Regional security and Pacific partnerships: recruiting Pacific Islanders into the Australian Defence Force
The security and stability of the South Pacific and Australia are deeply intertwined. Australian Government policies have for more than a decade consistently prioritised the Pacific for international engagement, including in defence, development and diplomacy. The Australian Government’s ‘Pacific Step-up’, first announced in 2016, delivered a heightened level of effort by Canberra in the region, as did Australia’s strong support for the Pacific Islands Forum’s Boe Declaration. The Albanese government’s increased policy focus on the region, and on a coordinated whole-of-government approach to the Pacific, demonstrates the centrality of our immediate region to the Australian Government’s strategic planning.
Australia’s 2023 Defence Strategic Review (DSR) outlined the need for innovative and bold approaches to recruitment and retention in the Australian Defence Force (ADF), which is seeking to grow by 30% by 2040 but is not yet hitting existing recruitment targets. Budget figures released for 2023 show that ADF personnel numbers dropped by more than 1,300, or more than 2% of the total force. The Budget projections for 2024 to 2026 indicate that the government requires more than 6,000 additional personnel—in addition to replacing those lost through attrition in the next three years—to meet stated growth requirements. In the context of a competitive recruitment environment in Australia, especially for skilled labour, that trend indicates that the Defence organisation will struggle to meet forecast requirements using existing recruitment options and will need to seek alternatives. This challenge of competition for talent and to retain skilled workers is not limited to defence nor Australia. It is an economy wide issue, and global.
As a result, there has been an ‘on-again, off-again’ public debate about whether the Australian Government should consider the recruitment of foreigners into the ADF, with a specific focus on Pacific islanders. Obviously, such an initiative could help the ADF’s recruitment numbers, but, importantly, it could open up economic, skills and training opportunities for Pacific islanders. It could also provide a powerful cultural and practical engagement opportunity for the ADF, while also providing Australia with avenues to help shape the region’s security environment in positive and culturally relevant ways. Such recruitment—especially if it involves bilateral agreements between governments—would also put Pacific Island governments in a unique position to inform Australia’s security assessments and contribute to shared outcomes. Those outcomes could include enhanced regional interoperability, especially for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) and supporting combined stability operations, and stronger two-way cultural and social engagement, bolstering familiarity and understanding between the ADF and Pacific Island countries (PICs). There are, of course, arguments against such recruitment. For example, the recruitment of Pacific islanders to fight for Australia could be viewed by some as ‘colonialist’ in a region understandably sensitive to that history. But this concern could be addressed through PICs retaining agency through bilateral arrangements. In addition, any scheme seeking to relocate workers to Australia could be seen as taking skills from a much smaller nation, and risking brain and skills drains. We look at these, and other, considerations in this report.
Below, we identify and assess the key recruitment and retention problems faced by the ADF that foreign recruitment, particularly the recruitment of Pacific islanders, may help to resolve. Our report then delves into various arguments for and against the recruitment of Pacific islanders into the ADF including background information that contextualises the current debate. Ultimately, there are many benefits to opening up pathways for Pacific islanders to serve in the ADF, with the clear caveat that any process to formally establish a program must be culturally and politically sensitive, be informed by detailed risk and impact assessment, and have strong monitoring and evaluation mechanisms in place.
We then explore three options for the recruitment of Pacific islanders:
- Direct recruiting from the Pacific region into the ADF
- Closer integration and operation between existing Australian and PIC forces
- A broader partnership model drawing on lessons from the US’s ‘compacts of free association’ and from the UK’s defence recruitment initiatives.
We analyse key impacts that those options may have, both in the Pacific and for the ADF. The potential policy options offered aren’t exhaustive. However, they are plausible and represent different approaches (which could be combined) to achieve outcomes related to ADF recruitment and retention as well as to improved regional collective security.
A critical consideration in developing these options was a two-way flow of benefit: from the Pacific to Australia and from Australia back to the region. For example, we recommend that, where possible, Pacific recruits receive focused training in HADR, which would help build sovereign PIC capabilities and facilitate the application of learned skills upon recruits’ return to their home countries.
An important part of this research was ensuring that PIC military and security personnel were engaged and could feed into and shape the development of this research report, including the three options put forward for potential recruitment. This occurred in multiple ways. We collected feedback and perspectives through a dedicated roundtable discussion, in a series of interviews and then during the research process to ensure that this report was informed by regional, cultural and local considerations (see details regarding some of that data collection on page 16). The report captures five specific insights from the Pacific island military and security community that are relevant in considering the implementation of any of the three recruitment options.
Finally, we acknowledge that further research is needed to resolve the complexity of some of the policy and legal issues associated with the options suggested. We nominate some specific areas that warrant further investigation.
Smooth sailing? Australia, New Zealand and the United States partnering in–and with–the Pacific islands
Australia, New Zealand and the United States should help create an ASEAN-style forum for Pacific island nations to discuss security and manage geopolitical challenges.
The call for a dialogue, modelled on the ASEAN regional forum, is one of several recommendations to improve security partnerships and coordination in the region, reducing the risk that the three countries trip over one another and lose sight of the Pacific’s own priorities as they deepen their Pacific ties out of strategic necessity amid China’s growing interest.
While focussing on those three countries, this report stresses that wider partnerships should be considered, including with France, India, Japan, South Korea, the United Kingdom and European Union.
The report states that the three countries will have to get used to greater Chinese involvement in the Pacific, even if they don’t accept it, much less like it.
State-sponsored economic cyber-espionage for commercial purposes: tackling an invisible but persistent risk to prosperity
As part of a multi-year capacity building project supporting governments in the Indo-Pacific with defending their economic against the risk of cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property, ASPI analysed public records to determine the effects, the actual scale, severity and spread of current incidents of cyberespionage affecting and targeting commercial entities.
In 2015, the leaders agreed that ‘no country should conduct or support ICT-enabled theft of intellectual property, including trade secrets or other confidential business information, with the intent of providing competitive advantages to companies or commercial sectors.’
Our analyses suggests that the threat of state-sponsored economic cyberespionage is more significant than ever, with countries industrialising their cyberespionage efforts to target commercial firms and universities at a grander scale; and more of these targeted industries and universities are based in emerging economies.
“Strategic competition has spilled into the economic and technological domains and states have become more comfortable and capable using offensive cyber capabilities. Our analysis shows that the state practice of economic cyber-espionage appears to have resurged to pre-2015 levels and tripled in raw numbers.”
In this light, we issued a Briefing Note on 15 November 2022 recommending that the G20 members recognise that state-sponsored ICT-enabled theft of IP remains a key concern for international cooperation and encouraging them to reaffirm their commitment made in 2015 to refrain from economic cyber-espionage for commercial purposes.
This latest Policy Brief, State-sponsored economic cyber-espionage for commercial purposes: tackling an invisible but persistent risk to prosperity, further suggests that governments should raise awareness by better assessing and sharing information about the impact of IP theft on their nations’ economies in terms of financial costs, jobs and competitiveness. Cybersecurity and intelligence authorities should invest in better understanding the extent of state sponsored economic cyber-espionage on their territories.
On the international front, the G20 and relevant UN committees should continue addressing the issue and emphasising countries’ responsibilities not to allow the attacks to be launched from their territories.
The G20 should encourage members to reaffirm their 2015 commitments and consider establishing a cross-sectoral working group to develop concrete guidance for the operationalisation and implementation of the 2015 agreement while assessing the scale and impact of cyber-enabled IP theft.
ICT for development in the Pacific islands
Information and communication technologies (ICTs) as an invisible driver of socio-economic change have long captured the imagination of politicians, policymakers and aid professionals alike.
Since the first fibre-optic submarine cable connected Fiji 20 years ago, many reports and studies have been written about the potential that the introduction of ICTs in the South Pacific would bring for reaching targets of poverty reduction and economic growth.
The internet, mobile devices and e-commerce have already penetrated the Pacific, configured to the political, economic and sociocultural context of the various island nations.
This report takes a step back and zooms in on one aspect of that digital revolution: e-government.
E-Government is defined as a set of capabilities and activities that involves the use of ICTs by government to improve intragovernmental processes and to connect with citizens, businesses and industry.
Fiji was the first island to get linked up to the global network of submarine communications cables in 2000. In 2020, all major islands in the region are connected through one or more domestic and international fibre-optic cables. The region is connected.
This report finds that the potential of ICTs to enable stronger governance, effective public service delivery and better government services is there. In all countries that are part of this study, critical foundational infrastructure is in place:
- Government broadband networks that connect departments, schools and hospitals have been established.
- Central government data centres have been built, public registries are being digitised, and the introduction of national (digital) identities is currently being considered.
- All Pacific island states have introduced relevant strategy and policy documents and have reviewed, or are currently reviewing, legislation related to data-sharing, cybersecurity and universal access.
- All islands have an online presence that is steadily professionalising. Government (information) services are increasingly provided online, along with tourism information, fisheries data, geological data and meteorological forecasts.
But there’s still a lot to be unlocked.
Increased internet connectivity, the availability of mobile devices and online services and access to information are creating a greater demand from users to their governments. International donors similarly focus on the delivery of ‘digital aid’, using ICTs to provide international assistance more efficiently and effectively.
This report asks the following questions:
- What capabilities have been established and are in place?
- What are the current policy issues?
- What can the international (donor) community do to enhance its support for the digitisation process of the Pacific island governments?
The report reaches five main conclusions for the implementation of e-government and digital government initiatives, and it concludes with four recommendations for future programming of international support in the area of ICTs and e-government.