Northern sovereign maritime sustainment

This special report explores the future of maritime sustainment in northern Australia through the lens of regional maintenance centres proposed under the Department of Defence’s Plan Galileo. Included in the report is consideration of the strategic environment and implications for the north, overview of the Australian Navy maritime sustainment, Plan Galileo, and discussion of US maritime sustainment model.

Maritime sustainment in Australia’s north presents far-reaching opportunities and new challenges for the Department of Defence, industry and local governments. Traditional Defence and industry models used in Australia’s southern states have less utility in the north if they aren’t adapted to the region’s unique economic context. As such, a deeper understanding of industry capability in the north coupled with greater collaboration and partnering is needed to overcome those challenges and take advantage of the opportunities.

In developing the report, the authors consulted a wide range of stakeholders. They included representatives from the Department of Defence, people representing the interests of the state, territory and local governments in northern Australia, port operators in Australia’s north, business organisations and the defence industry.
The report highlights opportunities that could arise from improved collaboration between Defence, local governments, defence industry and SMEs. This report has again reinforced the need for the Australia government to articulate how it will utilise northern Australia’s strategic geography as a strength both now and in a future conflict if deterrence fails.

The Australian Government needs to consider how to harness interests from different fields and identify points where the government may have to intervene with policies—and investments—that shape and enhance market forces. That’s a big shift from just thinking through how it ‘might’ take advantage of market forces and existing capacity and capability as circumstances change.

SBY’s tears: from managing crisis to managing process in Australia-Indonesia relations since the fall of Suharto

On 21 May 1998, Suharto resigned as president of Indonesia, ending the authoritarian New Order regime he had led since 1966.

In the 23 years since, Indonesia has had five presidents. It became the world’s third largest democracy. It granted wider powers to its regions while losing one province, East Timor, to independence. It emerged as one of the world’s top ten economies (in PPP terms) and a member of the G20, which it will chair in 2022.

At the same time, Indonesia has suffered grievously from terrorism and the greatest natural disaster in recorded history. Its democracy is now taking an illiberal turn. Corruption is rife and inequality is worsening. Separatism remains an issue.

This series plots this history and Australia’s part in it through the eyes and experience of six of its ambassadors to Jakarta over this period. It reveals a fundamental shift from a relationship defined by crisis management to one that’s now more about process management, and offers advice on how Canberra should build our ties at a time of greater geopolitical challenges.

Episode 1 – John McCarthy AO

In this episode, David Engel, Head of ASPI’s Indonesia program, and former ASPI Research Intern Hillary Mansour speak to John McCarthy AO, who was Ambassador to Indonesia from 1997 to 2001. They discuss some of the major developments during his time in the post, including the fall of Suharto, President Habibie and the Reformasi, East Timor, the election of Gus Dur and former prime minister John Howard’s relationship with the country’s leaders.

Episode 2 – Ric Smith AO

In this episode, Dr David Engel and Hillary Mansour speak to Ric Smith AO, PSM, who was Australia’s Ambassador to Indonesia from 2001 until 2002. The conversation explores economic reform after the Asian Financial Crisis, the end of Gus Dur’s presidency and the beginning of Megawati’s presidency, and the state of Australia’s relationship with Indonesia during Smith’s tenure. They also discuss the Tampa affair and the 2002 Bali bombings, and how Australia should engage with its northern neighbour.

Episode 3 – David Ritchie AO

In this episode, Dr David Engel and Hillary Mansour speak to David Ritchie AO, who was Australia’s Ambassador to Indonesia from 2002 until 2005. This discuss the different crisis which took place during his time as ambassador including the 2004 Boxing Day Tsunami, a terror attack on the Australian Embassy and the arrest of the Bali Nine. They explore Australia-Indonesia cooperation in addressing these challenges and how the relationship changed during Ritchie’s time as ambassador.

Episode 4 – Bill Farmer AO

In this episode of ASPI’s special series, Dr David Engel speaks to Bill Farmer AO, Ambassador to Indonesia from 2005 until 2010. They discuss the pivotal moments in the Australia-Indonesia relationship during Bill’s tenure, SBY’s presidency and Indonesia’s response to the Global Financial Crisis, and Indonesia’s foreign policy. They also reflect on the signing of the Lombok Treaty, developments in people smuggling and counterterrorism and highlight how Australia should approach its northern neighbour going forward.

Episode 5 – Gary Quinlan AO

In this episode of ‘SBY’s tears’, Dr David Engel, Head of ASPI’s Indonesia Program and Hillary Mansour, former ASPI Research Intern, speak to Gary Quinlan AO, who was Ambassador to Indonesia from 2018 until 2021. Their conversation explores developments in the Australia-Indonesia economic relationship, the development of Indonesia’s democracy and the relationship between religion and politics in the country. They also consider the impacts of climate change and Covid-19 on Indonesia and Australia’s use of soft power.

Episode 6 – Greg Moriarty

In the penultimate episode of the series, Dr David Engel, Head of ASPI’s Indonesia Program and Hillary Mansour, former ASPI Research Intern, speak to Greg Moriarty, who was ambassador to Indonesia from 2010 until 2014. Their conversation explores Indonesia’s foreign policy under SBY, the bilateral economic relationship and cooperation in the area of counter-terrorism. They also discuss some of the challenges in the bilateral relationship, such as the banning of live cattle exports to Indonesia and people smuggling.

Episode 7 – Series Final

In this final episode of the series, Dr David Engel, Head of ASPI’s Indonesia Program and Hillary Mansour, former ASPI Research Intern, revisit some of the themes explored throughout the series, such as Indonesia’s foreign policy, its relationship with Australia and the changes to Indonesian democracy. They reflect on the past experiences of Australia’s ambassadors, and how these lessons can impact our future relationship with Indonesia.

North of 26 degrees south and the security of Australia: views from The Strategist, Volume 4

The 27 essays in the collection demonstrate that Australia’s north—that great sweep of territory from Rockhampton in the east to Onslow in the west, taking in Townsville, Bamaga, Darwin and Broome—is about a whole lot more than even what makes its way into the national debate (borders, quarantine facilities, mining, agricultural and energy projects, and small but key defence facilities).

Between them, the authors of this volume cover proposals for an Indigenous civil defence force to work domestically and in our near region, the opportunities for processing critical minerals and producing rare-earth magnets, a broader way of thinking about and doing nation-building that gets beyond waiting for one big first-mover investor or entrepreneur before anything happens, and, of course, the ways that Australia can better use this huge chunk of the globe’s strategic geography—along with key partners like Japan and the United States.

As thinkers who understand the austere environment of our north, the authors are all distinguished by a sense of opportunity, optimism and even that much-maligned, now neglected word ‘vision’—which history shows is what’s needed to advance the development and prosperity of the north of our continent.

What is AUKUS and what is it not?

What IS the new AUKUS partnership between the US, the UK and Australia? How does it fit with the Quad, ASEAN and other new forums like the government-tech Sydney Dialogue?

This new ASPI Insight sets out what AUKUS is—a technology accelerator that’s’ about shifting the military balance in the Indo Pacific. Just as importantly, it sets out what AUKUS it isn’t, to reset some of the discussion that has made some assumptions here. AUKUS isn’t a new alliance structure, a competitor to the Quad between Australia, India, Japan and the US, or a signal of decreased commitment to ASEAN forums by the AUKUS members.

And the Insight proposes some focus areas for implementation of this new ‘minilateral’ technology accelerator, including having  a single empowered person in each nation charged with implementation and ‘obstacle busting’. This is to break through the institutional, political and corporate permafrost that has prevented such rapid technological adoption by our militaries in recent decades. As is the case with James Miller in the US, this person should report to their national leader, not from inside the defence bureaucracies of the three nations.

On purpose and urgency, the report identifies a simple performance metric for AUKUS implementers over the next three years. On 20 January 2025, when the Australian prime minister calls whoever is the US president on that day, AUKUS has become such a successful piece of the furniture, with tangible results that have generated broad institutional, political and corporate support that, regardless of how warm or testy this leaders’ phone call is (think Turnbull-Trump in January 2016), AUKUS’s momentum continues.

Collaborative and agile. Intelligence community collaboration insights from the United Kingdom and the United States

The central aim of this report is to generate insights from the US and UK intelligence communities’ collaboration efforts. It identifies insights so that members of Australia’s national intelligence community, including the ONI, can use them to enhance the community’s collaboration and agility for the purpose of giving Australian decision-makers an insight edge over others. We acknowledge that agencies must contextualise those insights to Australia’s specific circumstances, and we’ve sought to do some of that in this report. The report isn’t intended as an academic think piece but as a guide-and goad-to actions that can advance and protect Australia’s wellbeing, prosperity and security.

This report doesn’t seek to second-guess the internal insights that it explores. Instead, it takes an external perspective, informed by experience in relevant agencies and by perspectives from intelligence-community partners and analysts in the UK and the US.

China’s cyber vision: How the Cyberspace Administration of China is building a new consensus on global internet governance

This report provides a primer on the roots of the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) within China’s policy system, and sheds light on the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) intentions to use cyberspace as a tool for shaping discourse domestically and internationally.

The report details the position of the Cyberspace Administration of China in China’s propaganda system. Considering its origins in the former Party Office of External Propaganda, the authors argue that ‘countries that lack comprehensive cyber regulations should err on the side of caution when engaging with the CCP on ideas for establishing an international cyber co-governance strategy.’

By assessing the CCP’s strategy of becoming a ‘cyber superpower’, its principle of ‘internet sovereignty’, and its concept of ‘community of common destiny for cyberspace’, this report seeks to address how the CCP is working to build a consensus on the future of who will set the rules, norms and values of the internet.

The report also examines the World Internet Conference – a ‘platform through which the CCP promotes its ideas on internet sovereignty and global governance’ – and its links to the CAC.

Translated versions of this report are also available in IndonesianMalaysianThai, and Vietnamese.
The translation of these reports has been supported by the U.S. State Department.

The Sydney Dialogue: Playbook

Major advances in technology have always been disruptive. But when they occur against a backdrop of great power competition, the stable development and deployment of these technologies becomes fraught.

Few have grasped the enormity of the disruption coming our way as more and more new technologies – from increasingly sophisticated surveillance to quantum and biotechnologies – are deployed across the world. While governments grapple with foreseeing the full impacts and setting policy direction, there’s a growing realisation that emerging and critical technologies will be extraordinarily important for societies, economies and national security.

We launched The Sydney Dialogue to support a more stable roll-out of the next wave of transformational technologies. It is a forum allowing for frank debate about the rapidly changing strategic landscape, and a space for governments, business and civil society to come together to focus on solutions, cooperation and policy options.

The Sydney Dialogue came about because we saw big gaps in forums on technology, especially in the Indo-Pacific. There were industry events that showcased the latest technical advances and products, but they tended to eschew policy debates, and did not encompass government and civil society. There were important government multilateral discussion and policymaking forums, but these usually lagged well behind technological advances, and because they were primarily for governments, key global players – including those making the technology – weren’t part of the discussion. And there were excellent civil society initiatives, but these often focused on individual topics that were only one piece of a larger puzzle. Few of these initiatives focused on or resonated in the Indo-Pacific – the region that incubates much of the world’s technological innovation and has become a hotbed of strategic technological competition.

These gaps drove us towards a dynamic where all the key actors were speaking past one another, while rarely all being in the same room. Tech companies are developing and deploying products that are revolutionary and hugely disruptive. A decade later, governments are scrambling to retrospectively legislate to address issues they did not foresee, and civil society is critiquing from the sidelines.

Right now, three major problems must be addressed to ensure the stable development of advanced technologies.

First, there’s the large lag between the deployment of new technologies and regulation governing them. With social media, this lag was about a decade. As we’ve seen, this doesn’t lead to good outcomes for individuals, or for societies.

Second, there’s a delay between states’ use of new technologies and their consideration of the ethical questions raised by its use. Examples of this can be seen in the global surveillance industry, which has allowed its products to support some of the most egregious human rights abuses of our times.

Third, a tense relationship between governments and technology companies is playing out around the world. The negative dynamic that has taken hold is hindering progress and genuine cooperation, leaving democracies at risk of being left behind.

The Sydney Dialogue seeks to fill a gap and contribute towards these big challenges. By bringing world leaders, tech company CEOs and the world’s top civil society voices together for an annual dialogue, we hope the roll-out of the next wave of revolutionary technologies over the coming decade can be better managed.

This collection of striking essays from some of the world’s top strategic thinkers from across business, government and civil society is a fitting way to start this dialogue. It explores timely debates at the forefront of technology and examines points of crisis and tension in the nexus of society, government and technology. Crucially, it offers innovative ideas to solve these challenges and bring about a brighter, fairer Indo-Pacific.

The following pieces bring us all a much-needed dose of optimism and show that in many cases, the solutions already exist – we just need to work together to bring them to life.

Read the Playbook: Online

Myanmar’s coup, ASEAN’s crisis: And the implications for Australia

The rapidly unfolding Myanmar crisis is presenting Southeast Asia with one of its most severe security and stability threats in the past three decades. While the region is certainly familiar with military coups and violent changes of government, the ongoing crisis in Myanmar carries risks far more acute than previous coups d’etat in the region.

One of them is the risk to the sustained modus operandi of the region’s key institution—the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The outcome of ASEAN’s involvement in the Myanmar crisis is consequential not only for the Myanmar people, but also for the association’s ability to credibly lead efforts to preserve peace and security in the region into the future.

In this report, we assess the security situation in Myanmar, ASEAN’s collective response and the individual roles of key ASEAN member states in the mediating process. We focus on the effect that the Myanmar crisis has on the overall ASEAN political and security situation, and highlight Indonesia’s leadership, and limitations, in the process. We also detail the legal instruments and responsibility of ASEAN—in the form of the ASEAN Charter—to uphold the rule of law. The report concludes with some policy implications for the wider region, particularly Australia.

Sliding-door moments: ANZUS and the Blue Pacific

The report examines some key ‘sliding-door’ moments that have shaped the trajectory of ANZUS in the Pacific Island region over seven decades, to reach the current confused state within the alliance regarding its aims in the Pacific Islands.

Our Pacific neighbours recognise that their security is tied up with the region’s new and complex geopolitical environment and they have made it clear that they have no wish to be a catspaw in any strategic rivalries.

The report argues that ANZUS has not been fully functional as an alliance for several decades. If its three members are not unified on Pacific Island regional security, the alliance can scarcely advance the Islands concerns more widely.

For these reasons, the report recommends that ANZUS strengthen its internal machinery by finding the accommodation needed to resume ANZUS Council Meetings. It also recommends using the Treaty’s Article VIII provisions to incorporate supportive extra-regional powers into an ‘ANZUS Plus’ While recognising that ANZUS isn’t a humanitarian aid agency, as co-author Dr Anthony Bergin notes, “we can’t ignore the security importance of regional infrastructure.”

The report also recommends that the ANZUS allies act proactively through national aid programmes to identify and protect these interests in partnership with the Island states’ public and private sectors to prevent key assets becoming strategic bones of contention.

Snapshot in a turbulent time: Australian HADR capabilities, challenges and opportunities

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Australia has demonstrated the capacity and capabilities for fast, scalable responses to disasters and humanitarian crises in recent history. Australian governments, agencies, NGOs and the public have proven determined and flexible in both domestic and regional disasters and humanitarian crises. 

Looking forward, Australia’s established capabilities are facing new and growing challenges in disaster preparedness and response. The Indo-Pacific is facing a complex network of established, evolving and intersecting climate, conflict and human-security risks.

Without innovation in strategy and capabilities, the financial cost of regional disasters will continue to vastly outpace the capacity of Australia to fund preparedness and response efforts comprehensively enough to mitigate the human and strategic security risks those disasters pose.

This report presents a snapshot view of the current Indo-Pacific threatscape looking forward for Australia; takes a retrospective look at how key Australian HADR capabilities have been developed through lessons from domestic and regional disasters; considers the possible value in a strategy for what value-add northern Australia can bring to national HADR capabilities; and presents three areas of ‘low-hanging fruit’ for HADR capability uplift.