The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) today released a new Special Report providing an overall assessment of Australian defence policy.  In three separate essays, the report analyses Australian declaratory policy, the force structure that emerges from the paper, and defence finances.

The report argues that Australia’s latest Defence White Paper is at least as much a political document as a strategic one, intent on rebuilding defence bipartisanship after an era of controversy in strategic policy. Its picture of the strategic environment points to major uncertainties in coming decades and, consequently, to a need for Australia to enhance its own strategic weight.  At the core of the assessment lies an especially worrying uncertainty—about the United States’ role in the region.

The military strategy articulated in the White Paper comes down on the side of an Australian Defence Force constructed for the defence of Australia and operations in the ‘immediate neighbourhood’—Timor, PNG, Pacific Islands and New Zealand. But in analysing the associated equipment acquisition and force structure decisions, this report finds that the extra naval weight injected into the White Paper’s ‘Force 2030’ will also strengthen the ability of future governments to contribute to operations with the US in the wider Asia–Pacific arena.

The final essay looks at defence funding over the lifetime of the White Paper and the outlook for Defence’s $20 billion Strategic Reform Program. The conclusions are sobering—current plans for a significant ramp up of defence spending between 2012 and 2017 will present the department with an enormous challenge, and the long-term funding on Force 2030 is likely to prove inadequate for the expansion that is envisaged.

The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) today released a new report, Our western front: Australia and the Indian Ocean.

This report, authored by Sam Bateman and Anthony Bergin argues that Australia should develop a comprehensive policy approach to our Indian Ocean neighbourhood.

Australia is a three ocean country with the largest area of marine jurisdiction in the Indian Ocean, yet we have neglected the Indian Ocean, compared to the Pacific and Southern oceans. 
 
A new maritime great game is emerging in the Indian Ocean, as strategic competition between India and China becomes evident. It’s the major energy and international trade maritime highway, particularly for the booming economies of Asia.

Among the report’s 27 recommendations are that:

• Australia should focus on the East Indian Ocean to build cooperation between the countries of that sub region, which share a range of clear and pressing common interests.
 
• Australia should make more headway in marine research in the Indian Ocean, particularly in terms of understanding the drivers of weather and climate change. 
 
• Australia should make a greater effort to ensure that fisheries arrangements in the Indian Ocean are effective.
 
• Defence should establish a naval operating base in the northwest, because of the growing importance and value of infrastructure developments in that area. 
• More regular air and surface patrols should be undertaken around the Cocos Islands.

• The Western Australian Government might consider creating a portfolio for Indian Ocean region affairs.
  
• The Australian Government could sponsor an Indian Ocean conference in Perth as a building block for Australian initiatives and for actions by the region as a whole. 

The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) today released a new report which explores the issue of nuclear weapons in Asia.

This Strategy, titled ‘A delicate issue: Asia’s nuclear future’, says the world stands on the cusp of a new era in nuclear relations—one in which Asia is likely to become the dominant influence on global nuclear arrangements. The old, bilateral nuclear symmetry of the Cold War is giving way to new multiplayer, asymmetric nuclear relationships.

And it is doing so at a time when power balances are shifting across Asia, when pressures for proliferation are returning to the regional agenda, and when non-state actors are an increasingly worrying part of the Asian nuclear equation.

Report author Rod Lyon judges that, ‘we are headed into a nuclear order of which we have little previous experience.’

The paper argues that Australia’s own policy options will be profoundly shaped by how Asia’s nuclear future unfolds. We can assist with redesigning nuclear order in a cooperative Asia, including by drawing regional countries into a discussion about how stable deterrent relationships can be built across deep power asymmetries. But a darker, more competitive Asian nuclear future—a future characterised by proliferation, growing credibility problems for US extended nuclear deterrence arrangements, or the return of a revisionist great power—would confront Australian policymakers with difficult choices, of hedging rather than ordering.

‘Nuclear latency’—the set of nuclear-related skills, materials and possible weapons systems—will grow in both Asian futures, Dr Lyon said.  But it would obviously be more worrying in the darker future: there ‘the gaps between mere latency, actual nuclear hedging, and covert proliferation might well become less distinct.’

The report concludes that Australian strategic policy should retain the flexibility to accommodate a range of possible Asian nuclear futures, striking a balance between its ordering and hedging strategies during a possible turbulent era in regional security.

Rod Lyon is Program Director for the Strategy and International Program.

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The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) today released a report which reviews the current Royal Australian Navy helicopter fleet, including the annual flying hours and costs.

Naval helicopters provide a critical element of the warfighting capability of modern surface ships. The RAN’s current helicopter fleet comes up short in a number of important capabilities. Although the current Seahawk is a capable aircraft, it doesn’t have a dipping sonar for the detection of submarines, an anti-shipping missile or an effective anti-submarine weapon. The situation has been exacerbated by the demise of the billion dollar Super Seasprite helicopter project and the suspension of efforts to provide the Seahawk helicopters with a modern anti-submarine torpedo.

The report finds that Navy is doing a fair job at keeping the existing fleet in the air, although the flying hours don’t come cheaply. The loss of the eleven Seasprites means that the Seahawk fleet will have to continue to shoulder the combat tasks until a replacement can be procured.

The choice for a future helicopter seems to come down to a choice between two types. The new generation ‘Romeo’ variant of the Sikorsky Seahawk is already in service with the US Navy. It has anti-ship and anti-submarine systems and is less expensive than its main rival, the NATO Helicopter Industries NFH (NATO frigate helicopter). The NFH is a larger and structurally more advanced helicopter, and has more capacity in some of the roles it would be called on to perform. It has airframe commonality with helicopters already being bought for Army and Navy that should result in savings over time through economies of scale. But it is also a few years away from full service capability.

The government has to decide whether it needs an immediate decision on the future naval helicopters, and how much risk it wants to bear by choosing between an aircraft already in service and one in the later stages of its development. The best course is probably to wait until hard operator-validated data is available on both of the competitors.

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The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) today released a new Special Report that examines the implications of climate change for Australia’s eight police forces and 45,000 police officers.

The reports findings include:
• The interception and possible detention of environmental refugees is likely to require future police resources.
• Police will need to explore what opportunities exist for deception in the emissions trading scheme, particularly where emission trading intersects with world financial markets.
• Pacific island states would be vulnerable to criminal activity associated with carbon markets that may require our police to investigate. 
• Police forces will need to integrate their work with local emergency services and ensure they have a clear role in existing disaster management plans.
• The police may need to deal with possible civil unrest if certain groups feel frustrated that governments are moving too slowly in dealing with climate change and resort to violent protests.
• As water becomes increasingly precious, the lengths to which individuals will go to protect their water assets will increase, resulting in more serious crimes against both persons and property. 
• Police agencies will have to contribute to reducing greenhouse gas emissions. One area that could be addressed is energy efficiency in police motor vehicles.

The report recommends:
• The creation of an information hub to bring together current knowledge and future thinking on climate change and it’s implications for policing. 
• The development of research programs on the social implications of changing climatic conditions in Australia and the impact this might have on law enforcement agencies.
• Australia’s police forces, in cooperation with research bodies, should develop risk assessments of the locations that will be most affected by climate change as part of a multi-agency strategic approach to climate change adaptation.