The 2006 US Quadrennial Defense Review: Influencing Australia’s defence force

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Release of Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) Strategic Insight No. 30/2006

The Australian Strategic Policy Institute has today released a new Strategic Insight publication titled ‘The 2006 US Quadrennial Defense Review: Influencing Australia’s defence force’ by Peter Layton, an Australian on the faculty of the US National Defense University.

The US has articulated a new strategic direction for defence in tune with the post-September 11, post-Cold War strategic environment. If Australia chooses to follow, this new direction could fundamentally shape Australian defence policy just as the interwar British Singapore strategy and the Cold War US Guam Doctrine did.

In this paper the two key strategic drivers of the new US defence policy are discussed with the intention of stimulating debate on their potential implications for Australian defence polices.

In addressing these priority areas, the QDR defines distinct and important needs for military forces based on both an identified tangible threat and on a potential danger. The 2006 QDR is effectively shaped by two major but dissimilar strategic drivers: winning the ‘Long War’ and hedging against the re-emergence of a major state-based threat. 

‘The Long War affects both Australia and the US. Successfully meeting the transnational non-state actor threat requires global action that Australia cannot undertake alone. Collaborating closely with the US is directly in Australia’s interest to overcome a global terrorist threat that may be encountered anywhere.  Close collaboration with the US, and others, is essential for the necessary defence-in-depth’, states Peter Layton

‘Australia’s strategic culture suggests that the nation will adopt defence policies pragmatically informed by the QDR. While a lesser power, Australia since Federation has sought to be meaningfully involved in international affairs by being part of a great power’s alliance network.’

‘The new defence policies provide Australia as a ‘model’ alliance partner with opportunities and challenges.’

‘However, this QDR’s vision will influence all nations to a greater or lesser extent, willingly or unwillingly, close ally or implacable adversary’.

Australian domestic security: The role of Defence

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Release of Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) Strategic Insight No. 31/2006

The Australian Strategic Policy Institute has today released a new Strategic Insight publication titled ‘Australian domestic security: The role of Defence’ by Brigadier Andrew Smith and ASPI Director of Research Programs Dr Anthony Bergin.

Over the last five years the need for greater involvement by Defence in domestic security, both in counter-terrorism and consequence management, has been recognised by the government and the community.

While Defence has certainly not dropped its focus on traditional warfighting, much greater attention has been given to internal missions.

This paper examines the factors that have shaped the Defence organisation’s role in Australia’s response to the domestic security environment that has emerged since September 11 2001 and suggests that, while progress has been impressive, some further changes are needed.

These include developing a dedicated strategy for Defence support to domestic security, including capability benchmarks for military and civil agencies for counter terrorism missions, examining the need for a designated agency to assume standing responsibilities for special event security, finding a more relevant role for our reserve forces in domestic security and developing standing relationships between the military and local law enforcement and emergency response communities.

The Insight paper suggests that Defence should devote more intellectual effort to domestic security challenges, including adapting military culture to embrace domestic security as core business. Defence response capabilities, along with the emergency services, should be tested much more in no-warning exercises involving whole-city terrorism. Defence and civilian emergency services should share training and experience opportunities more regularly.

The road to a nuclear North Korea: Regional reactions, global impacts, Australian interests

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Release of Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) Strategic Insight No. 32/2006

The Australian Strategic Policy Institute has today released a new Strategic Insight publication titled ‘The
road to a nuclear North Korea: Regional reactions, global impacts, Australian interests’ authored by a panel of leading experts; James Cotton, Stuart Harris and Carl Ungerer.

The paper examines North Korea’s 9 October nuclear test, the culmination of a process begun in the 1960s, when with Soviet assistance Pyongyang began construction of a small experimental reactor. 

The immediate regional consequences have been common anger and concern, with widespread speculation about the implications of the North Korean nuclear test for international security and the future of the nonproliferation regime.

Fears have been raised that the test would spark a nuclear arms race as several nuclear-capable states begin to reassess their security policies in the face of North Korea’s actions. Another concern is that the North Korean test will lead to the collapse of the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

‘Australia’s interest in the North Korean situation extends to the nonproliferation question and well beyond. Instability in Korea, whether resulting in outright conflict or in internal disorder after a North Korean regime implosion could have many serious consequences’, state the authors. 

‘The Australian economy is especially dependent on Northeast Asian economies for trade and investment—three of our four largest commodity trading partners are in Northeast Asia and major tension, let alone conflict, would affect them all. Further, following its role in the Korean War under UN command, Australia retains a residual responsibility for South Korea’s security. Most significant, however, is our membership of the Pacific treaty system centred on the US.’  Whatever action Washington contemplates, it would expect Canberra to support it, including by employing armed force.

Given the centrality of North Korea to Australia’s national interest, the authors argue that it would be in Australia’s interests to encourage the US to adopt a more flexible stance towards the problem.  

Wedgetail: Australia’s eagle-eyed Sentinel

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Release of Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) Strategic Insight No. 29/2006

The Australian Strategic Policy Institute has today released a new ASPI Strategic Insight entitled Wedgetail: Australia’s eagle-eyed Sentinel by Dr Carlo Kopp, defence analyst, consulting engineer, and research fellow in regional military strategy at the Monash Asia Institute, in Melbourne. 

Recent reports of project delays in the Wedgetail Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) program have brought this important Defence project yet again into the media spotlight. Unfortunately, the Wedgetail has been the subject of ongoing controversy since 2000, yet it is absolutely critical to the Royal Australian Air Force’s (RAAF) future combat capability. 

This ASPI Strategic Insight explains why the Wedgetail is so important to the Australian Defence Force (ADF), and provides the reader with some understanding of this complex program. 

‘Wedgetail is a vital capability for the ADF, providing the only effective means of air defence surveillance and control across Australia’s northern geography and maritime approaches. With the proliferation of advanced Russian fighters, smart weapons, and cruise missiles across Asia, the Wedgetail is the only credible AEW&C system available which can deal with the developing strategic environment’, says Dr Kopp. 

‘Other than covering basic strategic imperatives in national air defence, the Wedgetail offers a valuable expeditionary capability to support not only coalition military campaigns, but also civil emergency, humanitarian and disaster relief contingencies abroad and in Australia, as well as border surveillance and enforcement of national sovereignty.’

‘A strong strategic argument can be made for the acquisition of additional Wedgetail aircraft. A fleet of eight or nine would allow for a much more comprehensive coverage of Australia’s strategic approaches and northern landmass.’

‘No matter what choices Australia makes for its future fighter fleets, aerial refueling fleets and other key capabilities, the Wedgetail AEW&C system is a pivotal capability at the core of the RAAF’s fleet’, states Dr Kopp. 

Sudan’s Darfur: Peace or more war on the horizon?

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Release of Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) Strategic Insight No. 27/2006

The Australian Strategic Policy Institute has today released a new ASPI Strategic Insight that examines the latest developments in Darfur and the factors that will determine whether there will finally be peace for the people of Darfur.

Written by Dr Claude Rakisits, a consultant focusing on developments in Africa, the Middle East and South Asia, the paper also examines the Australian Government’s policy options for contributing to a possible UN peacekeeping operation in Darfur.

This year marks Sudan’s fiftieth year of independence. Unfortunately, it has very little to celebrate. Sudan, the largest country in Africa is best known for its long history of maladministration, human rights abuses, coups d’état, and for the past three years a ruthless government-backed assault on the people of Darfur in western Sudan.

‘About two years ago, shocking pictures started coming out of Darfur. Well over 200,000 people have been killed since then, and about 2.5 million people are now living in refugee camps either in Darfur or in neighbouring Chad. There have been many UN and African Union (AU) reports confirming attacks, rapes and the destruction of villages by the Sudanese army and air force and by Sudanese government-backed ‘Arab’ militias, the Janjaweed, in a deliberate drive to push the locals out of the area.’

‘The US Government has called it genocide. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan has described it as ‘one of the worst nightmares in recent history, Dr Rakisits states. 

‘Unfortunately, ‘Darfur fatigue’ has settled in, and interest in the issue and the sense of urgency has diminished. But Darfur can’t be ignored. Jan Pronk, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Sudan, has admitted that the previous international strategy in Darfur failed. Let’s make sure the international community gets it right this time—and quickly, because the Darfurians are the ones paying in lives for the West’s lack of action.’

Australian uranium exports and security: Preventing proliferation

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Release of Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) Strategic Insight No. 28/2006

The Australian Strategic Policy Institute has today released a new Strategic Insight publication titled Australian uranium exports and security: Preventing proliferation by Andrew Davies, ASPI Program Director Operations and Capability.

The government has recently put the issue of Australia’s future nuclear industry firmly on the table, and has established a taskforce to review uranium mining processing and nuclear energy in Australia. This ASPI Strategic Insight examines the impact that any change to Australia’s place in the nuclear supply chain might have on the proliferation of nuclear weapons. 

It examines the issues that need to be managed if Australian-sourced nuclear materials are to be sold to a wider customer set without leading to a growth in the number of nuclear weapon armed states.

Australia has the world’s largest reserves of uranium ore, totalling almost a quarter of known deposits and 40 per cent of the uranium that is easily exploitable. 

‘There is little doubt that increased global interest in nuclear energy is a potential economic opportunity for Australia. However, the laws of physics impose a necessary overlap between the technologies required to generate nuclear energy or to produce nuclear weapons’, Dr Davies says. 

‘It is therefore incumbent upon us to adopt a defence-in-depth approach that can minimise the possibility of a would-be proliferant nation being able to use a civil power program to develop expertise and technologies required to ‘break out’ into a nuclear weapons program.’

The paper also offers several policy recommendations to help Australia continue to be a responsible nuclear supplier.

‘For exports to countries with no existing capability to enrich uranium or separate plutonium, the best security solution is for Australia to export uranium through NPT-signatories that already possess those capabilities. If Australia was to develop its own value-adding nuclear industry it would need careful diplomacy and the utmost openness and transparency.’

Securing the transnational movement of trade and people in the era of global terrorism

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The Australian Strategic Policy Institute has today released its latest Strategic Insight addressing important national and homeland security issues faced by the United States after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the potential for departmental cooperation in national security. 

Former Commissioner US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Robert Bonner spoke at a National Security Policy seminar in Canberra which was co-hosted by ASPI and Unisys on Wednesday, 24 May 2006. The Insight is a transcript of his presentation in which he described the evolution of the US strategy to safeguard homeland security.

‘We definitely had to increase security in the post 9/11 era, in the age of global terrorism, but we had to find a way to do that without choking off the flow of legitimate trade and travel, without shutting down our economy in the process.’ 

‘We had to find ways, strategies to achieve the ‘twin goals’ of greater security, but also facilitate the flow of legitimate cross-border trade and travel. This led to initiatives such as the Container Security Initiative (CSI), Advance Passenger and Cargo Information (APCI), Advance Passenger Information System (APIS) and the 24-Hour Rule, to the National Targeting Center (NTC) and its Automated Targeting System (ATS), and to the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C TPAT). Not one of these initiatives existed before 9/11 he says. 

‘Our strategy includes a strong offense with our allies and coalition partners carried out overseas and must also include an effort to diffuse the hatred and misunderstanding in the Muslim world that fuels al-Qaeda. That’s a huge task, I know, but we must address it.’ 

‘I firmly believe that America and our allies, working together, will defeat the forces of global terrorism. I do not doubt it, even for a moment.’

Reforming the United Nations: Kofi Annan’s legacy gets a reality check

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Release of Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) Strategic Insight No. 25/2006

The Australian Strategic Policy Institute has today released a new ASPI Strategic Insight that examines the context within which recent efforts at UN reform should be understood while assessing the key institutional and normative achievements over the last few years.

As the dust settles from the 2005 UN reform jamboree and Kofi Annan enters the twilight months of his second term as Secretary-General, the United Nations has created two new institutions—a Peacebuilding Commission and a Human Rights Council—but has anything really changed? 

Author and Executive Director of the Institute for International Law and Justice at NYU School of Law Simon Chesterman considers those achievements to be underwhelming. But when contrasted with the divisions over Iraq that split the UN in 2003, the better evaluation might not be whether the glass is half-empty or half-full, but how it is that we continue to have a glass at all.

‘The discussion of reform has always begged the question of whether that reform must take place primarily in the structures, procedures, and personnel that make up the United Nations, or in the willingness of member states to use them. Past efforts at creating and changing the international institutions of peace and security have tended to be led by political will, which is most plentiful in a time of crisis,’ Dr Chesterman writes. 

‘In the wake of the Iraq war, anxiety concerning the role and relevance of the United Nations was widespread. But leadership on the reform agenda came, unusually, from the Secretary-General. It was Kofi Annan who appointed the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, which attempted to grapple with legitimate US security concerns while broadening discussion of international threats beyond its counter-terrorism and non-proliferation agenda.’

As his term closes Secretary-General Annan’s efforts to drive reform and the response of member states provide a lens through which to view the promise, the prospects, and the limitations of the United Nations as an institution and as an idea.

Cutting their cloth: New Zealand’s defence strategy

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The Australian Strategic Policy Institute has today released its latest report, which traces the processes by which New Zealand determines its defence needs and maintains its policy directions while also managing its relationships with defence partners.

The report is authored by Jim Rolfe, a senior fellow at the Centre for Strategic Studies in New Zealand.  It examines three components of New Zealand’s defence posture: the country’s capabilities, its commitments, and its defence and security relationships with its two closest partners—Australia and the US.

Dr Rolfe argues that since 2000 the New Zealand government has attempted to build a New Zealand Defence Force that meets the country’s principal strategic needs.  The result, he says, has been a more practical military force, structured and equipped to achieve specific, and quite narrow outcomes, rather than to be able to fight a conventional enemy under almost any circumstances.  Still, the NZDF can take its place alongside allies when necessary, or operate more or less independently to support New Zealand’s interests in the immediate neighbourhood.

But New Zealand’s defence relationships are still fragile.  The relationship with Australia waxes and wanes, haunted by strongly held and long-term doubts within Australia about New Zealand’s commitment to and capacity for the two nations’ common defence.  The report examines the extent to which New Zealand’s capabilities add value to Australia’s, and considers what more the two nations could do together.  The New Zealand-US relationship is even more delicate, though the War on Terror has provided new opportunities for the two countries to work together. 

Malaysia’s two-step hedging strategy: Bilateral and regional activism

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Release of Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) Strategic Insight No. 24/2006

The Australian Strategic Policy Institute has today released a new ASPI Strategic Insight publication which examines Malaysia’s strategic objectives and positioning in relation to the great powers in its region, and its attempts to finesse bilateral and multilateral relations with those powers. 

Authored by Dr John Lee, Managing Director and co-founder of research and conferences company L21 the Insight argues that as Malaysia’s regional strategy swings between criticism of and cooperation with the US and praise and suspicion of China, these variations have made Malaysia’s strategic aims hard to read.

‘However, despite the various faces of its diplomacy, Malaysia’s strategic aim has been consistent: to hedge against domination.’ Dr Lee says.

‘Since emerging from the Cold War strategic straitjacket, Malaysia has grasped the opportunity to rethink its place in the international system and its policies towards great powers, and—crucially—to align foreign security strategy with internal and domestic priorities.’ 

‘By successfully forging its image as a renegade leader against Western ‘cultural imperialism’, Malaysia has found admirers in developing and Islamic countries. This led to Malaysia’s hedging strategy with the US suffering from diplomatic lows from late 1998 to 2001 despite the continuation of robust US-Malaysian security links during this period.’ 

The anticipated rise of China has caused consternation among ASEAN countries for decades. China’s size and proximity, the greatness and longevity of Chinese civilisation, the strength of Chinese nationalism, and the diaspora of disproportionately affluent ethnic Chinese minorities (such as in Malaysia) were all grounds for wariness. More recently, China’s continued development and military modernisation show irrefutably that her presence and influence will grow.

In May 2005, Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi proclaimed relations with China to be at their ‘best ever’. While remaining strategically ambivalent towards China on security matters, and encouraging a continued security partnership of sorts with the US, Malaysia has used a dual tactic of bilateral economic engagement and reviving regional activism as part of its hedging strategy as it carefully watches China’s rise.