Strategist Article Archives - Page 1150 of 1181

Indonesia’s complex ascent

4 March 2013

I recently had the pleasure of attending the National Security College’s workshop ‘Indonesia’s Ascent: power, leadership and Asia’s security order’ at the ANU. The presentations were delivered as part of a larger publication project that will explore and challenge different elements of Indonesia’s rise. In this Canberra workshop (the other being in Jakarta), the key message of most speakers was that, overall, Indonesia is on the right trajectory but is still grappling with questions of democratisation, governance and security.

Sue Thompson from the National Security College presented a historical overview of Indonesia’s self-perception as a leader and discussed the legacy of colonialism and great power interference in Indonesia’s affairs. Delivered at the outset of the workshop, these historical experiences provided an important framing device for subsequent presentations that explored the potential for Indonesia to assume a more powerful and influential role in the region. Also discussing historical legacies, independent researcher Robert Lowry explored a number of security fault lines in Indonesia—in particular, separatism—that could threaten its ascent if not addressed carefully. Read more

ASPI suggests

4 March 2013

Welcome back for our weekly round-up of news, reports and events in the defence, NatSec and strategy world.

It’s one minute past midnight, as the sequester—USD$1.2 trillion of cuts across the US federal budget over the next decade, including defence—has gone into effect. Expect more bickering to follow, writes The Economist.

For readers interested in strategy, Adam Elkus has a short and sweet review of a new edited volume by John Andreas Olsen and Colin Gray called The Practice of Strategy: from Alexander the Great to the present which asks the fundamental question, is there unity to all strategic experience?

There’s cautious optimism from Trita Parsi in this piece on recent negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program; the meeting in Almaty saw the paradigm of the talks shift from perpetual escalation to an exchange of concessions and incentives.

On a related note, why eliminate nuclear weapons? James E. Doyle has a new Survival article available free for download here. Read more

Kiwi and kangaroo (part IV): future imperfect

3 March 2013

This is part IV of a series on Australia–New Zealand relations (part I here, part II here, part III here).

The Australian Army can find positive things to say about its Kiwi counterpart, usually in a sardonic tone. My favourite in this version of an Oz Army compliment: ‘The Maori Army? Better than Gurkhas! They bring their own officers and you don’t have to pay them’.

In the South Pacific, we can add to those assets the fact that the Maori Army can sing while the Australian Army has a hard time just chanting. The Kiwi cultural feel for the region can matter. In East Timor, the Australian Army on foot was known for its sunglasses. The Kiwis stomped on the habit because of their awareness of the need for eye contact when out amongst the people.

The NZ Army is admired for doing what it does on a shoestring. The other side of the same budgetary coin is that it’s derided for bludging off others when it does turn up at a job—looking to fellow forces to overcome Kiwi deficiencies in transport and kit.

The Australian and New Zealand militaries have had a lot to do with each other in what have been long-term jobs in Bougainville, Timor and the Solomons. The old bonds have been burnished by new experiences. Read more

Marines in Darwin – make it so

1 March 2013

We’re in Washington this week for the Alliance 21 project being run by the US Studies Centre at the University of Sydney. It’s an interesting time to be in Washington. Over the next 24 hours the US budget negotiations will come to a head, potentially resulting in substantial cuts to US defence spending by way of sequestration.

To say that the situation has the attention of American defence planners is putting it mildly. The prospective cuts to come are likely to be deep and potentially long-term. Civilians in the Pentagon could see their working days (and income) reduced, and service personnel are facing a period of reduced training and limited promotion opportunities. As grim as those possibilities are for the individuals concerned, the impact of most interest to Australia and other American allies and partners is the potential reduction in the preparedness and capability of America’s armed forces.

This possibility comes at a particularly unfortunate time as far as the United States’ pivot/rebalance to the Asia–Pacific is concerned. After talking a big game, there’s now a real question mark over their ability to follow through. Further cuts to US defence spending would likely have two major effects. First, the ability of US forces to substantially change their force structure, let alone ramp up numbers in the region, would be in doubt. Moving forces around is expensive, especially when substantial facilities are required. Read more

Antarctic nationalism

1 March 2013

Australia has a range of interests in Antarctica. Preserving our sovereignty over our Antarctic territory remains a fundamental interest. Since 1936, Australia has claimed 42% of Antarctica. Our claim, including extensive offshore areas, gives us significant influence in Antarctic governance. We wish to maintain the continent free from strategic confrontation. This means we don’t need to worry about the security dimension of the cold continent. A peaceful Antarctica saves our defence dollars.

We also have a strong interest in a healthy Antarctic and Southern Ocean ecosystem at our maritime back door. That includes taking advantage of the special opportunities Antarctica offers for science. Antarctica is providing important data on climate change. Science is the cornerstone of our Antarctic presence. It’s the currency of influence in the governance of the continent. We want to be able to shape the political environment in a region proximate to Australia. And we want to derive economic benefits from Antarctica.

In the new National Security Strategy (PDF) there’s little attention devoted to Antarctica. There’s a brief mention in the section on ‘Australia’s place in the world’, that notes ‘[o]ur extensive ocean and seabed interests extend well away from the shoreline and include important interests in Antarctica’ yet it doesn’t capture well enough the strategic interests the continent holds for us. Read more

A challenging relationship: Australia–Indonesia defence cooperation

28 February 2013

The signing of a Defence Cooperation Agreement with Indonesia on 5 September 2012 shows a strong intent to deepen bilateral defence ties between Indonesia and Australia. At the time, Defence Minister Stephen Smith said that the tempo of defence cooperation was at its highest point in 15 years. There’s been a substantial increase in ministerial-level exchanges and the establishment of a regular Defence Minister’s meeting and a ‘two plus two’ dialogue between Defence and Foreign Ministers. And the next Defence White Paper will aim to set out a path to even closer and more comprehensive military cooperation.

These are positive developments and indeed ones which receive bipartisan support if Mr Abbott’s frequent use of the term ‘more Jakarta and less Geneva’ is translated into policy. But the fact remains that Australia and Indonesia have a challenging if not difficult relationship. The 15-year high Stephen Smith refers to can be contrasted with the all-time political and strategic low the relationship fell to in 1999 at the time of the East Timor crisis. Then, as Australian forces deployed into East Timor, there were justifiable fears that Canberra and Jakarta might descend into open military conflict. While relations today are positive, tensions remain, as does the potential for serious misunderstanding between two such starkly different countries. The Defence White paper can help strengthen this critical relationship—I suggest four areas of engagement here which could be used to dramatically strengthen ties.

First, it’s time to create a formal mechanism by which the Defence high commands of the two countries regularly meet. Such a grouping met once in the past, in March 1999, known as the CDF–PANGAB Forum. Around 20 senior ADF attended and, although the media statement announcing the meeting rather deliberately underplayed its purpose, the Forum was hoped to become a regular meeting of the top brass in both countries. It fell away with the Timor Crisis breaking a few months earlier, but the time is right to resume such structured connection. Read more

Is another ‘Guam doctrine’ moment approaching in Asia?

28 February 2013

On 25 July 1969 President Nixon outlined a US strategic policy for Asia that came to be known—because of the location in which the speech was delivered—as the ‘Guam doctrine’. The Guam doctrine contained three elements: a reassurance that the United States would not abandon its allies; a reaffirmation that extended nuclear deterrence remained a key US contribution towards regional security; and an expectation that regional military forces would become more self-reliant in their own defence. It was a speech intended to suggest that, post-Vietnam, the US would not lightly embark upon a future land-war in Asia, but it was widely interpreted across the region as a downplaying of the US role in the Asia Pacific. Here in Australia, it was one of the drivers towards the more self-reliant defence policy that unfolded in the 1970s and 1980s. Now, in 2013, with the US defence budget under pressure, and a rising level of economic development in Asia, are we close to a second round of the Guam doctrine?

It would certainly make sense for Washington to be more interested in burden sharing with its allies now that its economy is under pressure and theirs are expanding. And the US has been telling its NATO allies that it expects more from them in carrying the weight in Europe and its near abroad. But I sense that a repeat of the Guam doctrine isn’t close. I think there are three reasons to believe that. First, the general tone of US declaratory policy remains expansive in the Asian context, despite the slowing operational tempo suggested by Iraq and Afghanistan. The speech that Obama delivered to the Australian parliament in November 2011 suggests a greater engagement with Asia, not a lesser engagement. It’s true that the language of that engagement is not settled, and the fact that the administration is unsure in its own mind about whether its ‘pivoting’ or ‘rebalancing’ is not entirely reassuring to its allies and partners on the western side of the Pacific. But the US’ Asian allies aren’t hearing the same messages about burden-sharing that NATO allies are. Read more

How we can prevent Japan–China war

27 February 2013

The Australian debate on the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute is interesting for what it reveals, and what it omits. So far, very few are talking about Australia’s diplomatic strategy—and that’s a big problem. While the best strategy will probably involve elements of military balancing, it’s worth examining Australia’s potential diplomatic role in the peaceful de-escalation of Japan–China tensions.

Australian foreign policy, under Bob Carr, has been prudently non-committal on this dispute. That’s a smart approach, but prudence and even-handedness don’t equate a diplomatic strategy. Australia has some diplomatic leverage in the current crisis, in part thanks to its status as a new member of the UN Security Council and future G20 host. And we have good reason to take a keen interest.

It matters very little to the direct Australian national interest who owns a pile of rocks in the East China Sea. What matters is that Japan and China don’t go to war over them and risk Asia’s (and hence our) security and prosperity in the process. We can’t afford to be so complacent on this crisis as to assume that major war, involving Australian lives, could not result from it. Read more

Australia and Indonesia’s 2+2 dialogue: room for one more?

26 February 2013

There’s been talk lately about building our relationship with Indonesia beyond the usual military exercises and defence engagement. But while government statements like the National Security Strategy have emphasised building security ties via the Lombok Treaty, developing the overall relationship (as called for in the Asian Century White Paper) might begin to include more discussion on economic matters. In fact, that’s something that both Australian and Indonesian leaders have flagged at past summits, and the direction in which Indonesian Chamber of Commerce (amongst other Indonesian voices) would like to see the bilateral relationship go. So if we’re serious about moving the relationship forward, then why not a 3+3 dialogue?

The 2+2 dialogue is a newish forum held annually between the Australian foreign and defence ministers and their Indonesian counterparts. A 3+3 could broaden the agenda by adding the Trade Minister (a natural inclusion given DFAT’s structure) or the Treasurer. While the foreign minister bears responsibility for raising trade issues in the context of the 2+2, having a trade minister in person means the ability to address the specifics of ideas and discussion around the table. But while there might be appetite for more bilateral cooperation opportunities, the test of whether it’s worth adding more acronyms (or numbers) to the alphabet soup is really weighed up in terms of process and substance.

In terms of process, aligning six busy ministerial schedules will be no easy feat. The 2+2’s precursor, the Australia–Indonesian Ministerial Forum (AIMF), which lasted from 1992 to 2008, had to muster around 11 or 12 ministers at a time. But the logistics toll can be eased when you think of the number of smaller, more focused meetings that could be held along the sidelines of a larger forum. And there’s diplomatic mileage to be gained by expanding the 2+2 in a way that more meaningfully reflects our aspirations with Indonesia. In the coming years, there’ll be a lot of business sector as well social and cultural initiatives flourishing under the auspices of the Asian Century White Paper but it’s still crucial for high level talks to grow in symbolic terms. Read more

ASPI suggests

26 February 2013

Here’s our weekly round-up of links and events in the NatSec, defence and strategy world.

For those interested in AirSea Battle, Richard A. Bitzinger and Michael Raska have a new RSIS Policy Brief on the concept and the future of conflict in East Asia (PDF). ASPI’s Ben Schreer also has a paper on the subject due for release soon.

In the world of energy security, few technologies have offered so much hope and so little apparent progress over the past half century as nuclear fusion. Now Lockheed Martin have announced that they are planning to bring a reactor online by 2017.

Sticking with the United States, William C. Martel has a longread that argues the US needs a grand strategy to help grapple with foreign and self-generated sources of ‘disorder’.

Admiral Gary Roughead and Kori Schake have a new Brookings policy brief on restructuring the US military in a time of change.

Here’s a new post by Kenneth G. Lieberthal that examines prospects (or not) of negotiations with China on cyber security. Read more