ASPI recommends: The evolution of strategy

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The Evolution of StrategyFor readers looking for a good one-volume text on strategy, I would recommend Beatrice Heuser’s work, The evolution of strategy: thinking war from antiquity to the present, published in 2010. Heuser, an academic at the University of Reading, offers an overview of strategy across the ages, interesting both for the sweep and scope of the subject matter and for the author’s elegant unpacking of an immensely complex topic. Readers will doubtless focus upon those chapters of greatest interest to themselves, and for me it’s her observations about the Napoleonic and post-Napoleonic worlds that offer the greatest insights.

Her trenchant commentary upon strategy and war in general in the aftermath of World War II will give readers a lot of the broad framework they need to think about the contemporary strategic environment. For Heuser, warfare since 1945 has been characterised by what she calls ‘wars without victories and victories without peace’. With Afghanistan still stuttering to a fitful conclusion, it requires no great leap of imagination to believe that formulation might well continue to define the pattern of war in coming decades.

In an epilogue to the text, Heuser makes some astute observations about contemporary strategic thinking that will be of interest to Australian readers watching their government embark on yet another Defence White Paper. Writing with the British experience more in mind perhaps than the Australian one, Heuser notes: Read more

China’s military build-up: a cause for concern?

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It’s not hard to find examples of concerns about China’s military build-up. But how much should we actually worry about it? In my view, not as much as many commentators assume. It’s true that, at home, the Communist Party and its apparatus continue to be in charge of this huge state and fiercely determined to nip any signs of organised dissent or opposition in the bud, if necessary by force. It is also the case that even if there were—unimaginably—some kind of breakdown in the Party and governmental apparatus, no-one has any idea of what might follow.

And yet the social volatilities unleashed by Mao half a century ago continue to bubble under the surface. Every day there are reportedly hundreds of protests or riots against thuggish local Party authorities, which are often put down by force. The Bo Xilai affair is only one example of uncertainty, disarray and fierce competition within the Chinese leadership in the run-up to this autumn’s changes at the very top of the CCP. Obviously the military cannot remain unaffected.

One reason for China to keep and expand large security and military forces is the misguided nationalist sense that China has for too long been put upon by greedy or careless foreign countries. It is time to assert China’s general power and prestige. (Television recently showed a clip of President Hu Jintao meeting with UN Secretary-General Ban-ki moon. President Hu stood still in the middle of the carpet in the centre of the room waiting for Ban-ki moon to sidle obsequiously up to him. Clearly neither man had forgotten the behaviour appropriate for a Korean tribute-bearer being received by the emperor.) Read more

To shun or to embrace? Australia–US relations and China’s rise (part I)

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There’s a conundrum facing the writers of the Defence White Paper 2013. On one hand, Australia’s geography places it at the southern end of East Asia and its economy places it in a strong trading relationship with the North East Asian economies, particularly China. These factors have seen Australia become increasingly linked to the region. On the other hand, Australia’s cultural predisposition and security ties are Western orientated, particularly to the United States. The question to be asked, therefore, is: are Australia’s national interests best served by pressing into the United States or by pulling away to accommodate China’s rise? This two-part post seeks to address this question.

Australia has been living for almost seventy years under the Pax Americana—that is, the rules based order that the United States sponsored after World War II. The United States sponsored the IMF, World Bank, United Nations and a global order from which many have benefitted immensely.

There is also a strong predisposition in Australia towards the United States. The very idea of ‘America’ has always been attractive to many Australians ever since the Great White Fleet visited in 1907. The idea of a liberal, democratic, free-market and rules-based order is what the United States has seemed to epitomise. America is a remarkable country and it is one that is easy to criticise, and it is often in the breach of the rules that we consider its actions. Americans themselves are very critical of their failings and readily point them out to each other and to the world. But it is hard to imagine any country, with all its failings, having a more positive influence on world order than the United States. Read more

Singapore and the US: not quite allies

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Singapore and the United States are linked not only by important economic relations, but also by a burgeoning defence relationship. Most recently in June 2012 the US announced that it would deploy as many as four littoral combat ships to the city-state from 2013, as part of the Pentagon’s much-publicised ‘rebalance to the Asia-Pacific’.

Their security links date back to the late 1960s, when Singapore actively supported Washington’s war effort in Vietnam. While this continuity, and the closeness and depth of their defence links today, might give the impression that Singapore is a US ally, the city-state’s government has nevertheless pointedly eschewed that status, preferring the strategic autonomy deriving from a less formal—if still intense—defence nexus. Nevertheless, the relationship could pose dilemmas for Singapore.

Singapore’s support for the US’ regional security role and military presence originated in the appreciation of Singapore’s elite, led by Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, Foreign Minister S. Rajaratnam and Defence Minister Goh Keng Swee, that the interests of their small island state, sandwiched between much larger and potentially aggressive neighbours, as well as apparently endangered by communist North Vietnam and China, would be best served by preventing the regional dominance of any power. As Lee Kuan Yew said in 1966, it was vital for Singapore to have ‘overwhelming power on its side’. Singapore has built up its own armed forces primarily to prevent Indonesia and Malaysia from dominating its immediate locale; but at the grand regional level, Singapore’s small size and relatively limited diplomatic influence and military capacity have forced it to base its balance-of-power strategy on borrowing political and military strength from extra-regional powers, principally the US. Read more

What are we to make of the new Defence Capability Plan?

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Having announced its intention to publish a new Defence White Paper in the first half of 2013, the government has now taken the curious step of issuing a new Defence Capability Plan (DCP). That is, a new schedule for the approval of defence acquisition projects over the next four years. What’s curious is that a new DCP is normally the outcome of a Defence White Paper, rather than a precursor.

What’s more, given the short time since the substantial cuts to the defence spending in the May budget, the new DCP is at best a quick and dirty shoehorning of existing projects into the much-reduced funding envelope that’s available over the next four years. Moreover, how can the government be developing a new Defence White Paper but already know what capabilities it wants to pursue over pretty much the entire life of the document?

Logically, there are three possibilities; either the new DCP is worthless, the next White Paper is pointless, or both. Let’s hope that it’s the first of those options. The worst outcome would be a White Paper that ex facto justified the hastily cobbled together DCP.

In the meantime we have a new DCP to pore over. I’ll leave it to others to divine the implied shifts in strategy which the projects that have been included and excluded might imply—I’m not sure that strategy has much to do with Australia’s capability planning at the best of times. Instead, here’s my statistical analysis of the planned throughput of projects.

Under the two-pass process introduced back in 2003, defence projects are considered (at least) twice by the government; so-called ‘first pass’ and ‘second pass’ approval. At first pass the priority for the capability is confirmed, along with the range of options to be considered; at second pass an option is selected and given final approval. In the latest DCP, 25 of 111 projects are listed as having a combined or simultaneous first and second pass approval.

Because the DCP provides only multi-year bands for when project approvals are scheduled, it’s necessary to analyse the schedule using a statistical approach. Fortunately, with so many projects that gives a reasonable average result, so it’s possible to calculate the number of approvals required each year to deliver the plan.

The graph below (click to enlarge) shows the average number of projects planned and achieved for second pass approval since 2004—that is, the number of projects that have been green-lighted to commence. Two things are apparent. First, there have been continuing delays to the program; the actual number of projects approved in previous years has consistently been below the number planned. This matters because it means that the defence force will have to wait longer than planned for the equipment it presumably needs, and often means that ageing equipment has to soldier on longer than planned. Second, the number of approvals planned between 2013 and 2015 substantially exceeds recently achieved rates of approval.

Let’s now look at how first pass approvals have been going. As shown below (click to enlarge), the picture is even less encouraging. On past experience, there is little chance of the envisaged rate of approvals being achieved. (There are no planned figures are available for 2004-05 and 2005-06 because the first-pass milestone was introduced after the 2004 DCP was published.)

However, in putting together the graphs above, combined approvals have been counted as both a first- and second-pass approval. It may be that there is less work required when a combined approval occurs, meaning that the task ahead is less difficult than it might first appear. But whatever solace we take from that point must be tempered by the knowledge that there is a White Paper due in 2012–13 and an election in 2013–14, and past experience shows that such events seriously delay the approval of projects.

So where does that leave us? It will be interesting to compare the first post-White Paper DCP with the one just released. Unless there are significant differences between the two documents, the White Paper will have been an irrelevant waste of time—akin to the cheap magician’s trick of telling you the number you first thought of. At the very least, let’s hope that the new schedule of project approvals is more realistically aligned with past experience than what’s just been released.

Mark Thomson is senior analyst for defence economics at ASPI.

Killing the source: Uruzgan and The Liaison Office

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The first step to victory is always working out the vital ground. Occupy that and you force the enemy to come to you. You’ve already achieved dominance and are halfway on the path to victory.

Unfortunately, when the battlefield is being fought for hearts and minds, the terrain becomes highly complex. It’s difficult to work out exactly which ‘ground’ is commanding, and what features are irrelevant. That’s why intelligence is so important. Without it, the commander can’t know how to direct their forces or where to fight.

This is particularly the case in situations such as in Uruzgan. Australian forces involved in reconstruction have been deployed here since 2006, but the social dynamics are shifting all the time. This is a prime instance of a battlefield where deciding where the human contours lie is a highly complex task.

Perhaps the best (although by no means the only) instance of this is the tribal nature of society. Like everyone, before I first travelled to the country I’d been aware of the difference between the Hazara and Pashtun people. What brought the distinction home to me, however, was a map pasted onto a wall at The Liaison Office in Kabul. A mass of coloured pins indicated the real diversity of inhabitants within the province. Read more

Defence and expectation management

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There has already been some debate about the insurance analogy on this blog. I personally like the theme as it makes it easy to explain Defence funding to those not familiar with what our defence forces actually do.

There was a time when almost every family in the land knew someone who was in the Defence forces, either past or present. Anecdotally, that doesn’t seem to be the case anymore. All they see are mainstream media headlines that Defence costs a bucketload, can’t handle money very well and stuff keeps breaking/is delivered late/doesn’t work properly. And oh, look—another review.

There is no rational, informed public debate outside the community that has an interest in the field. This can be the same for many fields though. Do you know the difference between AMA and Medicare scheduled fees for services? Why have many Masters programs at universities dropped from 12 unit points to 10? If you’re in the field that cares, you know. If it doesn’t directly affect your life, you don’t tend to know.

How defence is funded matters insomuch to the average person as it relates to opportunity cost in their lives; how many university places/hospital beds/roads built could that money have been used for. This is not to say that the average voter doesn’t care about defence but there is a lack of understanding about the political and economic nature of white papers in the wider community. Read more

Graph of the week: JSF, it just grew and grew

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This week’s graph is an update of analysis started by ASPI in 2006. Drawing on annual figures published by the Pentagon, it analyses the real cost growth in the projected cost of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF).

The first graph (click to enlarge) is the raw figures of the projected average aircraft cost, adjusted for inflation. It’s not a pretty story. But it’s hard to tell from this figure whether this is anything out of the ordinary.

JSF average unit procurement costs

Source: US Dept. of Defense Selected Acquisition Reports 2001–2011

A bit of extra tweaking allows us to compare the cost growth in the JSF with the average for large American defence programs, and with another aircraft program—the development of the Super Hornet—which is generally regarded as an acquisition success story.

This is the same JSF data as in the graph above, but this time plotted as an index (in red, click graph to enlarge).The average historical performance of US weapon programs is in black and the Super Hornet program is in brown.

This all suggests that, while the JSF might yet prove to be a winner, it’s been a harder than average slog so far.

JSF development program cost estimation

Source: US DoD Selected Acquisition Reports 2001–2011 for JSF and Super Hornet data. The curve for the historical average performance is derived from data in Norman R. Augustine’s Augustine’s Laws (1983).

Andrew Davies is senior analyst for defence capability at ASPI and executive editor of The Strategist.

Defence and Tony Abbott’s Heritage Foundation speech

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Tony Abbott’s speech at the Heritage Foundation in Washington last week had some messages for Canberra policymakers to help shape next year’s ‘blue’ Incoming Government Brief. The speech was oddly constructed as some commentators have said, but there were four interesting themes: one announced a new bipartisan approach with government and three pointed to emerging differences.

Abbott’s bipartisan point was about defence spending. The one line on spending in the prepared speech said: ‘we will seek efficiencies in defence spending but never at the expense of defence capability.’ In the Q&A, Abbott criticised the cumulative effect of spending cuts but stressed savings could be made as long as they didn’t damage military capability. He said ‘the last thing we want to do is dismay our friends and allies.’ He did not say that a Coalition government would reverse spending cuts.

This is a new element of bipartisanship—to cut defence spending in the four-year period of budget forward estimates. Some Coalition Speaker’s Notes obtained by Crikey ‘commit to restoring the funding of Defence to 3% real growth out to 2017–18 as soon as we can afford it.’ But 3% growth won’t restore what has been cut and Abbott’s comments suggest the Coalition prefers the government’s approach. No one in Defence should imagine they will get an easy ride under a Coalition government. Nor should the Coalition think that cutting Defence will be easy. If they do form government they will get a shock when the Incoming Government Brief advises that cutting future capability is the only way to stay within the new spending guidelines. Read more

Reader response: risk, strategy and luck

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Hugh White nicely joins the fray in focusing on the key difference between risks and threats: time. That is, a risk can turn into a threat over time, and vice versa. As Hugh says, risk may be the ‘foundation of defence policy’ but I think we should be sure about what choosing such an approach leaves out.

In an earlier post, I noted that risk management is not a strategy. As Hugh said more eloquently then me, risk management is ‘about preparing against the possibility that dangers might arise in future.’ This means having defence capabilities available just in case, ready to respond to particular events if they occur—and we really, really hope they don’t. By contrast, as strategy has a defined end, defence capabilities are developed and used to try to achieve that end.

If we see military forces as being used as instruments for pursuing ‘politics by other means’ in the best Clausewitzian tradition, then military forces are useful across the spectrum of peace and war. From our point of view as a rather smug status quo power, then we may wish to try to shape our future in a particular direction that ensures that bad things do not happen to us, using the military as one tool amongst many to that end. This is conceptually a long way from sitting and waiting for a tragedy to occur.

Some hold that risk management is more than just awaiting events—that is, it involves being so obviously prepared that this shapes another’s thinking and they are dissuaded from taking ‘risky’ actions. This however sounds somewhat like deterrence, a strategy focused on someone at some time to convince them not to carry out some act. In short, shaping the future into a particular kind of desired international order.

Risk is about preparing for possible dangers, strategy can be working to try to make them not happen. Which is better for us? To paraphrase Clint Eastwood ‘do we feel lucky’? Or should we at least try to make our own luck?

We should think carefully whether risk management is the best foundation for our defence policy as there may be alternatives worth exploring.

Peter Layton is undertaking a research PhD in grand strategy at UNSW.