Tag Archive for: ADF

The ADF needs more specialists. To get them, it needs more flexibility

The Australian Defence Force needs a new way to recruit and retain hard-to-find experts, such as specialist engineers. Current systems do not allow for the flexibility that the 21st century demands, nor do they match industry salary standards.

These shortcomings were highlighted by the Strategic Review of the Australian Defence Force Reserves, which identifies the need to adopt a Total Workforce System that supports more innovative and flexible workforce arrangements.​

The problem has been worsening as tasks within the ADF have become more complex. But maybe the solution has been right in front of us all along.

We could adapt the existing Specialist Services Officer (SSO) system through which the army currently engages people in fields such a healthcare, finance, law, chaplaincy, management, public affairs, aviation, engineering or education, without necessarily requiring the full military training of standard army service. The SSO arrangement needs to be more flexible: rather than limited to pre-defined fields, it must be open to whatever roles the ADF requires.

It would thereby enable the ADF to employ a much wider range of specialists, and it would apply to people with particularly valuable skills who could already be in the ADF under a different role.

The adaption, renamed Specialist Service Person (SSP), could also replace the Specialist Service Soldier scheme, which the army is trialling for enlisted personnel and which is focused on specific trades.

For example, the army may need someone with specialist sanitation knowledge for an operation, but ‘sanitation engineer’ isn’t on the Specialist Services Officer list or a job in the ADF. The review of the reserves advocates creating pathways that allow a broader range of specialists to enter the ADF, ensuring operational requirements guide employment rather than rigid role categories.

Instead, operational needs should guide employment, and a system unconstrained by pre-defined employment categories and open to negotiable pay should ensure that ever-changing service demands are met.

Other examples of skills that the ADF can acquire with far more flexibility are artificial intelligence experts, automation engineers, naval architects, procurement specialists and unknown future roles we haven’t thought up yet.

The SSP system, like the SSO, would apply to civilians entering the ADF or to reservists with specialised skills. This gives the ADF options to move people into roles where there is an operational need and move them out when it is over.

A continuous full-time service (CFTS) contract, as already used for upgrading reservists to full-time employment, could be used. Under the SSP model, the ADF could call upon specialists when needed, similar to the reserves, rather than keeping people permanently on contract but underemployed.

Additionally, ADF also relies on a contracted external civilian workforce for niche expertise. They are often employed by companies that they work for directly, adding complexity, cost and conflicts of interest. Instead, such skills should be available from service members under SSP CFTS contracts.

Offering realistic market salaries under the SSP system would also improve the chance of keeping highly skilled ADF members who have grown beyond their standard employment model.

This proposal takes inspiration from the US Warrant Officer system and Singapore’s military expert system.

The US Army pays more for its technical experts through its Warrant Officer ranks. These members are specialists in specific fields rather than generalist leaders, enabling them to focus on their core skills. This system allows the military to retain and access the expertise of its best specialists.

The Singapore Armed Forces directly recruit specialists from the civilian sector, tapping into a wider talent pool to meet evolving defence needs. These specialists, known as military experts, can then develop their skills through the Military Domain Experts Scheme.

Like the US model, the proposed SSP system would recognise and promote expertise from within the ranks. Like Singapore’s approach, it would acknowledge the need to bring in external expertise when required. This hybrid model ensures seamless integration of both internal and external specialists, optimising the ADF’s capabilities.

The SSP system could also be used to keep the skills of people who would otherwise leave the ADF—for example, because medical conditions make them unfit for standard duties. If they hold the right in need skillsets the ADF in the SSP model would have the flexibility to reengage them under a CFTS contract with defined duties, salary and outcomes.

Currently, specialists often face pay cuts when they move from private companies into ADF roles. This concern is echoed in the review of the reserves, which emphasises the need to modernise conditions of service and adopt a more competitive pay structure to improve retention and recruitment outcomes.

The key word is ‘flexibility’. That’s what the ADF must have as it tries to employ and keep people with the ever-enlarging range of skills that it needs.

How drone racing promotes battlefield FPV capability

The Australian Defence Force is a global leader in first-person view (FPV) drone racing, a sport that has attracted public attention and gone viral on social media. The ADF’s success in the field demonstrates how competitive military sport can be used to advance dual-use technology and nurture technological skills in the next generation.

Military capability and military sport have been linked for millennia, with soldiers competing in events such as the Olympic Pentathlon and the Military World Games to develop their skills in peacetime. Today, militaries use sports to forge international relationships, a key application of soft power.

FPV drone racing, one of the most recent examples of military sports, has emerged as a form of honing skills for a disruptive battlefield technology that can quickly enhance the situational awareness and firepower of individual soldiers and small combat elements. The little aircraft are cheaper and require less training than do more complex military-specification precision-guided weapons and autonomous systems.

Commercial camera drones and FPV drone racing were at first adapted for the battlefield by the Ukrainian military in response to shortage of precision-guided munitions and artillery rounds. The affordability, accessibility and ease of designing, building and flying drones have proliferated their use in conventional battlefield applications. They are effective as tools for disruption and provide opportunities for innovation to maintain combat advantage.

The Australian Army and British Army collaborated to assemble the first military drone racing teams in 2017 and 2018, and the inaugural Military International Drone Racing Tournament was held in Sydney in 2018. Since then, the ADF’s FPV drone racing pilots have remained undefeated, with consecutive wins in 2018, 2023 and 2024. The tournament brings together military FPV drone practitioners from around the world with the highest skills in designing, building and flying FPV racing drones. They compete in drone design, technology, pilot skills and teamwork. Most participating nations now have full-time pilots developing their military tactics, techniques and procedures; some of them are involved in the racing.

The ADF’s commitment to promoting FPV drone racing is enthusiastic, with its hashtag #SendIt! going viral across the movement. Its initiation of the international tournament in 2018 and the establishment of the ADF Drone Racing Association in 2023 are clear demonstrations of this commitment.

These initiatives illustrate how military sports programs can support the evolution of warfighting techniques and technology. They help ensure that ADF personnel remain competitive in drone racing, and have opportunities to learn and practise designing, building, flying, and repairing drones.

Racing tournaments encourage pilots to innovate in the quest for a drone design that delivers a winning performance. In many ways, the technology involved in FPV drone racing is an innovative application of the technology made affordable by commercial smartphones. Smartphone technology includes miniaturised batteries, microprocessors, high-definition cameras, small monitors, network communications and gyro-stabilised gravimeters. FPV racing drones are assembled from micro electric motors, electronic speed controllers, radio receivers, video transmitters, cameras and a flight controller integrated into a carbon fibre quadcopter frame. Thanks to the diversity of available components, racing pilots can hone their preferences for the most effective brands, software and technologies.

Drone racing tournaments also help pilots develop their flying skills. During a race, pilots control their custom-built FPV racing drones around a 3D obstacle racetrack. They wear FPV goggles to see the live video from the drone’s forward-facing camera and remotely manoeuvre the drone using electronic and radiofrequency systems. The video gives pilots an immersive experience so that they can see and understand where the drone needs to go. They decide on the flight control actions required to complete the race, sometimes recovering from unplanned mid-air collisions with other drones, the race gates and the ground.

Through its creation of FPV drone racing associations, the ADF is also highlighting the importance of building drones as a key skill that future generations should learn through science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) outreach programs. The pilots and teams visit schools, demonstrate at science festivals, career expos and airshows, and run drone racing boot camps for the ADF’s cadet and training organisations. Their message is clear: all STEM skills are required across the entire ADF, not just in drone operations.

While the ADF’s drone racing champions appear to simply relish winning at the sport, the main mission of the team lies in the innovation of drone technology and its application to the battlefield. The pilots’ success demonstrates how competitive military sports can be utilised to advance dual-use technology and promote STEM within the next generation, fostering innovation and disruptive thinking in current and future drone experts. #SendIt!

Faster, please: the ADF needs to catch up on uncrewed-aircraft technologies

The rapidly deteriorating strategic environment necessitates a shift in defence strategies and capabilities. The Australian Defence Force (ADF), like many military forces globally, must acknowledge that uncrewed systems will play an important role in future conflicts. It must accelerate its processes for developing their capability.

Russia’s war against Ukraine and fighting in the Red Sea have demonstrated a rapid proliferation of high volume, low-cost technologies that are now indispensable on the battlefield. In light of this, the ADF should further develop and implement strategies for uncrewed aerial systems (UASs) and counter-uncrewed aerial systems (C-UASs).

These strategies should provide clear guidelines on accelerating ADF access to UASs across air, land and sea; investments in and collaboration with the UAS industry; defining roles of civil and military authorities; and ways to counter drone threats.

The 2024 National Defence Strategy (NDS) and associated spending plan, the Integrated Investment Program, recognise the importance of enhancing Australia’s drone and counter-drone capabilities. The Defence Department does include UASs in ‘robotics, autonomous systems, and artificial intelligence’, one of its sovereign industrial capability priorities, but this covers only limited aspects of UASs, not the technology’s full breadth of capability and the need for large-scale manufacturing. Moreover, there is no evidence of recently developed or released strategies specifically addressing UASs and C-UASs.

By contrast, Australia’s allies, including the United States, Britain, France and South Korea, have already developed or revised their strategies. These are based in part on observations of the use of drones in Ukraine and understanding the need to protect against them. For example, the US released a C-UAS strategy in early December. Britain launched a new UAS strategy in February 2024 highlighting clear directions for enhancing UAS capabilities and for spending for the next decade. The ADF can similarly provide clear directions to accelerate access to UASs and C-UAS across air, land and sea by developing its own strategies.

The NDS calls for integrating existing and emerging technologies and for boosting military-industrial capacity with secure supply chains. The war in Ukraine has shown that a country needs to develop its own supply chain, manufacturing capabilities and stocks. The Australian industry is highly skilled and capable of doing this, but it needs direction through clear policy guidelines.

The ADF must recognise the need to balance between investing in complex, highly capable systems and high-volume, low-cost technologies that can provide quick and simple solutions for a range of security challenges.

The Integrated Investment Program includes spending on a range of uncrewed and autonomous systems. The ADF plans to spend more than $10 billion on drones, with at least $4.3 billion on uncrewed aerial systems and $690 million on uncrewed tactical systems for the army.

So far, Australia’s spending on UASs has focused on complex aircraft, such as the Boeing MQ-28A Ghost Bat, designed to operate alongside crewed aircraft or to independently increase aircraft numbers in combat. The air force has begun receiving MQ-4C Tritons, an unarmed, high-altitude and long-endurance uncrewed aircraft.

The ADF will spend more than $100 million on 110 drones from the Australian manufacturers SYPAQ and Quantum-Systems. While it considers the delivery of the limited number of systems in 2025 to express ‘an intent to enhance at speed’, other nations spend far more on ensuring that warfighters have such systems and, most importantly, are protected against them.

It must also acknowledge that UASs with high-end capabilities are highly vulnerable and must be protected. The conflict in Ukraine demonstrates that large UAS have become targets that are easy to detect and destroy. For example, TB2 Bayraktars, celebrated in 2022 for their performance, are no longer frequently used. Similarly, the Russian fleet has had to relocate from parts of the Black Sea due to drone threats, such as the one in November when Ukrainian drone boats motored over 1000km and blasted three Russian warships in one blow.

Furthermore, the government must better understand the relationship between civil and military authorities and their roles and responsibilities in counteracting UAS threats.

In peacetime, civil law enforcement agencies are responsible for defence against UAS, but responsibilities may overlap in relation to military installations and critical infrastructure. Moreover, civil agencies may require military support since only the armed forces have the equipment to detect, identify and engage UAS. The government must encourage close cooperation between civil and military organisations in order to maintain an effective level of interoperability.

Regardless of how the ADF develops its own UAS, it must prepare to defend against them. Every soldier must be aware of UAS threats, learn how to use a UAS, how to counter them for self-defence and to protect others and costly equipment. As UAS technologies evolve, so do C-UAS capabilities.

As evident from Russia’s war against Ukraine, the UAS are already threats, and they are here to stay. Australia must keep up with the rapid pace of innovation in this field. It needs to demonstrate commitment to stay ahead in the development of drone technology and ensure that its armed forces are prepared in the fast-changing security landscape.

Unlocking the full potential of the ADF’s northern ranges and training areas

The Northern Territory (NT) is one of the world’s most exceptional military training environments, offering vast and rugged landscapes ideally suited for large-scale exercises, live-fire drills and complex operations. Defence-owned areas such as Bradshaw Field Training Area and Mount Bundey Training Area have earned global recognition for their ability to support high-intensity training.

Yet the Australian Defence Force is not fully exploiting the potential of these assets. It is underutilising critical resources that could enhance the ADF’s operational capabilities and Australia’s broader defence posture.

The NT’s training areas have been integral to the ADF’s operational readiness, providing an ideal environment for training in conventional and irregular warfare. They have long supported complex exercises, testing of diverse military equipment and joint training with allied forces.

However, in recent years, there has been a noticeable reduction in the scale and frequency of ADF exercises in the NT. This decline, compounded by the army’s shrinking presence in the NT and competing demands on Defence, has limited the ADF’s ability to fully exploit these ranges for high-intensity, combined-arms training, leaving a significant gap in defence readiness.

The underutilisation of the NT’s training grounds is particularly clear when compared with the heavy involvement of the US military. Under the US Force Posture Initiatives, the United States has made significant spending in these areas and regularly conducted exercises on them. This engagement reinforces the strategic importance of the NT’s ranges, highlighting the gap in the ADF’s use of them. Other international partners, particularly Japan, also recognise the value of the ranges. As regional tensions rise, training alongside allies in a location as strategically situated as the NT enhances interoperability and military readiness.

Despite the NT’s exceptional training environment and the US forces’ frequent use of this advantage, the ADF’s commitment to high-intensity exercises in the region has waned. As the Indo-Pacific becomes more geopolitically significant, the NT’s ranges should be central to Australia’s defence strategy, not secondary assets used infrequently or for limited purposes.

The Australian government and the ADF must act to maximise the utility of the NT’s training areas. The ADF must significantly ramp up its commitment to large-scale, complex training exercises in the NT.

To optimise use of the ranges, Australia must increase large-scale exercises in the NT that integrate multiple military services and allies. These exercises should reflect Australia’s strategic challenges, such as maritime security, territorial defence and regional stability. A focus on rapid deployment and modern warfare scenarios will ensure that the ADF is prepared to address a broad spectrum of threats, from conventional military conflicts to humanitarian crises and natural disasters.

Equally important is fostering closer collaboration between the Australian government, the ADF and the NT government. As the ADF ramps up its training activities in the region, the NT government must actively support the expansion. The NT’s vast, sparsely populated landscape provides a unique opportunity for the ADF to collaborate with local communities and businesses, creating mutually beneficial partnerships.

Expanding military exercises can generate jobs, boost local economies and improve infrastructure, all of which will help sustain the NT’s growing role in Australia’s defence strategy. It can also stress-test the region’s transport and logistics infrastructure and industry base, while providing economic opportunities for local businesses and communities. The increased ADF activity will also enhance the region’s security and emergency response capabilities, providing direct benefits to the local population.

Australia can unlock the full potential of these invaluable resources by revitalising its commitment to these ranges, increasing international cooperation and fostering stronger partnerships with the NT government and local communities. A comprehensive policy approach, focused on increased training activity and stronger collaboration with both domestic and international partners, will ensure that the NT remains central to Australia’s defence strategy in the Indo-Pacific region. This will enhance the ADF’s operational readiness, strengthen relationships with key allies, and solidify Australia’s role as an important player in regional security.

Editors’ picks for 2024: ‘A PNG view on recruitment for the ADF: yes, please’

Originally published on 12 August 2024.

Papua New Guineans should serve in the Australian Defence Force. As a Papua New Guinean, I believe this would instill Western values of democracy and freedom in our young people, who must be made to realise that these principles are under threat as China expands its influence in the region.

Australian military service would also provide employment for young people from PNG and other Pacific island countries, giving them real life skills.

As Australia considers the possibility of Pacific recruitment, it must understand that this would not just be a way to make up the ADF personnel shortfall. It would also help the countries from which service personnel were drawn, demonstrating good will towards the Pacific and going well beyond mere words in promoting their alignment with the West.

In general, the Pacific islands would prefer to align with Australia and the United States rather than China, but this view is predominantly held by older people, especially those who remember what they call the good times of the colonial era. In contrast, the younger people do not care greatly whether their countries are aligned to the West or not.

Service in the ADF would do more than bind many young people in PNG and other Pacific island countries to Australia. It would also teach them the moral values that come with military service, values that are lacking among far too many of them, especially in PNG. And they would take those values back home after completing their ADF service, to the gratification of their fellow citizens, not least their extended families.

Serving in the armed forces of a sturdily democratic country such as Australia would also reinforce democratic values that are fast eroding in the Pacific islands.

Terms of service for Pacific island people should require them to return home after, say, nine years in the ADF. If they later wanted to apply for Australian citizenship, they could be given preferential treatment, but only after at least five years serving in the armed forces of their home countries.

This should be an important feature of Pacific recruitment. Pacific defence and security forces are short on skills and suffer declining disciplinary and ethical standards. The infusion of ex-ADF people would address both problems. For the PNG Defence Force, the skills transfer would be particularly effective, because almost all its equipment has been donated by Australia.

If Pacific islanders did not shift from the ADF to their home countries’ forces, their skills would still benefit their countries in non-military employment.

In return for giving Pacific islands these benefits, Australia would gain from their labour availability. Pacific island countries, such as PNG, have economies that are not growing much but populations that have exploded, leaving many well educated young people unemployed.

The $600 million that Canberra plans to spend on establishing a team from PNG in the Australian Rugby League competition would be far better spent on ADF recruitment in the country. It would employ far more PNG people if it were. And rugby league does not teach life skills, whereas ADF service would provide that and other much deeper benefits.

Crucially, Pacific countries must be treated as equal partners in defence of democracy and freedom. It is not their politicians but their people who must realise that Western values that they enjoy, such as democracy and freedom of speech, are not guaranteed.

They must also be reassured that the Pacific islands are not merely a military buffer against a threat to Australia. Young Papua New Guineans, who have a better grasp of geopolitics than their parents, are increasingly of the view that PNG must not be treated as useful cannon fodder in a possible war. If they think that that is Australia’s attitude, any sense of loyalty or partnership will vanish.

They can see what China is doing to enlarge its influence and what the US is doing in response. In my experience, they are not clear about what Australia is doing, as distinct from what it is merely saying, to demonstrate commitment to the region.

In the spirit of equal partnership, the ADF should avoid creating a Pacific Regiment, one composed entirely of Pacific recruits, as that would give rise to criticisms of colonialism and second-class status. Instead, as recommended by former British Army officer Ross Thompson, it should follow the model that Britain uses for Fijian recruits: it should spread Pacific islanders across a range of units.

Australia needs to demonstrate its commitment to Pacific island countries. The best way it can do so is by giving Pacific islanders the benefits of service in the ADF.

Great progress and greater potential: Australia needs to accelerate programs for uncrewed naval vessels

Australia is doing well in developing uncrewed naval vessels. Now it needs to redouble efforts to get them into service faster. Application of asymmetric technology is a declared outcome of the Defence Strategic Review (DSR) to generate deterrence by denial, so these systems should be moved to the front of the queue.

The Australian Defence Force has designs for three uncrewed vessels in development: the extra large uncrewed submarine Ghost Shark by Anduril Australia in Sydney, the smaller Speartooth submarine by Melbourne’s C2 Robotics, and the Bluebottle boat by Sydney’s Ocius Technology. Each craft is the result of navy-industry collaboration. When the three are operated together as a maritime system, they offer excellent combinations of capabilities and force multiplication, achieving outcomes that no single type could achieve alone.

The selection of the designs appears to be intended to provide effects over an expected future maritime battle space involving the extremely large distances and wide areas of the Indo-Pacific. Australia doesn’t have the workforce, the funding or the time to do that with only crewed platforms. Uncrewed craft are necessary to provide numbers and breadth of coverage in such a large area of operations, and they come with the triple bonus of being highly affordable, imposing low demands on the navy’s workforce, and prompt availability. Working together, the three systems are significantly greater than the sum of each individually.

The Bluebottle’s key advantages are low-cost persistence by use of environmental energy—wind, waves and sunlight for propulsion and electricity—its need for only a small support crew, little equipment and few spare parts ashore.

The Speartooth has long range, is inexpensive and can therefore be made in high volumes. Also, it has very low logistics footprint for storage, launching, recovering and operation.

The Ghost Shark’s key advantages are a large payload volume and very long range and endurance.

While details have not been released, the Speartooth and Ghost Shark presumably use battery-electric propulsion.

Importantly, these vessels are not for next decade in the DSR’s third epoch. The Bluebottle is mature and mission ready. Long-range maritime operations are standard everyday activities for Bluebottles that have already been delivered to the navy. The Speartooth is continuing intensive testing and trials, with more than two years in the water so far and a number of units operating frequently in a test environment. The Ghost Shark is also progressing rapidly, ahead of schedule, with in-water testing well underway.

For all three, testing is showing low workforce demands. Allocated personnel are operating many of these uncrewed systems concurrently. Humans assist and direct them but do not continuously control them.

Uses for the three designs range widely from augmenting contemporary maritime operations to extreme asymmetry—technological outmatching of the opponent. First, uncrewed submarines will probably be the most forward-deployed maritime units. The key advantage of any underwater system is in stealth, and uncrewed subs will use it to penetrate adversary defences and sea lines of communications, projecting capabilities at maximum ranges.

In a conventional operation, the Speartooth subs are likely to be the first line of engagement. Since they are inexpensive, they can be numerous, and losses could be easily afforded. Indeed, large numbers can be sent forward with the expectation that many (or most) won’t come back.

Their deployment in large numbers would raise the enemy’s challenge in looking for and eliminating them, tying up precious antisubmarine warfare resources on these relatively low-value targets. Being small, they can get to places that would be hard for crewed submarines to navigate, such as shallows or constricted waters where turns must be tight.

Speartooths’ payloads would probably also be made cheaply and in large volumes. We may imagine this as a whole host of tricks that could include a wide range of sensors (such as sonars and radio receivers for surveillance) and effectors (such as mines or small torpedoes, or the uncrewed submarine itself acting as a torpedo). A Speartooth could even be noisily present simply to confuse and disrupt an adversary network by acting as decoy by mimicking the sound, magnetic signature or even volume of another underwater object. With a simple mission update, a Speartooth could be tasked to a location to look like an AUKUS or Quad nation submarine, or to generate even greater confusion as a Chinese, Russian or North Korean submarine. The imagination goes wild with the possibilities.

During a period of competition short of war, Ghost Sharks will be forward, maintaining continuous and close surveillance. In war they would probably sit back somewhat, carrying higher-value payloads, but move forward to help outweigh an enemy’s strength in a particular area for a while. Speartooths can be a shield behind which the more-sophisticated Ghost Sharks could operate more effectively to activate or deploy larger and more elaborate payloads.

Ghost Sharks will have more payload space and much greater power reserves than Speartooths, for large, energy-intensive payloads and higher deployment speeds. Their price will put them above the range of expendable equipment, so we will want Ghost Sharks to come back most of the time. They may need protection and usually won’t be exposed to high risk of detection and destruction.

So the Speartooth and Ghost Shark designs appear to very neatly complement one another.

They will also be produced at scale here in Australia. These are two cards that the ADF can play when required to mobilise large numbers of craft. We can export them to allies and friends, too.

Bluebottles will probably sit further back, providing many support functions to forward deployed uncrewed submarines. As surface vessels, they can be detected and targeted much more readily than subsurface systems; However, they provide persistent presence in ways that can’t be provided from below the surface, thanks to their use of the wind and sun to keep them going. Plausible functions include surface surveillance, acting as a persistent communication relay, and potentially even recharging of uncrewed subs, using batteries or generators aboard the Bluebottles. They can also contribute to combat operations with radar, cameras and electronic warfare systems above the water and sonars below it, listening for and attempting to detect and track adversary submarines.

Supported by uncrewed boats and submarines, crewed ships and subs have more options in achieving operational tasks. Maritime autonomous systems are likely to be a critical element in the survival and employment of the small numbers of crewed vessels that the ADF has. The ADF really needs to protect crewed ships and submarines: the loss of any would be a national tragedy, taking lives and depriving the ADF of an extremely rare resource that would take years to replace. Risk reduction for crewed ships and subs is alone a reason for seeing accelerated investment in autonomous vessels providing extraordinarily high value-for-money.

The ADF looks in very good shape to bring serious maritime autonomous systems to fruition in the near term. The navy has chosen its designs carefully, so the three platforms working together will be far more effective than any platform on its own. Development of these world-leading systems in Australia, supported by our own industrial base, promises the great benefits of easy supportability and capability expansion.

The National Defence Strategy should accelerate these developments in any way possible. The ADF could and should be producing significant numbers of these uncrewed systems to contribute to the DSR’s demand to generate asymmetric effects from a focused force that deters by denial.

Australia’s army is suffering from a crisis of identity and confidence

The Australian Army does not have a social licence problem, it has self-confidence issue.

On balance, the community from which the Australian Army is drawn, and that it serves, values and implicitly permits the army’s existence. While we can argue the toss in terms of whether the army should be the first port of call for national disaster relief, it remains the fact Australian society looks to our army in times of peril.

But the army has not pushed back, and the list of society’s requirements continues to grow. We ask more and more of our army and, rightly or not, lash it when it stumbles. Truth is, the army has ceded too much territory in our national debate to woke politics. Our army has overcorrected on its course correction following the Brereton inquiry.

The army’s fundamental role is the application of lethal force in our nameto kill. The army does not go out of its way to remind Australians that this task is one we consciously place on its shoulders. So, we tend to forget about it.

Perhaps the army has an identity problem. Australian Bureau of Statistics data indicates the proportion of Australian citizens who were born overseas (first-generation Australians) or have a parent born overseas (second generation) has surpassed 50 per cent of our population. This has direct implications for the story our army tells. Anzac Day commemorations strike a chord with an ever-narrowing group. Society is shifting and our shared stories are no longer simply grandfather stories of World War II.

The new histories and composition of our community make it slightly more difficult to pinpoint an Australian brand of duty. The army must think differently about the society it serves and from which it draws.

The recruitment focus on school-leavers is too late. Given our cultural diversity, it is important to capture the interest of much younger children. The army might consider a primary school focus akin to the Constable Kenny Koala program, whereby Annie Army visits schools to spark early interest in a life of service.

Recent census data shows that in five years from 2016 the largest source of community growth was Nepal. Australia’s Nepalese community grew by 124 per cent. There is an opportunity for a real marriage of service, identity and cultural affinity here: a targeted recruitment effort to establish an Australian Army Gurkha Brigade.

The army continues to operate with a sense of restriction. Its recruitment efforts are tailored at fiscal benefits, social opportunities and travel. While these are commendable draw cards, the army is about so much more.

Our army needs to rediscover confidence before society to follow suit. It has owned mistakes made and committed to do better. Instead of cracking on, our army seems to find itself in a constant state of flight or fight, anxious to not make headlines. This reinforces challenges in recruitment and retention, too.

It is time for the army to reintroduce itself to Australia. We can easily capture army composition from headcounts or gender statistics, and from doctrine understand its mission, purpose and ethos. This tells us what the army is but not who. I think this is a significant distinction to overlook.

The Australian Army is a living, breathing entity. This is something Winston Churchill captured: ‘The army is not like a limited liability company, to be reconstructed, remodelled, liquidated, refloated from week to week as the money market fluctuates. It is not an inanimate thing, like a house, to be pulled down or enlarged or structurally altered at the caprice of the tenant or the owner; it is a living thing.’

It must act like one.

Of course, our army is both a profession and a bureaucracy. But in recent times the bureaucracy has outweighed profession. While both must feature, ideally in equilibrium, for a righteous and efficient Australian Army to exist we must rebalance the scales. The army should cultivate a sense of calling, of pride, of duty, among those who serve as well as the community served.

Instead, our army appears unconfident in its purposeseeking too much direction from the society it serves, allowing its bureaucratic nature to take hold and frame service as a job. How odd it is to have such a stellar international reputation as a reliable and skilled boutique force respected by allies and enemies, only to be consumed by a crisis of confidence at home.

To return to Churchill, it is true that if an army ‘is bullied, it sulks; if it is unhappy, it pines; if it is harried, it gets feverish; if it is sufficiently disturbed, it will wither and dwindle and almost die; and when it comes to this last serious condition, it is only revived by lots of time and lots of money’.

Our army is sufficiently disturbeddisconnectedand lacks adequate self-confidence. Australia lacks time and money to throw at the problem but this does not excuse us from an honest discussion about our army. The army must be ready to respond with unashamed confidence in its vital purpose. A life of service and duty is to be celebrated, aspired to and revered for its contribution to the prosperity and security of our country.

Adapting all-domain forces to changes in land warfare

Many elements of 21st-century warfare echo those of the 20th century. The nature of war as a brutal and fundamentally human endeavour has endured despite the introduction of stealth aircraft, precision missiles, drones, satellites and cyber capabilities to contemporary battlefields. Making sense of this context is just one of many challenges confronting the Australian Army and how it best contributes to the joint force.

Transitioning to an Australian Defence Force that can generate decisive battlefield effects in all domains in Australia’s immediate region is no trivial task. The role of land forces in deterrence and war is being reshaped by emerging technologies and social circumstances for warfare, the growing connection between forces on the land and at sea, the tendency for wars to be prolonged and the relative merits of heavy ground units in the Indo-Pacific.

These are among the developments I explore in a new ASPI report, The implications of emerging changes in land warfare for the focused all-domain defence force.

The report is presented in good faith for the sake of further discussion and the contest of ideas. It derives from a strong personal sense of obligation for senior leaders of the profession of arms to lead and encourage professional discourse on the ever-changing features of warfare.

Current strategic guidance makes clear that strike capability is viewed as an essential and dominant feature of future warfare and a core part of a diverse joint or all-domain mix. That mix includes carefully designed and prepared conventional ground forces that are capable of long-range strike and of defence from enemy missiles and drones. But it also includes capabilities and forces designed and postured for conventional attack and defence from and through fortified positions on land at close quarters. Australia’s National Defence Strategy provides for this with an amphibious-capable combined-arms land system.

This is important, as the increasing range of emerging land-based strike systems will make the sea a very dangerous place for warships, including ships carrying units of the combined-arms land system. As an Australian force crossed the water to make a landing, it and friendly forces could try to suppress some of the enemy’s ability to attack it. Entirely suppressing that ability may be impossible, however.

One underexplored and perhaps less palatable option to overcoming enemy anti-access and area-denial capabilities is to use large numbers of small, inexpensive, fast and somewhat protected land vehicles and watercraft that overwhelm defensive systems. They would be mixed with autonomous decoys and using technologies to spoof sensors and remain undetected. This idea of small, cheap and many may be an answer to cover no-man’s-lands.

Indeed, the US Marine Corps is already testing low-profile vessels to resupply distant outposts in contested spaces. While seemingly inefficient, the large numbers of small and relatively inexpensive craft could absorb enough of the enemy’s fire to enable a decisive number of troops and materiel to get into the fray to carry the day.

To keep costs down and to ensure the defence industrial base can produce large enough quantities to rapidly reconstitute combat losses, the vessels would need to have minimal defensive capabilities. A premium could be placed on the ability to carry or instantly access command and control, computing, communications, cyber, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and targeting capabilities. The intention would be to degrade an adversary’s ability to sense and target small watercraft or personnel carriers to enable a landing.

Rather than dismiss or ignore the problem of transportation, critics and advocates should turn their attention to resolving how to manoeuvre naval and land forces and all their supplies and other logistical needs across no-man’s-lands encompassing both sea and land. It’s an all-domain problem and solving it would go a long way towards building confidence that the ADF and potential partners can manoeuvre in the Indo-Pacific at all.

While this report sketches some rough ideas for how land forces might contribute to Australia’s all-domain defence in various scenarios, there’s still a lot of imagination and creativity required. A lack of circumspection about the problems of contemporary warfare will only serve to inhibit that imagination and creativity.

The challenge now is to work out how best to use those ground forces in concert with forces in other domains to create a truly maritime ADF.

Australia’s lack of defence primes isn’t a problem; it’s an opportunity

Australia is uniquely suited to help solve the greatest defence acquisition challenge of our time. While the world is innovating at an unmatched pace, the old scions of the defence industry are not.

Western armed forces need equipment that is developed and built not just more cheaply and quickly but with evolution built in. They cannot keep waiting for superb systems that take many years, even decades, to get into service and cost so much that few units can be bought—and are then improved only on achingly slow schedules, if at all.

General Jim Rainey, the commander of the US Army Futures Command, had sharp comments when he visited ASPI this spring: ‘We need to change and adapt how we acquire. We are either going to do it now or we are going to do it when we go to war.’

Australia’s chief of army, Lieutenant General Simon Stuart, was equally sanguine: ‘As one of my predecessors, Sir Henry Wells, adroitly put it in 1957, we must “avoid the situation where soldiers have to be killed to learn”.’

And at ASPI’s Sydney Dialogue in September, Abraham M Denmark, a senior associate from the Center for Strategic and International Studies, had a blunt call to action: ‘Adapt or die.’

By all appearances, US and British primes contractors have chosen ‘die’. Despite increasing calls to change the way they develop defence technologies, they keep podding along with their old processes. At Land Forces 2024, while discussing how the Australian Army relied on space, Northrop Grumman offered to lend its ‘experience and primacy in space’ to help up-and-coming firms—but seemed to have no direct answer to Starlink, a cost-effective commercial service that militaries across Europe and the Indo-Pacific are looking to.

Pillar 2, the part of AUKUS that is not about nuclear submarines, has not enjoyed the detailed attention of Pillar 1, which is. It has been dismissed occasionally as a grab bag of disparate technologies, but a common thread runs through them. Not only will they be critical in a future fight; they are all innovations that primes have failed to deliver over the past decade. China is investing heavily in these technologies and, according to ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker, is now outpacing the AUKUS partners.

At Land Forces, the US and British prime contractors at least acknowledged the problem, conceding they needed to reduce historical seven- to 10-year production timelines down to 18 to 24 months. It’s unclear how the prime contractors, widely known for cost overruns and delayed delivery, can cut their development times by 80 percent. Regardless, the processes need to be not just faster but fundamentally different.

The US and British defence industries are accustomed to a waterfall process, in which development progresses slowly ‘from requirements definition through to testing, deployment, and field use.’ The process is linear and often irreversible. ‘Information flows in one direction only, regardless of the downstream consequences for the system …’. What is needed, instead, is ‘an iterative fashion where requirements and design solutions can evolve as the technology is developed.’

Take drone technology, for example. In recent research, the Royal United Services Institute’s Justin Bronk and Jack Watling outline findings that Ukraine’s drone industry is constantly tweaking designs, adapting to a fiercely competitive battlefield. Everything from sensors, radios, software and weapons are getting updated every six to 12 weeks, they find.

At Land Forces, Anduril, a disrupting entrant to the US defence industry, demonstrated an understanding of current defence technology challenges: ‘It’s not about getting the tech faster to the warfighter. It’s about getting tech that can evolve,’ stated a spokesman, retired Lieutenant General Neil Thurgood.

Each Pillar 2 technology will require integrating systems of systems. Countering drones can require seamless integration of well over a dozen technologies, which react faster than a human can. The primes, however, continue to try and capture sole source vendor contracts.

While Australia doesn’t have the established defence primes the US and Britain have, it also doesn’t have their bad habits. And Pillar 2 technologies aren’t solely for the benefit of defence, with plenty of opportunity for dual use. Dean Rosenfield, the chief executive of defence-focused engineering company Nova, cites the example of Australia’s mining and farming industries. ‘Australia should be an autonomous systems superpower,’ he says.

Sixty years ago in The Lucky Country, Donald Horne was pessimistic about his compatriots. ‘Australia has not been a country of great innovation or originality,’ he wrote. ‘It has exploited the innovations and originality of others and much of its boasting is that of a parasite’. Half a century later, it is the US and British defence industries that have shown a persistent lack of cleverness. Pillar 2 represents an unmatched opportunity for Australia’s firms, if they wish to take it.

Reservists should be integrated with regular forces, not separate

In a military context, the word ‘reserve’ is usually understood as meaning some group on standby for use as field commanders decide. However, in today’s Australian Defence Force it now generally refers to individuals. This is part of a trend of at least 50 years in which the Defence Force Reserves as an organisation have become less important while reservists as individuals have become fundamental to the functioning of the Defence establishment.

It is in fact a trend towards what we need—towards a single, cohesive force, in which reservists are integrated, not ancillary.

The long-term decline of the navy, army and air force reserves organisations may soon culminate in their disappearance. The 2024 National Defence Strategy had a chapter on workforce but no mention of the reserves. The 2023 Defence Strategic Review (DSR) did recommend a strategic review of the reserves, which was again noted in the 2024 Defence Workforce Plan. This review may report by June 2025.

Regular forces are generally more effective than reservists, as full-time training enables them to reach a higher standard than part-time personnel. Intuitively, having distinctly different groups that are required to work closely only in times of crisis is inefficient and ineffective. Integration would be better.

A 1995 review of the Ready Reserve Scheme considered that if Defence had unlimited resources, ‘the strategic arguments for relying solely on regular forces would be overwhelming.’ This echoed the 1974 Millar report, which said that the principal justification for having the reserves was economic: part-time personnel were cheaper than full-time personnel.

Today, driven by a pressing need to staff the permanent force, many reservists have been integrated into the regular forces under the Total Workforce System, which aims to increase the flexibility of defence personnel. This has been made easier, because many reservists are now ex-regulars, not citizen soldiers. The DSR said that Defence adopting ‘the Total Workforce Model has significantly improved the utilisation of the reserve workforce.’

On the other hand, the DSR also calls for the reserves to ‘provide the expansion base for the ADF in times of crisis.’ Reserve forces will generally need additional training before being used for warfighting tasks. The costs of this are rarely considered, and it isn’t certain whether such ‘times of crisis’ will arise at all. Investing in the reserve forces as an expansion base is an investment in a force that may never be needed.

In the Vietnam War, the government chose conscription and training civilians from scratch rather than activating the available, but only partly trained, reserves. The army’s reserves in the 1960s were strategically irrelevant but still expensive.

The Army Reserve is the largest of the three reserve organisations. Unlike navy and air force reservists, some of the army’s are not ex-regulars. The Millar Report grumbled that the land force’s reserve force ‘for much of its history [had] around 20,000 [personnel], despite the fact that the national population nearly trebled in the past 50 years. This demonstrates a declining level of interest in such service.’ Fifty years on again, the Army Reserve is now about 15,500 and the population has more than doubled again.

Given this steady long-term decline, if the role of reserves becomes more than filling gaps in the regular workforce, their purpose may need to be narrow and specific. The DSR called for army reservists ‘to provide area security to the northern base network and other critical infrastructure.’ The 2024 Integrated Investment Program gives this idea limited support in allotting $200 million to $300 million over the next decade.

Vital area protection shaped discussions about the reserves across most of the 20th century. However, an analysis, noting the long historical antecedents, found that the role had ‘proved somewhat uninspiring’ for the reservists actually involved and that retention was a problem. Sustaining adequately sized reserve forces may be difficult without suitable motivation.

The overall ADF workforce balance between full and part-time defence personnel has steadily moved in favour of the full-time. Indeed, the new workforce plan funds integrating 1000 reservists more closely with the regulars, including through moving them to full-time service. Emphasis is generally placed on reservists as individuals and how they may be integrated within permanent units, rather than on Defence Force Reserves as formed part-time units with specific, long-term roles. They are seen as working effectively on demand, as the ADF requires. If the Australian society has adopted gig economy workforce ideas, in a broad sense so has Defence.

The DSR recommended investigating ‘innovative ways to adapt the structure, shape and role of the Reserves.’ Australia’s more-than-a-century reserve history can be usefully mined to provide different ideas and warn of likely problems. However, any innovations will need to be implemented in the contemporary geostrategic context and against a long-term trend of decline. The long history of Australia’s Defence Reserve Forces does not guarantee them a place in Australia’s future.

The solution to finding the balance between regular and reserve forces may be resolved by simply discarding the reserves while embracing and institutionalising part-time service. The gradual disappearance of Australia’s reserve forces is likely unintentional, but rather a consequence of the steady evolution of strategic thinking and policies over more than a century.

Quite likely, we need reservists but not reserve units.