Game-planning national security and the PNG NRL team

Papua New Guinea’s entrance into the National Rugby League (NRL) is officially confirmed. Already, sports writers are excitedly pulling out their whiteboards to draw up potential rosters for the team’s inaugural season in 2028. But before the team kicks off, a clear national security gameplan is needed to support it.

Australian national security requires a close relationship with a stable PNG. Increasing strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific is also pushing Australia to quickly secure its role in the Pacific.

The Port Moresby-based team is the result of two years of political collaboration. It aims to refresh and deepen the strong foundation of the PNG-Australia relationship while also delivering domestic opportunities.

The team aspires to be a national symbol for PNG and a unifying force in a large, diverse and sometimes divided nation. It also brings significant economic and tourism opportunities.

Despite shared history, most Australians know little of PNG. A PNG team in the NRL may remedy this, building familiarity as it plays regularly on Australian screens. As highlighted by PNG Prime Minister James Marape, the team will foster the crucial people-to-people connection needed for our bilateral relationship.

Creating the team is a rare foreign policy opportunity for public and political diplomacy, as well as improved national stability, justifying its admittedly hefty $600 million, 10-year cost to the Australian government.

The squad is also already scoring national security points. Australia has negotiated an agreement under which PNG will not sign new security agreements with China. This ensures that Australia won’t be blindsided, as it was by the Solomon Islands-China security agreement in 2022.

But for this policy to succeed, Australia needs to carefully manage security risks. The team is a unique initiative and will face high levels of media scrutiny, with stories on team performance or player misconduct potentially loaded with political criticism and geopolitical commentary.

Chinese interference presents the highest-profile risk. The team will be an important part of Australia’s bilateral engagement with PNG and will block a China-PNG security relationship. China cannot directly replicate this type of sports diplomacy, but capital, industry and regional banking presence offer it ways to influence or interfere.

In the team’s first 10 years, the Australian government will strongly influence ownership and sponsorship of the squad. This will inhibit interference and safeguard two core objectives: the team being clearly Papua New Guinean, and it being recognised as a product of the PNG-Australia partnership. Both require protecting the team from other international influences.

But not all risks are geopolitical. Serious criminal risks may emerge, considering the team’s high profile and high value, its athletes being young and highly paid, and its connections to the PNG and Australian economies.

Sport Integrity Australia and Australian law enforcement will need to closely collaborate with the PNG government to protect the team from organised crime. According to the Global Organized Crime Index, PNG suffers from pervasive corruption and a reasonably complex organised crime ecosystem.

Money laundering, fraud and bribery are prevalent and commonly facilitated by Australian professionals. Law enforcement will need to look both ways to keep Australian and PNG criminal entities away from the team and make sure it stays in the public’s good books.

Managing geopolitical and criminal risks will require close attention to team ownership, finances, sponsorship and the conduct of the team’s executive leadership.

Comprehensive vetting and protections are needed from the start and will still be needed beyond the team’s first decade. It is unclear what measures will be in place after this period. If Australia has no direct oversight or input, it must establish regulatory bodies. Viable options include a PNG mechanism, similar to Australia’s Foreign Investment Review Board, capable of blocking foreign investment where it is contrary to the national interest, or an investment review mechanism co-managed by the PNG government, the NRL and the team itself.

Physical security concerns also loom. Major sporting events can trigger public unrest or result in personal injury to the public or the players. Port Moresby’s January 2024 riots, resulting in an estimated 1 billion kina ($400 million) of damage, highlight the need for precautions. Australian-PNG law enforcement collaboration will be crucial to protecting against violence, with incidents potentially undermining public safety, team legitimacy and social licence, and business operations. Security is also key to boosting tourism and giving Australians confidence to travel to games in Port Moresby.

Effectively managing any of these risks will depend on clear communication from both governments and the NRL. Pressures may mount in coming years, contesting the logic behind creating this team, with cynics or hostile actors attempting to spin issues into major challenges. Preparation and clarity of messaging will be key, as will transparency on the team’s foreign policy and national security role.

This initiative’s success relies on a team effort now and going forward.