Ice panda: navigating China’s hybrid Antarctic agenda

Antarctica is often overlooked in strategic discussions, but its role in geopolitical competition deserves attention.

This report assesses the continents importance to Australian security, China’s hybrid Antarctic activity, and the need for Australia to develop a balancing strategy capable of bolstering the Antarctic Treaty and ‘pushing back’ against growing Chinese power in Antarctica.

Antarctica offers significant strategic advantages for the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Although Beijing’s actions in Antarctica may not overtly violate the Antarctic Treaty (AT), they effectively undermine its principles and, by extension, Australia’s strategic interests. Currently, the PRC is adeptly navigating the AT System to challenge the status quo without explicitly breaching the treaty.

China’s domestic policies, which merge civil and military sectors, appear to contravene the spirit of the AT’s military prohibitions, even if they have not yet resulted in direct military activity on the continent. This evolving dynamic underscores the pressing need for Australia to safeguard the existing Antarctic status quo.

With robust Australian foreign and security prioritization, the AT can counter Beijing’s growing ambitions, which may directly impact Australian interests. We must protect and uphold the principles of the AT.

With diverse domestic and international priorities, Australia must not neglect Antarctica, as Beijing continues to exploit the strategic gap left by our limited focus. Australia, with its rich history and commitment to Antarctica, must assert its role as an Antarctic claimant and clarify that China’s presence is contingent on Australian and other claimants’ cooperation. It’s time for Australia to lead in Antarctica and protect our strategic interests.

Australia’s new digital ID system: finding the right way to implement it

This report reviews the Australian Government’s proposed plans for establishing a digital ID, and the ways the new system is expected to work. It explores the planned digital ID system, the key features of the approach, and the privacy and security protections that have been built into the proposals.

Australia has had a long and troubled history with national ID systems, dating back to the mid-1980 when the government failed to introduce the Australia Card. Since then, Australia has ended up with a clunky and inefficient process to identify peoples’ identities online. It has led to an oversharing and storage of sensitive personal data. As the Medibank and Optus data breaches has shown, this creates serious cybersecurity risks.

Now that Parliament has passed the Digital ID legislation, it’s critical that government gets the implementation right.

The report outlines that, although the proposed federated model for a digital ID system is commendable and a needed step-forward, there is a need to still address a range of policy issues that – if left unresolved – would jeopardise trust in the system.

The ‘official’ histories of Australian and British intelligence: Lessons learned and next steps

Unclassified, official histories of ‘secret’ intelligence organisations, for public readership, seem a contradiction in terms. These ‘official’ works are commissioned by the agencies in question and directly informed by those agencies’ own records, thus distinguishing them from other, outsider historical accounts. But while such official intelligence histories are relatively new, sometimes controversial, and often challenging for historians and agencies alike, the experiences of the Australian and British intelligence communities suggest they’re a promising development for scholarship, maintaining public trust and informed public discourse, and more effective functioning of national security agencies. Furthermore, these histories remain an ongoing project for Australia’s National Intelligence Community (NIC).

Gender mainstreaming in United Nations peace operations: An unfulfilled promise?

The principle of gender equality is a cornerstone of the United Nations (UN). Centred on equal access to rights, opportunities, resources and decision-making powers irrespective of gender, it’s embedded within the UN Charter and championed in the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Mechanisms such as the inaugural resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agreed to in 2000 by the UN Security Council (UNSC), and the adoption of an additional nine WPS resolutions, further represent the critical intent to achieve this goal. The purpose of such WPS mechanisms is to cultivate gender balance, foster diverse leadership and champion gender equality in a global effort to establish sustainable peace after conflict.

Yet, as we stand on the threshold of the 25th anniversary of UNSC resolution 1325, the UN’s stride towards gender equality for uniformed women in peace operations has been ‘exceedingly slow’. The lofty aspiration of ‘equal opportunity peacekeeping’ through gender mainstreaming policies and practices remains elusive, entangled in a web of misconceptions and entrenched systemic barriers and institutional challenges.
The purpose of this ASPI report is threefold.

First, it examines the blocks to implementation and the effects of gender mainstreaming strategies.
Second, it advances three strategic interventions for the UN system and its global peace and security community:

  • redefining peacekeeping benchmarks for an efficient and effective uniformed component
  • shifting the narrative on peacekeepers’ contributions regardless of gender
  • incorporating feminist voices and practices in the development of policies and practices for the deployment of peacekeepers.

These proposed interventions offer a unique prospect for the final section of this report: encouraging Australian Government departments and agencies that have responsibilities for and commitments to execute the Australian National Action Plan (NAP) on WPS. Those commitments extend to fostering gender equality in both domestic and international WPS endeavours, thereby strengthening Australia’s position as a proactive UN member state.

The geopolitics of water: How the Brahmaputra River could shape India–China security competition

This report assesses the geopolitical impact of a possible dam at the Great Bend of the Brahmaputra. In particular, it exams the dam as a potential source of coercive leverage China may gain over India. A dam there would create four likely strategic effects: it would very likely consolidate Beijing’s political control over its distant borderlands; it would create the potential for massive flooding as a tool of violence; it may affect human settlement and economic patterns on the Indian side of the border, downstream; and it would give Beijing water and data that it could withhold from India as bargaining leverage in unrelated negotiations.

To mitigate those challenges and risks, the report provides three policy recommendations for the Indian Government and its partners in Australia and the US. First, it recommends the establishment of an open-source, publicly available data repository, based on satellite sensing, to disseminate information about the physical impacts of the Great Bend Dam. Second, it recommends that like-minded governments use international legal arguments to pressure Beijing to abide by global norms and conventions. Third, it recommends that the Quad—the informal group comprising Australia, India, Japan and the US—use its humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) guidelines to begin to share information and build capacity for dam-related contingencies.

Full tilt: The UK’s defence role in the Pacific: Views from The Strategist

Britain has a new prime minister, Keir Starmer, leading its first Labour government in 14 years. Key questions for us now are how Britain under Labour will approach the security partnership with Australia and whether London will remain committed to investing defence resources in the Indo-Pacific.

This report provides vital context for addressing these questions. In this series of articles, originally published in ASPI’s The Strategist this year, ASPI authors review the historical underpinnings and future course of Britain’s strategic recoupling with Australia and this region, especially the Pacific Islands, from perspectives ranging from deterrence to climate resilience.

The report makes some recommendations for how to strengthen the Australia-UK defence partnership and shape Britain’s approach to our region.

A national strategic warning intelligence capability for Australia

Australia’s strategic warning time has collapsed—in response to profound geopolitical shifts. As the ADF is adapting to the hard implications of this change, so must the national intelligence community (NIC).

Australian Government decision-makers need time and insight to identify and prioritise threats (and opportunities) and devise effective responses. Strategic warning intelligence enables and empowers them to do so. But it must be done in a way that keeps up with the rapid pace of geopolitical and technological change, and a widening array of non-traditional strategic threats, and in a fashion best suited to Australia’s circumstances.

To meet this need the NIC should develop a discrete, institutional strategic warning intelligence function—an Australian Centre for Strategic Warning (ACSW). This would recognise the distinct skills, analytical focus and interface with decision-making entailed—and the vital national interests at stake. In implementing an ACSW, much can be learned from our own and other intelligence communities’ ongoing efforts to adapt to threats other than invasion—notably terrorism and pandemics. This will be especially pertinent in its application to grey-zone threats such as economic coercion.

Done right, an ACSW would be an important addition to the suite of Australia’s statecraft tools.

North of 26 degrees south and the security of Australia: Views from The Strategist, Volume 9

The Northern Australia Strategic Policy Centre’s latest report, North of 26 degrees south and the security of Australia: views from The Strategist, Volume 9, contains articles published in ASPI’s The Strategist over the last six months.

Expanding on previous volumes, this edition introduces thematic chapters focused on a range of subjects relevant to northern Australia. These include;

1. Defence in the North,

2. Developing Northern Australia,

3. Northern Australia and the Indo-Pacific

4. Critical Minerals, Energy, and Commodities,

5. Space, Food Security and Climate Trends

As in previous editions, Volume 9 contains a range of expert opinions across these varied topics.

Volume 9 also features a foreword by the Hon. Eva Lawler, Chief Minister of the Northern Territory. Chief Minister Lawler calls readers attention to the relevance of northern Australia in light of the National Defence Strategy and updated Integrated Investment Program as well as Australia’s economic ambitions, stating “the strategies in this volume can inform our efforts to unlock northern Australia’s full potential and build a stronger, more resilient nation.”

The 36 articles discuss practical policy solutions for decision makers facilitating development, prosperity and security of northern Australia. These policy solutions tackle both the challenges and opportunities present in the north, and reflect the potential of the north to increasingly contribute to Australia’s national security and economic prosperity.

Negotiating technical standards for artificial intelligence

The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) is delighted to share its latest report – the result of a multi-year project on Artificial Intelligence (AI), technical standards and diplomacy – that conducts a deep-dive into the important, yet often opaque and complicated world of technical standards.

At the heart of how AI technologies are developed, deployed and used in a responsible manner sit a suite of technical standards: rules, guidelines and characteristics that ensure the safety, security and interoperability of a product.

The report authors highlight that the Indo-Pacific, including Australia and India, are largely playing catch-up in AI standards initiatives. The United States and China are leading the pack, followed by European nations thanks to their size, scope and resources of their national standardisation communities as well as their domestic AI sectors.

Not being strongly represented in the world of AI governance and technical standards is a strategic risk for Indo-Pacific nations. For a region that’s banking on the opportunities of a digital and technology-enabled economy and has large swathes of its population in at-risk jobs, it’s a matter of national and economic security that Indo-Pacific stakeholders are active and have a big say in how AI technologies will operate and be used.

Being part of the conversations and negotiations is everything, and as such, governments in the Indo-Pacific – including Australia and India – should invest more in whole-of-nation techdiplomacy capabilities.

Authored by analysts at ASPI and India’s Centre for Internet and Society, this new report ‘Negotiating technical standards for artificial intelligence: A techdiplomacy playbook for policymakers and technologists in the Indo-Pacific’ – and accompanying website (https://www.techdiplomacy.aspi.org.au/) – explains the current state of play in global AI governance, looks at the role of technical standards, outlines how agreements on technical standards are negotiated and created, and describes who are the biggest ‘movers and shakers’.

The authors note that there are currently no representatives from Southeast Asia (except Singapore), Australia, NZ or the Pacific Islands on the UN Secretary-General Advisory Body on AI – a body that’s tasked to come up with suggestions on how to govern AI in a representative and inclusive manner with an eye to achieving the UN Sustainable Development Goals.

The capacity of the Indo-Pacific to engage in critical technology standards has historically been lower in comparison to other regions. However, given the rapid and global impact of AI and the crucial role of technical standards, the report authors argue that dialogue and greater collaboration between policymakers, technologists and civil society has never been more important.

It is hoped this playbook will help key stakeholders – governments, industry, civil society and academia – step through the different aspects of negotiating technical standards for AI, while also encouraging the Indo-Pacific region to step up and get more involved.

ASPI’s submission to PM&C’s review of funding for strategic policy work

Independent, expert and evidence-based national security research and analysis has never been more important than it is now that we are in a period of rising strategic uncertainty. The Australian Strategic Policy Institute believes that government support for such research is crucial to the nation’s interests.

The Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet’s Independent Review of Commonwealth funding for strategic policy work—led by University of Queensland Chancellor Peter Varghese—provides an opportunity to strengthen the role that think tanks play in bringing contestability and adding vitality to established national security policy debate.

Over the past two decades, ASPI has evolved and adapted to strategic developments, addressing immediate defence and security issues while identifying new trends and exploring emerging areas that fall into research gaps or require new expertise. Changes in technology and geopolitics have dramatically transformed the strategic landscape—and ASPI has demonstrated a continuing agility in keeping up with, and staying ahead of, those trends.

ASPI has developed a globally competitive advantage in foundational, data-driven and policy-relevant work that looks over the horizon. Our publication of original datasets, coupled with frank and fearless advice, provides contestability and an essential evidence-base to inform decision-makers.

ASPI’s leadership and Council is closely cooperating with the PM&C review, have met with Peter Varghese and the review secretariat several times and appreciate the ongoing engagement. ASPI is publishing our submission to the review to ensure stakeholders have full access to it. As we told PM&C and the review team, we believe all submissions to the review should be published.

As Australia’s only dedicated defence and security think tank—and one of the very few in the Indo-Pacific region—ASPI complements the work of other institutes in Australia that focus predominantly on foreign policy, trade and economics. Most of these institutes aren’t traditional think tanks but are embedded within Australian universities and hence are shaped by that academic setting. Both types—stand-alone and university-based—are valuable inputs to policy.

The establishment of an ASPI office in Washington DC in mid-2022 has filled a gap that existed in the non-government policy community between Australia and the United States—an important priority at a time when Australia’s strategic concerns, centred on the Indo-Pacific, need to be championed in the capital of our major ally. This value has long been recognised by other countries that have established think tanks in Washington, such as the United Kingdom, India, Japan and Germany.

ASPI’s submission outlines the role of think tanks in Australia and makes 10 recommendations to the PM&C review. Most of these recommendations aren’t limited to ‘strategic policy work’ but should apply to all Commonwealth funding, especially in related fields.

The submission also made the following key points to the PM&C review:

  • Australia’s think-tank sector is small and remains underdeveloped. Nonetheless, some now attract a very global audience and it would not serve Australia’s interests to lose that global access and influence. Ten years ago ASPI’s stakeholder base was largely in Canberra. Today, our stakeholders are global, and readership is just as strong internationally as it is in Australia. The sector needs to be supported and developed, and new entrants should be encouraged.
  • Fee-for-service funding and narrow grant parameters rarely generate work that is innovative, far-reaching and relevant to long-term policy making. ASPI’s most forward-looking and globally impactful research projects are the result of ideas that our staff generate, not simply responding to grants or tenders, many of which tackle yesterday’s policy challenges. As such, a narrow funding model would limit national security research to parameters set by the government of the day. Responding to current policy priorities is important, but think tanks must also look long-term and set their own research agendas to provide fundamental contestability.
  • Australian think tanks should have a presence in Washington as other countries do. The US has more than 2200 think tanks, with more than 300 in Washington alone. ASPI’s office in Washington has filled a longstanding gap. The ANU has a unique presence in the Australian Embassy in DC. Australian think tanks and universities should have a greater presence in Washington to share Australian perspectives.
  • Funding for sensitive research should be incentivised and increased. Australian Government departments and agencies tend to avoid funding research on sensitive topics. This goes against the national interest and puts a greater burden on Australia’s partners and allies to fund that work (notably, ASPI’s China research, for example, is heavily used by Australian officials, but most often funded by Australia’s partners). Think tanks can and need to delve into challenges that go beyond the topic and government of the day. There is demonstrably strong interest from government stakeholders and the public in that analysis.
  • National security has at times suffered from limited transparency and ‘closed shop’ tendencies, leading to a combination of considerable public interest but limited public knowledge. This can increase Australia’s vulnerability to disinformation and misinformation that can be easily and cheaply spread online. Platforms such as ASPI’s Strategist (and the Lowy Institute’s Interpreter) are powerful ways to reach wider audiences in Australia and globally, especially in an era where there is shrinking space for international news and analysis.

ASPI has an international reputation that reflects the appreciation that the policy community around the world has for Australia’s defence and security thinking. The PM&C review affords an opportunity to consider in depth the value of dedicated national security research and an informed public discourse. We encourage all interested stakeholders to engage with the review and with national security debate in Australia.