The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) has released a new assessment of the future of US primacy.

The report’s authors, Rod Lyon and Julia Rabar, argue that the US faces challenges to its global leadership position both within and beyond its borders.  Domestically, a new mood of frugality is stalking the land, driving Americans back towards domestic spending priorities and exerting downward pressure on the US defence budget.  And externally, the US faces a set of rising powers, a greater number of players in the global commons, and uncertainties about its commitment to exposed peripheries. 

There is an increasing tendency to apply a qualifying adjective to the condition of US primacy, whether it’s ‘contested primacy’, ‘patchy primacy’, or some other variant.  Primacy in almost any form is a valuable asset. But as US relative power slips, the US will be drawn into more difficult choices about its own priorities.

Already, the Obama administration seems to be prioritizing its Asia-Pacific commitments. It has made clear that it does not intend to cede the Pacific to anyone.  And both the Libyan intervention and Gates’ speech at the recent NATO summit suggest Washington wants its European partners to carry more responsibility for their own region. Still, we face a more multipolar Asia, where US allies will all be doing rather more to help sustain US influence in the region.  Australia will be no exception to that rule.

The Australian Strategic Policy Institute today released a new report, Staying the course: Australia and maritime security in the South Pacific.

This report, authored by Sam Bateman and Anthony Bergin, argues that we should develop a comprehensive approach to replace Australia’s Pacific Patrol Boat Program.

Australia has supplied twenty-two boats to twelve island countries for maritime security. The vessels will start reaching the end of their service lives from 2018.  But Australia’s future plans for Pacific maritime aid remain opaque.

The paper argues that air surveillance for the islands should be mainly provided by civil aircraft working under a contractual arrangement managed centrally by a regional maritime coordination centre.

Coastal boats would be operated by the islands at a national level. Two or more might be required by those states with large offshore zones to respond to incidents. Larger vessels should be operated regionally. Their role would be to undertake patrols through the high seas and national offshore zones of the island countries. Three such vessels would be required to ensure that two are on task at any one time.

The total project costs for these boats would be about $300 million, below the approximately $550 million required to replace the existing twenty-two patrol boats with similar vessels.

The paper argues that a regional maritime coordination centre should be established for coordinating regional responses. Apart from Australia, the US, France, New Zealand, Japan and even China could assist in funding such a centre.

The paper finds no evidence of any significant progress towards addressing Australia’s future contribution to maritime security in the South Pacific.

The paper argues that Defence should be leading this work and not the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service.

The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) and the Foundation for Development Cooperation today released an Independent Task Force report that argues that Australia’s aid program should be better fitted to enhance Australia’s national security. The Task Force panel comprised of distinguished Australians with deep experience in public policy, development, business and national security.

Australia’s aid program is likely to double in the next four years; the program will increase from its current level of 0.33 percent of gross national income to 0.5 percent of GNI by 2015-16. Our aid program should become a more important element in Australia’s security strategies. AusAID needs to be brought more into decisions about national security.

The Task Force recommends that:
• The Australian Government should put more effort into explaining how Australia’s aid contributes to national security by preventing potential threats to the Australia developing. Australia should give higher priority to security in its aid initiatives in those cases where fragile states request it. 
• AusAID’s Office of Development Effectiveness should have a statutory role and the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade should establish a sub-committee on the aid program to provide parliamentary oversight.
• Australia should follow the example of the US in conducting a Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review which would enable government to re-examine the aid program every four years, paying attention to the links between our aid effort and national security.
• Australia should establish a new Minister for Overseas Development Assistance in the Foreign Affairs portfolio. 
• Australia should maintain the new aid commitment to Africa, but not at the expense of the Asia-Pacific.  
• Australia should maintain its aid focus in the South Pacific, an area where China is fast growing in importance as an aid donor, investor and trade partner; Australia has compelling security interests to remain predominant in this region.
• Australia should maintain its aid commitment to PNG that’s set to rise by as much as 50% over the next four years.
• An increasing aid program provides the opportunity to expand Australia’s spending on climate change adaptation initiatives in Pacific countries.
•  A separate security sector of the aid budget should be created to give recognition to the increasing importance of aid-security cooperation in the aid program and to provide greater transparency about aid expenditure by agencies such as the Australian Federal Police.
• Australia needs      for a coherent government strategy to enhance civil-military cooperation as the aid budget grows.

The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) today released a new Strategic Insights paper on the future of Australia-South Korea security cooperation. This report, authored by Carl Ungerer and Simon Smith, provides a clear-eyed assessment of the small but productive role that an expanded bilateral agenda can play in maintaining regional peace and stability.

Ungerer and Smith explain why, until recently, Australia and South Korea have shown little interest in developing a more comprehensive strategic relationship. ‘Tectonic shifts’ in our region, however, have convinced policymakers in Seoul and Canberra of the value of new forms of security cooperation.

The authors maintain that South Korean President Lee Myung-bak hopes to transform his country into ‘a respected middle power with sufficient clout to effect change on the global stage.’ Greater Korean participation in international security initiatives will create new opportunities for collaboration, the report argues. Australia has already capitalised on this momentum, signing the Joint Statement on Enhanced Global and Security Cooperation with South Korea in March 2009.

Ungerer and Smith claim that building better habits of security dialogue and cooperation ‘will require a carefully balanced assessment of where and when our mutual interests coincide.’ They suggest three broad areas of security cooperation for consideration: joint activism in regional security forums, assistance with post-conflict and stabilisation operations, and strengthening cooperation among the ‘spokes’ of the San Francisco alliance system.

While the potential gains from an enhanced Australia–ROK strategic partnership would be sizeable, Ungerer and Smith warn that expectations should be tempered by the evolving complexities of the Asia-Pacific region. The barriers to new forms of security cooperation are considerable, and political leadership will be crucial if a new vision for the relationship is to be realised.

Carl Ungerer is the Program Director (National Security Program) at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute.

Simon Smith is a Research Analyst at the Australian Strategy Policy Institute.

This Special Report, authored by Carl Ungerer, examines the recent evolution of Australia’s national security institutions.  
The report highlights the major changes to Australia’s national security institutions since 2008 including the shifting conceptual foundations for policy making, new power structures and changes to the way in which our national security institutions are funded and organised. The paper argues that despite several years of reform, the institutional design for national security policy-making as a whole remains dominated by centralisation and limited coordination.  
In the paper Carl Ungerer argues that, ‘a more appropriate model for Australia’s national security would better align strategy, resources and administrative functions.’
‘Over the next decade, Australia will confront an international security environment that will be more competitive and less amendable to a ‘business as usual’ approach’, he said.
The paper identifies three broad recommendations for building a more integrated policy framework: (1) making networks the main institutional design feature, not departments; (2) placing the functions of the National Security Advisor on a statutory basis; and (3) appointing a special minister of state for national security. 
These reforms are neither complicated, technically difficult or resource intensive, he said.