Exclusive: Inside Beijing’s app collecting information from Belt and Road companies

/in

China’sMinistry of Foreign Affairs operates a secure digital platform that connects it directly with Chinese companies operating abroad, requiring participating companies to submit regular reports about their activities and local security conditions to the government, internal documents reveal.

The documents obtained and verified by ASPI’s China Investigations and Analysis team show how the platform, called Safe Silk Road (平安丝路), collects information from companies participating in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s signature foreign policy initiative. The BRI has facilitated Chinese infrastructure projects and other investment in more than 100 countries, particularly developing regions. The Safe Silk Road platform was initially launched in 2017 and is now used by at least dozens of Chinese companies across several continents.

By tapping into the extensive network of Chinese companies engaged in projects around the world, the platform demonstrates how Beijing is finding new ways of improving its global information and intelligence collection to better assess risks, and ultimately protect its interests and its citizens, even in the most remote corners of the world. The Safe Silk Road platform is one more building block in the growing global infrastructure that seeks to place the Chinese government at the center of the Chinese experience abroad, and that replicates some of the structures of information collection and surveillance that have now become ubiquitous within China.

The MFA’s External Security Affairs Department (涉外安全事务司), which operates the Safe Silk Road, has said the platform is a direct response to the difficulty of obtaining information relevant to Chinese companies abroad. The information the app collects feeds into the department’s assessments. The platform is also part of a trend across Chinese government ministries of creating apps to facilitate some of the work they were already doing.

ASPI is the first organisation to report on the Safe Silk Road platform. It is mentioned on some regional Chinese government websites but has not been covered by Chinese state media. The platform operates through a website and an associated mobile app that can only be accessed with registered accounts.

The platform is not available for download in app stores. The documents state that the platform is only intended for companies’ internal use, and that users are strictly prohibited from circulating information about it online. Companies can apply for an account through the MFA’s External Security Affairs Department or their local consulate and, once approved, designate an official contact person within the company, called a ‘company liaison officer’ (公司联络员), who is authorized to submit reports and use the app’s full functionality. The MFA provides companies with a QR code to download the app and requires companies to use the platform’s bespoke VPN with the app and desktop version.

Companies are asked to submit quarterly reports through the app. Those reports include basic information such as the name, national ID number and contact information of the owner, the region in which the company operates, its sector or industry, the amount of investment in US dollars, the number of Chinese and local employees, and whether it has registered with a local Chinese embassy or consulate, according to internal company documents viewed by ASPI analysts.

The app has a feature called ‘one-click report’ for ‘sudden incidents’ (突发事件) that allows users to report local security-related incidents directly to the MFA, according to the documents and other materials. The reporting feature includes the following categories: war/unrest, terrorist attack, conflict between Chinese and foreign workers, protest, kidnapping, gun shooting, production safety accident, contagion/epidemic, flood, earthquake, fire, tsunami, and other. The user can then provide more information including date, location and other details about the incident.

The reporting form also asks the company to provide information about its ‘overseas rights protection object’ (海外权益保护对象) and ‘police resources database object’ (警务资源库对象). An ‘overseas rights protection object’ may refer to patents, trademarks, and copyrights held by the company; the Chinese government has made protecting the intellectual property of Chinese companies a key focus in recent years. ‘Police resources database object’ is a vague term that may refer to security contractors, Chinese overseas police activity, or physical assets or company personnel that need protecting.

Users can subscribe to real-time security updates for their region and register to attend online safety training classes. There is even a video-conference feature within the app that allows embassy officials to call the app user directly. It is common for foreign ministries to create digital services that provide information and security alerts for their citizens abroad—such as Australia’s ‘Smartraveller’, the US Smart Traveler Enrollment Program (STEP), and China’s own ‘China Consul’ (中国领事).

The Safe Silk Road platform, however, is different. It is not public-facing, it is tailored specifically for BRI companies and, most importantly, it asks for detailed information from those companies about their own activities and local conditions, rather than just offering helpful information. For some companies, participation may even be compulsory.

ASPI’s analysis of the Safe Silk Road platform underscores Beijing’s determination to safeguard its global infrastructure and investment power play under the BRI. As China’s investment in developing regions has grown, so has Beijing’s emphasis on protecting its citizens, companies, and assets abroad.

As of December 2023, about 150 countries had joined the BRI. According to the official Belt and Road Portal, China has 346,000 workers dispatched overseas. BRI-affiliated companies often run projects in regions with underdeveloped infrastructure, high poverty, poor governance, lack of quality medical care, domestic political instability, violent crime, and terrorist attacks. Private security contracting companies are increasingly offering their services to Chinese companies abroad. The number of Chinese private security contractors has expanded dramatically in recent years as BRI companies have faced growing security challenges.

Several events over the past few years, including the pandemic and a string of attacks in Pakistan in 2021 targeting Chinese nationals supporting BRI projects, have underscored to Beijing the need for better security measures. At the third Belt and Road symposium in 2021, Xi Jinping said China needed ‘an all-weather early warning and comprehensive assessment service platform for overseas project risks’. The External Security Affairs Department said the same year that ‘the difficulty of obtaining security information is one of the major problems faced by companies who “go out”’, referring to Chinese companies that invest overseas. To address this concern, the department ‘launched the Safe Silk Road website and the related mobile app to gather information about security risks in Belt and Road countries to directly serve company personnel engaged in projects overseas’. The department said that in 2021 the app was used to disseminate 13,000 pieces of information, including more than 2,800 early warnings.

More broadly, the platform is illustrative as a digital tool to help Beijing protect its interests abroad. The External Security Affairs Department was established in 2004 in response to a perceived increase in kidnappings and terrorist attacks targeting Chinese nationals abroad, but its role in China’s security policy has expanded since then.

The department’s leading role in ‘protecting China’s interests abroad’ (中国海外利益保护) meets an objective increasingly found in official Chinese Communist Party documents and Chinese law. This objective appears in China’s National Security Strategy 2021–2025, the new Foreign Relations Law 2023, and new regulations on consular protection and assistance passed in 2023. The party’s ability and readiness to protect China’s interests abroad is considered one of the historic achievements of the party, according to a resolution it passed in 2021.

But the exact scope of China’s interests abroad is still a matter of debate in the public commentary among Chinese national security and foreign policy academics and analysts. Are China’s interests just the physical security of Chinese nationals and commercial or strategic assets in foreign countries? Or do they also include ‘intangible interests’ (无形利益), such as protecting China’s national image and reputation, and anything else that should be within China’s national interest as a major global power? How the Chinese government currently defines China’s interests abroad is probably somewhere in the middle, and may broaden.

China has a widely recognised deficiency: gaps in its overseas intelligence collection capabilities. Safe Silk Road is part of the toolbox that the External Security Affairs Department uses to extend the range and effectiveness of Beijing’s information-gathering and to better understand the situation on the ground everywhere that China has interests.

Critical technology tracker: two decades of data show rewards of long-term research investment

/in ,

China and the United States have effectively switched places as the overwhelming leader in research in just two decades, ASPI’s latest Critical Technology Tracker results reveal.

The latest tracker findings, which can be found in a new report and on the website, show the stunning shift in research leadership over the past 21 years towards large economies in the Indo-Pacific, led by China’s exceptional gains.

China led in just three of 64 technologies in the years from 2003 to 2007, but is the leading country in 57 of 64 technologies over the past five years from 2019 to 2023. This is an increase from last year’s Tech Tracker results, in which it was leading in 52 technologies. 

The US led in 60 of 64 technologies in the five years from 2003 to 2007, but in the most recent five year period, it was leading in just seven.

Critical technologies have been on the agenda for US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan’s visit to Beijing this week—the first visit by a US NSA since 2016. Meanwhile, dozens of countries are coming together in Australia for the third Sydney Dialogue on Monday to discuss issues around technology, security, cyber and global strategic competition.

Our results show India is also emerging as a key centre of global research innovation and excellence, establishing its position as a science and technology power. India now ranks in the top five countries for 45 of 64 technologies (an increase from 37 last year) and has displaced the US as the second-ranked country in two new technologies (biological manufacturing and distributed ledgers) to rank second in seven of 64 technologies.

The latest Tech Tracker has updated results for 64 critical technologies from crucial fields spanning artificial intelligence, defence, space, energy, the environment, biotechnology, robotics, cyber, computing, advanced materials and quantum technology areas. The dataset has been expanded from five years of data (previously, 2018 to 2022) to 21 years of data (from 2003 to 2023).

The Tech Tracker is a data-driven website that reveals the countries and institutions—universities, national labs, companies and government agencies—leading scientific and research innovation in critical technologies. It does that by focusing on high-impact research—the top 10 percent of most highly cited papers. We focus on the top 10 percent because those publications have a higher impact on the full technology life cycle and are more likely to lead to patents, drive future research innovation and underpin technological breakthroughs.

Looking at the average share of annual global research across the 64 technologies (see Figure 1 below), shows us the astonishing inversion between the US and China in high impact research.

graph: Research leadership inversion over 21 years

Figure 1: Average annual research share across the 64 technologies between 2003 and 2023.

China has made its new gains in quantum sensors, high-performance computing, gravitational sensors, space launch and advanced integrated circuit design and fabrication (semiconductor chip making). The US leads in quantum computing, vaccines and medical countermeasures, nuclear medicine and radiotherapy, small satellites, atomic clocks, genetic engineering and natural language processing. 

Another notable change involves the United Kingdom, which has dropped out of the top five country rankings in eight technologies, declining from 44 last year to 36 now. The technologies in which the UK has fallen out of the top five rankings are spread across a range of areas, but are mostly technologies related to advanced materials, sensing and space.

The European Union, as a whole, is a competitive technological player that can challenge the China-US duopoly. Like the US and China, the EU, when aggregating its member countries over the past five years, is in the top FIVE countries in all 64 technologies. With members of the EU aggregated over the past five years, we found that the EU leads in two technologies (gravitational force sensors and small satellites) and is ranked second in 30 technologies. 

Besides India and the UK, the performance of second-tier science and technology research powers (those countries ranked behind China and the US) in the top five rankings is largely unchanged: Germany is in the top five in 27 technologies, South Korea in 24, Italy in 15, Iran in 8, Japan also in 8 and Australia in 7.

In terms of institutions, US technology companies have leading or strong positions in AI, quantum and computing technologies. IBM now ranks first in quantum computing, Google ranks first in natural language processing and fourth in quantum computing, and Meta and Microsoft also place seventh and eighth in natural language processing respectively. The only non-US based companies that rank in the top 20 institutions for any technology are the UK division of Toshiba, which places 13th in quantum communications, and Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, which places 20th in advanced integrated circuit design and fabrication.

Key government agencies and national labs also perform well, including the US National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), which excels in space and satellite technologies. The results also show that the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS)—thought to be the world’s largest science and technology institution—is by far the world’s highest performing institution in the Tech Tracker, with a global lead in 31 of 64 technologies—an increase from 29 last year. CAS is a ministerial-level institution that sits directly under the State Council, and has spearheaded the development of China’s indigenous science, technological and innovation capabilities, including in computing technologies, nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles. CAS also specialises in commercialising its findings and creating new companies. According to CAS, by 2022, more than 2,000 companies had been founded from the commercialisation of its scientific research.

Our report also looks at the combined US-UK-Australia performance in AUKUS pillar two-relevant technologies. It finds that combining AUKUS efforts with those of closer partners Japan and South Korea helps to close the gap in research performance for some technologies. But for others such as autonomous underwater vehicles and hypersonic detecting and tracking, China’s high impact research lead is so pronounced that no combination of other countries can currently match it. 

The graph below shows the share of research across a range of AUKUS pillar two-relevant technologies. (Please click on the image to see it full screen.)

Figure 1: Research share across a range of AUKUS Pillar 2–relevant technologies

We have continued to measure the risk that any country will hold a monopoly in a technology capability in the future, based on the share of high impact research output and the number of leading institutions in the dominant country—noting that for all 64 technologies, only China or the US currently has the lead. The number of technologies classified as ‘high risk’ has jumped from 14 technologies last year to 24 now. China is the lead country in every one of the technologies newly classified as high risk—putting a total of 24 of 64 technologies at high risk of a Chinese monopoly. 

Worryingly, the technologies newly classified as high risk include many with defence applications, such as radar, advanced aircraft engines, drones, swarming and collaborative robots and satellite positioning and navigation. See the below table for a small selection of critical technologies currently classified as ‘high risk’.

Grpah: technology monopoly risk top 5 countries

The new historical dataset shows the points in time at which countries have gained, lost or are at risk of losing their global edge in scientific research and innovation. It  provides a new layer of depth and context, revealing the performance trajectory countries have taken, where the momentum lies and also where longer term dominance over the full two decades might reflect foundational expertise and capabilities that carry forward even when that leader has been edged out more recently by other countries. The results also help to shed light on the countries, and many of the institutions, from which we’re likely to see future innovations and breakthroughs emerge.

In advanced aircraft engines, for example, US government or government-affiliated institutions performed strongly from 2003 to 2007—with NASA and the US Air Force Research Laboratory ranking first and second respectively—reflecting this technology’s clear relevance to military and space capability. Today, these institutions occupy much lower positions in the new rankings and 10 out of 10 of the world’s top-performing institutions are in China. 

When looking further down the science and technology life cycle, at patent data for example, our research finds there is a closer and more recent competition between the US and China but the overall trends are similar.

China’s dominant high impact research performance across so many technologies doesn’t necessarily equate to the same dominance in actualising those technologies. At times, China is ahead in high impact research because it’s actually behind in the development and commercialisation of that technology and is making major investments to try to catch up to the advances made by other countries over previous decades.

But the fact that China has enhanced its lead since last year’s Critical Technology Tracker results, especially in defence technologies, points to its growing momentum in science and technology, which other countries would be wise to assume will continue.

For some technologies, this inversion in research leadership has occurred because the high impact research output of pioneering science and technology powers such as the US, Japan, the UK and Germany has flatlined, putting them in a position where they’re losing—or at risk of losing—some of the research and scientific strengths they have built over many decades. Some of these long-term changes can be seen, for example, in the dwindling numbers of globally recognised—and sometimes Nobel Prize winning— research and development laboratories based in electronics and telecommunications firms across Europe—Philips of the Netherlands— and the US—AT&T Bell Labs previously known as Lucent Technologies or Alcatel Lucent and now as Nokia (US).

With other technologies, however, the shift is instead being driven by an enormous surge in China’s research outputs over the past 21 years. China has executed a dramatic step-up in research performance that other countries simply haven’t been able to match.

The historical strong performance of the US and other advanced economies in high impact research, which can now be tracked closely, is reflected in their sustained vitality. For example, the US shows continued innovation and leadership in key technology areas amidst immense competition, especially in quantum computing, and vaccines and medical countermeasures. This reflects its long term strengths across the full spectrum of the technology ecosystem. Decades of research effort can lead to decades of payoff in the application and commercialisation of the knowledge and expertise that a country has built up.

Measuring high-impact research, by itself, doesn’t provide a full picture of a country’s current technological or innovation competitiveness of course. Actualising and commercialising research performance into technological gains can be a difficult, expensive and complicated process, no matter how impressive the initial breakthrough. A range of other inputs are needed, such as an efficient manufacturing base and ambitious policy implementation.

But the purpose of the Tech Tracker is not to assess the current state of play but to improve global understanding of countries’ strategic intent and potential future science and technology capability.

Some observers might argue that China’s ascendance into a research power—indeed the research power—doesn’t matter because other countries, the US in particular, remain ahead in commercialisation, design and manufacturing. That might be true for some technologies, but it represents a very short term attitude. China, too, is making enormous investments in its manufacturing capabilities, subsidising key industries and achieving technological breakthroughs that are catching the world by surprise.

Our results serve as a reminder to governments around the world that building technological capability takes a sustained investment in, and accumulation of, knowledge, innovative skill, talent and high performing institutions—none of which can be acquired through only short term investments. In a range of essential sectors, democratic nations risk losing hard-won, long term advantages in cutting edge science and research—the crucial ingredient that underpins much of the development and progress of the world’s most important technologies. There’s also a risk that retreats in some areas could mean that democratic nations aren’t well positioned to take advantage of new and emerging technologies, including those that don’t exist yet. Meanwhile, the longitudinal results in the Tech Tracker enable us to see how China’s enormous investments and decades of strategic planning are now paying off.

The sugar hit of immediate budget savings must be balanced against the cost of losing the advantage gained from decades of investment and strategic planning. Strategic investments are needed in technologies that are identified as important to a country’s national interest. Continuous investments in those technology areas must then follow. And, of course, that must take place alongside complementary efforts that help build capability across the science and technology life cycle: targeted policies on issues such as skilled migration, industry reform and incentives to boost innovation, manufacturing capability and commercialisation opportunities.

Given the extent to which strategic influence will be determined by technological primacy, even the US has demonstrated that it needs trusted partners in research, innovation and industry to maintain an edge over major competitors such as China.

The Tech Tracker results show that countries can benefit from co-operation on technology by pooling their efforts and finding complementary and tangible areas in which to collaborate in an era when science and technology expertise is becoming increasingly concentrated in one country. Without bigger changes to the status quo, the trajectory laid out in this research will continue to be consolidated. 

Partners and allies must plan, act and collaborate more strategically and more ambitiously—indeed, this might be the only way to stay collectively ahead.

Australia needs a one-of-a-kind strategy to prepare for a second Trump presidency

/in

The Presidential debate last week was tough viewing. In the aftermath of President Joe Biden’s faltering performance, and the Supreme Court’s favourable ruling on Donald Trump’s immunity claim, Australia needs to supercharge its planning, because the odds of a second Trump presidency have seemingly shortened.
Australia, like many countries, has been preparing for a possible second Trump administration. Ambassador Kevin Rudd’s Twitter account provides insights into how hard he and our embassy in Washington are working. But as we get closer to the election, there needs to be an approach that goes well beyond the embassy and traditional diplomacy.
Australia needs a laser-focused strategy that is ambitious, well-resourced and co-ordinated across all arms of government.
Our ability to navigate another Trump presidency depends on the creation and implementation of a one-of-a-kind strategic plan that considers every risk, predicts curve balls, and foreshadows decisions that affect us. This is difficult, but not impossible.
During the first Trump presidency, there was some conservative commonality between the ruling parties in both countries, which won’t be the case this time—noting Australia is set to have its own election within the next 11 months. This adds an extra dimension to the complexities that would need to be managed.
Scenarios should be workshopped and tested, including with well-connected people from business and civil society. Options should be developed that would help deter policy directions that are not in Australia’s interests or those of our broader region. No doubt a lot of work is already going into future-proofing AUKUS, for example—a job that will have to ramp up significantly if Trump is re-elected. Trump might change direction on the partnership. He could decide to stay committed to just one of the two pillars, or seek to renegotiate the terms of the arrangement.
In addition to defence issues, Australia’s strategy will also need to cover economic security, trade and industrial policy, societal impacts, international affairs and security.
The strategy must also have an offensive element and prepare Australia to capitalise on opportunities, including by making plans to support partners and allies during times of great difficulty, or worse, crisis. Australia fared well during the first Trump presidency and, along with partners such as Japan and India, has lessons it can share that could strengthen our partners’ hands.
What follows are six priorities the Australian Government should pursue immediately.

Switzerland summit should give peace a chance, but only on Ukraine’s terms

/in ,

This weekend’s Summit on Peace in Ukraine is a misnomer. It’s not about an immediate end to the war but about finding ways to strengthen Ukraine’s hand so that it heads to the negotiating table on its own terms and timing, and that we have a reasonable chance of a peace that is both acceptable and durable.

Hosted by Switzerland, it will bring together leaders from about 100 countries ranging from Germany and France to Japan and Southeast Asian nations.

Russia has not been invited and has said it wouldn’t attend anyway. That’s good, because the goal cannot be to seek agreement on a ceasefire just to stop the fighting by any means. As with Crimea in 2014, a confected outcome would enable Russia simply to ease off until it feels confident to resume its invasion.

Instead, the conference should rally behind the Ronald Reagan doctrine of peace through strength. As Reagan told the 1980 Republican party convention—in remarks that some of today’s Republicans might usefully heed: ‘War comes not when the forces of freedom are strong but when they are weak. It is then that tyrants are tempted.’

This will likely require a willingness to escalate the conflict in the short term to ensure de-escalation can happen on Ukraine’s terms and to all of our long term benefit.

The conference attendees cannot allow—perfectly legitimate—humanitarian concerns, short term economic challenges or disinformation peddled by regimes propping up the Russian war machine to distract from the harsh reality—Ukraine has chosen as a nation to fight bravely at great human cost. Given they are fighting for basic values that keep the rest of us safer—as Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has said as he increasingly desperately seeks continued international support—we owe the nation a post-war reconstruction and political plan that enables them to live with some confidence as Russia’s neighbour. This means not only helping Ukraine with the capabilities to fight against Russia but to help give them something to fight for.

No one would deny that this is a tough road for Ukraine and, in different ways, for its supporters internationally. But the price of allowing Russia to win or to enjoy impunity for the most flagrant violation of international rules in decades is incalculable for global security and stability.

That is the case for countries as geographically distant as Australia. Prime Minister Anthony Albanese is not attending, and nor is any other minister on the National Security Committee of Cabinet.

This is disappointing for a democracy such as Australia, which enjoys security and prosperity because of support from other democracies in times of war—both hot and cold. True, China’s Premier Li Qiang is visiting in the coming days, but the Peace Summit is too important a gathering for not one of our key ministers to attend—and it would be deeply worrying if any senior government ministers and officials undervalue Europe’s importance to Australia and view the war as being fought a long way from our shores.

That said, it is positive that the minister attending, National Disability and Insurance Scheme Minister Bill Shorten will be viewed internationally as a former leader of the opposition—a very senior figure in the mould of Kim Beazley—with orthodox views on security.

As a former party and union leader, Shorten will take with him the experience that any type of negotiation—whether employment, trade, political or peace—is a contest in which the respective strength of each party is vital to the outcome and its lasting nature.

A favourable outcome to the war is not just a regional dilemma for Europe but is important for Australia and the Indo-Pacific, and any Russian ‘win’ would translate into insecurity for us.

There are no perfect analogies between Europe and the Indo-Pacific. The European theatre is predominantly land, while the Indo-Pacific is maritime, which means lessons at the operational level must be carefully interpreted. However, the strategic and political parallels are clear, from the global trust in liberal democracies and the US alliance system to confidence in effective constraint of aggressive authoritarian regimes and longstanding nuclear deterrence. A future in which Russia cannot be beaten back and deterrence effectively re-established in Europe automatically means deterrence is immeasurably weaker everywhere else, including in our region.

As Japan’s Prime Minister Kishida consistently states, ‘today’s Ukraine could be tomorrow’s East Asia’.

Indeed, the likely reason China is skipping the summit is that Beijing correctly judges it will not further Russia’s, and therefore its own, war aims. A Russian victory would recalibrate expectations about authoritarian aggression being held to account, and this would clearly benefit Beijing.

China is supporting Russia economically and materially, propping up its industrial capacity and supplying dual use goods that enable Russia to restock weapons and parts of weapons. Throughout history, wars have most often been won by out-producing the enemy.

This should be called out through a joint statement at the conference. A declaration that condemns countries such as North Korea and Iran for supporting Russia but stays silent on China would represent an appeasement that would only embolden Beijing to dig its heels in to help a Russian victory.

Prominent opponents of support for Ukraine tend to be isolationists or to be narrowly China-focused. The latter claim that the US and allied effort must not be distracted by Europe and should be aimed only at countering China as the pacing and long-term threat. They’re right that Beijing is the more enduring challenge, but they are wrong to think that tolerating Russia’s onslaught against its neighbour would better place us to tackle China’s own malign activity.

To deter all of Russia, China, Iran and North Korea, none can be ignored or tolerated. Freedom and sovereignty are not protected by picking and choosing which international rules are enforced and which regimes are appeased.

Australia and our region depend on the rules-based order even though some loud voices criticise the concept as increasingly quixotic. A world without rules such as the observance of other states’ territorial integrity and freedom of navigation at sea is worse than anarchy—it would mean aggressive authoritarian states such as Russia and China are free to achieve their strategic goals at the expense of others’ freedom and sovereignty while the rest of us live in hope that our silence and passivity means we are not next.

This means Australia should be firmly in the camp of helping Ukraine to determine any peace agreement to end the war. It cannot be resolved by other countries—or individual leaders—negotiating with Putin without Ukraine.

Given the relatively small cost of supporting Ukraine, Beijing would only interpret our giving up Ukraine as a sign of general western weakness, indifference, short-sightedness and self-absorption. It would be emboldened.

The argument that supporting Ukraine amounts to an opportunity cost to more important  priorities just doesn’t add up, considering the cost of Ukraine support is actually very mild. Indeed some might argue it is the bargain of a lifetime—as the Ukrainians are doing the fighting.

The objective for this conference must be peace through strength—both Ukraine’s and our own.

Balancing the offensive and defensive in the AUKUS innovation agenda

/in ,

Intensifying geopolitical competition is having an adverse effect on the internet and innovation. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, increasing Chinese aggression in the South China Sea and the lack of an Iran nuclear deal are contributing to the weaponisation of cyber technologies and the raising of technology barriers.

At the same time, Web3—a new iteration of the internet—and the technologies that enable it, such as blockchain, are developing systems that are increasingly decentralised, permissionless and not reliant on governments and organisations to facilitate trust. Amid these polarising tensions, Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States have proposed new levels of technology sharing through the AUKUS agreement.

‘Blocking’ the enemy has become a hallmark of modern hybrid warfare. The war in Ukraine has demonstrated the application of novel tactics and attempts by both sides to ‘unplug’ the adversary. Persistent, distributed denial-of-service attacks by Russian botnet armies, such as Killnet, against Ukraine and its supporters are now standard disruption and sabotage tactics. Ukraine’s more extreme approach of asking the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers to restrict Russia’s internet access exemplifies a ‘digital iron curtain’ attempt to advance sovereign goals, the possible long-term consequences of which policymakers have yet to flesh out.

Outside of active conflicts, governments around the globe seek more digital sovereignty, self-sufficiency and, increasingly, restrictions on information sharing. The Chinese Communist Party has long sought to censor and disengage from the global internet through its ‘Great Firewall’, which involves a ban of Facebook and development of alternatives to Amazon, such as Alibaba. Beijing’s establishment of a ‘metaverse industry committee’ in November similarly speaks to a pre-emptive attempt to set the rules for the emergence of Web3 and metaverse-enabling technologies. Similar attempts have been made by AUKUS members. The ongoing campaign in the US to ban video-sharing platform TikTok is an example of geopolitical tensions and security concerns affecting the access developers and creators have to foreign technologies and networks.

President Joe Biden recently signed an executive order requiring the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States to tighten its focus on advanced technologies, including information and communication technologies. The aim is to address the government’s concerns about what data Beijing can access, as well as to prevent supply-chain dependencies and the enabling of technology advances that aid Chinese military capabilities.

Similarly, the CHIPS and Science Act 2022 speaks to the Biden administration’s supply-chain concerns. The act announced US$52 billon in incentives for domestic production of semiconductors, which are used in computers and other electronic devices. Currently, 92% of the world’s supply is produced in Taiwan. The act also provides incentives for investment in critical sciences and technologies with the intention of strengthening homegrown capabilities.

What’s occurring is a trade-off between national security and access to global platforms, ideas and networks that aid innovation, and the market competitiveness that drives it. The by-product of innovation and market competition is more effective development of advanced technologies that have both commercial and defence applications. The need to develop compatible and effective channels for communication and technology sharing between AUKUS members is vital to the success of the agreement. Currently, however, this is not default government behaviour.

Despite the influence of geopolitical tensions on cyberspace and technology, entrepreneurs find ways to circumnavigate policy. Ukraine’s use of blockchain technology to fund defence efforts and Russia’s use to avoid economic sanctions demonstrate how these technologies operate without bias or morality. A hallmark of Web3 development is its resistance to censorship. Decentralised technology enables individuals to own their data and to select preferred platforms, since user communities rather than an overarching authority manage and moderate content and user data. The technology is still in its infancy, but the ability for governments to implement effective policy controls is limited. AUKUS is occurring in this context.

Under the AUKUS agreement, technology sharing is intended to result in increased capability among the three partners to strengthen regional deterrence against Chinese or other foreign adversary aggression. Using AUKUS as a vehicle to deepen ties between Australian, US and UK technology industrial bases is a sea change from traditional tendencies to favour sovereign capabilities over coordinated and open sharing of advanced technologies.

There is an opportunity and need to prioritise information and cyber technologies, such as Web3 and blockchain, that both aid in transparent and secure information sharing and ensure that innovation is compatible with their rapidly developing characteristics. The failure of AUKUS to do so could have a negative impact on the effectiveness of subsequent initiatives, already evidenced through the ability for emergent technologies to circumvent traditional policy and cyber barriers. It could also dampen industry’s incentive to innovate and commercialise these technologies, which could lead to an exodus of skilled labour to nations with laws that enable less constrained innovation and allow access to the necessary networks and data. For Australia, talent shortages are already a significant capability limitation that affects its ability to contribute to or retain technology gains achieved through AUKUS.

Eight of the 17 AUKUS working groups focus on advanced technology capabilities, and they should collectively consider the long-term implications of developments for industry and how they can focus on prioritising the strategies and frameworks that enable sharing between nations while strengthening their own commercial relationships. Ultimately, technology sharing, particularly in the advanced cyber, innovation, artificial intelligence and information-sharing working groups, should be constructive, be compatible with peacetime operations and reinforce secure and open digital connectivity with non-member nations, including long-term, stable engagement, at least commercially, with adversaries.

The internet and emergent technologies exist in a borderless domain. A defensive approach to innovation and ongoing efforts to block adversaries’ engagement in these spaces—or limit domestic engagement—are not sustainable. Technology will continue to find ways to overcome these efforts. Such behaviour is also likely to exacerbate tensions between governments and the private sector, which would be counterproductive to the cooperation required for technological advancement. AUKUS technology initiatives should be conscious of industry partners. The AUKUS members also need to think creatively about how defensive goals can be achieved in a way that’s compatible with the underlying characteristics of new technologies.

AUKUS’s technology-sharing goals represent a significant opportunity for Australia to bolster its capabilities, industry skills and expertise. The consequences will feed into the private sector. The challenge will be ensuring that defensive developments designed to protect AUKUS members are compatible with policy that encourages open but secure digital engagement.

This piece originally published on The Strategist. 

Australia must get review of climate-change security risks right

/in ,

t

The most consequential gap in the climate policies of the Coalition government under Scott Morrison was not its weak commitment to reduce greenhouse gas emissions or its reluctance to accelerate the transition from fossil fuels to renewables, but rather its neglect of the security threats posed by climate change.

Prime Minister Anthony Albanese’s government moved quickly to address this gap by ordering an ‘assessment of the implications for national security of climate change’. The review will be led by Andrew Shearer, the director-general of the Office of National Intelligence, working closely with the Department of Defence. The review team faces a daunting task.

Smart Asian women are the new targets of CCP global online repression

/in ,

The Chinese Communist Party has a problem with women of Asian descent who have public platforms, opinions and expertise on China.

In an effort to counter the views and work of these women, the CCP has been busy pivoting its growing information operation capabilities to target women, with a focus on journalists working at major Western media outlets.

Right now, and often going back weeks or months, some of the world’s leading China journalists and human rights activists are on the receiving end of an ongoing, coordinated and large-scale online information campaign. These women are high profile journalists at media outlets including the New Yorker, The Economist, the New York Times, The Guardian, Quartz and others. The most malicious and sophisticated aspects of this information campaign are focused on women of Asian descent.

Based on open-source information, ASPI assesses the inauthentic Twitter accounts behind this operation are likely another iteration of the pro-CCP ‘Spamouflage’ network, which Twitter attributed to the Chinese government in 2019.

Delivering ‘joined-up’ government: achieving the integrated approach to offshore crisis management

/in ,

The call to improve ‘joined-up’ government articulates a principle that is the foundation of effective and efficient public administration. Increasingly, the ability of government to achieve effects that are more than the sum of their parts will determine whether Australia influences its strategic environment or is merely captive to it. 

Offshore crisis response requires a higher level of multiagency interconnectedness than ever before. This level of interconnectedness requires the adoption of transformative approaches to recruitment, professional development, leadership and management.

The paper stresses the need for adaptable people, the importance of capturing lessons of recent experience and provides practical actions to strengthen joined-up government.