The ADF reserve system is obsolete. We need a dramatically expanded force

Australia needs to radically reorganise its reserves system to create a latent military force that is much larger, better trained and equipped and deployable within days—not decades.
Our current reserve system is not fit for purpose. It was designed many decades ago to support distant expeditionary operations, not the prospect of major war in our immediate region emphasised in the 2023 Defence Strategic Review (DSR).
With doubts growing about the reliability of our major ally, we have no choice but to prepare to defend ourselves—if necessary, largely on our own. This requires whole-of-nation preparations that were described in the DSR. The driving needs are to deter and provide effective defence against an aggressive China.
But the Review of the ADF Reserves, quietly released before Christmas, addresses none of this. At best, it is an administrative review that describes how management of the current system can be refined. It is an exercise in deck chair rearrangement, when we need a credible plan to build a far larger latent force that can be mobilised to carry much of the load if we must fight alone with little notice.
Commissioning this review of Australian Defence Force reserves was a key recommendation of the DSR. The DSR said:
The strategic risks we face require the implementation of a new approach to planning force posture, force structure, capability development and acquisition… It is clear that a business-as-usual approach is not appropriate.
The DSR said that the force structure was ‘not fit for purpose’ and that the country needed a larger defence force, greater war-fighting endurance and stronger national resilience.
The review of reserves doesn’t address these issues at all but does describe the current reserve system. It states that in early 2024 some 41,000 people were registered as ADF reserves, but they included 10,000 who had never rendered service. Some of the remaining 31,000 provided specialist skills that were in short supply elsewhere in Defence, some filled gaps in permanent units, and a few served as a base for ADF force expansion in future emergencies.
At best, the reserves review performs a process-reform function, suggesting tweaking of current systems for efficiency and effectiveness. It recommends three categories of reserve service, accelerated entry pathways, adoption of an approach of providing minimal essential training, and a further review of conditions of service. However, the review proposes a recruitment target of only another 1000 personnel by 2030.
This is clearly not what the authors of the DSR had in mind.
There are limits on how many permanent ADF personnel can be recruited short of major war. However, given our strategic circumstances, a steep increase in part-time personnel should be a priority.
Advanced democracies variously use three reserve force models. The first is an expeditionary one suitable for countries which are not directly threatened but whose militaries periodically deploy to fight in distant wars of choice. Britain, Canada, New Zealand and Australia use this model.
The second type is the homeland and theatre defence model. It is used by countries that face serious threats of direct attack with little warning and therefore need to be able to field a very large defence force to fight wars of necessity within a few hours or, at most, a few days.
Examples include: Finland which, with a population of 5.6 million, operates a force of 24,000 permanent military personnel and 254,000 trained and equipped reservists; Israel, which from a population of 9.8 million, fields 170,000 permanent force personnel and 465,000 active reservists; and Singapore, which, with a population of 6 million, can field 51,000 permanent force personnel and 253,000 trained and equipped reservists.
The third type is a hybrid, such as the US model. From a population of 340 million, the United States it has a permanent military force of 1.3 million supported by 807,000 well-trained and well-equipped reservists.
The reserves review should have asked which model was now most suitable. Our expeditionary model, inherited from forward commitments in Korea, Malaysia and Vietnam, is obsolete. It provides some operational capabilities but generates limited resilience and would require many years to expand the reserves to the size needed for major regional war, which we could face before the end of this decade.
We must rapidly transition to a homeland and theatre defence model or, possibly, some sort of hybrid model. We must quickly prepare a reserve force that is much stronger than what we have: better trained, equipped and organised, and much larger. It must be deployable within days.
We must simplify and accelerate the way we bring people into it and improve ADF access to the national skills pool. Many intelligence, cyber, transport, medical, maintenance and other roles can be filled by qualified civilians following short training periods.
This next-generation ADF reserves system demands big changes in leadership, culture and organisational habits. The government must explain the security challenges Australia faces, why major changes are needed and why people should enlist.
What’s needed now is an action plan to quickly develop a much larger ADF reserve force. We needed it yesterday.