power against Australia through our northern approaches, will confusingly be based in Adelaide. This is despite road and rail infrastructure between Adelaide and Darwin remaining unacceptably vulnerable to weather disruption. Moving by air is hardly an answer since airlift capacity never seems sufficient even in exercises, and Australia barely has any merchant shipping to call on.

The Royal Australian Navy has several vessels based in Darwin, including the Armidale-class patrol boats and the soon to commissioned Arafura-class patrol ships. The versatile Arafuras will bolster the navy’s capabilities in northern waters. However, the navy has limited moorings and options for supporting and rearming vessels in Darwin, Australia’s most northern deep port. Thus, the ships would all have to travel great distances from likely combat zones just to be combat ready once more.

There is a clear gap between the Northern Territory policy in the National Defence Strategy and action. While the US strengthens its presence and capabilities in the Northern Territory as part of its force posture initiative, Australia’s action is spending on bases and training areas.

There can be no doubt that Defence faces logistical and workforce challenges in the Northern Territory, and policy to address these comes with a price tag. Arguably, this is why, during a meeting in Hawaii earlier this year, a senior Australian defence official told US Army Pacific representatives that there was neither room nor industry-support capacity for them to preposition equipment in the Northern Territory.

For years, Defence has suffered from cultural resistance to being in the Northern Territory. It’s time to move beyond that.

The next step in continued implementation of the National Defence Strategy should be to hold a nationally coordinated, simulated stress test of the region’s Defence and civilian capacity to withstand a range of contingencies. The simulations should involve desktop exercises that access datasets from industry, state and the territory government. In addition to testing legal frameworks, strategic reserves, logistics and transport infrastructure, and force posture, attention should be directed to questions of time and space for responses.

 

Changing our perspective on ADF recruitment and retention

A cultural shift is required around how we think about careers in the Australian Defence Force and metrics of capability and retention. Counterintuitively, we should consider not only how to recruit and retain ADF members, but also how to support them to leave, thereby retaining extended service.

The core function of the ADF is deployment and operation of a tri-service fighting force. To maintain this capability, we must consider that the arc of national service can be life-long and take many forms. Metrics of recruitment and retention can look beyond short-term service obligations to how ADF capability can be retained following full-time service. This requires a shift in perspective from recruitment to post-discharge retention.

Australia needs to consider innovative approaches to generate the same commitment through schemes and marketing the benefits of service. Redeveloping financial supports for members to enter the housing market has been suggested, as well as flexible career paths, improved compensation and opportunities to upskill in new technologies.

None of these ideas are new. Nations such as Denmark and Finland have long-term service commitments with their citizens. In Sweden, military service marks conscripts for excellence to potential employers due to high standards in selection. These countries also use varying approaches to conscription. Their decisions are also supported by centuries of history and by having a nearby nuclear-armed great power prosecuting war in Ukraine.

Similar connections between Australian military service and employable skillsets would provide similar effect. This could be facilitated through strengthened ADF-industry partnerships in critical technologies, which would not only build skills and establish the calibre of ADF training and education but also capitalise on recruiting from existing capacities in the civilian workforce. ADF-delivered microcredentials could also support member transition.

Further supports and incentives could be targeted towards issues facing modern Australians. Options could include subsidising past and ongoing government education loans in non-military disciplines, retailer benefits for service members similar to those provided to community volunteers and other methods of reducing cost of living and housing pressures.

Any potential benefit schemes can be tailored so maximum benefit for the individual is gained incrementally over the longer term. This contrasts with service benefits that scale over time and increase over years of service.

This benefits schemes would also require consideration of how ADF careers can continue following initial service obligations. Potential transitions out of the ADF and exit pathways should be considered and advertised as a normalised component of military service.

It has become a common approach in the modern civilian work environment to shift careers several times. For the ADF, this could take the form of supported transitions with partners in defence industry, the public service or alternative service options such as emergency services. This service pathway can then be advertised during recruitment and as a means of retention. Using existing service category and service option systems to allow for maximum flexibility in ongoing service opportunities into ADF reserves would further help in retention over the long term.

The attraction of a career beginning with ADF service followed by supported transition into a second profession, alongside supports such as housing and education, would allow the military to advertise a unique, flexible and varied opportunity in a competitive employment market.

The aim is to cultivate a transformation in how the public views military service: not as an outlier for only those with a military interest or family history, but as a career-starter and life-starter.

Other initiatives could involve following the lead of the British reserves in decentralising responsibility for recruitment to local units, many of which already cultivate their own social media presence through savvy videos displaying a relatability that official Defence communication often lacks. Local parliamentarians or celebrities could act as unit patrons and support ADF recruitment in their areas, an approach taken by Canada. Further, adapting basic and ongoing ADF training into tertiary electives could support university-level recruitment.

Reserve compensation likely needs to be revisited also. Analysis has shown a fully trained private earns more working a weekend at Woolworths than at a reserves weekend. There are also arguments for adopting variable tax and superannuation systems, as well as pro-rata remuneration, to further improve the attractiveness of ongoing reserve service for civilian applicants or full-time members transitioning out of the ADF. This could entail an opt-in system, whereby members choose the most appropriate tax arrangement for their needs; university students might prefer the tax-free salary, while older members could choose taxed payments alongside superannuation.

We need to acknowledge that recruitment into the military is unlike that of any other employer. Any attempts to raise recruitment and retention levels must reflect this difference. To improve the current retention and recruitment problems, the ADF must create a culture that supports members during their service and beyond.

Job-sharing and flexibility: ideas for ADF recruitment

The Australian Defence Force needs new approaches to recruitment and retention. It should look at sharing people with industry and consider reducing induction training, while also getting people into limited service before their long security clearances are complete.

As things stand, long processes, inability to retain experienced staff and difficulties attracting critical technology skill sets are hampering the ADF’s ability to prepare for a heightened strategic threat environment.

Much can be learned from recent conflicts abroad, which have demonstrated approaches to rapidly scaling a military workforce and leveraging specialised industry skill sets for adaptive campaigns. Critical technologies, such as cyber, artificial intelligence and autonomous systems, have proved transformational in the modern adaptive battlefield, as highlighted in the Russo-Ukraine War.

Applying those lessons to further emerging technologies, such as quantum computing, robotics and space-domain, geospatial long-range strike and influence campaigns, will be essential for ADF transformation and deterrence. A shift in perspective is needed to attract those skill sets to the ADF and retain them without competition with the organisations where those skills have been cultivated.

Take the example of an AI specialist: defence and industry or academia will be sharing his or her important skill set that’s probably integral to an organisation’s core function and business. A new model for engaging with industry based upon reciprocity and shared benefit, as opposed to competing with civilian employers for the time and energy of their experts, can shift the recruitment calculus in the ADF’s favour. Flexible and non-traditional approaches to service would allow for the sharing of skilled personnel with the ADF, while potential links and access to defence projects grants, and public-relations opportunities, could be incentives for organisations.

Personnel working on ADF projects not only contribute to their organisations’ ongoing links to Defence, but also bring those experiences and learning back to their core organisational work. That benefit can be multiplied through ADF opportunities for courses, upskilling and cross-discipline work across technologies. The intangible benefits of opportunities to use critical skill sets in new domains and upskill in areas beyond the scopes of their civilian organisations are what will attract those members and gain the support of their employers.

Established entry pathways for recruits between industry and the ADF can offer further unique opportunities to those participating. Consider a cybersecurity business that offers prospective employees the chance for a career in the private sector while also providing access to unique and exclusive ADF projects. Potential members can then consider a form of national service in their skill area that likely doesn’t fit into the usual notion of a military career or involve long days in the field.

The ADF Total Workforce System can be leveraged to enable such innovative engagement with industry. Using the existing service category system (SERCAT) for maximum flexibility is needed to ensure that critical skill sets are retained wherever possible, whether through a regular pattern of service or even through short-notice calls for duty, irregular service or full-time service for brief periods.

Part-time service, including SERCATs 3, 5 and 6, can enable the recruitment and retention of personnel with critical skills. Experts in industry require the flexibility to maintain dual careers in the military and civilian sectors, as well as to continue to hone and develop their skills in industry and academic domains. SERVOP D (dual civilian–military employment) and the SERCAT system can then be leveraged for ongoing flexibility. For example, the AI specialist could be seconded by his employer to work on a defence project full time for a short period before falling back into irregular service until the next period of need.

Paradoxically, by allowing for less service obligation, the ADF will be likely not only to maximise its return on investment in staffing key projects and research, but also to benefit from the experience that personnel will continue to accumulate in their civilian careers. The ADF can further offer access to unique and interesting projects, technological sandboxes including AUKUS Pillar 2 technologies, and collaboration with domestic and international peers on work that will benefit the nation.

Recruitment pathways for skilled members should be revitalised to cater for what is needed. That can include reduced induction training, flexible approaches to medical requirements, and rapid entry into service in a sanitised environment while security clearances are processed. An AI specialist doesn’t need to spend three weeks at basic training to be effective in his or her specialty in the ADF. A bespoke approach is needed, depending on the specialist area, as has proven successful within the UK Joint Cyber Reserve Force.

Conditions of service could also be revisited. This might include pro-rata remuneration with full-time members, superannuation or leveraging the existing retention bonus system. Highly skilled part-time personnel are unlikely to be retained in the long term through the traditional binary reserve compensation system that allows for daily renumeration only at either three or six hours per day, regardless of actual service length.

The ADF’s acute workforce challenges require new approaches and flexibility to overcome. Beginning with industry engagement trials would be a good idea, particularly with an aim of accessing specialised and niche skill sets. Regional industry engagement cells can be established, and a flexible approach to the total workforce system and its varying service categories will be essential to enable their success.

Whole-of-nation readiness demands whole-of-nation exercises

Australia must develop robust, interdepartmental and whole–of–nation exercises based on potential conflict scenarios or it risks discovering when lives are at stake that it’s ill–prepared. 

The Covid-19 pandemic and increasingly destructive natural disasters have demonstrated repeatedly that what may start as a localised issue can rapidly become a national emergency. Poor organisational readiness and inadequate coordination across the government can amplify the damage. 

The strains in responding to natural phenomena show just how pressing it is that the Australian Government identifies and trains for conflict scenarios in which the enemy not only has a say but wishes to actively do harm. Running such exercises will improve whole-of-nation coordination and response, demonstrate resilience and strategic capacity and serve a vital educational role for the civilian populace. 

The National Defence Strategy said that ‘the concept of National Defence [is] a coordinated, whole-of-government and whole-of-nation approach that harnesses all arms of national power …’ 

Shifting away from stovepiped thinking on security is long overdue, but rhetoric must be matched by action. Given the increasingly interconnected nature of war and conflict, it’s impossible for the Defence Department to adequately respond to large-scale conflict without support from other government agencies and civil-society actors. 

Developing and running interagency exercises based on potential conflict scenarios, such as mass casualties following a naval engagement, will identify weaknesses, pressure-test current planning, and give the government the opportunity to rectify problems. Exercises should involve the public, local communities and non-government organisations in simulating a conflict as close to reality as possible. 

When directing exercises for sailors, one of the present authors often found that one of the biggest stumbling blocks would be knowing whom to contact for needed support, even within the defence organisation. In the case of an emergency, ironing out such wrinkles as who is the point of contact for local mass-casualty support now is vital to seamless responses in the event of a kinetic conflict. 

New, more robust best practices will emerge from the process, which would be tested in follow-on exercises, generating a virtuous cycle and sharing the preplanned responses as widely as possible. 

Covid-19 and the 2019 bushfires highlighted the interconnectedness of the Defence apparatus and the whole-of-government effort, but information-technology systems needed to enable whole-of-nation coordination were not fit for purpose. The ADF isn’t geared to operate in environments with minimum to no security classification. Even if all parties knew exactly whom to contact, there would be difficulties in getting the required information to all necessary recipients. 

Successful deterrence requires that a potential adversary believes you have both the capacity and the will to respond to its actions. These exercises would demonstrate that in a high-intensity conflict Australia has the capacity and the competence to continue effective operations while managing losses. 

It’s not enough to show that the ADF can execute integrated and joint combat operations. The support functions spearheaded by society writ large must be demonstrated as well. Wider public engagement shows that it’s not just the roughly 58,600 uniformed members of the ADF who are in play but that Australian efforts truly are whole-of-government, as the National Defence Strategy advocates. 

This show of support would prove that the ADF couldn’t be taken out in the first round and that it can provide a continued material impact on decision-making in the region during protracted fighting. If a potential adversary doesn’t think the Australian public can be split and forced to settle a conflict on disadvantageous terms, it will perceive a higher risk in taking kinetic action. The deterrent effect of the ADF is thus higher. 

Even if the needs facing a democratic country are existential and immediate, a population that doesn’t understand the scope or speed of action required won’t give the government its support. The number of those actively serving or with direct relations to those who serve is rather low within Australia, so even larger exercises, such as Talisman Sabre or command post exercises such as Vital Prospect, have minimal reverberations within the wider community and government. Running complex, whole-of-government exercises would serve as excellent educational opportunities for the general populace. 

The involvement of numerous government agencies, such as the Department of Veterans’ Affairs, emergency service organisations, hospitals and the finance and critical infrastructure sectors, in these exercises would give a broader swathe of Australians first-hand knowledge of what’s required to adequately resource and run complex conflict responses. Exercises also give the government the opportunity to engage with citizens and explain why such readiness is necessary and to counter efforts at dividing the country with misinformation and disinformation. 

No plan survives first contact, but the skills and institutional knowledge needed to adapt and overcome can and must be developed in peacetime. Designing and running whole-of-nation exercises will ensure that Australia is ready for whole-of-nation efforts in the event of a high-intensity conflict in our region. 

Bringing non-traditional players into these exercises also gives the government the opportunity to educate the wider populace, creating vital buy-in for the tough strategic decision-making required to prepare for worst-case scenarios. A well-trained, prepared country has the capacity and latitude to withstand coercive policies and force adversaries considering violence to say, ‘not today.’ Complex, multiplayer drilling is integral to Australian security. Australia owes it to itself to build the strength needed for tomorrow today. 

Why defence warning time requires urgent attention

In this government’s National Defence Strategy, published in April, Defence Minister Richard Marles reaffirmed that ‘Australia no longer enjoys the benefit of a 10-year window of strategic warning time for conflict.’ This was one of the key judgements of the 2023 Defence Strategic Review and, indeed, of the Morrison Government’s 2020 Defence Strategic Update. So, there is bipartisan agreement on this critical subject. However, as argued below, this new era of shortened warning time requires a radically new approach to Australia’s defence policy.

The National Defence Strategy goes on to describe this ‘fundamentally new approach’ as one that leverages and coordinates all arms of national power to achieve an integrated approach to Australia’s national security. It specifically identifies the need for a robust National Intelligence Community capable of providing strategic decision-making advantage and strategic warning, as well as direct support to ADF operations and domestic security.

So far, so good, but—as far as we are aware—little is being done yet to address the radical new concept of little or almost no warning time, to quickly reorder Australia’s defence posture and preparedness, as well as the urgent need for more strike weapons.

It is important in this regard to have a good understanding of what has changed to Australia’s defence policy, and why. In brief, Australia’s defence policies for most of the past 50 years have been based on the key strategic conclusion that only lesser contingencies were credible in the shorter term, with higher levels of military contingency credible only in the longer term, after an extended period of strategic deterioration. From the mid-1970s to 2020 a strategic warning period of 10 to 15 years was envisaged. (The 2016 Defence White Paper even predicted no major threat before 2040.) Intelligence analysis would provide this warning, leading to a timely response by the machinery of government. This response would include expansion of the Australian Defence Force.

These policies were appropriate for the time but resulted in an ADF which, while capable in many respects, was of modest size, was at low states of readiness and had little capacity for sustained operations beyond the routine: in other words, a peacetime force.

Similar observations may be made about the areas necessary to support military operations, such as intelligence, policy and industry.

As is now widely recognised, the rise of China’s economic and military strength, together with its aggressive foreign policies, has rendered invalid this earlier Australian conceptual framework. The consequences of this are far-reaching and change radically the framework within which Australia’s government needs to manage strategic risk.

The key is that China’s military capabilities now give it the potential to conduct and sustain sophisticated operations against our interests, were it to develop the motive and intent to do so. The timescales within which motive and intent can change are much less than the timescales which previous Defence policies concluded would be needed for an adversary to develop the readily detectable capabilities to be used against us.

This leads to the conclusion that warning times now would be much less than those assumed in earlier decades.

Further, assessment of motive and intent is inherently difficult and subject to ambiguity. There would likely be the absence of an obvious warning threshold. Yet the consequences of getting it wrong would be severe, much more so than in the past.

With this in mind, we have proposed that the Office of National Intelligence set up a National Intelligence Warning Staff. This is set out in our paper Deterrence through denial: A strategy for an era of reduced warning time (ASPI Strategy, May 2021).

Our recommendations included the following:

In view of the radical contraction in defence warning time, Australia needs to appoint a National Intelligence Officer (NIO) for Warning. In the Cold War, which was a highly demanding era in which warning of a surprise attack was a critical priority, the CIA had an NIO for Warning whose sole task was to scrutinise daily the incoming evidence from intelligence indicators and subject them to critical assessment.

In Australia, such an NIO, together with the position’s National Intelligence Warning Staff, could be in the Office of National Intelligence. It would be important, however, that the Intelligence Warning Staff include officials from various disciplines—and not least intelligence officers skilled in the interpretation of political, strategic, and military warning indicators, some of whom should also have a policy background.

We would now add that this new intelligence body would also require new skills, such as threats with no warning from cyber and artificial intelligence and from unmanned air, sea and submarine platforms and drones. There will be an obvious need for more political warning advice from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, which, given cuts to their already modest budget, suggests additional expertise and funding for this purpose.

We said also that an alternative would be to locate the NIO in the Defence Organisation and that, wherever its location, ‘the NIO needs to have influential access at the highest levels of decision-making—including briefing the National Security Committee of Cabinet in times of impending crisis.’

We made the further suggestion that the program of national assessments increase its focus on the United States. This reflected a concern that US security policies could become more volatile than over recent decades. Among other things, Australia needs a well-informed analysis of where it thinks the US is going in its confrontation with China and in support of allies, including the role of extended nuclear deterrence. The latter has received no new focus in Australian defence policy since the end of the Cold War more than 30 years ago.

Australia needs prudent analysis about how the US will react to its own warning indicators of potential military attack and what it would expect of Australia. Australia cannot afford not to be fully informed about US contingencies relating to Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula or China’s or Russia’s clash with Japan over disputed territories. So, we need to assess both US military capabilities and US intentions.

There is also the question of the capacity of our National Intelligence Community to respond in a timely way to the outbreak of hostilities and to sustain the necessary level of support to decision-making and military operations. As mentioned earlier, the policies of earlier decades have resulted in an ADF and supporting capabilities that currently do not have the levels of readiness and sustainability that are needed in Australia’s new and more demanding strategic circumstances.

Governments are unlikely to accept that standing forces and their associated support need to be kept at a level sufficient to handle today’s more-demanding contingencies without at least a degree of preparation. This is because some element of warning would be expected, even today, and because the additional costs would be significant and best avoided.

We note here the conclusions of Richard K Betts in his seminal book Surprise Attack: Lessons for Defense Planning (Brookings Institution, 1982). Betts argues that governments should expect to be surprised. He believes that governments’ ability to interpret other people’s politics is always limited. But he also acknowledges that inadequacies in warning are rarely due to the absence of anyone in the system ringing an alarm. He suggests that the principal cause of surprise isn’t the failure of intelligence but the unwillingness of political leaders to believe intelligence or to react to it with sufficient dispatch.

In our view, to analyse the implications of greatly reduced warning time, defence planners now need to address three interrelated questions: Readiness for when? Readiness for what? Readiness of what? As all those who have ever been involved in defence planning know, a major interaction between answers to these questions comes from their implications for resources and allocation of money. Competition between decisions on resource allocation is now even more inevitable for Australia’s defence planners, and the resolution of that competition must be integral to defence planning and—dare one suggest it—prompt decision-making.

The new demands we now envisage might best be described as a need for a surge capacity:  the ability, quickly and confidently, to move to higher states of readiness and to sustain higher rates of effort for as long as contingent developments might require. This kind of attribute has been little needed in previous decades and represents a new departure for Australian security policy.

The on-going challenges of setting priorities for intelligence collection and analysis suggest there is unlikely to be much current spare capacity within our National Intelligence Community. While some extra capacity could be made available by the reordering of priorities, this is likely to be limited in extent. This implies the need for a clear pathway for the NIC to move to a higher level of capacity, although what this path might be is not clear, not least because of the requirement for personnel to have high levels of security clearance and the need for secure facilities.

Following the publication of our ASPI paper in 2021, we gave a presentation on its key findings to a senior Defence group led by the chief of the defence force, and we also had a separate discussion with a senior group in ONI.

In summary, we encourage the current Independent Intelligence Review to examine whether the National Intelligence Community is correctly structured and prepared to meet the urgent requirements of Australia’s new defence policy. In particular, the dramatically changed nature of Australia’s strategic circumstances—recognition of which is a basic bipartisan policy—means that policymakers need to be sure that the NIC can meet the challenges of short-warning contingencies involving the support of round-the-clock military operations sustained over months rather than days. Ministers must be left in no doubt about the NIC’s ability to move quickly to higher states of alert and then to sustain operations on a 24/7 basis.

For the first time since the Second World War, the NIC needs to be able to respond rapidly to the demands of such military operations, in circumstances of serious military threat to our key national security interests and survival.

Closer Pacific integration could help solve the ADF’s recruitment problems

Australia needs to develop more creative and bold recruitment and retention strategies for the Australian Defence Force.

The recruitment of foreigners into the ADF, particularly Pacific islanders, is one solution that commentators have proposed in an ‘on-again, off-again’ debate.

Based on our research, and our conversations with Pacific island country security officials, the creation of a ‘Pacific Battalion’ possibly offers the greatest benefit across the broadest set of criteria and is the preferred option among those officials.

Ultimately, there are many benefits to opening up pathways for Pacific islanders to serve in the ADF, with the clear caveat that any process to formally establish a program must be culturally and politically sensitive, be informed by detailed risk and impact assessment, and have strong monitoring and evaluation mechanisms in place.

In our ASPI report published today, ‘Regional security and Pacific partnerships: recruiting Pacific Islanders into the Australian Defence Force’, we explore three options:

  • direct recruiting from the Pacific region into the ADF;
  • closer integration and operation between existing Australian and PIC forces;
  • and a broader partnership model drawing on lessons from the US’s ‘compacts of free association’ and from the UK’s defence recruitment initiatives.

We’ve demonstrated that enhancing and deepening regional security mechanisms and cohesion is a necessary corollary to any solution focused on outcomes for the ADF. Although broadening the ADF recruitment scheme to directly recruit Pacific islanders would go some way towards addressing the ADF’s recruitment shortfalls, other options, such as the co-operative development of regional military forces, may be a better investment of time and money over the long run if it’s well planned and executed in genuine partnership and consultation with PICs.

An initial ‘Pacific Battalion’ option could build and evolve over time, learning and implementing lessons through an effective monitoring and evaluation framework. That may prove a tremendously useful way for Australia and the region to coordinate and cooperate on regional security.

The security and stability of the South Pacific and Australia are deeply intertwined. Australian Government policies have, for more than a decade, consistently prioritised the Pacific for international engagement, including in defence, development and diplomacy.

The Australian Government’s ‘Pacific Step-up’, first announced in 2016, delivered a heightened level of effort by Canberra in the region, as did Australia’s strong support for the Pacific Islands Forum’s Boe Declaration. The Albanese government’s increased policy focus on the region, and on a coordinated, whole-of-government approach to the Pacific, demonstrates the centrality of our immediate region to the Australian Government’s strategic planning.

Australia’s 2023 Defence Strategic Review (DSR) outlined the need for innovative and bold approaches to recruitment and retention in the Australian Defence Force (ADF), which is seeking to grow by 30 percent by 2040 but is not yet hitting existing recruitment targets.

Budget figures released for 2023 show that ADF personnel numbers dropped by more than 1,300, or more than 2 percent of the total force. The Budget projections for 2024 to 2026 indicate that the government requires more than 6,000 additional personnel—in addition to replacing those lost through attrition in the next three years—to meet stated growth requirements.

In the context of a competitive recruitment environment in Australia, especially for skilled labour, that trend indicates that the Defence organisation will struggle to meet forecast requirements using existing recruitment options and will need to seek alternatives. This challenge of competition for talent and to retain skilled workers is not limited to defence, nor Australia. It is an economy wide issue, and global.

Obviously, such an initiative could help the ADF’s recruitment numbers, but, importantly, it could open up economic, skills and training opportunities for Pacific islanders.

It could also provide a powerful cultural and practical engagement opportunity for the ADF, while also providing Australia with avenues to help shape the region’s security environment in positive and culturally relevant ways. Such recruitment—especially if it involves bilateral agreements between governments— would also put Pacific Island governments in a unique position to inform Australia’s security assessments and contribute to shared outcomes.

Those outcomes could include enhanced regional interoperability, especially for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) and supporting combined stability operations, and stronger two-way cultural and social engagement, bolstering familiarity and understanding between the ADF and Pacific Island countries (PICs).

There are, of course, arguments against such recruitment. For example, the recruitment of Pacific islanders to fight for Australia could be viewed by some as ‘colonialist’ in a region understandably sensitive to that history. But this concern could be addressed through PICs retaining agency through bilateral arrangements.

In addition, any scheme seeking to relocate workers to Australia could be seen as taking skills from a much smaller nation, and risking brain and skills drains. We look at these, and other, considerations in this report.

These policy options aren’t exhaustive but they are plausible and represent different approaches (which could be combined) to achieve outcomes related to ADF recruitment and retention as well as to improved regional collective security.

A critical consideration in developing these options was a two-way flow of benefit: from the Pacific to Australia and from Australia back to the region. For example, we recommend that, where possible, Pacific recruits receive focused training in HADR, which would help build sovereign PIC capabilities and facilitate the application of learned skills upon recruits’ return to their home countries.