Australia and Ballistic Missile Defence: Our Policy Choices

Release of Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) Strategic Insight No. 5/2004

ASPI today released its latest Strategic Insight: Australia and Ballistic Missile Defence: Our Policy Choices.

Whether we like it or not, there are high levels of commitment in the US, by both the Republican and Democrat parties, to develop defences against attack by ballistic missiles. What are the policy issues that this raises for Australia?

Australia has been involved in missile defence and associated matters for many years, in particular through the Defence Support Program (DSP) formerly at Nurrungar and now collocated with the Joint Facility at Pine Gap.

The most persuasive option for Australia is to continue with our intelligence relationship with the US and with the use of data from DSP (and from its replacement SBIRS in the future) to give alert and initial tracking.

To do less, or to seek to differentiate between warning of massive ICBM attack, theatre attacks and US homeland attacks, fails the test of common sense and our national interest.

We should also look for opportunities to conduct more joint scientific investigations with the US.

There is no need to go beyond this and to acquire our own systems. There is neither threat nor priority.

There are nevertheless some threshold issues. The paper argues that the US missile defence program will most likely not upset the stability of the nuclear balance or in itself cause proliferation. But the Australian Government needs to establish an independent and informed view on the matter and to explain it to the Australian people; a major statement in the Parliament is called for.