How will the midterms affect US foreign policy and Australia’s strategic interests?

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On 8 November, Americans will vote in midterm congressional elections to determine all 435 voting seats in the House of Representatives and one-third of the 100 seats in the Senate. Despite the political theatre, Australians should take heart.

Recent discussions between ASPI DC and congressional committee staff members serving both Democratics and Republicans in both the House and Senate suggest that the looming presidential election in 2024 and the likely focus of congressional committee hearings on topics far from the Indo-Pacific region—such as funding for the war in Ukraine and the US withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021—appear all-engrossing.

But in a new ASPI report we found that next week’s midterms should not negatively affect the Australia–US alliance and the core interests that underpin its success.

While a foreign policy mandate or change in general direction is unlikely to occur, the possible shuffle of congressional committee leadership may facilitate or curb the passage and implementation of policies that address Australian concerns. Canberra should therefore be highly attuned to the changes in the structure and membership of committees, which are the bodies that have a significant influence on the formation of US foreign policy.

Currently, the Democratic Party holds the majority in the House and, with the tie-breaking vote of the vice president, holds an effective majority in the Senate. President Joe Biden’s newly released national security strategy and national defence strategy demonstrate bipartisan consensus and continuity with the previous administration on threats posed in the Indo-Pacific region. The Congress has shown the same commitment through broad consensus to support and work with key allies such as Australia on these issues.

There are three possible outcomes of the midterm elections: the status quo is maintained, with a marginal Democrat hold in both the Senate and the House; a split Congress emerges where the Senate is held by one party and the House by the other; or the Republicans take both the Senate and the House.

A status quo outcome is least likely, but if this scenario comes to pass and the Democrats retain control of both chambers, Congress may empower the Biden administration to introduce policies and laws with less consultation or cooperation with the Republicans. It may also see reduced Republican willingness to offer bipartisanship in the lead-up to the 2024 presidential election. The Republican Party would probably seek to blame a Democrat-led Congress and White House for any domestic troubles, such as an economic downturn or energy shortages. That domestic disruption could spill into foreign affairs if, for example, US domestic politics is seen as outweighing US resourcing of Ukraine in its war with Russia.

In the second scenario, in which one party has the numbers in the House and the other has the numbers in the Senate, the Biden administration won’t be able to push through controversial legislation by sheer weight of numbers. However, a Republican win in either chamber (but not both chambers) and committees that change accordingly could stall legislation and lead to congressional gridlock as each side tries to advance its own agenda in the lead-up to 2024.

A split Congress will likely view foreign policy legislation and oversight activity through a lens of domestic politics and partisanship. In this scenario, we expect to see partisanship between the two chambers and within the individual committees, which may lead to reduced agreement. Precedent indicates that there’s likely to be more cooperation in committees that are working directly and collaboratively on foreign policy than in the broader theatre of the chambers. That could change quickly if, for example, resourcing Ukraine in the war in Europe loses popularity domestically.

An agreement such as AUKUS depends on it being both a domestic and a foreign policy priority. Congress will continue to strongly support AUKUS. However, new policies for the second pillar of AUKUS’s work program (advanced capabilities such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing and hypersonics) may become harder to develop due to overlap between domestic and foreign policy. Domestic battles may also rank above foreign policy considerations.

Support for ongoing US prioritisation of the Indo-Pacific will remain bipartisan. However, there may be more political debate on the level of simultaneous US resourcing to counter Russia’s war in the Euro-Atlantic and China’s aggression in the Indo-Pacific. That will depend in part on the partisan and personal predilections of committee and subcommittee chairs.

In the third possibility, which is looking more likely as the midterms near, a Republican Congress, emboldened by an electoral win, would have incentives to challenge the Biden administration. The Republicans would be in a stronger position to introduce and attempt to pass legislation. It’s highly probable that Republican oversight would hinder the administration’s making of political appointments, including US ambassadors. The appointment process is already hindered by committee rules, but Republican oversight would further stymie hearings.

Republican political clout may not necessarily reduce bipartisan cooperation and compromise on foreign and defence policy more broadly—at least not before the presidential election campaign gets underway in mid-2023. There is an overall strong consensus to make foreign policy work, and there would likely be a six-month window of opportunity for cooperation, provided neither branch of government puts forward policies unacceptable to the other.

Awareness of this closing window for cooperation ahead of the presidential campaign season could even increase compromise and bipartisanship over that period. Notably, the Biden administration has overcome these challenges by successfully reaching across the aisle on foreign policy issues (for example, with the recent passage of the ‘CHIPS and Science Act’).

Polls suggests the Republicans will win a majority in the House and could also control the Senate, with the economy and cost of living as the dominant election issues. If that happens, both parties will focus on domestic political needs, requiring Australia to work even harder to keep attention on our priorities. That would mean regularly highlighting Indo-Pacific issues for distracted American lawmakers who, besides their focus on China, will be occupied with the war in Ukraine.

Canberra will also need to encourage presidential and vice-presidential attendance at Indo-Pacific meetings and push for early congressional visits to Australia and the region from members of the new foreign affairs, defence and armed services committees.

In the less likely event that the Democrats hold both chambers, the Biden administration would have more room to move on foreign policy.

Whatever the outcome, it’s in the US’s interest to prioritise the Indo-Pacific even as it manages challenges at home and in Europe. The kind of intimate relationship that Australia needs with the US to strengthen its security and sovereignty requires Australian politicians and policymakers—as well as key civil society and industry actors—to continue putting in time and resources and not rely on an expectation that this critical alliance will manage itself.

ASPI DC provide expertise to MITRE on Indo-Pacific Wargaming exercise

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On November 2nd and 3rd, ASPI DC Analysts, Greg Brown, Bronte Munro and Iain MacGillivray participated in MITRE’s Sage Dragon exercise re: influence competition in the Pacific. The team provided unique insights into Australia’s strategic outlook in the region and helped informed allied decision making in the hypothetical scenarios.

Despite progress, major challenges lie ahead for AUKUS

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Discussions during a trilogy of AUKUS-related events in Washington on the one-year anniversary of the deal’s announcement suggest the novel strategic partnership is about much more than submarines, the transfer of nuclear propulsion know-how and Anglosphere chumminess.

Political officials, scholars and practitioners gathered last week under the auspices of ASPI, the Center for New American Security and the Centre for Grand Strategy at King’s College London to identify key successes and primary challenges for the partnership.

The political leadership in all three countries appears fully aboard with AUKUS—the deal has survived a change in government in Australia and a change in prime minister in the UK—and officials describe levels of cooperation not seen since World War II to streamline advanced technology sharing. Participating officials described AUKUS as a new paradigm of defence integration across a broad spectrum of advanced technologies to maintain scientific and engineering advantages while improving a collective defence posture among the three countries.

For the US, this project represents an overdue shift of attention to the Indo-Pacific and a determined effort to make good on longstanding promises of a geostrategic pivot to the region and the looming Chinese threat with the help of steadfast partners. It also portends a change in the American approach to alliance capability sharing. AUKUS helps to further anchor Australia in the American defence orbit and should make Beijing think hard about how to respond to a Canberra that’s increasingly willing to push back against Chinese aggression. In the UK, the AUKUS agreement is seen as necessary to show strength alongside allies with shared interests and values, but also as part of the UK’s new ‘global Britain’ strategy in the wake of its departure from the EU.

The much-publicised submarine component of the pact—so-called pillar 1—appears to be moving forward apace. All parties expect that a plan to provide Australia with nuclear-propelled submarines will be announced, as scheduled, in March. The details are being held close by officials, but a year into talks, confidence is growing that delivery may occur earlier than the parties expected at the beginning of discussions. Besides the actual capacity-enhancing propulsion technology transfer, AUKUS partners see pillar 1 as a ‘big bet’ signal that will demonstrate a capacity to meet the defence coordination challenges of the second pillar, relating to artificial intelligence, quantum computing and other emerging technologies.

The decision of the AUKUS partners to take their case for the sharing of nuclear-propulsion technology to the International Atomic Energy Agency in the interests of transparency, and the response from most of the international community to consider, accept or support the argument in good faith, portend success for pillar 1. Some allies and partners have expressed concerns about AUKUS’s effects on nuclear proliferation and possible further destabilisation of the Indo-Pacific, but the Chinese information campaign to discredit AUKUS has so far failed to gain much traction.

Despite widespread support for AUKUS and a desire for its success, three pressing issues were repeatedly raised throughout the discussions.

First, there is a lack of clarity around AUKUS’s strategic purpose and what each partner aims to achieve. The inability to define specific, shared goals beyond banalities of protecting the ‘rules-based order’ or technology sharing to ‘deter Chinese aggression’ may belie a failure to identify different threat perceptions and risk appetites, which, if accounted for, help determine how to rank the technologies that are critical to advancing specific interests for each partner.

Does AUKUS strengthen integrated deterrence against a common threat, namely China, or may some technology transfers—even discussion of them—trigger escalation in some scenarios? If power projection is itself a goal for one or more of the partners, pillar 2 activities need tailoring. It is understandable that more time is needed here given that the efforts under pillar 1 are the initial priority. Determining metrics for measuring AUKUS’s worth is necessary before making any further claims of success, however.

Second, the story of AUKUS—or lack of one—also poses a challenge. The narrative on the need for the deal in the first place hasn’t really registered beyond nuclear submarines meeting Australia’s defence needs, resulting in confusion from regional allies and partners, and giving rise to concerns that AUKUS could destabilise the Indo-Pacific region. Canberra, London and Washington need to have explicit and uncomplicated discussions with allies and partners about what they intend the deal to accomplish more broadly.

Is AUKUS a trial run for a similar, future initiative with Japan, France or other countries in the Indo-Pacific? The potential for Chinese disinformation to colour perceptions of the deal will grow the longer that the AUKUS members delay announcements and fail to fully explain its parameters and objectives. This effort will require the AUKUS partners to gain a more comprehensive understanding of why allies and friends may be sceptical, regardless of Chinese influence.

Finally, a major concern is the failure so far of AUKUS partners to assess the role of commercial industry, supply chains and broader society in enabling pillar 2 to succeed. Shared bureaucratic, legal and practical infrastructure is needed to support sustained advanced technology sharing across myriad critical technologies—all of which are at various stages of development. Each partner needs to conduct a comprehensive review of its supply chains and skills gaps to ensure shared technology is utilised and retained.

Pillar 2 is fundamentally different from pillar 1. A top-down approach needs grassroots support for AUKUS to succeed. Pillar 2 exceeds the scope of traditional defence capability sharing, and this alone will necessitate creative and uncomfortable changes at all levels to ensure its success. Long-term momentum may be difficult to sustain without greater industry and civil-society stakes in AUKUS’s development and a better understanding of its potential benefits. Domestic diplomacy will need the support of think tanks, educational institutions and ‘track 2’ planning to clarify and refine AUKUS over time.

ASPI launches Washington DC office

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Australia’s first overseas think tank presence was officially opened today by Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister of Australia, the Hon Richard Marles MP.

The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) has gained global attention for its research and today launched its office in Washington DC.

The Deputy Prime Minister said, ‘in so many ways, the product of ASPI is critically important, not only in informing the Australian public, but those of us in government who seek to play a role in this space.’

On the importance of think tanks, Marles stated: ‘for those of us who believe in democracies, it’s really important that the value of modern democracies is advocated.’

ASPI Executive Director, Justin Bassi, said ‘as one of the most important US allies, it’s important Australia is competing in this marketplace, and providing US decision makers and the US public with a perspective from the most critical part of the world.’

ASPI’s Washington presence will be led by Mark Watson, a former lawyer and diplomat with over thirty years experience in international relations and national security.

ASPI’s DC office will build on its existing great reputation in the United States by serving a unique role as an authoritative Australian voice in the American capital for think tank perspectives on Australian security, defence and foreign policy.

COCONUT WIRELESS – Dr Anthony Bergin, ASPI

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This interview with Dr Anthony Bergin, Senior Fellow at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) is the first of a series focused on Australia-United States relations as a result of the AUKUS security deal signed in September 2021 exploring how the AUKUS deal opened potential for business and investment opportunities for Australian business to partner with US firms in the Pacific.

Click here to view the video.

Information about membership of the Australia Pacific Islands Business Council is available here.

In-conversation with General David H. Berger, Commandant of the United States Marine Corps

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Recently, ASPI was joined by General David H. Berger, Commandant of the United States Marine Corps. In conversation with ASPI’s Executive Director Peter Jennings, General Berger discussed defence reform and capability acquisition, the US-Australia alliance and the strategic outlook in the Indo-Pacific, including the latest developments between China and Solomon Islands.

Note: The welcome and introduction of the session unfortunately had to be removed due to technical issues.

Bio: General David H. Berger assumed the duties of Commandant of the Marine Corps on July 11, 2019. A native of Woodbine, Maryland, General Berger graduated from Tulane University and was commissioned in 1981.

He commanded at every level – including a Reconnaissance Company; 3d Battalion, 8th Marines in Haiti during Operation SECURE TOMORROW; Regimental Combat Team 8 in Fallujah, Iraq during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. As a General Officer, he commanded 1st Marine Division (Forward) in Afghanistan during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM; I Marine Expeditionary Force; U.S. Marine Corps Forces Pacific/Fleet Marine Forces Pacific; and Marine Corps Combat Development Command.

General Berger’s staff and joint assignments include serving as Assistant Division Commander of 2d Marine Division; policy planner in the Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate, J-5; Chief of Staff for Kosovo Force (KFOR) Headquarters in Pristina, Kosovo; and Director of Operations in Plans, Policies, and Operations, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps; Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration.

General Berger’s formal military education includes the U.S. Army Infantry Officer Advanced Course, U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College, and U.S. Marine Corps School of Advanced Warfighting. He holds multiple advanced degrees including a Master of International Public Policy from Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies.

.auCheck: A free website and email security check tool

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Today, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), in collaboration with the .au Domain Administration (auDA), is launching ‘.auCheck‘: a free tool that helps users check their website, email and internet connection for use of the latest and most secure internet standards.

Standards form the technical heart of the internet and are fundamental to the security, reliability and resilience of websites and email communication. As these standards develop over time, it is crucial to remain up-to-date.

Checking if a website and email are set up correctly can be quite difficult; that’s why .auCheck was created. Its aim is to empower users, in particular Australian small businesses, to ask the right questions and choose the right level of services from their providers, including adequate security settings.

.auCheck will enable users to have an informed discussion with their IT support, internet service provider, domain registrar, web hosting company or IT contractor to improve the security standards of their website, email or internet connection and facilitate the adoption of best practice internet standards.

Standards that are checked by the .auCheck tool include:

  • Encryption methods (to ensure the secure transfer of information over the Internet);
  • Ways to authenticate website and mail servers (to ensure internet users are dealing with genuine website and email accounts);
  • Security of domain names (to allow domain names to be verified);
  • Security of website applications (to prevent insertion of malicious code or unauthorised access);
  • Protection against phishing through email from fake accounts.

Following the test, .auCheck offers users advice on additional steps they can take to bring their website and email domains up-to-standard.

Fergus Hanson, Director of ASPI’s International Cyber Policy Centre, believes .auCheck will be a valuable practical contribution to the work Australian governments, industry and internet organisations are already doing to raise awareness of the need to be cyber secure.

‘We hope .auCheck will give Australian businesses practical advice to improve the security and reliability of their online presence. The tool also empowers every Australian to check for themselves the security of the websites they visit.

‘The idea for .auCheck came from discussions with international partners in the UK and the Netherlands who pioneered similar tools. We’re very grateful to the Dutch Internet Standards Platform and for the support of auDA which allowed us to develop .auCheck in a way that fits the Australian context.‘

auDA CEO Rosemary Sinclair AM said auDA was pleased to support the development of .auCheck, noting the tool will provide Australian small businesses and consumers with information to empower them, boosting their online confidence and uplifting security standards by working with their IT support professionals.

‘auDA research shows cyber security is the top concern among Australian internet users. However, many Australian internet users and small business owners are unsure where to find trusted information and advice on cyber security. The .auCheck tool provides a free, independent and plain language assessment of online security standards, and will help empower users to be more confident managing their cyber security.‘

Over time, the aggregated test results will deliver an understanding of the security standards being used by individuals, businesses and organisations in Australia.

You can access .auCheck here

Government commits $240 million to critical minerals projects in mission to end Australia’s reliance on China

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Dr John Coyne speaks to ABC’s Henry Belot. 

The Australian outback has become the stage for a renewed push to safeguard the future of western industries and break a near complete reliance on critical minerals from China.

China produces and supplies almost all the minerals used in the production of renewable energy products, mobile phones, electric vehicles and even the batteries used in the US joint-strike fighter.

The federal government will today announce $240 million to develop a rare earth minerals industry in Australia with senior ministers openly listing China as one reason to do so.

“China currently dominates around 70 to 80 per cent of global critical minerals production and continues to consolidate its hold over these supply chains,” Energy and Industry Minister Angus Taylor said in a statement.

“This initiative is designed to address that dominance.”

Australia has enormous volumes of rare earth minerals but until now no domestic production capacity has been built, partly because China has refined the minerals cheaply, despite environmental criticisms.

Strategic concerns about China’s market dominance have increased since Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine, which exposed Europe’s reliance on Russia for energy.

“We know that Russia provides very large amounts of thermal coal and gas into Europe and that is now a strategic challenge for them — we want to make sure Australia is never in that position,” Resources Minister Keith Pitt said.

“We do need to ensure that no matter what we do, we make sure that these concentrated supply chains in some areas that we currently have do get broken up into the future.”

The funding announced today includes $30 million for a rare earth minerals separation plant run by Arafura Resources in Central Australia.

Arafura managing director Gavin Lockyer said its Nolan’s Project near Aileron would harness one of the world’s biggest stockpiles of neodymium-praseodymium, which is used to make incredibly strong magnets used in wind turbines and solar farms.

“[Nolan’s] will be Australia’s first vertically integrated project of its kind and world’s second biggest non-China source of rare earths, processing on site to meet more than 5 per cent of global demand,” Mr Lockyer said.

Australian miner Lynas, which produces rare earths for electric cars and Tomahawk cruise missiles, was recently given final approval to construct a rare earth refinery in Kalgoorlie.

Lynas has moved some of its operations outside its production base in Malaysia, where it has faced sustained criticism from environment groups.

Given the strategic risk posed by China’s market dominance, the United States military has taken a financial interest in Lynas, providing initial funding for a processing plant in Texas.

‘We’ve definitely been asleep’

In 2019, China threatened to ban exports of rare earth minerals to the United States during a protracted trade war with Washington.

The threat would have hit the production of military equipment along with a booming renewable energy industry.

Rare earths are an essential ingredient for technologies including wind turbines.(Supplied: Michael Abrahams)

Dr John Coyne, an analyst at the partially Defence funded Australian Strategic Policy Institute, said other strategic allies had been targeted too.

“Ten years ago, China reduced the availability of rare earth to Japan in punishment over issues to deal with the South China Sea,” Mr Coyne said.

Mr Coyne said western nations were increasingly abandoning free market thinking to address the strategic risk.

“I think this is one of those cases where if we don’t want to be exposed and have vulnerable supply chains then there is a need for the government to intervene in the economy and promote national resilience,” Mr Coyne said.

“[China has] done a great job at being able to supply everything the western world needed — whether it be metals or magnets — and they supply them a lot cheaper than what the western world would be able to produce.”

The head of one rare earth minerals company, Northern Minerals, told the ABC the strategic vulnerability was significant.

“China could stop any time in the next three to five years exporting anything to do with heavy rare earths (…) and only supply internal to Chinese industries,” chief executive Mark Tory said.

“We’ve definitely been asleep but the reason we’ve been asleep is because [China] has done a great job at being able to supply everything the western world needed.”

Defence ‘acutely aware’ of risks posed by climate change: ADF chief

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Defence has a key role to play supporting the government’s climate and disaster resilience agenda by integrating climate risk into the planning and conduct of its activities and operations, says Australian Defence Force chief Angus Campbell.

In a video statement at the launch of a new ASPI publication, The geopolitics of climate and security in the Indo-Pacific, Campbell described as ‘outstanding’ the work of ASPI’s Climate and Security Policy Centre led by Robert Glasser and said it performed an essential role in driving discussion of the long-term strategic consequences of climate change.

Read the full piece on The Strategist. 

Darwin US fuel storage facility

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Fifteen kilometres from Darwin CBD, there’s a plot of mud and dirt that is about to become a $270 million asset for the United States defence force.

By September 2023, the East Arm fuel storage facility is expected to be able to store 300 million litres of military jet fuel to support American defence activities in the Northern Territory and Indo-Pacific region.

Dr Teagan Westerdorf speaks to ABC News. Read the full piece here.