Cyber norms & the Australian private sector

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Across the world, there are conflicting ideas about how to manage the dynamic environment of cyberspace. States have the liberty of implementing legislation for the domestic regulation of cyberspace, but disagreements arise over national visions for the management of cyberspace internationally. Many have looked to norms to fill this breach, as their flexibility to adapt to changing technology and are attractive for the management of cyberspace and its broader stakeholder group. For this reason, norms, alongside international law have emerged as the preeminent means to establish what is acceptable behaviour in global cyberspace.

As owners and operators of a large amount of the world’s internet infrastructure and expertise, private sector bodies are some of the best placed organisations to speak authoritatively on the operation of cyberspace, and are therefore critical to the successful implementation of norms. However the private sector has largely been absent from the discussions shaping the creation of these international norms. To gain a deeper understanding of private sector perspectives on cyber norms, ASPI conducted a workshop and survey series with experts from some of Australia’s largest and most influential private sector organisations. Through this discussion and workshop series it was established that key Australian private sector organisations both understand and are interested in the formation of cyber norms. The resulting report documents the key takeaways from this research, highlighting central private sector insights on how cyber norms should be shaped to enable economic prosperity and broader wellbeing of the interconnected online ecosystem.

America’s ‘Maginot Line’: a study of static border security in an age of agile and innovative threats

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Borders and border security are once again becoming increasingly important to the nation state. Many take a default position that our coastline is our border and that border security involves merely police, security guards and immigration or customs officials. But Australia’s geography no longer provides the physical barrier from the outside world that it once did.

This strategy provides a case study analysis of post-9/11 changes to US border security policies. It examines each of America’s different borders: the friendly northern borders, maritime borders, and the militarised southern border. It provides recommendations for Australia’s border security.

ASPI at 15

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ASPI was registered as a wholly government-owned company on 22 August 2001, but it was several years earlier when Ian McLachlan, the first Defence Minister of the Howard government, saw the need to establish an institute to provide an alternate source of advice on defence and strategic policy.

The articles in this Strategic Insights paper, originally published on the ASPI Strategist website in August 2016, come from a number of individuals who deeply wanted the institute to succeed and indeed were prepared to invest their own effort to make it happen. While turning 15 is a good time to reflect on growth and early experiences, ASPI’s most productive years are still ahead of it.

From Hollywood to Bollywood? Recasting Australia’s Indo/Pacific strategic geography

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Australia’s strategic geography is being revolutionised. China and India’s rising maritime power, coupled with a Eurasia-wide ‘connectivity revolution’, is drawing together two formerly disparate theatres: the Asia–Pacific and the Indian Ocean region.

This report argues against the Indo-Pacific idea and presents the case for a more regionally differentiated ‘Indo/Pacific’ alternative. The hyphen at the heart of the Indo-Pacific aggregates two distinct regional security orders that have differed widely in their historical evolution and that today present different challenges and regional order-building opportunities for Australia.

By contrast, an Indo/Pacific strategic geography explicitly differentiates the Asia–Pacific from the Indian Ocean region and calibrates Australia’s strategies for regional engagement accordingly.

The Asia–Pacific and the Indian Ocean region thus present increasingly interconnected—but still durably distinct—security orders. For this reason, Australia should pursue a regionally differentiated ‘triple track’ strategy of order-building.

Cyber maturity in the Asia-Pacific region 2016

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The 2016 Cyber Maturity report is the culmination of 12 months’ research by the ASPI International Cyber Policy Centre. The report assesses the approach of 23 regional countries to the challenges and opportunities that cyberspace presents, in terms of their governance structure, legislation, law enforcement, military, business and social engagement with cyber policy and security issues.

The 2016 report includes an assessment of three new countries, Bangladesh, Pakistan and the Solomon Islands. It also features, for the first time, separate data points on fixed line and mobile connectivity to better reflect the growth of mobile-based internet access across the region, its role in facilitating increased connectivity and opening new digital markets.  

Turning to the country rankings, coming in at top of the table for the third year running is the United States. In 2016 the United States continued to further refine its national policy approach to cyber issues, with President Obama’s National Security Action Plan and 30-day Cybersecurity Sprint, and the passing of the Cybersecurity Act. South Korea, Japan, Australia and Singapore round out the top five.

South Korea and Japan have swapped positions in second and third place, and Australia has leapfrogged Singapore into fourth place, recovering after dropping to fifth place in 2015. Australia’s improved position reflects the changes taking place as part of the implementation of the new Australian Cyber Security Strategy.

This includes the appointment of Australia’s first ministerial level cyber position (Minister Assisting the Prime Minister The Hon. Dan Tehan) and a new coordinator within the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet for government for cyber issues (Alastair MacGibbon).

Assessing the South China Sea award

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The Philippines had a major, if unenforceable, win against China in the 12 July South China Sea Arbitration under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. But the implications go beyond the bilateral dispute between China and the Philippines and it carries great legal weight as an authoritative ruling by an international judicial body.

Bearing in mind that the award is legally binding only on the parties to the arbitration, there’s the question of what might this assertion mean for third countries who may opt to exercise navigational rights based on the Tribunal’s rulings on the status and maritime entitlements of features in the Spratlys.

The South China Sea award has produced a diverse range of opinions on ASPI’s blog The Strategist. This Strategic Insights assembles a selection of those articles.

Authors: Sam Bateman, Allan Behm, Anthony Bergin, Jay L Batongbacal, William Choong, Helen Clark, Malcolm Davis, Peter Jennings, Amelia Long, Donald Rothwell & Feng Zhang.

Improving on zero: Australia and India attempt strategic convergence

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India no longer sees Australia as merely a strategic stooge of the US. And Australia is starting to accord India the importance India always saw as its right. Those are big changes in attitude and policy—and in the two countries’ understanding of each other’s interests.

Strategy: The Australia–India strategic relationship was in zero territory—often in negative mode—for much of the 20th century; indeed, effectively since India’s independence. In the 21st century, though, Australia and India can reach for greater strategic convergence.

People: Australia in the 21st century can have a set of relationships with India based on people as much as on economic and strategic need.

Economics and trade: As China slows economically, Australia turns to India. The negotiation of an Australia–India free trade deal—a Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement—aims to match the bilateral agreements Australia reached with China, Japan and South Korea.

Improving on zero: The previous negative relationship was based on a lot of hard history (White Australia, the Cold War, alliance versus non-alignment and India’s nuclear weapons status). This time it’s different—our astigmatism and the antagonisms should not derail the opportunity, and the need, to see each other clearly and do much more together.

Australian border security and unmanned maritime vehicles

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Protecting the sovereignty of our maritime borders has never been more difficult than it is today. Australia must identify strategies for pre-positioning our finite maritime response capabilities in order to be able to respond promptly, effectively and efficiently to risks across our EEZ.

This special report examines the potential for UMVs to expand Australia’s maritime domain awareness and make the ADF’s and Australia Border Force’s risk management strategies more efficient. It provides recommendations for improving the efficiency of Australia’s maritime border security efforts.

Opportunities abound abroad: optimising our criminal intelligence system overseas

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Criminal intelligence (CrimInt) is so useful in serious criminal investigations that it’s difficult to envisage a situation where it shouldn’t be sought and used if it’s available.

This special report argues that Australia’s current arrangements for gathering and disseminating CrimInt overseas are suboptimal.

While additional resources are needed to address this condition, there’s also a need to streamline priority setting and associated collection requirements, provide ways to evaluate and better coordinate the collection of information and intelligence product, and expand opportunities to improve training in CrimInt.

The paper provides recommendations to improve the quality and utility of our overseas CrimInt effort for law enforcement, policy and regulatory agencies.

Why Russia is a threat to the international order

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Almost a quarter of a century after the demise of the USSR, Russia is back on the world stage and in a familiar, threatening manner. There can be no doubt that Putin’s Russia is now seeking to reassert itself as a major power. It seems set on a path to confrontation with the West and is now challenging the established post-World War II security order in Europe.

This paper analyses Russia’s geopolitical ambitions, its military modernisation, the threat it poses to the international order and how the West should respond. It estimates the prospects for the Russian economy to assess how economic weakness might affect Russian behaviour. It concludes by addressing Moscow’s strategic priorities in the Asia–Pacific region and the implications of Russia’s rise for Australia.