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Kiwi and kangaroo (part IV): future imperfect

3 March 2013

This is part IV of a series on Australia–New Zealand relations (part I here, part II here, part III here).

The Australian Army can find positive things to say about its Kiwi counterpart, usually in a sardonic tone. My favourite in this version of an Oz Army compliment: ‘The Maori Army? Better than Gurkhas! They bring their own officers and you don’t have to pay them’.

In the South Pacific, we can add to those assets the fact that the Maori Army can sing while the Australian Army has a hard time just chanting. The Kiwi cultural feel for the region can matter. In East Timor, the Australian Army on foot was known for its sunglasses. The Kiwis stomped on the habit because of their awareness of the need for eye contact when out amongst the people.

The NZ Army is admired for doing what it does on a shoestring. The other side of the same budgetary coin is that it’s derided for bludging off others when it does turn up at a job—looking to fellow forces to overcome Kiwi deficiencies in transport and kit.

The Australian and New Zealand militaries have had a lot to do with each other in what have been long-term jobs in Bougainville, Timor and the Solomons. The old bonds have been burnished by new experiences. Read more

Marines in Darwin – make it so

1 March 2013

We’re in Washington this week for the Alliance 21 project being run by the US Studies Centre at the University of Sydney. It’s an interesting time to be in Washington. Over the next 24 hours the US budget negotiations will come to a head, potentially resulting in substantial cuts to US defence spending by way of sequestration.

To say that the situation has the attention of American defence planners is putting it mildly. The prospective cuts to come are likely to be deep and potentially long-term. Civilians in the Pentagon could see their working days (and income) reduced, and service personnel are facing a period of reduced training and limited promotion opportunities. As grim as those possibilities are for the individuals concerned, the impact of most interest to Australia and other American allies and partners is the potential reduction in the preparedness and capability of America’s armed forces.

This possibility comes at a particularly unfortunate time as far as the United States’ pivot/rebalance to the Asia–Pacific is concerned. After talking a big game, there’s now a real question mark over their ability to follow through. Further cuts to US defence spending would likely have two major effects. First, the ability of US forces to substantially change their force structure, let alone ramp up numbers in the region, would be in doubt. Moving forces around is expensive, especially when substantial facilities are required. Read more

Antarctic nationalism

1 March 2013

Australia has a range of interests in Antarctica. Preserving our sovereignty over our Antarctic territory remains a fundamental interest. Since 1936, Australia has claimed 42% of Antarctica. Our claim, including extensive offshore areas, gives us significant influence in Antarctic governance. We wish to maintain the continent free from strategic confrontation. This means we don’t need to worry about the security dimension of the cold continent. A peaceful Antarctica saves our defence dollars.

We also have a strong interest in a healthy Antarctic and Southern Ocean ecosystem at our maritime back door. That includes taking advantage of the special opportunities Antarctica offers for science. Antarctica is providing important data on climate change. Science is the cornerstone of our Antarctic presence. It’s the currency of influence in the governance of the continent. We want to be able to shape the political environment in a region proximate to Australia. And we want to derive economic benefits from Antarctica.

In the new National Security Strategy (PDF) there’s little attention devoted to Antarctica. There’s a brief mention in the section on ‘Australia’s place in the world’, that notes ‘[o]ur extensive ocean and seabed interests extend well away from the shoreline and include important interests in Antarctica’ yet it doesn’t capture well enough the strategic interests the continent holds for us. Read more

A challenging relationship: Australia–Indonesia defence cooperation

28 February 2013

The signing of a Defence Cooperation Agreement with Indonesia on 5 September 2012 shows a strong intent to deepen bilateral defence ties between Indonesia and Australia. At the time, Defence Minister Stephen Smith said that the tempo of defence cooperation was at its highest point in 15 years. There’s been a substantial increase in ministerial-level exchanges and the establishment of a regular Defence Minister’s meeting and a ‘two plus two’ dialogue between Defence and Foreign Ministers. And the next Defence White Paper will aim to set out a path to even closer and more comprehensive military cooperation.

These are positive developments and indeed ones which receive bipartisan support if Mr Abbott’s frequent use of the term ‘more Jakarta and less Geneva’ is translated into policy. But the fact remains that Australia and Indonesia have a challenging if not difficult relationship. The 15-year high Stephen Smith refers to can be contrasted with the all-time political and strategic low the relationship fell to in 1999 at the time of the East Timor crisis. Then, as Australian forces deployed into East Timor, there were justifiable fears that Canberra and Jakarta might descend into open military conflict. While relations today are positive, tensions remain, as does the potential for serious misunderstanding between two such starkly different countries. The Defence White paper can help strengthen this critical relationship—I suggest four areas of engagement here which could be used to dramatically strengthen ties.

First, it’s time to create a formal mechanism by which the Defence high commands of the two countries regularly meet. Such a grouping met once in the past, in March 1999, known as the CDF–PANGAB Forum. Around 20 senior ADF attended and, although the media statement announcing the meeting rather deliberately underplayed its purpose, the Forum was hoped to become a regular meeting of the top brass in both countries. It fell away with the Timor Crisis breaking a few months earlier, but the time is right to resume such structured connection. Read more

Is another ‘Guam doctrine’ moment approaching in Asia?

28 February 2013

On 25 July 1969 President Nixon outlined a US strategic policy for Asia that came to be known—because of the location in which the speech was delivered—as the ‘Guam doctrine’. The Guam doctrine contained three elements: a reassurance that the United States would not abandon its allies; a reaffirmation that extended nuclear deterrence remained a key US contribution towards regional security; and an expectation that regional military forces would become more self-reliant in their own defence. It was a speech intended to suggest that, post-Vietnam, the US would not lightly embark upon a future land-war in Asia, but it was widely interpreted across the region as a downplaying of the US role in the Asia Pacific. Here in Australia, it was one of the drivers towards the more self-reliant defence policy that unfolded in the 1970s and 1980s. Now, in 2013, with the US defence budget under pressure, and a rising level of economic development in Asia, are we close to a second round of the Guam doctrine?

It would certainly make sense for Washington to be more interested in burden sharing with its allies now that its economy is under pressure and theirs are expanding. And the US has been telling its NATO allies that it expects more from them in carrying the weight in Europe and its near abroad. But I sense that a repeat of the Guam doctrine isn’t close. I think there are three reasons to believe that. First, the general tone of US declaratory policy remains expansive in the Asian context, despite the slowing operational tempo suggested by Iraq and Afghanistan. The speech that Obama delivered to the Australian parliament in November 2011 suggests a greater engagement with Asia, not a lesser engagement. It’s true that the language of that engagement is not settled, and the fact that the administration is unsure in its own mind about whether its ‘pivoting’ or ‘rebalancing’ is not entirely reassuring to its allies and partners on the western side of the Pacific. But the US’ Asian allies aren’t hearing the same messages about burden-sharing that NATO allies are. Read more

How we can prevent Japan–China war

27 February 2013

The Australian debate on the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute is interesting for what it reveals, and what it omits. So far, very few are talking about Australia’s diplomatic strategy—and that’s a big problem. While the best strategy will probably involve elements of military balancing, it’s worth examining Australia’s potential diplomatic role in the peaceful de-escalation of Japan–China tensions.

Australian foreign policy, under Bob Carr, has been prudently non-committal on this dispute. That’s a smart approach, but prudence and even-handedness don’t equate a diplomatic strategy. Australia has some diplomatic leverage in the current crisis, in part thanks to its status as a new member of the UN Security Council and future G20 host. And we have good reason to take a keen interest.

It matters very little to the direct Australian national interest who owns a pile of rocks in the East China Sea. What matters is that Japan and China don’t go to war over them and risk Asia’s (and hence our) security and prosperity in the process. We can’t afford to be so complacent on this crisis as to assume that major war, involving Australian lives, could not result from it. Read more

Australia and Indonesia’s 2+2 dialogue: room for one more?

26 February 2013

There’s been talk lately about building our relationship with Indonesia beyond the usual military exercises and defence engagement. But while government statements like the National Security Strategy have emphasised building security ties via the Lombok Treaty, developing the overall relationship (as called for in the Asian Century White Paper) might begin to include more discussion on economic matters. In fact, that’s something that both Australian and Indonesian leaders have flagged at past summits, and the direction in which Indonesian Chamber of Commerce (amongst other Indonesian voices) would like to see the bilateral relationship go. So if we’re serious about moving the relationship forward, then why not a 3+3 dialogue?

The 2+2 dialogue is a newish forum held annually between the Australian foreign and defence ministers and their Indonesian counterparts. A 3+3 could broaden the agenda by adding the Trade Minister (a natural inclusion given DFAT’s structure) or the Treasurer. While the foreign minister bears responsibility for raising trade issues in the context of the 2+2, having a trade minister in person means the ability to address the specifics of ideas and discussion around the table. But while there might be appetite for more bilateral cooperation opportunities, the test of whether it’s worth adding more acronyms (or numbers) to the alphabet soup is really weighed up in terms of process and substance.

In terms of process, aligning six busy ministerial schedules will be no easy feat. The 2+2’s precursor, the Australia–Indonesian Ministerial Forum (AIMF), which lasted from 1992 to 2008, had to muster around 11 or 12 ministers at a time. But the logistics toll can be eased when you think of the number of smaller, more focused meetings that could be held along the sidelines of a larger forum. And there’s diplomatic mileage to be gained by expanding the 2+2 in a way that more meaningfully reflects our aspirations with Indonesia. In the coming years, there’ll be a lot of business sector as well social and cultural initiatives flourishing under the auspices of the Asian Century White Paper but it’s still crucial for high level talks to grow in symbolic terms. Read more

ASPI suggests

26 February 2013

Here’s our weekly round-up of links and events in the NatSec, defence and strategy world.

For those interested in AirSea Battle, Richard A. Bitzinger and Michael Raska have a new RSIS Policy Brief on the concept and the future of conflict in East Asia (PDF). ASPI’s Ben Schreer also has a paper on the subject due for release soon.

In the world of energy security, few technologies have offered so much hope and so little apparent progress over the past half century as nuclear fusion. Now Lockheed Martin have announced that they are planning to bring a reactor online by 2017.

Sticking with the United States, William C. Martel has a longread that argues the US needs a grand strategy to help grapple with foreign and self-generated sources of ‘disorder’.

Admiral Gary Roughead and Kori Schake have a new Brookings policy brief on restructuring the US military in a time of change.

Here’s a new post by Kenneth G. Lieberthal that examines prospects (or not) of negotiations with China on cyber security. Read more

Australia’s future submarine, but which one?

25 February 2013

Last week ASPI and the Submarine Institute of Australia sat around a table for a day to discuss the rationale for the future submarine. The aim was to set out as clearly as possible what each team thought about the role of submarines. Note that I didn’t say ‘both sides’—it wasn’t a debate between opposing factions, but an exercise in understanding the shared and disputed spaces in the argument. We didn’t reach a definitive result—and I’m not sure that’s even possible given the subjective nature of the judgements required—but we got to a point where there was agreement about a wide range of issues and disagreement on only a few.

For example, we quickly agreed that submarines have some capabilities that can’t be easily replaced by other platforms. I think the readiness with which we agreed to that surprised our SIA colleagues, perhaps based on a slight misreading of my previous blog post in which I suggested several other ways to do some of the things that subs do. But my claim wasn’t that the alternatives were the same—and Peter Briggs did a good job of explaining the differences last week—but that some of the submarines capability was replaceable by other means.

It also didn’t take long to agree that big submarines are more capable than small ones. That shouldn’t be a surprise. After all, a submarine’s payload is proportional to its overall weight, typically a little under 10%. That payload has to include the fuel required to get to the patrol area and stay there for an operationally useful time. It also includes all of the weapons it might need and the provisions the crew will get through during the voyage. As well, if the patrol area is far from base, the boat will use a lot of its endurance in just getting there, unless it has a fast transit speed. But the higher the speed, the more fuel required, in something of a vicious circle. Read more

The South Pacific ‘arc of opportunity’

25 February 2013

I’ve previously written on The Strategist that it’s time for Australian policymakers and academics to see the South Pacific as an ‘arc of opportunity’, rather than an ‘arc of instability’ (PDF). That proposal was tested at an 8 February workshop at the Australian National University (ANU), which brought together two often separate communities: security and strategic thinkers on the one hand; development and governance thinkers on the other.

The overwhelming consensus was that it’s time to reframe Australian perceptions of the South Pacific to focus not only on the region’s challenges but also its potential. Professor Peter Leahy, Director of the National Security Institute at the University of Canberra, emphasised that the region sits across the ‘shoulders and flanks of approaches to Australia’, and therefore that securing it through supporting development offers an opportunity to make Australia more secure. Emeritus Professor Paul Dibb from the Strategic and Defence Studies at the ANU stressed that these efforts should focus on strengthening South Pacific states (PDF), reflecting the approach of the recent National Security Strategy.

His Excellency Charles Lepani, Papua New Guinea High Commissioner to Australia, argued that the relationship between Australia and Papua New Guinea should shift from one of ‘perceived dependence’ to one of ‘mutual respect’, in which Australia recognises Papua New Guinea’s trade, investment and other economic opportunities. James Batley, Deputy Director General of the Asia, Pacific and Program Enabling Group at AusAID, expressed confidence that the relationship between Australia and South Pacific states is improving and highlighted an emerging sense that Australia is working with the region as ‘partners’. Batley also argued that strengthening South Pacific states will involve new approaches to development at sub-national levels, including by working with communities and NGOs. Read more