The strategic circumstances that Australia contemplates over the coming decades present multiple, cascading and concurrent crises. Ensuring a safe and secure Australia, able to withstand the inevitable shocks that we’ll face into the future, will require a more comprehensive approach to strategy than we’ve adopted over the past seven decades. We can’t rely on the sureties of the past. The institutions, policies and architectures that have supported the nation to manage such crises in our history are no longer fit for purpose.
The report highlights lessons drawn from international responses to crisis, to assist policymakers build better responses to the interdependent and hyperconnected challenges that nations face. The report brings together the disciplines of disaster management, defence strategy and national security to examine what an integrated national approach to resilience looks like, and how national resilience thinking can help Australia build more effective and more efficient responses to crisis and change.
The report concludes that now is the time to commence action to deliver a national resilience framework for Australia. Collective, collaborative action, enabled by governments, built on the capability and capacity of Australian industry and the community, and aimed at the goal of a resilient Australia, can ensure that we’re well placed to face the future with confidence.
https://aspi.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/13120637/National-Resilience-Banner2.jpg5342480nathanhttps://aspi.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/10130806/ASPI-Logo.pngnathan2024-02-15 06:00:002025-03-06 14:54:48National resilience: lessons for Australian policy from international experience
A pro-China technology and anti-US influence operation thrives on YouTube
Executive Summary
ASPI has recently observed a coordinated inauthentic influence campaign originating on YouTube that’s promoting pro-China and anti-US narratives in an apparent effort to shift English-speaking audiences’ views of those countries’ roles in international politics, the global economy and strategic technology competition. This new campaign (which ASPI has named ‘Shadow Play’) has attracted an unusually large audience and is using entities and voice overs generated by artificial intelligence (AI) as a tactic that enables broad reach and scale.1 It focuses on promoting a series of narratives including China’s efforts to ‘win the US–China technology war’ amid US sanctions targeting China. It also includes a focus on Chinese and US companies, such as pro-Huawei and anti-Apple content.
The Shadow Play campaign involves a network of at least 30 YouTube channels that have produced more than 4,500 videos. At time of publication, those channels have attracted just under 120 million views and 730,000 subscribers. The accounts began publishing content around mid-2022. The campaign’s ability to amass and access such a large global audience—and its potential to covertly influence public opinion on these topics—should be cause for concern.
ASPI reported our findings to YouTube/Google on 7 December 2023 for comment. By 8 December, they had taken down 19 YouTube channels from the Shadow Play network—10 for coordinated inauthentic behaviour and nine for spam. As of publication, these YouTube channels display a range of messages from YouTube indicating why they were taken down. For example, one channel was ‘terminated for violating YouTube’s community guidelines’, while another was ‘terminated due to multiple or severe violations of YouTube’s policy for spam, deceptive practices and misleading content or other Terms of Service violations’. ASPI also reported our findings to British artificial intelligence company, Synthesia, whose AI avatars were used by the network. On 14 December 2023, Synthesia disabled the Synthesia account used by one of the YouTube accounts, for violating its Media Reporting (News) policy.
We believe that it’s likely that this new campaign is being operated by a Mandarin-speaking actor. Indicators of this actor’s behaviour don’t closely map to the behaviour of any known state actor that conducts online influence operations. Our preliminary analysis (see ‘Attribution’) is that the operator of this network could be a commercial actor operating under some degree of state direction, funding or encouragement. This could suggest that some patriotic companies increasingly operate China-linked campaigns alongside government actors.
The campaign focuses on promoting six narratives. Two of the most dominant narratives are that China is ‘winning’ in crucial areas of global competition: first, in the ‘US–China tech war’ and, second, in the competition for rare earths and critical minerals.2 Other key narratives express that the US is headed for collapse and that its alliance partnerships are fracturing, that China and Russia are responsible, capable players in geopolitics, that the US dollar and the US economy are weak, and that China is highly capable and trusted to deliver massive infrastructure projects. A list of visual representative examples from the network for each narrative is in Appendix 1 on page 35.
Figure 1: An example of the style of content generated by the network, in which multiple YouTube channels published videos alleging that China had innovated a 1-nanometre chip, without using a lithography machine
Sources: ‘China Charged’, ‘China reveals the world’s first 1nm chip & SHOCKS the US!’, YouTube, 3 November 2023, online;‘ Relaxian’, ‘China’s groundbreaking 1nm chip: redefining technology and global power’, YouTube, 4 November 2023, online; ‘Vision of China’, ‘China breaks tech limit: EUV lithography not needed to make 1nm chips!’, YouTube, 17 July 2023 online; ‘China Focus—CNF’, ‘World challenge conquered: 1nm chips produced without EUV lithography!’, YouTube, 5 July 2023, online; ‘Curious Bay’, ‘China’s NEW 1nm chip amazes the world’, YouTube, 24 July 2023, online; ‘China Hub’, ‘China shatters tech boundaries: 1nm chips without EUV lithography? Unbelievable tech breakthrough!’, YouTube, 30 July 2023, online.
This campaign is unique in three ways. First, as noted above, there’s a notable broadening of topics. Previous China-linked campaigns have been tightly targeted and have often focused on a narrow set of topics. For example, the campaign’s focus on promoting narratives that establish China as technologically superior to the US presents detailed arguments on technology topics including semiconductors rare earths, electric vehicles and infrastructure projects. In addition, it targets, via criticism and disinformation, US technology firms such as Apple and Intel. Chinese state media outlets, Chinese officials and online influencers sometimes publish on these topics in an effort to ‘tell China’s story well’ (讲好中国故事).3 A few Chinese state-backed inauthentic information operations have touched on rare earths and semiconductors, but never in depth or by combining multiple narratives in one campaign package.4 The broader set of topics and opinions in this campaign may demonstrate greater alignment with the known behaviour of Russia-linked threat actors.
Second, there’s a change in techniques and tradecraft, as the campaign has leveraged AI. To our knowledge, the YouTube campaign is one of the first times that video essays, together with generative AI voiceovers, have been used as a tactic in an influence operation. Video essays are a popular style of medium-length YouTube video in which a narrator makes an argument through a voiceover, while content to support their argument is displayed on the screen. This shows a continuation of a trend that threat actors are increasingly moving towards: using off-the-shelf video editing and generative AI technology tools to produce convincing, persuasive content at scale that can build an audience on social-media services. We also observed one account in the YouTube network using an avatar created by Sogou, one of China’s largest technology companies (and a subsidiary of Tencent) (see page 24). We believe the use of the Sogou avatar we identified to be the first instance of a Chinese company’s AI-generated human being used in an influence operation.
Third, unlike previous China-focused campaigns, this one has attracted large views and subscribers. It has also been monetised, although only through limited means. For example, one channel accepted money from US and Canadian companies to support the production of their videos. The substantial number of views and subscribers suggest that the campaign is one of the most successful influence operations related to China ever witnessed on social media. Many China-linked influence operations, such as Dragonbridge (also known as ‘Spamouflage’ in the research community), have attracted
initial engagement in some cases but have failed to sustain a meaningful audience on social media.5 However, further research by YouTube is needed to determine whether view counts and subscriber counts on YouTube demonstrated real viewership or were artificially manipulated, or a combination of both. We note that, in our examination of YouTube comments on videos in this campaign, we saw signs of a genuine audience. ASPI believes that this campaign is probably larger than the 30 channels covered in this report, but we constrained our initial examination to channels we saw as core to the campaign. We also believe there to be more channels publishing content in non-English languages that belong to this network; for example, we saw channels publishing in Bahasa Indonesia that aren’t included in this report.
That’s not to say that the effectiveness of influence operations should only be measured through engagement numbers. As ASPI has previously demonstrated, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) influence operations that troll, threaten and harass on social media seek to silence and cause psychological harm to those being targeted, rather than seeking engagement.6 Similarly, influence operations can be used to ‘poison the well’ by crowding out the content of genuine actors in online spaces, or to poison datasets used for AI products, such as large-language models (LLMs).7
This report also discusses another way that an influence operation can be effective: through its ability to spill over and gain traction in a wider system of misinformation. We found that at least one narrative from the Shadow Play network—that Iran had switched on its China-provided BeiDou satellite system—began to gain traction on X (formerly Twitter) and other social-media platforms within a few hours of its posting on YouTube. We discuss that case study on page 29.
This report offers an initial identification of the influence operation and some defining characteristics of a likely new influence actor. In addition to sections on attribution, methodology and analysis of this new campaign, this report concludes with a series of recommendations for government and social media companies, including:
the immediate investigation of this ongoing information operation, including operator intent and the scale and scope of YouTube channels involved
broader efforts by Five Eyes and allied partners to declassify open-source social-media-based influence operations and share information with like-minded nations and relevant NGOs
rules that require social-media users to disclose when generative AI is used in audio, video or image content
national intelligence collection priorities that support the effective amalgamation of information on Russia-, China- and Iran-linked information operations
publishing detailed threat indicators as appendixes in information operations research.
Shadow play (or shadow puppetry) is a storytelling technique in which flat articulated cut-out figures are placed between a light source and a translucent screen. It’s practised across Southeast Asia, China, the Middle East, Europe and the US. See, for example, Inge C Orr, ‘Puppet theatre in Asia’, Asian Folklore Studies, 1974, 33(1):69–84, online. ↩︎
A recent Pew Research Center poll indicates that technology is one of the few areas in which public opinion in high-income and middle-income countries sees China and the US as equally capable, which suggests that narratives on those lines are credible for international viewers. Laura Silver, Christine Huang, Laura Clancy, Nam Lam, Shannon Greenwood, John Carlo Mandapat, Chris Baronavski, Comparing views of the US and China in 24 countries, Pew Research Center, 6 November 2023, online. ↩︎
‘Telling China’s story well’, China Media Project, 16 April 2021, online; Marcel Schliebs, Hannah Bailey, Jonathan Bright, Philip N Howard, China’s public diplomacy operations: understanding engagement and inauthentic amplification of PRC diplomats on Facebook and Twitter, Oxford Internet Institute, 11 May 2021, https://demtech.oii.ox.ac.uk/research/posts/chinas-public-diplomacy-operations-understanding-engagement-and-inauthentic-amplification-of-chinese-diplomats-on-facebook-and-twitter/#continue. ASPI’s work on foreign influencers’ role in telling China’s story well includes Fergus Ryan, Matt Knight, Daria Impiombato, Singing from the CCP’s songsheet, ASPI, Canberra, 24 November 2023, https://www.aspi.org.au/report/singing-ccps-songsheet . Fergus Ryan, Ariel Bogle, Nathan Ruser, Albert Zhang, Daria Impiombato, Borrowing mouths to speak on Xinjiang, ASPI, Canberra, 10 December 2021, https://www.aspi.org.au/report/borrowing-mouths-speak-xinjiang ; Fergus Ryan, Daria Impiombato, Hsi-Ting Pai, Frontier influencers, ASPI, Canberra, 20 October 2022, https://www.aspi.org.au/report/frontier-influencers/. . ↩︎
Reports on China-linked information operations that have targeted semiconductors and rare earths include Albert Zhang, ‘The CCP’s information campaign targeting rare earths and Australian company Lynas’, The Strategist, 29 June 2022, online; ‘Pro-PRC DRAGONBRIDGE influence campaign targets rare earths mining companies in attempt to thwart rivalry to PRC market dominance’, Mandiant, 28 June 2022, https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/dragonbridge-targets-rare-earths-mining-companies ; Shane Huntley, ‘TAG Bulletin: Q3 2022’, Google Threat Analysis Group, October 26 2022, https://blog.google/threat-analysis-group/tag-bulletin-q3-2022/ . ↩︎
Ben Nimmo, Ira Hubert, Yang Cheng, ‘Spamouflage breakout’, Graphika, 4 February 2021, online. ↩︎
Danielle Cave, Albert Zhang, ‘Musk’s Twitter takeover comes as the CCP steps up its targeting of smart Asian women’, The Strategist, 6 November 2022, online; Donie O’Sullivan, Curt Devine, Allison Gordon, ‘China is using the world’s largest known online disinformation operation to harass Americans, a CNN review finds’, CNN, 13 November 2023, https://edition.cnn.com/2023/11/13/us/china-online-disinformation-invs/index.html . ↩︎
Rachael Falk, Anne-Louise Brown, ‘Poison the well: AI, data integrity and emerging cyber threats’, Cyber Security Cooperative Research Centre, 30 October 2023, online. ↩︎
https://aspi.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/12121352/Policy-brief_-Shadow-play_-a-pro-China-technology-and-anti-US-influence-thumbnail.png555791markohttps://aspi.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/10130806/ASPI-Logo.pngmarko2023-12-14 12:15:562025-03-12 15:40:30Shadow Play
The Northern Australia Strategic Policy Centre’s latest report, North of 26 degrees south and the security of Australia: views from The Strategist, Volume 8, contains articles published in ASPI’s The Strategist over the last six months.
Building on previous volumes, this edition discusses the opportunities and intersections between improved national defence and capability development in northern Australia, regional economic growth, and enhanced engagement with the Indo-Pacific region.
Similar to previous editions, Volume 8 contains a wide range of articles sourced from a diverse pool of expert contributors, writing on topics such as: northern Australia’s critical role for national defence, how Defence can improve operational capability and re-design its strategy in the north, critical minerals and rare earths, national disaster preparedness, and economic opportunity in northern Australia.
Volume 8 also features a foreword by the Hon. Natasha Fyles, Chief Minister of the Northern Territory. Chief Minister Fyles writes, “this edition sheds light on our region’s position at the intersection of significant national and international interests.”
The 27 articles discuss practical policy solutions for decision makers to facilitate the development, prosperity and security of Australia’s north. The authors share a belief that Australia’s north presents yet to be tapped opportunity and potential, and that its unique characteristics – its vast space, low population density, specific geography, and harsh investment environment – can be leveraged to its advantage.
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The role of foreign influencers in China’s propaganda system
Disclaimer: Please note that because of a website upload issue, an earlier version of this page and report contained errors including incorrect author names & acknowledgement text from a previous report. We have rectified these issues.
Executive summary
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has always viewed contact with foreigners and the outside world as a double-edged sword, presenting both threats and opportunities. While the CCP and its nationalist supporters harbour fears of foreigners infiltrating China’s information space and subtly ‘setting the tempo’ (带节奏) of discussions, the CCP also actively cultivates a rising group of foreign influencers with millions of fans, which endorses pro-CCP narratives on Chinese and global social-media platforms.
In the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the information ecosystem is geared towards eliminating rival narratives and promoting the party’s ‘main melody’ (主旋律)—the party’s term for themes or narratives that promote its values, policies and ideology.1 Foreign influencers who are amenable to being ‘guided’ towards voicing that main melody are increasingly considered to be valuable assets. They’re seen as building the CCP’s legitimacy for audiences at home, as well as supporting propaganda efforts abroad.
This report examines how a growing subset of foreign influencers, aware of the highly nationalistic online environment and strict censorship rules in China, is increasingly choosing to create content that aligns more explicitly with the CCP’s ‘main melody’.2 In addition to highlighting the country’s achievements in a positive light, these influencers are promoting or defending China’s position on sensitive political issues, such as territorial disputes or human rights concerns.
As we outline in this report, foreign influencers are involved in a wave of experimentation and innovation in domestic (and external) propaganda production that’s taking place at different levels around the PRC as officials heed Xi Jinping’s call to actively participate in ‘international communication’. That experimentation includes their use in the Propaganda Department’s efforts to control global narratives about Covid-19 in China and the cultivation of Russian influencers in China to counter Western narratives.3 This research also reveals that the CCP is effectively co-opting a widespread network of international students at Chinese universities, cultivating them as a talent pool of young, multilingual, social-media-friendly influencers.
Foreign influencers are guided via rules, regulations and laws, as well as via platforms that direct traffic towards user-generated propaganda. Video competitions organised by propaganda organs and the amplification of party-state media and government spokespeople further encourage this trend. The resulting party-aligned content foreign influencers produce, coupled with that of party-state media workers masquerading as influencers and state-approved ethnic-minority influencers4 are part of a coordinated tactic referred to as ‘polyphonous communication’ (复调传播).5
By coordinating foreign influencers and other communicators, Beijing aspires to create a unified choir of voices capable of promoting party narratives more effectively than traditional official PRC media. The ultimate goal is to shield CCP-controlled culture, discourse and ideology from the dangers of foreign and free political speech, thereby safeguarding the party’s legitimacy.
As this report outlines, that strategy reveals the CCP’s determination to defend itself against foreign influence and shape global narratives in its favour, including through covert means. As one party-state media worker put it, the aim is to ‘help cultivate a group of “foreign mouths”, “foreign pens”, and “foreign brains” who can stand up and speak for China at critical moments’.6
The CCP’s growing use of foreign influencers reinforces China’s internal and external narratives in ways that make it increasingly difficult for social-media platforms, foreign governments and individuals to distinguish between genuine and/or factual content and propaganda. It further complicates efforts to counter disinformation and protect the integrity of public discourse and blurs the line between independent voices and those influenced by the party’s narratives.
This report makes key recommendations for media and social-media platforms, governments and civil society aimed at building awareness and accountability. They include broadening social-media platforms’ content labelling practices to include state-linked, PRC-based influencers; preventing PRC-based creators from monetising their content on platforms outside China to diminish the commercial incentives to produce party-aligned content; and, in countries with established foreign interference taskforces, such as Australia, developing appropriate briefing materials for students planning to travel overseas.
Key Findings
Foreign influencers are reaching increasingly larger and more international audiences. Some of them have tens of millions of followers in China and millions more on overseas platforms (see Appendix 1 on page 65), particularly on TikTok, YouTube and X (formerly Twitter).
The CCP is creating competitions that offer significant prize money and other incentives as part of an expanding toolkit to co-opt influencers in the production of pro-CCP and party-state-aligned content (see Section 2.3: ‘State-sponsored competitions’ on page 20).
Beijing is establishing multilingual influencer studios to incubate both domestic and foreign influencers in order to reach younger media consumers globally (see Section 2.5: ‘The influencer studio system’ on page 33).
The CCP is effectively using a widespread network of international students at Chinese universities, cultivating them as a latent talent pool of young, multilingual, social-media-friendly influencers (see breakout box: ‘PRC universities’ propaganda activities’ on page 32).
Russian influencers in China are cultivated as part of the CCP’s strategic goal of strengthening bilateral relations with Russia to counter Western countries (see Section 3.4: ‘Russian influencers’ on page 53).
The CCP is using foreign influencers to enable its propaganda to surreptitiously penetrate mainstream overseas media, including into major US cable TV outlets (see Section 3.3: ‘Rachele Longhi’ on page 44). Chinese authorities use vlogger, influencer and journalist identities interchangeably, in keeping with efforts aimed at influencing audiences, rather than offering professional or objective news coverage.
CCP-aligned influencer content has helped boost the prevalence of party-approved narratives on YouTube, outperforming more credible sources on issues such as Xinjiang due to search-engine algorithms that prioritise fresh content and regular posting (see Section 2.2 ‘Turning a foreign threat into a propaganda opportunity’ on page 15).
Foreign influencers played a key part in the Propaganda Department’s drive to control international narratives about Covid-19 in China and have, in some instances, attempted to push the CCP’s narrative overseas as well (see Section 1.1: ‘Case study’ on page 7).
Efforts to deal with CCP propaganda have taken a step backwards on X, which under Elon Musk has dispensed with state-affiliation labels and is allowing verification for party-state media workers, including foreigners (see Section 2.5 ‘The influencer studio system’ on page 33).
The term ‘Propaganda Department’ is used here for the Publicity Department of the Central Committee of the CCP. Subordinate CCP organisations in many cases have their own propaganda departments. ↩︎
Fergus Ryan, Daria Impiombato, Hsi-Ting Pai, Frontier influencers: the new face of China’s propaganda, ASPI, Canberra, 20 October 2022. ↩︎
Devin Thorne, ‘1 key for 1 lock: the Chinese Communist Party’s strategy for targeted propaganda’, Recorded Future, September 2022. ↩︎
Du Guodong [杜国东], ‘A tentative analysis of how to leverage the role of foreign internet celebrities in China’s international communication’ [试析如何发挥洋网红在中国国际传播中的作用], FX361, 10 September 2019. ↩︎
https://aspi.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/12123347/Singing-from-the-CCPs-songsheet_-the-role-of-foreign-influencers-banner.png519740markohttps://aspi.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/10130806/ASPI-Logo.pngmarko2023-11-24 12:33:192025-03-12 15:48:45Singing from the CCP’s songsheet
In 2020, the then Director of ASPI’s International Cyber Policy Centre, Fergus Hanson, approached me to research the views of the 46th Parliament on a range of cybersecurity and critical technology issues. The resulting data collection was then conducted in two parts across 2021 and 2022, with the results analysed and written up in 2022 and 2023. Those parliamentarians who ‘opted in’ completed and provided an initial quantitative study, which I then followed up on with an interview that explored an additional set of qualitative questions. The results, collated and analysed, form the basis of this report.
This research aims to provide a snapshot of what our nation’s policy shapers and policymakers are thinking when it comes to cybersecurity and critical technologies. What are they worried about? Where are their knowledge gaps and interests? What technologies do they think are important to Australia and where do they believe policy attention and investment should focus in the next five years?
This initial study establishes a baseline for future longitudinal assessments that could capture changes or shifts in parliamentarians’ thinking. Australia’s ongoing cybersecurity challenges, the fast-moving pace of artificial intelligence (AI), the creation of AUKUS and the ongoing development of AUKUS Pillar 2—with its focus on advanced capabilities and emerging technologies (including cybertechnologies)—are just a few reasons among many which highlight why it’s more important than ever that the Australian Parliament be both informed and active when engaging with cybersecurity and critical technologies.
We understand that this in-depth study may be a world first and extend our deep and heartfelt thanks to the 24 parliamentarians who took part in it. Parliamentarians are very busy people, and yet many devoted significant time to considering and completing this study.
This was a non-partisan study. Parliamentarians were speaking on condition of strict anonymity, without any identifiers apart from their gender, chamber, electorate profile and backbench or frontbench status. Because of that, the conversations were candid, upfront and insightful and, as a result, this study provides a rich and honest assessment of their views.
https://aspi.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/12133247/What-do-Australias-parliamentarians-think-about-cybersecurity-banner.png509792markohttps://aspi.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/10130806/ASPI-Logo.pngmarko2023-11-14 13:32:332025-04-14 17:22:19What do Australia’s parliamentarians think about cybersecurity and critical technology?
Semiconductors are a critical component in all modern technologies, from personal communication devices and medical devices to weapons systems. Crucial to producing semiconductors is the availability of a highly skilled workforce, managing clean-room facilities and highly specialised equipment to execute the hundreds of unique steps needed to manufacture a single wafer, depending on the complexity of the chip.
ASPI’s 2022 report, Australia’s semiconductor national moonshot, laid out the strategic reasons why Australia must embark on a capacity-building initiative to create a homegrown semiconductor manufacturing ecosystem. Every item on the Australian federal government’s List of Critical Technologies in the National Interest is dependent on semiconductors.
By committing to growing a semiconductor-manufacturing industry from a mature-process-scale baseline, policymakers would position Australia to manufacture chips relevant to the energy, transport, health, IT and defence sectors. Such an industry would enable Australia to execute long-term critical technology strategies in areas such as quantum computing and artificial intelligence, to mitigate supply-chain risk against disruption from conflict or natural disaster, and provide highly skilled jobs in affordable locations, enriching the Australian economy.
It’s important to note that both AUKUS Pillar 2 and the Albanese government’s April 2023 publication of the Defence Strategic Review reflect a shift in Australia’s strategic thinking on defence and national security, and the important correlation and greater cooperation between industry, education and defence priorities, particularly when it comes to technology. Delivering on that shift will be difficult and often costly, but this report provides a series of recommendations of what that correlation and cooperation could look like.
For Canberra, such an endeavour is of the same magnitude as America’s historic ‘moonshots’ during the 1960s and 1970s. It’s a once-in-a-generation challenge that will determine Australia’s place in the world, and human capital is central to ensuring success. Opting out of semiconductor manufacturing for the long term would severely constrain Australia’s growth as a technological nation and consign it to second-tier status.
This report expands on the recommendations made in the 2022 ASPI report for establishing a semiconductor-manufacturing capability in Australia and focuses on the importance of creating a talent pipeline that can support a scaled industry. Achieving a semiconductor moonshot requires stepping up Australia’s very respectable semiconductor device fabrication R&D to industry-compatible prototyping via a dedicated facility, together with attracting (through that capability and by government incentives) a semiconductor manufacturer to locate a mature-process-scale foundry in Australia—which will require support from an upskilled Australian talent pipeline. This is an ambitious move but is an essential step in growing such a capability.
The ability to grow and maintain a high-skilled workforce is a foundational challenge for Australia that can be addressed through close examination of trailblazing public–private partnerships (PPPs) that aim to provide talent-pipeline security in the US, Taiwan and Japan. Australian governments, industry and academia can emulate and engage with the examples highlighted through case studies in this report to attract semiconductor industry investment, boost talent-pipeline development and strengthen industry R&D. Australia’s states and territories all have varied capacity to o›er support to a semiconductor-manufacturing capability.
Australia is a maritime nation. The sheer scale of our sovereign maritime territory and responsibilities, our dependence on maritime trade for our prosperity and the increasing value of activity in the maritime environment must all be recognised in our maritime strategy. In a highly interconnected world, we face fundamental vulnerabilities from the realities of our geostrategic situation. In this report, the author argues that the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) lacks the resources to adequately protect Australia’s vast maritime interests. This concern isn’t unique to our time: maritime strategists have long lamented that, despite being uniquely an island, a continent and a nation, Australia struggles to understand the central importance of a maritime strategy to our defence and security. The underappreciation of Australia’s dependence on the maritime domain and that domain’s significance for the nation’s prosperity and security has consistently produced a RAN that’s overlooked and under-resourced.
In this report, the author examines whether the bipartisan thesis of a structural change in our strategic circumstances, as articulated in the 2023 Defence Strategic Review (DSR), also requires a structural change and an expansion of the RAN. The author argues that both are needed, through both an increased surface-combatant fleet that’s designed on the principle of a balanced fleet and a review of the RAN’s structure. Such a structural review should include consideration of bold changes, including reconsideration of a fleet auxiliary, a coastguard or forward basing of assets to support the workforce requirements of an expanded fleet.
This report looks mainly at the structure of the surface-combatant fleet, noting the recent finalisation of the surface-combatant fleet review. In the light of the Australian Government’s consideration of that review’s recommendations, the report makes eight recommendations for government consideration.
The author also argues that the status quo of 11–12 major surface combatants is insufficient for Australia. That was the case even when the force was structured around the concept of Australia having 10 years warning time of military conflict. That problem has become more acute today, given the new era of strategic competition and the capability and size of our potential adversaries, in particular China, as recognised in the DSR. The report recommends that a major surface-combatant fleet structure of 16–20 ships is needed.
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The strategic partnership between Australia and South Korea holds great potential in an increasingly challenging time. The two nations have many common strategic interests and both can rightly claim to be regional powers. However, the relationship remains a relative underperformer compared with other key regional relationships and has suffered from inconsistency. When Canberra’s contemporary relationship with Seoul receives attention from Australian analysts, it tends to be framed largely in the context of the threats posed by Pyongyang.
While some uncertainties remain over the long-term trajectory of South Korea’s foreign and security policy due to concerns that Seoul’s current vision is tied to the Yoon government as opposed to being embedded in longer-term statecraft, the structural basis for deeper engagement between Seoul and Canberra is sound. Investing in the relationship is in both nations’ interests. Building bureaucratic and commercial frameworks for cooperation now would help ensure that bilateral strategic alignment is less prone to future changes in government.
This paper assesses the Australia–South Korea partnership through the three-pillar structure outlined in the 2021 Australia-South Korea Comprehensive Strategic Partnership and offers recommendations for strengthening the relationship. These recommendations include furthering strategic cooperation by incrementally aligning key trilateral formats, developing bilateral cooperation in critical technologies including those relevant to AUKUS Pillar 2, and nurturing collaboration with respect to the Indo-Pacific clean energy transition.
https://aspi.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/13123734/wnfaask_cover.png9421791nathanhttps://aspi.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/10130806/ASPI-Logo.pngnathan2023-10-26 06:00:002024-12-13 12:41:06Where next for the Australia–South Korea partnership?
Australia and the US are both federations of states in which power is shared constitutionally between the national and subnational levels of government. However, traditionally, one domain that hasn’t been considered a shared power, but rather the constitutionally enshrined responsibility of the national governments, has been international affairs (in the US Constitution through Article I, Section 10 and other clauses and in the Australian Constitution through section 51 (xxix), known as the external affairs power). For this reason, foreign-policy and national-security decision-makers in Washington DC and Canberra have rightly seen themselves as the prime actors in the policymaking that develops and strengthens the US–Australia alliance and all global relationships, with limited power held by subnational governments.
However, in our globalised and digital world, constitutional power no longer means that subnational governments have only narrow roles and influence on the international stage. While national governments will continue having primary responsibility for setting foreign policy, subnational governments have offices overseas, sign agreements with foreign governments, and regularly send diplomatic delegations abroad. Recent events, including the Covid-19 pandemic, have highlighted subnational governments’ decisive role in shaping, supporting, adapting to and implementing national and international policy. The pandemic, including post-pandemic trade promotion, demonstrated that the relationships between layers of governments in both federations are essential to national security, resilience, economic prosperity and social cohesion.
Subnational governments have vital roles to play in helping to maximise national capability, increase trust in democratic institutions, mitigate security threats and build broader and deeper relationships abroad. At the subnational level in Washington and Canberra, people-to-people, cultural and economic links create the deep connective tissue that maintains relationships, including those vital to the US-Australia alliance, no matter the politics of the day. But that subnational interaction must be consistent with national defence and foreign policy.
Australia’s federal system should help facilitate international engagement and incentivise positive engagement while ensuring that the necessary legislative and policy levers exist to require the subnational layer to conduct essential due diligence that prioritises the national interest. In this report, the authors make a series of policy recommendations that will support the development of such a framework.
https://aspi.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/12224449/Building-whole-of-nation-statecraft_banner.png4501350nathanhttps://aspi.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/10130806/ASPI-Logo.pngnathan2023-10-19 06:00:002025-03-06 14:55:29Building whole-of-nation statecraft: How Australia can better leverage subnational diplomacy in the US alliance
‘Intelligence diplomacy’ – using intelligence actors and relationships to conduct, or substantially facilitate, diplomatic relations – is a potent tool for statecraft; useful in specific circumstances to either enhance conventional diplomacy or create subtler lines of communication. Intelligence diplomacy, its increasing utility and potential hazards, is the subject of Doing good deeds quietly, the latest report from ASPI’s Statecraft & Intelligence Centre.
The report finds that governments turn to intelligence diplomacy when a variety of circumstances – and critically those governments’ assessments of related capabilities and effectiveness of their intelligence services – makes use of intelligence actors or relationships attractive and advantageous.
Furthermore, Doing good deeds quietly finds that governments should use intelligence diplomacy selectively and purposefully, in concert and collaboration with other arms of policy, and with robust, agreed policy objectives and parameters. They should also be wary of over-use, for the effective utility of intelligence diplomacy depends in part on prudent and selective application.
For politicians, policymakers and the interested public, understanding the important role intelligence diplomacy can play in international relations provides a fuller sense of what it is that intelligence agencies actually do in their name.
https://aspi.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/13143329/Doing-good-deeds-quietly_banner.png5911772nathanhttps://aspi.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/10130806/ASPI-Logo.pngnathan2023-10-16 06:00:002025-03-06 15:13:27‘Doing good deeds quietly’: The rise of intelligence diplomacy as a potent tool of statecraft