AUKUS has a heavy focus on R&D of military capabilities. A number of departments, including defence, foreign affairs and prime ministerial equivalents are engaged. The science and technology to deliver those capabilities must resolve issues of insecure supply chains. Currently, supply chains for processed critical minerals and their resulting materials aren’t specifically included.
Yet all AUKUS capabilities, and the rules-based order that they uphold, depend heavily on critical minerals. China eclipses not only AUKUS for processing those minerals into usable forms, but the rest of the world combined. Without critical minerals, states are open to economic coercion in various technological industries, and defence manufacturing is particularly exposed to unnecessary supply-chain challenges.
This is where Australia comes in. Australia has the essential minerals, which are more readily exploitable because they’re located in less densely populated or ecologically sensitive areas. Australia also has the right expertise, including universities offering the appropriate advanced geoscience degrees, as well as advanced infrastructure, world-class resources technology and deep industry connections with Asia and Africa, which are also vital global sources of critical minerals.
This paper outlines why Australia offers an unrivalled rallying point to drive secure critical-mineral supply among a wide field of vested nations, using AUKUS but not limited to AUKUS partners, how WA has globally superior reserves and substantial expertise, and why northern Australia more generally has a key role to play. The paper also explains why policy action here must be prioritised by the Australian Government.
https://aspi.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/12223519/AUKUS-critical-minerals_banner.jpg4501350nathanhttps://aspi.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/10130806/ASPI-Logo.pngnathan2023-06-22 06:00:002025-03-06 15:14:11AUKUS and critical minerals: Hedging Beijing’s pervasive, clever and coordinated statecraft
The Northern Australia Strategic Policy Centre’s latest report, North of 26 degrees south and the security of Australia: views from The Strategist, Volume 7, is a series of articles published in The Strategist over the last six months. It builds on previous volumes by identifying critical intersections of national security, nation-building, resilience and Australia’s north.
This issue, like previous volumes, includes a wide range of articles sourced from a diverse pool of expert contributors writing on topics as varied as critical minerals, rare earth, equatorial space launch, agriculture, advanced manufacturing, fuel and water security, and defence force posturing. Importantly, it addresses the Defence Strategic from a northern Australian perspective. It also features a foreword by the Honourable Madeleine King MP, Minister for Northern Australia.
Minister King writes, “Northern Australia is central to the prosperity, security and future of our nation and will be the engine room of Australia’s decarbonisation effort and drive towards net zero.”
The 24 articles propose concrete, real-world actions for policy-makers to facilitate the development, prosperity and security of Australia’s north. The authors share a sense that those things that make the north unique – its vast space, low population density, specific geography, and harsh investment environment – are characteristics that can be leveraged, not disadvantages.
https://aspi.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/13205343/SI181-NorthOf26-V7-banner.jpg4501350nathanhttps://aspi.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/10130806/ASPI-Logo.pngnathan2023-06-19 06:00:002025-03-06 14:55:40North of 26 degrees south and the security of Australia: Views from The Strategist, Volume 7
This is a very different year for the defence budget. We are in a time of significant change and upheaval.
Uncertainty is rife, but some fundamentals can help in working through uncertainty, especially in the world of defence policy, planning, capability programming and budget. The order of those words is important.
Defence budgets are not arbitrary. Capability requirements must drive budgets. It doesn’t mean that the budget is unlimited but it demands that governments consider proposals for what is required and assess what can be afforded. If budgets drive capability, it risks the true capability needs not being put to government which results in failure to ask of government what they are elected to do – make decisions based on all available information.
The oft-cited metric of defence spend as a percentage of GDP is helpful as a point of comparison on the rate of effort of specific economies towards defence outcomes. It establishes a baseline from which we can measure – and therefore tell a story about – defence spending over time, and in the context of broader geopolitics. The low percentages across major European economies helps to illustrate why deterrence failed against the Putin regime and should be a lesson for all in relation to why defence spending is so important for managing tension and long-term peace.
But a percentage in isolation is not helpful in assessing whether the budget allocated to Defence will allow it to deliver the capabilities for which the government has asked.
The Albanese government released the 2023 Defence Strategic Review (DSR) and its Portfolio Budget Statements (Budget) within weeks of one another. The DSR establishes the future strategic direction for the Department of Defence and the ADF, including by identifying priorities that must be acted upon in the immediate term. The Budget represents a continuity approach with the strategic and budgetary guidance from the 2020 Defence Strategic Update and 2016 Defence White Paper.
There is, therefore, a disconnect between the two. This can be addressed and will be through a series of further reviews and specific activities to be progressed by Defence in the coming year. There are significant additional bodies of work yet to be finalised that will affect the future defence budget; all indications point to a steady and possibly substantial rise.
Australia must of course invest in defence capability commensurate with the challenges of the strategic environment. Crucially, however, the role of defence to help deter wars, while being ready for times of conflict, requires spending even in times of relative peace. A detailed discussion of how defence is budgeted to both deter and win wars, and the external and internal dynamics that drive budget (and other) programming and management, is more important today than at any time in the post-Cold War era. This document is a must read for those interested in current and future defence spending and for increased understanding of its importance to the government’s overall budget theme of providing increased certainty to Australians in an increasingly uncertain world.
Executive summary
Defence has long been seen as a necessary burden on the federal budget. However, it is assuming the status of an urgent priority in the wake of the AUKUS agreement and the far-reaching reform urged by this year’s Defence Strategic Review (DSR). Both are responding to a much more challenging geopolitical environment and the realisation that Australia doesn’t have the luxury of time to achieve readiness.
This year’s Defence budget reflects the urgency of the demands upon Defence to the extent that it includes the initial spending on the nuclear-powered submarines and the first response to the DSR, despite there being only very approximate estimates for how that spending is to be scheduled and for the savings that will pay for them.
However, the urgency of the demands upon Defence isn’t reflected in its short-term funding. The only increase in the Defence budget over the next three years is compensation for the increased cost of imported military equipment flowing from a fall in the value of the Australian dollar.
Excluding this, the core funding of Defence (not including the Australian Signals Directorate) has actually been reduced at a time when unprecedented demands are being placed upon it. Between 2023-4 and 2025-6, Defence funding, excluding compensation for adverse foreign exchange movements, drops from $154.0 billion to $152.5 billion.
Both the AUKUS submarines and the DSR conclusions highlight an approach in which capability will drive budget conversations – not vice versa. That is welcome. But there is clearly much more work to be done to clarify the capability implications of the DSR, and then reflect those accurately – and at the appropriate time – in the budget.
The difficulty in bringing the DSR reforms and the spending on submarines into the budget is understandable. The timing of the DSR meant it reached the staff compiling the Defence budget very late in the annual process, while the nuclear-powered submarine program is of historically unprecedented complexity for any government project. The broad outline of the submarine program was only announced in March 2023.
New programs responding to the DSR such as a long-range strike capability or the hardening of the northern Australian bases, are not the subject of budget measures, with Defence expected to provide the additional funds needed with savings obtained from other programs.
Funding in each year continues to move faster than the predicted annual rate of inflation, consistent with the recommendations of the 2016 Defence White Paper (DWP) and the 2020 Defence StrategicUpdate (DSU).
However, the Defence Department’s financial controllers have fewer real resources to work with over the next three years than they were expecting in March 2022, when the Budget still contained the French submarine program and the DSR hadn’t even been commissioned.
The surge of inflation over the past year has made the constraints of a reduced funding base even tighter. The Treasury now expects inflation to reach 6% this year, or double the level it predicted a year ago. Inflation is being powered, both in Australia and globally, in large part by an overheated economy that’s the result of record low interest rates and large government deficits and further exacerbated by the impact of the Russian invasion of Ukraine on food and energy markets.
With unemployment at near record lows, Defence has been unable to meet its recruitment targets, which has been further exacerbated by increasing separation rates among uniformed personnel.
Defence had planned for the ADF to raise its numbers this year (2022-23) by 2,201 but instead faced a contraction in size by 1,389 uniformed personnel.
The rigid constraints on Defence funding over the next four years reflect the Treasury’s judgement that total government spending must be curbed if inflation is to be brought under control. Treasury’s economic forecasts assume that the combined efforts of government and the Reserve Bank of Australia will succeed in taming inflation over the next 18 months, bringing inflation back into the Reserve Bank’s target band by 2024-25.
The government will start providing increased funding for defence from 2027-28 onwards. An amount of $30.5 billion has been set aside for defence spending out to 2032-33. It’s expected that this will increase the defence share of GDP from around 2.05% to more than 2.3%. The additional funding will lift Defence’s share of government spending from about 8.2% now, including both operational and capital spending, to about 9.7% by 2032-33.
However, the principal task for Defence over the year ahead is to decide how to reconfigure its force structure and capability acquisition programs in line with the DSR and the difficult budget constraint.
That work is to be completed ahead of the planned 2024 National Defence Strategy, which is expected to be released before next year’s budget. The uncertainty surrounding the existing Integrated Investment Program (IIP) will affect defence industry as the scope and schedules of major programs are reviewed. Although Defence has raised the share of its procurement sourced domestically from about 45% to 55% over the past five years, it’s possible that the pressure to acquire new capabilities quickly will result in more ‘off-the-shelf’ imports.
Given the intense re-ordering of the Defence capital program expected over the year ahead, this year’s ASPI defence budget brief isn’t a detailed examination of the major acquisition programs. Rather, it’s a guide for the government, industry, academia and citizens interested in Australian defence strategy, capability and budget.
The strategic context for the 2023-24 defence budget is complex and extremely challenging. There’s currently a gap, and quite a significant one, between the rhetoric of the 2023 DSR and the 2023-24 defence budget (and forward estimates). How Defence and the rest of government will work together to bridge the gap will become clearer over the coming year. This publication focuses on what ASPI can usefully contribute to that process, and where the key issues lie in the defence budget.
https://aspi.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/12141010/The-big-squeeze-ASPI-defence-budget-brief-banner.png515792markohttps://aspi.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/10130806/ASPI-Logo.pngmarko2023-05-30 14:07:452025-03-12 15:33:15The big squeeze
AUKUS, and the Australian Government’s release of the 2023 report of the Defence Strategic Review (DSR), reinforce to Canberra and Washington DC that there’s an urgent need to continue strengthening the US–Australia alliance. Those efforts underpin allied cooperation within the Indo-Pacific, which is an increasingly complex security environment.
This report highlights 9 opportunities for both US and Australian defence decision-makers at a vital time in the relationship as it develops in complexity and builds towards the ambitions of AUKUS over the coming decade.
A series of ‘quick wins’ for the US DoD are recommended, including arranging more training for inbound DoD personnel and conducting allied-centric training for relevant US-based action officers and planners at US headquarters. US DoD Funding should be provided for US action officers to visit Australia to build rapport with their counterparts and facilitate appreciation for the relationship in person. Broadly, US professional military education at every level should incorporate Australian Defence-centric views when appropriate, and the DoD can better leverage its US liaison network throughout Australia earlier in planning and when considering new initiatives.
Recommended quick wins for Australian Defence to include further leveraging of US-based Australian Defence personnel and encouraging greater transparency with US counterparts regarding capacity. Enhanced transparency would provide maximum clarity on capacity challenges at all echelons, especially regarding the potential impacts of a future crisis within the Indo-Pacific. It’s also recommended that Australian Defence provide greater clarity regarding sovereignty and security concerns for the US DoD.
Finally, this report also makes a major long-term recommendation that will require more resourcing, coordination and focus from US and Australian defence decision-makers, and that’s to establish and empower a US Forces Australia headquarters (USFOR-A) to synergise US DoD efforts with the Australian defence establishment. It’s inevitable that the US–Australia defence relationship will grow in scope and complexity. That will quickly outgrow and challenge the current coordination structure, which was built and implemented decades ago. This report also notes that there are lessons to be learned from the US–Japan bilateral coordination mechanisms, especially in the light of the US–Japan–Australia defence relationship, as it is set to grow in importance in the coming years.
https://aspi.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/13211916/SR192-ImpactfulMateship-banner.jpg4501350nathanhttps://aspi.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/10130806/ASPI-Logo.pngnathan2023-05-25 06:00:002024-12-13 21:21:29Impactful mateship: Strengthening the US–Australia defence relationship through enhanced mutual understanding
Australia, New Zealand and the United States should help create an ASEAN-style forum for Pacific island nations to discuss security and manage geopolitical challenges.
The call for a dialogue, modelled on the ASEAN regional forum, is one of several recommendations to improve security partnerships and coordination in the region, reducing the risk that the three countries trip over one another and lose sight of the Pacific’s own priorities as they deepen their Pacific ties out of strategic necessity amid China’s growing interest.
While focussing on those three countries, this report stresses that wider partnerships should be considered, including with France, India, Japan, South Korea, the United Kingdom and European Union.
The report states that the three countries will have to get used to greater Chinese involvement in the Pacific, even if they don’t accept it, much less like it.
https://aspi.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/13212236/SR191-SmoothSailing_banner.jpg4501350nathanhttps://aspi.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/10130806/ASPI-Logo.pngnathan2023-05-22 06:00:002024-12-13 21:24:55Smooth sailing? Australia, New Zealand and the United States partnering in–and with–the Pacific islands
The CCP’s increasingly sophisticated cyber-enabled influence operations
What’s the problem?
The Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP’s) embrace of large-scale online influence operations and spreading of disinformation on Western social-media platforms has escalated since the first major attribution from Silicon Valley companies in 2019. While Chinese public diplomacy may have shifted to a softer tone in 2023 after many years of wolf-warrior online rhetoric, the Chinese Government continues to conduct global covert cyber-enabled influence operations. Those operations are now more frequent, increasingly sophisticated and increasingly effective in supporting the CCP’s strategic goals. They focus on disrupting the domestic, foreign, security and defence policies of foreign countries, and most of all they target democracies.
Currently—in targeted democracies—most political leaders, policymakers, businesses, civil society groups and publics have little understanding of how the CCP currently engages in clandestine activities online in their countries, even though this activity is escalating and evolving quickly. The stakes are high for democracies, given the indispensability of the internet and their reliance on open online spaces, free from interference. Despite years of monitoring covert CCP cyber-enabled influence operations by social-media platforms, governments, and research institutes such as ASPI, definitive public attribution of the actors driving these activities is rare. Covert online operations, by design, are difficult to detect and attribute to state actors.
Social-media platforms and governments struggle to devote adequate resources to identifying, preventing and deterring increasing levels of malicious activity, and sometimes they don’t want to name and shame the Chinese Government for political, economic and/or commercial reasons.
But when possible, public attribution can play a larger role in deterring malicious actors. Understanding which Chinese Government entities are conducting such operations, and their underlying doctrine, is essential to constructing adequate counter-interference and deterrence strategies. The value of public attribution also goes beyond deterrence. For example, public attribution helps civil society and businesses, which are often the intended targets of online influence operations, to understand the threat landscape and build resilience against malicious activities. It’s also important that general publics are given basic information so that they’re informed about the contemporary security challenges a country is facing, and public attribution helps to provide that information.
ASPI research in this report—which included specialised data collection spanning Twitter, Facebook, Reddit, Sina Weibo and ByteDance products—reveals a previously unreported CCP cyber-enabled influence operation linked to the Spamouflage network, which is using inauthentic accounts to spread claims that the US is irresponsibly conducting cyber-espionage operations against China and other countries. As a part of this research, we geolocated some of the operators of that network to Yancheng in Jiangsu Province, and we show it’s possible that at least some of the operators behind Spamouflage are part of the Yancheng Public Security Bureau.
The CCP’s clandestine efforts to influence international public opinion rely on a very different toolkit today compared to its previous tactics of just a few years ago. CCP cyber-enabled influence operations remain part of a broader strategy to shape global public opinion and enhance China’s ‘international discourse power’. Those efforts have evolved to nudge public opinion towards positions more favourable to the CCP and to interfere in the political decision-making processes of other countries. A greater focus on covert social-media accounts allows the CCP to pursue its interests while providing a plausibly deniable cover.
Emerging technologies and China’s indigenous cybersecurity industry are also creating new capabilities for the CCP to continue operating clandestinely on Western social platforms.
Left unaddressed, the CCP’s increasing investment in cyber-enabled influence operations threatens to successfully influence the economic decision-making of political elites, destabilise social cohesion during times of crisis, sow distrust of leaders or democratic institutions and processes, fracture alliances and partnerships, and deter journalists, researchers and activists from sharing accurate information about China.
What’s the solution?
This report provides the first public empirical review of the CCP’s clandestine online networks on social-media platforms.
We outline seven key policy recommendations for governments and social-media platforms (further details are on page 39):
Social-media platforms should take advantage of the digital infrastructure, which they control, to more effectively deter cyber-enabled influence operations. To disrupt future influence operations, social-media platforms could remove access to those analytics for suspicious accounts breaching platform policies, making it difficult for identified malicious actors to measure the effectiveness of influence operations.
Social-media platforms should pursue more innovative information-sharing to combat cyber-enabled influence operations. For example, social-media platforms could share more information about the digital infrastructure involved in influence operations, without revealing personally identifiable information.
Governments should change their language in speeches and policy documents to describe social-media platforms as critical infrastructure. This would acknowledge the existing importance of those platforms in democracies and would communicate signals to malicious actors that, like cyber operations on the power grid, efforts to interfere in the information ecosystem will be met with proportionate responses.
Governments should review foreign interference legislation and consider mandating that social-media platforms disclose state-backed influence operations and other transparency reporting to increase the public’s threat awareness.
Public diplomacy should be a pillar of any counter-malign-influence strategy. Government leaders and diplomats should name and shame attributable malign cyber-enabled influence operations, and those entities involved in their operation (state and non-state) to deter those activities.
Partners and allies should strengthen intelligence diplomacy on this emerging security challenge and seek to share more intelligence with one another on such influence operations. Strong open-source intelligence skills and collection capabilities are a crucial part of investigating and attributing these operations, the low classification of which, should making intelligence sharing easier.
Governments should support further research on influence operations and other hybrid threats. To build broader situational awareness of hybrid threats across the region, including malign influence operations, democracies should establish an Indo-Pacific hybrid threats centre.
Key findings
The CCP has developed a sophisticated, persistent capability to sustain coordinated networks of personas on social-media platforms to spread disinformation, wage public-opinion warfare and support its own diplomatic messaging, economic coercion and other levers of state power.
That capability is evolving and has expanded to push a wider range of narratives to a growing international audience with the Indo-Pacific a key target.
The CCP has used these cyber-enabled influence operations to seek to interfere in US politics, Australian politics and national security decisions, undermine the Quad and Japanese defence policies and impose costs on Australian and North American rare-earth mining companies.
CCP cyber-enabled influence operations are probably conducted, in parallel if not collectively, by multiple Chinese party-state agencies. Those agencies appear at times to collaborate with private Chinese companies. The most notable actors that are likely to be conducting such operations include the People’s Liberation Army’s Strategic Support Force (PLASSF), which conducts cyber operations as part of the PLA’s political warfare; the Ministry of State Security (MSS), which conducts covert operations for state security; the Central Propaganda Department, which oversees China’s domestic and foreign propaganda efforts; the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), which enforces China’s internet laws; and the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC), which regulates China’s internet ecosystem. Chinese state media outlets and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) officials are also running clandestine operations that seek to amplify their own overt propaganda and influence activities.
Starting in 2021, a previously unreported CCP cyber-enabled influence operation has been disseminating narratives that the CIA and National Security Agency are ‘irresponsibly conducting cyber-espionage operations against China and other countries’. ASPI isn’t in a position to verify US intelligence agency activities. However, the means used to disseminate the counter-US narrative— this campaign appears to be partly driven by the pro-CCP coordinated inauthentic network known as Spamouflage—strongly suggests an influence operation. ASPI’s research suggests that at least some operators behind the campaign are affiliated with the MPS, or are ‘internet commentators’ hired by the CAC, which may have named this campaign ‘Operation Honey Badger’. The evidence indicates that the Chinese Government probably intended to influence Southeast Asian markets and other countries involved in the Belt and Road Initiative to support the expansion of Chinese cybersecurity companies in those regions.
Chinese cybersecurity company Qi An Xin (奇安信) appears at times it may be supporting the influence operation. The company has the capacity to seed disinformation about advanced persistent threats to its clients in Southeast Asia and other countries. It’s deeply connected with Chinese intelligence, military and security services and plays an important role in China’s cybersecurity and state security strategies.
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The Quad has prioritised supporting and guiding investment in critical and emerging technology projects consistent with its intent to maintain a free and open Indo-Pacific.
Governments cannot do this alone. Success requires a concerted and coordinated effort between governments, industry, private capital partners and civil society.
To explore opportunities and challenges to this success, the Quad Critical and Emerging Technology Working Group convened the inaugural Quad Technology Business and Investment Forum in Sydney, Australia on 2 December 2022. The forum was supported by the Australian Department of Home Affairs and delivered by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI).
The forum brought together senior Quad public- and private-sector leaders, laid the foundations for enhanced private–public collaboration and canvassed a range of practical action-oriented initiatives. Sessions were designed to identify the key challenges and opportunities Quad member nations face in developing coordinated strategic, targeted investment into critical and emerging technology.
Attendees of the forum overwhelmingly endorsed the sentiment that, with our governments, industry, investors and civil society working better together, collectively, our countries can lead the world in quantum technology, artificial intelligence, biotechnology and other critical and emerging technologies.
This report reflects the discussions and key findings from the forum and recommends that the Quad Critical and Emerging Technology Working Group establish an Industry Engagement Sub-Group to develop and deliver a Quad Critical and Emerging Technology Forward Work Plan.
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This paper surveys the current reporting and analysis on climate and security to explore the implications that climate change may have for China’s ability to prosecute its security goals in the region’s three major hotspots: the SCS, Taiwan and the India–China border conflict. Those three hotspots all involve longstanding border and territorial disputes between China and other nations and may draw in various levels of US involvement should China continue to escalate tensions.
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This report surveys China’s enormous energy transition to renewables. It begins by sketching the energy challenges China faces and its climate-change-related energy policies, in the context of the global geopolitics of the energy transformation. Next the report focuses on conventional energy sources (oil and natural gas), followed by electricity, and energy technologies. Although the report is intended primarily to survey developments to date, it concludes with some brief observations about the considerable energy challenges China faces in the years ahead.
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How the CCP is influencing the Pacific islands information environment
What’s the problem?
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is conducting coordinated information operations in Pacific island countries (PICs). Those operations are designed to influence political elites, public discourse and political sentiment regarding existing partnerships with Western democracies. Our research shows how the CCP frequently seeks to capitalise on regional events, announcements and engagements to push its own narratives, many of which are aimed at undermining some of the region’s key partnerships.
This report examines three significant events and developments:
the establishment of AUKUS in 2021
the CCP’s recent efforts to sign a region-wide security agreement
the 2022 Pacific Islands Forum held in Fiji.
This research, including these three case studies, shows how the CCP uses tailored, reactive messaging in response to regional events and analyses the effectiveness of that messaging in shifting public discourse online.
This report also highlights a series of information channels used by the CCP to push narratives in support of the party’s regional objectives in the Pacific. Those information channels include Chinese state media, CCP publications and statements in local media, and publications by local journalists connected to CCP-linked groups.1
There’s growing recognition of the information operations and misinformation and disinformation being spread globally under the CCP’s directives. Although the CCP’s information operations have had little demonstrated effectiveness in shifting online public sentiment in the case studies examined in this report, they’ve previously proven to be effective in influencing public discourse and political elites in the Pacific.2 Analysing the long-term impact of these operations, so that informed policy decisions can be made by governments and by social media platforms, requires greater measurement and understanding of current operations and local sentiment.
What’s the solution?
The CCP’s presence in the information environment is expanding across the Pacific through online and social media platforms, local and China-based training opportunities, and greater television and short-wave radio programming.3 However, the impact of this growing footprint in the information environment remains largely unexplored and unaddressed by policymakers in the Pacific and in the partner countries that are frequently targeted by the CCP’s information operations.
Pacific partners, including Australia, the US, New Zealand, Japan, the UK and the European Union, need to enhance partnerships with Pacific island media outlets and online news forum managers in order to build a stronger, more resilient media industry that will be less vulnerable to disinformation and pressures exerted by the CCP. This includes further assistance in hiring, training and retaining high-quality professional journalists and media executives and providing financial support without conditions to uphold media freedom in the Pacific. Training should be offered to support online discussion forum managers sharing news content to counter the spread of disinformation and misinformation in public online groups. The data analysis in this report highlights a need for policymakers and platforms to invest more resources in countering CCP information operations in Melanesia, which is shown to have greater susceptibility to those operations.
As part of their targeted training package, Pacific island media and security institutions, such as the Pacific Fusion Centre, should receive further training on identifying disinformation and coordinated information operations to help build media resiliency. For that training to be effective, governments should fund additional research into the actors and activities affecting the Pacific islands information environment, including climate-change and election disinformation and misinformation, and foreign influence activities.
Information sharing among PICs’ media institutions would build greater regional understanding of CCP influence in the information environment and other online harms and malign activity. ASPI has also previously proposed that an Indo-Pacific hybrid threats centre would help regional governments, businesses and civil society better understand and counter those threats.4
Pacific partners, particularly Australia and the US, need to be more effective and transparent in communicating how aid delivered to the region is benefiting PICs and building people-to-people links. Locally based diplomats need to work more closely with Pacific media to contextualise information from press releases and statements and give PIC audiences a better understanding of the benefits delivered by Western governments’ assistance. This includes greater transparency on the provision of aid in the region. Doing so will debunk some of the CCP’s narratives regarding Western support and legitimacy in the region.
A number of local journalists and media contributors have connections to CCP-linked entities, such as Pacific friendship associations. The connections between friendship associations and CCP influence are described in Anne-Marie Brady, ‘Australia and its partners must bring the Pacific into the fold on Chinese interference’, The Strategist, 21 April 2022. ↩︎
Blake Johnson, Miah Hammond-Errey, Daria Impiombato, Albert Zhang, Joshua Dunne, Suppressing the truth and spreading lies: how the CCP is influencing Solomon Islands’ information environment, ASPI, Canberra. ↩︎
Richard Herr, Chinese influence in the Pacific islands: the yin and yang of soft power, ASPI, Canberra, 30 April 2019, online; Denghua Zhang, Amanda Watson, ‘China’s media strategy in the Pacific’, In Brief 2020/29, Department of Pacific Affairs, Australian National University, 26 March 2021, online; Dorothy Wickham, ‘The lesson from my trip to China? Solomon Islands not ready to deal with the giant’, The Guardian, 23 December 2019. ↩︎
Lesley Seebeck, Emily Williams, Jacob Wallis, Countering the Hydra: a proposal for an Indo-Pacific hybrid threat centre, ASPI, Canberra, 7 June 2022. ↩︎
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