Force expansion and warning time (part II)

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As I pointed out in my previous post, there’s a much-neglected policy principle embedded in the conceptual framework that guides Australian defence planning: in the event of major deterioration in Australia’s strategic circumstances, the Government would undertake a major expansion of the defence force. Are such times upon us now? With the new age of Asia, Australia is now less remote from the global locus of economic and military growth than in previous decades. But it is also true that the tensions of the North Pacific remain a considerable distance from Australia, and the South China Sea can hardly be said to be proximate. So military operations in those areas would hardly represent a major and direct threat to Australia—although they wouldn’t do much for relationships between nations in the region and beyond.

On the other hand, we can expect that as China’s economy continues to develop, so too will its military capacity. This will start to undermine one of the central pillars of Australia’s security: while motive and intent might well remain absent, China’s ability to conduct military operations against us will, over time, increase. And conventional wisdom tells us that motive and intent can change much more quickly than defence capability can be developed. Nevertheless, the difficulty of major attack on Australia would be formidable, as has been convincingly argued in previous decades.

For the most part, the force structure plans of the 2009 White Paper amount more to modernisation than to expansion—least of all major expansion. The outstanding exception is the decision to double the size of the submarine fleet to twelve. But it’s quite possible that the fleet won’t reach this size until the early 2040s (if then), and there’s no discussion of comparable expansion of other ADF elements. So, in the absence of arguments about strategic deterioration, the official position with respect to warning and expansion is at best ambiguous. Read more

Inflated ambitions and DWP 2013

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Before turning its attention to the future force structure of the ADF, the team writing the 2013 Defence White Paper will have to grapple with the rising cost of even maintaining the existing force. This will be a particular issue in the coming decade with the delivery of some substantial new capabilities—two amphibious ships that will be the Navy’s largest ever vessels, three air warfare destroyers, the completion of the enhanced land force initiative, and replacement of almost every aircraft in the RAAF’s frontline inventory.

There will be a ‘double whammy’ from all of this new kit. Firstly, there’s the immediate cost of personnel and sustainment overheads. New platforms are almost always more expensive to acquire in real terms than their predecessors by virtue of their added complexity, which also results in higher through-life costs as well. Aircraft, for example, cost about twice their purchase price in the first twenty years of their lives. And service personnel are usually fairly keen to be paid and are, on average, more costly than the civilian workforce.

The second impact is the effect sometimes called ‘defence inflation’. My colleague Mark Thomson pointed out in his 2008–09 Cost of Defence brief (and earlier here) that the cost of sustaining the activities of the Department of Defence increases at a rate somewhat above the CPI. This is due to a number of factors, some of which are relatively easy to estimate, while others are more subtle. In the former category are things like wages. The same growth in real weekly earnings that has seen Australians become more prosperous in the past few decades means that maintaining numbers in the ADF costs more every year. Similarly, health costs for defence personnel easily outstrip the CPI—just as they do for the rest of us. It’s harder to calculate the magnitude of defence inflation for things like sustainment, but specialised skills, equipment and components are all increasing in cost faster than inflation. Read more

ADF: more than just warfighters?

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An Australian Defence Force (ADF) engineering and health team conducted assessments of some of the current healthcare facilities and infrastructure in Padang in order to determine and develop engineering and healthcare support options for the post-disaster recovery operation that faces Indonesia and its people.In the 2009 Defence White Paper, the Government expected the ADF to carry out a number of tasks. In addition to its core war fighting roles, there were a number of secondary tasks, including missions that involve an overlap of responsibility with other government agencies. In this category were a range of activities; protecting our offshore estate; contributing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities for border protection; assisting civil authorities protect major events and deal with counterproliferation; supporting emergency response efforts for natural disasters within Australia and our neighbourhood; and providing marine search and rescue.

The rationale was that the ADF possesses a range of specialised capabilities on a scale and of a kind available from no other Australian agency and that humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations need to be closely integrated with efforts by civilian agencies.

Sometimes the ADF would be expected to be the lead agency—in circumstances where there might be a need to demonstrate a willingness and capacity to employ military force, or where its substantial level of capacity is required in circumstances that are beyond that of other agencies. In other cases, the ADF will take a more secondary role. The evacuation of Australian nationals from foreign trouble spots might be one such case. Read more

Graph of the week: Comparative defence spending revisited

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Andrew’s recent chart demonstrated how Australia’s defence spending equals the combined budgets of the five biggest spending ASEAN countries. Charts like this do a great job of communicating the magnitudes of spending involved, and put the budget cuts in perspective. There is a danger, however, that our appetite for budget comparisons can lead us astray.

When analysing countries of different sizes with different economies, comparing budgets in absolute dollar terms is misleading. Where labour rates are lower, that component of the budget is reduced. Where a nation has a large population and a conscription policy or retains a large military reserve, the nation can devote resources to a defence capability that isn’t captured accurately by the defence budget.

One attempt to broaden the measure of resources dedicated to defence is the Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC) Global Militarization Index (GMI). The GMI aims to objectively depict worldwide militarisation, and is calculated on the basis of quantifiable aspects such as the availability of heavy weapons, and the size of the military budget in comparison to the healthcare budget.

The GMI is especially effective at illustrating regional military power balances. For example, it can capture the effect where one nation may ratchet up their militarisation through increased conscription (at low cost) and a neighbouring nation (where that solution is not politically acceptable) responds with increased spending on defence capital.

For comparison with last week’s charts, I’ve charted the GMIs over the same period (click to enlarge). Read more

Reader response: Singapore’s relations with the US and China

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Jason Lim responds to Tim Huxley’s post on Singapore–US relations:

The relationship between China, the United States and Singapore is a complex one. Singapore has always seen itself as an ally of the United States since the days of the Cold War. In the 1960s and 1970s, with Singapore combating what it saw as the twin evils of communism and Chinese chauvinism, China was regarded as a major proponent for the destabilising of non-communist Asian regimes. Even after China launched its ‘reform and opening up’ policy in 1982, the official policy in Singapore has been to monitor the progress of Chinese economic reforms while maintaining a diplomatic distance from it. Passports issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs in Singapore list China as one of the countries the passport holder is not expected to visit unless permission has been given by the Singapore government.

Singapore still pursues a policy of ‘non-alignment’, with China replacing the position of the Soviet Union. Singapore recognises the economic and military value of having the United States as an ally but it does not place China in the same position. Singapore has taken a soft approach towards China, training its political leaders, provincial officials and civil servants in financial management and public administration. It is hoped that this approach will cement Sino-Singapore ties. Singapore has always maintained a position that it does not pursue any position that will be detrimental to the interests of Southeast Asia, chiefly its neighbours Malaysia and Indonesia. Singapore established diplomatic ties with China only in 1991, after Indonesia and Malaysia had done so. The recent dispute in the South China Sea between China and some Southeast Asian nations (Malaysia, Brunei, Philippines and Vietnam) has revealed that Singapore’s position has not radically changed with the rise of China. Just last week, Emeritus Senior Minister Goh Chok Tong said, ‘Whether we like it or not, after the 45th AMM [ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in July 2012], the South China Sea will remain a test case of ASEAN’s ability to forge consensus on difficult problems and act in the region’s broader interests’. China is seen to be a potential threat, even if the Singapore government does not explicitly say so.

Jason Lim is a lecturer in Asian history at the University of Wollongong.

Force expansion and warning time (part I)

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The twin notions of force expansion and warning time have been integral to Australian defence planning since the 1970s. Yet over the years the focus on these issues has been neither strong nor consistent. Today, in the new age of Asia, we have to ask if these ideas are still relevant. In the first part of this post, I explore their conceptual foundations and history; in the second, I’ll draw some conclusions for defence policy, including ideas that the 2013 Defence White Paper could usefully pick up.

Time is often the neglected dimension of defence planning, yet its consideration is central to practical defence decision-making, including the allocation of resources. Two examples illustrate the principle. First, readiness and sustainability can be major consumers of resources, so not all elements of a defence force are kept at short notice for operations. There will usually be a spectrum of preparedness: counterterrorist forces able to move within hours at one end of the range, and reserve forces mostly able to move only after many months at the other. Second is the idea of reconstitution or mobilisation: when threats emerge, the defence force will be expanded and, conversely, when threats go away, as at the end of the World Wars and the Cold War, forces will be reduced. So time is an important parameter in a government’s approach to defence policy and risk management.

In Australia’s case, the end of the war in Vietnam called for fresh thinking about defence policy. The emerging ideas of the Defence of Australia filled some of this gap, but there was a need also for an analytical basis from which to argue for levels of defence funding—else the prospective budget cuts at a time of evident ‘low threat’ would have been harsh. This led the then deputy secretary, Gordon Blakers, to develop the concept of the core force and expansion base. In brief, a force-in-being would evolve which would both meet the demands of those lesser contingencies that might arise in the shorter term, and be the base from which expansion would occur in the event of major strategic deterioration. Intelligence would be critical in assessing warning time and ensuring that expansion would be timely. Read more

Australia in the Indo-Pacific century?

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Defence Minister Stephen Smith used his ASPI speech on Wednesday night to make the definitive case for bringing the White Paper forward by a year. Close followers of the defence debate will be familiar with his strategic themes, but some interesting points emerged that hint at potentially sharp discussions around the Cabinet table. Most notable of these was Smith’s emphasis on the growing strategic importance of the Indian Ocean region: ‘In this century, the Asia–Pacific and the Indian Ocean Rim, what some now refer to as the Indo-Pacific, will become the world’s strategic centre of gravity.’

Smith does not just mean India; he is talking about the factors which drive Chinese and US interest in the region, in Indonesia’s growing role above and beyond ASEAN and in the wider range of countries around the Indian Ocean that engage Australia’s strategic and commercial interests. Smith sees the US as an integral part of the Indo-Pacific and says that ‘substantially enhanced practical cooperation between Australia and the US is an essential part of Australia’s contribution to regional peace and security.’

Let’s be clear: if geographic terms have any meaning, this is not a vision of ‘Australia in the Asian Century’—the working title of Dr Ken Henry’s white paper. Stephen Smith is painting on a broader canvas, one which defines a wider set of Australian interests and which explicitly incorporates the United States. Australia will have two white papers, released perhaps some six or nine months apart. If these documents are truly to provide blue-prints for government decision-making, they should agree on how to think about the region and Australia’s place in it. Read more

To shun or to embrace? Australia–US relations and China’s rise (part II)

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Minister Smith and General LiangIn my first post, I argued while there are very good historical reasons Australia should stay close to the United States, there are a number of factors for Defence White Paper writers to consider. Here, I’ll tease out those factors Australia should take into account in deciding whether to further embrace or to shun additional US overtures for security engagement in an attempt to placate a rising China.

Firstly, China has some valid strategic concerns. It has resource insecurity and needs to import masses of energy and raw materials to sustain its economy. It also needs to keep open its sea lines of communication. This makes it vulnerable to competing pressures—not unlike the way Japan was vulnerable to American embargoes in the early 1940s. It isn’t unreasonable that China would want to have a greater sense of security and a confidence that it wouldn’t be subject to blackmail on the open seas.

China also has some understandable historical grudges. In considering the Opium Wars of the 19th century, we look back in horror at what the West, particularly Britain, was prepared to do to China to get its economic way there. Then, in the first half of the 20th century, what Japan did to China was also horrific. As a result of these legitimate long-held-grievances we’re looking collectively to China to not take it out on us. The concern is that, in light of its memories and longer term view, China might not have the appetite for a polite and restrained accommodation with its neighbours as its power grows and its military capabilities are enhanced. Recent events at the ASEAN meetings in Cambodia and at sea (at the Senkaku Islands, Scarborough Shoals and Paracel Islands, as well as the incident involving the USNS Impeccable in 2009), coupled with China’s aggressive cyber posture, reinforce this concern. Read more

Thinking about defence and risk

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Paul Monk initiated a valuable debate on these pages about the role of risk in defence planning. As it happens, I’ve been thinking along similar lines for sometime myself. So here’s my take on the role of risk in defence planning.

Just to be clear, I’m not talking about ‘risk management’ in the sense used in the 2009 White Paper. That was about hedging against changes in the strategic environment through the maintenance of a robust capability base coupled with regular reassessments. Sensible as that is, it’s at best a fragment of true risk-based approach to defence planning. My agenda is more ambitious; I contend that defence and strategic planning begins and ends with the management of strategic risk.

Let me begin by explaining what I mean by a strategic risk. I define a strategic risk to be an adverse event whose likelihood can be diminished by the possession of armed forces or consequences mitigated through the use of armed force. Other definitions of strategic risk are of course possible—there is at least one for each of the myriad ways in which the word strategic can be used—but this one suits my purposes. (As an aside, Hugh White’s carefully circumscribed definition of strategic interests bears close examination.) Read more

Grand Strategy? Influencing others…

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This post is the second on demystifying grand strategy; it looks at how we can influence others. Grand strategy involves interacting with others in a way that will change them to our advantage. Grand strategy is not the ends sought—we decide that separately—nor is it the resources (the means) we use. Instead grand strategy is a mental roadmap we devise about how to use the people, money and materiel we have, we can build, we can hire or we can borrow to try to move others where we want them to go.

There are intrinsically three broad types of ways we can influence others as part of a grand strategy. Denial involves stopping others doing what they would like to do. Engagement involves helping others achieve what they—and ultimately we—want. Reform involves changing the social principles and rules that drive others’ actions. Each type has its own particular way to achieve an objective, but crucially different outcomes require using different grand strategies.

A denial grand strategy assumes that superior power determines outcomes; you can stop others achieving their objectives by being more powerful than them. Military and economic might is used in ways that deters or, if need be, physically stop others from engaging in undesirable behaviour. You become more powerful through building up your own military and economic power, forming alliances, or both. The problem with alliances though is that your allies may only be fair-weather friends seeking to maximise their benefits. Read more