Xinjiang Data Project website launch

/in ,

ASPI’s International Cyber Policy Centre has launched the Xinjiang Data Project, along with two new major pieces of research, on Xinijang’s detention system, and on the destruction of mosques and significant Uyghur cultural sites in the region. One of the most effective research methods in both of these projects was the collection and analysis of satellite imagery, including the examination of night-time satellite imagery from Xinjiang.

Since 2017, a government crackdown in the far-western region of China known as the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region has seen over a million Uyghurs and other Turkic and Muslim minorities extrajudicially detained in a vast network of purpose-built detention facilities. There have also been media reports about incidents of mosques demolished or repurposed, along with other Uyghur cultural sites. 

Credible data on the extent of Xinjiang’s post-2017 detention system is scarce. But researchers at ASPI’s International Cyber Policy Centre have now located, mapped and analysed 380 suspected detention facilities in Xinjiang, making it the most comprehensive data on Xinjiang’s detention system in the world. This new database highlights ‘re-education’ camps, detention centres, and prisons which have been newly built or expanded since 2017, and we believe it covers most such detention facilities. 

The findings of this research contradicts Chinese officials’ claims that all “re-education camp” detainees had ‘graduated’ in December 2019. It presents satellite imagery evidence that shows newly constructed detention facilities, along with growth in several existing facilities, that has occurred across 2019 and 2020. 

The second key piece of research on our new website is a project investigating the rate of cultural destruction in Xinjiang. This research estimates 35% of mosques have been demolished; and a further 30% have been damaged in some way, usually by the removal of Islamic or Arabic architectural features such as domes, minarets or gatehouses. We estimate approximately 16,000 mosques have been damaged or totally destroyed throughout Xinjiang (65% of the total). The majority of demolished sites remain as empty lots. 

Further, 30% of important Islamic cultural sites (sacred shrines, cemeteries and pilgrimage routes) across southern Xinjiang have been demolished since 2017, with an additional 28% damaged or altered in some way. This includes the complete demolition of the ancient pilgrimage town of Ordam Mazar. 

This new research and associated maps and satellite imagery, can be viewed at the Xinjiang Data Project website. 

Biodata and biotechnology: Opportunity and challenges for Australia

/in , ,

This new ASPI report canvasses the extraordinary recent developments in genome sequencing and genetic engineering, which will transform all biological enterprises, including healthcare, among the most important parts of the global economy. It argues that there is a once-in- generation opportunity for Australia to play a leading role in a major economic and revolution with digital deliverables, capitalising on our high quality biomedical science, agricultural R&D and healthcare systems

The report identifies a number of elements for Australia to realize this opportunity. First and foremost, a national strategic and action plan is required for the collection and integration of genomic, clinical and smart sensor data for healthcare, and the development of advanced analytical software and point-of-care reporting systems, which can be exported to the world. This plan needs to be resourced by the Australian government, as a major public good infrastructure project. 

Such information will be part of the very fabric of healthcare and drug development in the future. More broadly, genomic information will be used in infection tracing, customs, quarantine, protection of commercial rights, quality control, provenance, security and policing, among others. It will accelerate the identification of valuable traits in animals, plants and microorganisms. Genetic engineering can now be done with speed, sophistication and precision that were unimaginable just a few years ago, and will enhance the efficiency, quality and range of biological production.

There are resourcing, privacy, vulnerabilities, sensitivities and national security issues to consider, protections to be put in place, and social licenses to be obtained.  Big-data analysis skills need be taught in science and engineering, and built into research institutions as well as health, agricultural and environmental management enterprises and agencies.

How to stay cyber-secure when working from home during Covid-19.

/in ,

As Australian organisations plan to slowly return to the office in the coming weeks and months, cyber security, and cyber safety, becomes even more important.

ASPI’s International Cyber Policy Centre asked experts for some tips on how to stay secure and safe when working from home, and as we transition back to the office, full-time or part-time.

They discuss the importance of patching your device & updating your firmware; two-factor authentication; being wary of suspicious emails, links and attachments; e-safety when at home with your kids; and treating cyber security at home just as you would in the office.

Hear from:

  • Paul Fletcher MP, Minister for Communications, Cyber Safety and the Arts
  • Tim Watts MP, Shadow Assistant Minister for Cyber Security
  • Sean Duca, Palo Alto
  • Christian Frain, Splunk
  • Matt Carling, Cisco
  • Julie Inman-Grant, Australia’s e-Safety Commissioner
  • Vicky Xu, ASPI’s International Cyber Policy Centre
  • Glenn Maiden, Fortinet
  • Damien Manuel and Megan Spielvogel, AISA
  • Mark Anderson, Microsoft
  • Michelle Bedson, Jacobs
  • Rachael Falk, Cyber Security CRC

Video edited by Henry Stentiford

Australia’s intelligence community needs another independent review

/in , ,

On 9 March 2020 ASPI’s Danielle Cave co-authored an article with The Lowy Institute’s Alex Oliver focused on why women remain under-represented in senior and strategic roles in Australia’s intelligence community:

“The quality of the community’s output is dependent on the thousands of staff who manage an increasingly complex mix of operational, technical, and analytical work. Many of them work in high-pressure environments and are responsible for delivering the fruits of that work to the government, and to parliament.

A lack of independent and in-depth investigation over many decades has allowed a community to evolve in which women have not risen to the top at nearly the same rate as their male counterparts, which has produced a culture far less diverse than Australian society itself…

…The gap is most startling because, when you interrogate the data as we did for our 2019 report Foreign Territory: Women in International Relations, you can see it clearly. Our report found that Australia’s intelligence agencies, collectively, have the lowest proportions of women in leadership among the study sample, with female representation in the senior executive service across the community far lower than in the public service generally. Some agencies had actually suffered periodic declines in senior female representation.

We also discovered that there were fewer women in key senior intelligence roles, running operational, analytical, and technical divisions, posted in senior roles overseas and leading policy-shaping activities (such as reviews).”

Read the full article at the Lowy Interpreter here.

After Covid-19: Australia and the world rebuild (Volume 1)

/in , , ,

This Strategy report offers policy-focused analysis of the world we will face once the pandemic has passed. At a time when all our assumptions about the shape of Australian society and the broader global order are being challenged, we need to take stock of likely future directions.

The report analyses 26 key topics, countries and themes, ranging from Australia’s domestic situation through to the global balance of power, climate and technology issues. In each case we asked the authors to consider four questions. What impact did Covid-19 have on their research topic? What will recovery mean? Will there be differences in future? What policy prescriptions would you recommend for the Australian government?

Webinar

Some of the report authors discussing their chapters here…

After COVID 19. Chapter summary

5G matters: (Geo)politics and critical national infrastructure

/in ,

In January 2020 Danielle Cave contributed an essay for the Raisina Dialogue hosted by India’s largest think-tank The Observer Research Foundation (ORF) as part of ORF’s Raisina Edit series:

“Few people would have guessed that the ‘topic du jour’ for 2019 would be 5G. While telecommunications companies have long had their eye on the prize as the chief deployers of fifth-generation telecommunications, few world leaders, politicians, and key policy departments have had to pay much attention as we have slowly ticked over from 2G to 3G, and from 3G to 4G. But 5G, which is still very much on the horizon for most countries, is different. And it is different for a range of reasons.

First, 5G is a departure from its predecessors, because we are no longer dealing with just telecommunications. 5G will not just give us extra connectivity and faster smartphones; it will connect billions of smart devices, increasingly sophisticated smart cities, and will enable developments like autonomous vehicles. It will provide a platform for advances in robotics and artificial intelligence. While its predecessors brought us text messaging, wireless internet connections, mobile broadband, and cloud technologies, the power of 5G lies in the fact that it will underpin and enable other technological advancements (including those still in the pipeline).

So instead of seeing it as just another step forward for telecommunications, states must also view 5G’s strategic technology as critical national infrastructure….

…Because 5G is critical national infrastructure, decisions made about which companies to partner with really come down to a state’s risk appetite. And states across the world will assess the risks that matter to them and make different decisions. For many, decisions will not focus on the companies themselves. Rather, key consideration will be given to the rules, laws and norms that govern a company’s home environment and guide that state’s international behaviour.

Given the evidence available, Australia’s place in the world and our strategic outlook in the Indo-Pacific, Australia’s risk appetite had its limits. And that hard limit was working with high-risk vendors in a technological advancement critical to enabling the world’s next industrial revolution.”

Read Danielle’s full essay here.

Joint BBC-ASPI investigation into West Papua information operations

/in ,

A joint investigation between the BBC and ASPI’s International Cyber Policy Centre analysed a well-funded and co-ordinated information campaign aimed at distorting the truth about events in Indonesia’s West Papua province, and has identified those responsible for its operation.

The researchers found that the campaign used slanted or factually untrue content (including “news” articles, infographics and videos) to promote narratives supportive of the Indonesian government’s actions in West Papua, and to undermine the pro-independence movement.

In a context like this in which independent media is restricted and verified information is scarce, a disinformation campaign such as the one the researchers uncovered has the potential to have a substantial impact on how the situation is perceived by the international community. This in turn could have implications for policies and decisions made by other governments, and in international forums such as the UN.

Building off earlier research published on Bellingcat, the researchers used open source data and digital forensics to analyse the campaign’s operations across multiple platforms and identify Jakarta-based communications consultancy InsightID as the source of the operation. 

This attribution was then confirmed by Facebook, and later acknowledged by the organisation itself.

A second, smaller campaign was also uncovered. Researchers tracked this campaign back to an individual with political connections. On being approached by the BBC, the individual eventually admitted his role in the campaign but insisted that they had been undertaken in his personal capacity and were not connected to his political work.

The investigation was led by BBC’s open source investigator Benjamin Strick and ASPI International Cyber Policy Centre researcher Elise Thomas and included:

A detailed report outlining the full investigation published on Bellingcat

Coverage of the investigation on the BBC in English and in Indonesian

Engineering global consent: The Chinese Communist Party’s data-driven power expansion

/in ,

The Chinese party-state engages in data collection on a massive scale as a means of generating information to enhance state security—and, crucially, the political security of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)—across multiple domains. The party-state intends to shape, manage and control its global operating environment so that public sentiment is favourable to its own interests. The party’s interests are prioritised over simply the Chinese state’s interests or simply the Chinese people’s interests. The effort requires continuous expansion of the party’s power overseas because, according to its own articulation of its threat perceptions, external risks to its power are just as likely—if not more likely—to emerge from outside the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) borders as from within.

This report explains how the party-state’s tech-enhanced authoritarianism is expanding globally. The effort doesn’t always involve distinctly coercive and overtly invasive technology, such as surveillance cameras. In fact, it often relies on technologies that provide useful services. Those services are designed to bring efficiency to everyday governance and convenience to everyday life. The problem is that it’s not only the customer deploying these technologies—notably those associated with ‘smart cities’, such as ‘internet of things’ (IoT) devices—that derives benefit from their use. Whoever has the opportunity to access the data a product generates and collects can derive value from the data. How the data is processed, and then used, depends on the intent of the actor processing it.

Asia’s Great Huawei Debate – A special on The Diplomat

/in ,

Experts on Singapore, South Korea, India, Japan, and Australia weigh in on the Chinese telecom firm’s reception. Experts Pauline Reich, June Park, Aman Thakker, Motohiro Tsuchiya, and Danielle Cave explain how the Huawei debate has unfolded domestically in each of those countries, and what conclusions (if any) were reached.

Read a version of this article ‘Australia and the great Huawei debate: risks, transparency and trust on The Strategist here.

Access the Diplomat special Asia’s Great Huawei Debate here;

AISA Partnership with the International Cyber Policy Centre

/in ,

t

The Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s International Cyber Policy Centre is delighted to announce a new partnership with the Australian Information Security Association (AISA).

As a not-for-profit, AISA champions the development of a robust information security sector by building the capacity of professionals and advancing the cyber security and safety of the public, businesses, and government in Australia.

“We are delighted to have AISA join as a partner,” said the Head of the International Cyber Policy Centre, Fergus Hanson. “AISA has a prominent voice in the information security space in Australia, and we look forward to an enduring partnership.”

AISA chairman Damien Manuel said ASPI’s International Cyber Policy Centre provided the focus needed to highlight the growing importance and impact of cyber-related issues and the need for sustained dialogue.

“The partnership strengthens the relationship between government, businesses and the community,” Mr Manuel said.

In October, AISA will join forces with the Australian Cyber Security Centre in Melbourne to launch the inaugural Australian Cyber Conference. The International Cyber Policy Centre will be an active participant in the Australian Cyber Conference.