Iain MacGillivray was interviewed by the Georgetown University podcast Initiative for US-China Dialogue on Global Issues

On November 16th, ASPI DC Analyst, Iain MacGillivray was interviewed by the Georgetown University podcast Initiative for US-China Dialogue on Global Issues. The episode, China leans on pragmatism in the Middle East, unpacks the complexities of China’s perception by Middle Eastern states and explored the notion that China might displace the regional security role played by the US.

How will the midterms affect US foreign policy and Australia’s strategic interests?

On 8 November, Americans will vote in midterm congressional elections to determine all 435 voting seats in the House of Representatives and one-third of the 100 seats in the Senate. Despite the political theatre, Australians should take heart.

Recent discussions between ASPI DC and congressional committee staff members serving both Democratics and Republicans in both the House and Senate suggest that the looming presidential election in 2024 and the likely focus of congressional committee hearings on topics far from the Indo-Pacific region—such as funding for the war in Ukraine and the US withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021—appear all-engrossing.

But in a new ASPI report we found that next week’s midterms should not negatively affect the Australia–US alliance and the core interests that underpin its success.

While a foreign policy mandate or change in general direction is unlikely to occur, the possible shuffle of congressional committee leadership may facilitate or curb the passage and implementation of policies that address Australian concerns. Canberra should therefore be highly attuned to the changes in the structure and membership of committees, which are the bodies that have a significant influence on the formation of US foreign policy.

Currently, the Democratic Party holds the majority in the House and, with the tie-breaking vote of the vice president, holds an effective majority in the Senate. President Joe Biden’s newly released national security strategy and national defence strategy demonstrate bipartisan consensus and continuity with the previous administration on threats posed in the Indo-Pacific region. The Congress has shown the same commitment through broad consensus to support and work with key allies such as Australia on these issues.

There are three possible outcomes of the midterm elections: the status quo is maintained, with a marginal Democrat hold in both the Senate and the House; a split Congress emerges where the Senate is held by one party and the House by the other; or the Republicans take both the Senate and the House.

A status quo outcome is least likely, but if this scenario comes to pass and the Democrats retain control of both chambers, Congress may empower the Biden administration to introduce policies and laws with less consultation or cooperation with the Republicans. It may also see reduced Republican willingness to offer bipartisanship in the lead-up to the 2024 presidential election. The Republican Party would probably seek to blame a Democrat-led Congress and White House for any domestic troubles, such as an economic downturn or energy shortages. That domestic disruption could spill into foreign affairs if, for example, US domestic politics is seen as outweighing US resourcing of Ukraine in its war with Russia.

In the second scenario, in which one party has the numbers in the House and the other has the numbers in the Senate, the Biden administration won’t be able to push through controversial legislation by sheer weight of numbers. However, a Republican win in either chamber (but not both chambers) and committees that change accordingly could stall legislation and lead to congressional gridlock as each side tries to advance its own agenda in the lead-up to 2024.

A split Congress will likely view foreign policy legislation and oversight activity through a lens of domestic politics and partisanship. In this scenario, we expect to see partisanship between the two chambers and within the individual committees, which may lead to reduced agreement. Precedent indicates that there’s likely to be more cooperation in committees that are working directly and collaboratively on foreign policy than in the broader theatre of the chambers. That could change quickly if, for example, resourcing Ukraine in the war in Europe loses popularity domestically.

An agreement such as AUKUS depends on it being both a domestic and a foreign policy priority. Congress will continue to strongly support AUKUS. However, new policies for the second pillar of AUKUS’s work program (advanced capabilities such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing and hypersonics) may become harder to develop due to overlap between domestic and foreign policy. Domestic battles may also rank above foreign policy considerations.

Support for ongoing US prioritisation of the Indo-Pacific will remain bipartisan. However, there may be more political debate on the level of simultaneous US resourcing to counter Russia’s war in the Euro-Atlantic and China’s aggression in the Indo-Pacific. That will depend in part on the partisan and personal predilections of committee and subcommittee chairs.

In the third possibility, which is looking more likely as the midterms near, a Republican Congress, emboldened by an electoral win, would have incentives to challenge the Biden administration. The Republicans would be in a stronger position to introduce and attempt to pass legislation. It’s highly probable that Republican oversight would hinder the administration’s making of political appointments, including US ambassadors. The appointment process is already hindered by committee rules, but Republican oversight would further stymie hearings.

Republican political clout may not necessarily reduce bipartisan cooperation and compromise on foreign and defence policy more broadly—at least not before the presidential election campaign gets underway in mid-2023. There is an overall strong consensus to make foreign policy work, and there would likely be a six-month window of opportunity for cooperation, provided neither branch of government puts forward policies unacceptable to the other.

Awareness of this closing window for cooperation ahead of the presidential campaign season could even increase compromise and bipartisanship over that period. Notably, the Biden administration has overcome these challenges by successfully reaching across the aisle on foreign policy issues (for example, with the recent passage of the ‘CHIPS and Science Act’).

Polls suggests the Republicans will win a majority in the House and could also control the Senate, with the economy and cost of living as the dominant election issues. If that happens, both parties will focus on domestic political needs, requiring Australia to work even harder to keep attention on our priorities. That would mean regularly highlighting Indo-Pacific issues for distracted American lawmakers who, besides their focus on China, will be occupied with the war in Ukraine.

Canberra will also need to encourage presidential and vice-presidential attendance at Indo-Pacific meetings and push for early congressional visits to Australia and the region from members of the new foreign affairs, defence and armed services committees.

In the less likely event that the Democrats hold both chambers, the Biden administration would have more room to move on foreign policy.

Whatever the outcome, it’s in the US’s interest to prioritise the Indo-Pacific even as it manages challenges at home and in Europe. The kind of intimate relationship that Australia needs with the US to strengthen its security and sovereignty requires Australian politicians and policymakers—as well as key civil society and industry actors—to continue putting in time and resources and not rely on an expectation that this critical alliance will manage itself.

The 2022 US midterm elections and what they might mean for Australia

On 8 November, Americans will vote in midterm congressional elections to determine all 435 voting seats in the House of Representatives and one-third of the 100 seats in the Senate. This ASPI commentary outlines what the midterm election outcomes could mean for Australia’s strategic interests by examining the role of congressional committees in US foreign, security and defence policymaking. While most core elements of the Australia–US relationship are bipartisan and enduring, changes to the congressional committees can influence policy areas that overlap with or are vital to Australian interests. Even small changes in the way Congress works could determine how much priority Australian strategic interests receive. Canberra should therefore be highly attuned to the changes in committee structure and membership. 
 
Once the new Congress settles in, the Australian Government will have a brief window of opportunity to feed into and influence outcomes in US foreign, security and defence policymaking. After that point, campaigning will consume Congress, making it harder for Australian diplomats, politicians and other officials to be heard leading up to the 2024 US presidential election. AUSMIN in December 2022, the outcomes of the Defence Strategic Review and AUKUS pathway review (both expected March 2023) along with major Quad meetings held in the first half of 2023, all fall within this window and provide opportunities for senior Australian Government representatives visiting Washington to engage with both their Administration counterparts and with members of Congress including, for example, the strong friends of Australia in the AUKUS Working Group. 
 
This analysis of the midterms and their implications for Australia is informed by a series of meetings with congressional committee staff members (policy analysts and researchers). Those individuals serve both Democratic and Republican members of Congress and work in both the House of Representatives and the Senate.

ASPI DC provide expertise to MITRE on Indo-Pacific Wargaming exercise

On November 2nd and 3rd, ASPI DC Analysts, Greg Brown, Bronte Munro and Iain MacGillivray participated in MITRE’s Sage Dragon exercise re: influence competition in the Pacific. The team provided unique insights into Australia’s strategic outlook in the region and helped informed allied decision making in the hypothetical scenarios.

Despite progress, major challenges lie ahead for AUKUS

Discussions during a trilogy of AUKUS-related events in Washington on the one-year anniversary of the deal’s announcement suggest the novel strategic partnership is about much more than submarines, the transfer of nuclear propulsion know-how and Anglosphere chumminess.

Political officials, scholars and practitioners gathered last week under the auspices of ASPI, the Center for New American Security and the Centre for Grand Strategy at King’s College London to identify key successes and primary challenges for the partnership.

The political leadership in all three countries appears fully aboard with AUKUS—the deal has survived a change in government in Australia and a change in prime minister in the UK—and officials describe levels of cooperation not seen since World War II to streamline advanced technology sharing. Participating officials described AUKUS as a new paradigm of defence integration across a broad spectrum of advanced technologies to maintain scientific and engineering advantages while improving a collective defence posture among the three countries.

For the US, this project represents an overdue shift of attention to the Indo-Pacific and a determined effort to make good on longstanding promises of a geostrategic pivot to the region and the looming Chinese threat with the help of steadfast partners. It also portends a change in the American approach to alliance capability sharing. AUKUS helps to further anchor Australia in the American defence orbit and should make Beijing think hard about how to respond to a Canberra that’s increasingly willing to push back against Chinese aggression. In the UK, the AUKUS agreement is seen as necessary to show strength alongside allies with shared interests and values, but also as part of the UK’s new ‘global Britain’ strategy in the wake of its departure from the EU.

The much-publicised submarine component of the pact—so-called pillar 1—appears to be moving forward apace. All parties expect that a plan to provide Australia with nuclear-propelled submarines will be announced, as scheduled, in March. The details are being held close by officials, but a year into talks, confidence is growing that delivery may occur earlier than the parties expected at the beginning of discussions. Besides the actual capacity-enhancing propulsion technology transfer, AUKUS partners see pillar 1 as a ‘big bet’ signal that will demonstrate a capacity to meet the defence coordination challenges of the second pillar, relating to artificial intelligence, quantum computing and other emerging technologies.

The decision of the AUKUS partners to take their case for the sharing of nuclear-propulsion technology to the International Atomic Energy Agency in the interests of transparency, and the response from most of the international community to consider, accept or support the argument in good faith, portend success for pillar 1. Some allies and partners have expressed concerns about AUKUS’s effects on nuclear proliferation and possible further destabilisation of the Indo-Pacific, but the Chinese information campaign to discredit AUKUS has so far failed to gain much traction.

Despite widespread support for AUKUS and a desire for its success, three pressing issues were repeatedly raised throughout the discussions.

First, there is a lack of clarity around AUKUS’s strategic purpose and what each partner aims to achieve. The inability to define specific, shared goals beyond banalities of protecting the ‘rules-based order’ or technology sharing to ‘deter Chinese aggression’ may belie a failure to identify different threat perceptions and risk appetites, which, if accounted for, help determine how to rank the technologies that are critical to advancing specific interests for each partner.

Does AUKUS strengthen integrated deterrence against a common threat, namely China, or may some technology transfers—even discussion of them—trigger escalation in some scenarios? If power projection is itself a goal for one or more of the partners, pillar 2 activities need tailoring. It is understandable that more time is needed here given that the efforts under pillar 1 are the initial priority. Determining metrics for measuring AUKUS’s worth is necessary before making any further claims of success, however.

Second, the story of AUKUS—or lack of one—also poses a challenge. The narrative on the need for the deal in the first place hasn’t really registered beyond nuclear submarines meeting Australia’s defence needs, resulting in confusion from regional allies and partners, and giving rise to concerns that AUKUS could destabilise the Indo-Pacific region. Canberra, London and Washington need to have explicit and uncomplicated discussions with allies and partners about what they intend the deal to accomplish more broadly.

Is AUKUS a trial run for a similar, future initiative with Japan, France or other countries in the Indo-Pacific? The potential for Chinese disinformation to colour perceptions of the deal will grow the longer that the AUKUS members delay announcements and fail to fully explain its parameters and objectives. This effort will require the AUKUS partners to gain a more comprehensive understanding of why allies and friends may be sceptical, regardless of Chinese influence.

Finally, a major concern is the failure so far of AUKUS partners to assess the role of commercial industry, supply chains and broader society in enabling pillar 2 to succeed. Shared bureaucratic, legal and practical infrastructure is needed to support sustained advanced technology sharing across myriad critical technologies—all of which are at various stages of development. Each partner needs to conduct a comprehensive review of its supply chains and skills gaps to ensure shared technology is utilised and retained.

Pillar 2 is fundamentally different from pillar 1. A top-down approach needs grassroots support for AUKUS to succeed. Pillar 2 exceeds the scope of traditional defence capability sharing, and this alone will necessitate creative and uncomfortable changes at all levels to ensure its success. Long-term momentum may be difficult to sustain without greater industry and civil-society stakes in AUKUS’s development and a better understanding of its potential benefits. Domestic diplomacy will need the support of think tanks, educational institutions and ‘track 2’ planning to clarify and refine AUKUS over time.

North of 26 degrees south and the security of Australia: Views from The Strategist, Volume 5

The Northern Australia Strategic Policy Centre’s latest report is a series of articles published in The Strategist over the last six months, building on previous volumes by identifying critical intersections of national security, nation-building and Australia’s north.

This issue, like previous volumes, includes a wide range of articles sourced from a diverse pool of expert contributors writing on topics as varied as biosecurity, infrastructure, critical communications, cyber-resilience, maritime infrastructure, foreign investment, space, and Indigenous knowledge-sharing. It also features a foreword by ASPI’s new Executive Director, Justin Bassi.

The 19 articles propose concrete, real-world actions for policy-makers to facilitate the development, prosperity and security of Australia’s north. The authors share a sense that those things that make the north unique – its vast space, low population density, specific geography, and harsh investment environment – are characteristics that can be leveraged, not disadvantages.

ASPI launches Washington DC office

Australia’s first overseas think tank presence was officially opened today by Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister of Australia, the Hon Richard Marles MP.

The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) has gained global attention for its research and today launched its office in Washington DC.

The Deputy Prime Minister said, ‘in so many ways, the product of ASPI is critically important, not only in informing the Australian public, but those of us in government who seek to play a role in this space.’

On the importance of think tanks, Marles stated: ‘for those of us who believe in democracies, it’s really important that the value of modern democracies is advocated.’

ASPI Executive Director, Justin Bassi, said ‘as one of the most important US allies, it’s important Australia is competing in this marketplace, and providing US decision makers and the US public with a perspective from the most critical part of the world.’

ASPI’s Washington presence will be led by Mark Watson, a former lawyer and diplomat with over thirty years experience in international relations and national security.

ASPI’s DC office will build on its existing great reputation in the United States by serving a unique role as an authoritative Australian voice in the American capital for think tank perspectives on Australian security, defence and foreign policy.

Australian views on the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework

Australian officials surveyed for this research view the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) as an opportunity to bring more investment into the Indo-Pacific region, shape standards setting, form collective solutions to supply-chain risks, and influence the direction of clean energy infrastructure. The IPEF is viewed as a potentially innovative way to boost regional investment rather than as a mechanism to strengthen the usual substance of trade agreements, such as market access into the US.

While we note that the officials interviewed aren’t the ultimate decision-makers and that there’s a new government in Canberra with its own emerging priorities, this report offers insight into the potential opportunities for Australia to shape the framework.

ASPI appoints inaugural director of Washington DC office

ASPI is delighted to announce the appointment of Mr. Mark Watson as the inaugural director of ASPI’s Washington DC office.

With more than 30 years’ experience in national security and international relations, Mark comes to ASPI with expertise in policy analysis, stakeholder mapping and engagement, strategic planning and business management, and public-private partnerships in the national security community.

Mark is a trained Chinese linguist, holding degrees in Law and History from the University of Sydney, an Honours degree in Strategic Studies from Deakin University and a Masters degree in Public Policy from the University of New England. He also completed post-graduate studies in the Economic and Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China at the University of Hong Kong, and is a graduate of the Senior Executives Leadership Program at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard.

During his time as a diplomat, Mark had postings to Port Moresby, Hong Kong, Singapore, London and, most recently, at the Australian Embassy in Washington DC. In that role, Mark was responsible for maintaining and developing partnerships with US Defence, national security and policy analysis communities, as well as with the private sector companies supporting those communities.

Most recently, Mark established Sydney Avenue Consultants; a strategic advice consultancy specialising in national security and defence community issues. He is also currently the National Security Strategic Adviser at Bondi Partners.

ASPI’s Executive Director Peter Jennings welcomes the new appointment and said Mark would reinforce ASPI’s commitment to become a more active participant in United States think tank debates about defence and national security, and to strengthen the US-Australia relationship. Mark’s knowledge of the Washington DC stakeholder environment and leadership experience will be invaluable for establishing ASPI’s presence in DC.

‘I really feel a great of sense of responsibility in opening ASPI’s first overseas office, particularly one located in a city I know well – Washington DC. It is a unique opportunity for ASPI and for me personally, and I am looking forward to getting to the US as soon as possible to get the office up and running,’ comments Mark on his appointment.

‘This move comes at a time when the US-Australia alliance has never been more integral to Australia’s strategic planning than it is following the announcement of the AUKUS agreement. As President Biden said at the launch of AUKUS: “This is about investing in our greatest source of strength — our alliances — and updating them to better meet the threats of today and tomorrow.”

‘That is a sentiment that I think applies equally well to ASPI and the reason we are opening an office in Washington at this time. To help Australia better meet the threats of today and tomorrow.’

We are excited to welcome Mark to the ASPI leadership team and look forward to working with him. Mark will join us in Canberra until January 2022, when he is anticipated to be on the ground in DC.

ASPI to open an office in Washington DC

Today the Minister for Defence, the Hon Peter Dutton, MP announced that the Australian Government will support the Australian Strategic Policy Institute to open an office in Washington DC.

Chair of the ASPI Council Lt Gen (Ret’d) Ken Gillespie said “The whole ASPI team is delighted at the Government’s decision to support the opening of a Washington DC Office.

We are particularly pleased that this comes at the time of the 70th Anniversary of the US-Australia alliance and also in ASPI’s 20th year of operations.

Australia has a deep interest in contributing to strategic policy thinking in Washington DC through that city’s lively think tank community.

I am grateful to Mr Dutton for his endorsement of the quality, depth and value of ASPI’s work in contributing to contestability of policy advice.”


How the United States of America engages with the Indo-Pacific region, with China, with America’s regional friends and with treaty allies matters profoundly to Australia and to global security.

ASPI will seek to further strengthen the bilateral relationship by becoming a more active participant in United States think tank debates about defence and national security. 

These think tanks are often the source of new policy ideas and are designed to be able to experiment, develop and explain innovative policy ideas.

The Executive Director of ASPI, Peter Jennings said: “ASPI’s Washington DC office will operate as a branch and be an integral part of ASPI in Canberra, as such, the business model will mirror ASPI’s which has been successfully developed over twenty years.

ASPI’s work focuses on non-partisan empirically grounded original research, a capacity for policy innovation and an ability to shape real-world policy outcomes.

We are proud of the achievements of the organisation over the past twenty years and look forward to the next twenty.

We thank the Minister for Defence for his support to ASPI as well as for the continuing support the Institute receives from Parliament, the Defence organisation and the wider public service, our sponsors and supporters.”