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British public opinion on foreign policy: President Trump, Ukraine, China, Defence spending and AUKUS

Results snapshot

President Trump

  • Britons support an open and engaged foreign policy role for the United Kingdom. In light of the re-election of President Donald Trump, 40% believe Britain should continue to maintain its current active level of engagement in world affairs, and 23% believe it should play a larger role.
  • Just 16% of Britons support a less active United Kingdom on the world stage.
  • When asked what Britain’s response should be if the United States withdraws its financial and military support from Ukraine, 57% of Britons would endorse the UK either maintaining (35%) or increasing (22%) its contributions to Ukraine. One-fifth would prefer that the UK reduces its contributions to Ukraine.

UK–China relations

  • Just a quarter (26%) of Britons support the UK Government’s efforts to increase engagement with China in the pursuit of economic growth and stabilised diplomatic relations.
  • In comparison, 45% of Britons would either prefer to return to the more restricted level of engagement under the previous government (25%) or for the government to reduce its relations with Beijing even further (20%).
  • A large majority of Britons (69%) are concerned about the increasing degree of cooperation between Russia and China. Conservative and Labour voters share similarly high levels of concern, and Britons over 50 years of age are especially troubled about the trend of adversary alignment.

Defence and security

  • When asked whether the UK will need to spend more on defence to keep up with current and future global security challenges, a clear two-thirds (64%) of the British people agree. Twenty-nine per cent of Britons strongly agree that defence spending should increase. Just 12% disagree that the UK will need to spend more.
  • The majority of Britons believe that collaboration with allies on defence and security projects like AUKUS will help to make the UK safer (55%) and that partnerships like AUKUS focusing on developing cutting-edge technologies with Britain’s allies will help to make the UK more competitive towards countries like China (59%).
  • Britons are somewhat less persuaded that AUKUS will succeed as a deterrent against Chinese aggression in the Indo-Pacific, although the largest group of respondents (44%) agree that it will.

Brief survey methodology and notes

Survey design and analysis: Sophia Gaston

Field work: Opinium

Field work dates: 8–10 January 2025

Weighting: Weighted to be nationally and politically representative

Sample: 2,050 UK adults

The field work for this report was conducted by Opinium through an online survey platform, with a sample size of 2,050 UK adults aged 18 and over. This sample size is considered robust for public opinion research and aligns with industry standards. With 2,000 participants, the margin of error for reported figures is approximately ±2.3 percentage points at a 95% confidence level. Beyond this sample size, the reduction in the margin of error becomes minimal, making this size both statistically sufficient and practical for drawing meaningful conclusions with reliable representation of the UK adult population. For the full methodological statement, see Appendix 1 of this report.

Notes

  1. Given the subject matter of this survey, objective and impartial contextual information was provided at the beginning of questions. There are some questions for which fairly substantial proportions of respondents were unsure of their answers. All ‘Don’t knows’ are reported.
  2. The survey captured voters for all political parties, and non-voters; however, only the findings for the five largest parties are discussed in detail in this report, with the exception of one question (6C), in which it was necessary to examine the smaller parties as the source of a drag on the national picture. The five major parties discussed in this report are the Conservative Party, the Labour Party, the Liberal Democrats, Reform (formerly the Brexit Party and UKIP), and the Green Party.
  3. This report also presents the survey results differentiated according to how respondents’ voted in the 2016 referendum on the UK’s membership of the European Union, their residency within the UK, their age, their socio-economic status, and whether they come from White British or non-White British backgrounds. The full methodological notes are found at the end of the report.
  4. Some of the graphs present ‘NET’ results, which combine the two most positive and two most negative responses together – for example, ‘Significantly increase’ and ‘Somewhat increase’ – to provide a more accessible representation of the balance of public opinion. These are presented alongside the full breakdown of results for each question for full transparency.

Introduction

There’s no doubt that 2025 will be a consequential year in geopolitical terms, with the inauguration of President Donald Trump marking a step-change in the global role of the world’s largest economy and its primary military power. The full suite of implications for America’s allies is still emerging, and there will be opportunities for its partners to express their agency or demonstrate alignment. For a nation like the United Kingdom, whose security and strategic relationship with the United States is institutionally embedded, any pivotal shifts in American foreign policy bear profound ramifications for the UK’s international posture. The fact that such an evaluation of America’s international interests and relationships is taking place during a time in which several major conflicts – including one in Europe – continue to rage, only serves to heighten anxieties among policy-makers and citizens alike.

Public opinion on foreign policy remains an understudied and poorly understood research area in Britain, due to a long-held view that the public simply conferred responsibility for such complicated and sensitive matters to government. Certainly, many Britons don’t possess a sophisticated understanding of the intricacies of diplomatic and security policy. However, they do carry strong instincts, and, in an internationalised media age, are constantly consuming information from a range of sources and forming opinions that may diverge from government positions.

The compound effect of a turbulent decade on the international stage has made Britons more perceptive to feelings of insecurity about the state of the world, which can be transposed into their domestic outlook. At the same time, their belief in the efficacy of government to address international crises, or their support for the missions being pursued by government, isn’t guaranteed. This creates a challenging backdrop from which public consent can be sought for the kind of bold and decisive actions that may need to be considered as policy options in the coming months and years.

This study provides a snapshot of the views of British citizens at the moment at which President Donald Trump was inaugurated for a second time. It shows a nation which, overall, continues to subscribe to clear definitions of its friends and adversaries, carries a sense of responsibility to Ukraine, and greets the rise of a more assertive China with concern and scepticism. Underneath the national picture, however, the data reveals some concerning seeds of discord and divergence among certain demographic groups and political parties. The UK Government must build on the good foundations by speaking more frequently and directly to the British people about the rapidly evolving global landscape, and making the case for the values, interests, and relationships it pursues.

Sophia Gaston

March 2025

London

The Pacific cocaine corridor: A Brazilian cartel’s pipeline to Australia

Australia faces an emerging national security threat from Brazilian transnational crime groups. Once a domestic concern, Brazilian organised crime has evolved into a powerful narco-insurgency with transnational reach, making Brazil the world’s second-largest player in the cocaine trade after Colombia.

While Brazilian organised crime previously posed little threat to Australia, this report, The Pacific cocaine corridor: A Brazilian cartel’s pipeline to Australia, examines how Brazil’s expanding role in global cocaine supply, rising criminal network sophistication, and growing demand in Australia’s lucrative cocaine market are increasing the presence of Brazilian organised crime on Australian shores.

The report highlights how Brazil’s Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) has become a major transnational criminal threat, exploiting weaknesses in political, legal, and economic systems. It explores Brazil’s geography and criminal networks with South American cocaine producers and examines the PCC’s global distribution networks, with a focus on how the Pacific is increasingly used to transport drugs destined for Australia. A recent case study demonstrates the prioritisation of the Australian market in these operations.

The report concludes with recommendations for strengthening police cooperation, enhancing financial surveillance, and proactively detecting and disrupting PCC activities. By addressing key enablers of the PCC’s resilience and closing gaps in international information exchange, a coordinated approach will not only mitigate the immediate threat but also bolster Australia’s long-term defences against transnational organised crime.

ASPI’s two-decade Critical Technology Tracker: The rewards of long-term research investment

The Critical Technology Tracker is a large data-driven project that now covers 64 critical technologies spanning defence, space, energy, the environment, artificial intelligence, biotechnology, robotics, cyber, computing, advanced materials and key quantum technology areas. It provides a leading indicator of a country’s research performance, strategic intent and potential future science and technology capability.

It first launched 1 March 2023 and underwent a major expansion on 28 August 2024 which took the dataset from five years (previously, 2018–2022) to 21 years (2003–2023). Explore the website and the broader project here.

Governments and organisations interested in supporting this ongoing program of work, including further expansions and the addition of new technologies, can contact: criticaltech@aspi.org.au.

Executive Summary

This report accompanies a major update of ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker website,1 which reveals the countries and institutions—universities, national labs, companies and government agencies—leading scientific and research innovation in critical technologies. It does that by focusing on high-impact research—the top 10% of the most highly cited papers—as a leading indicator of a country’s research performance, strategic intent and potential future science and technology (S&T) capability.

Now covering 64 critical technologies and crucial fields spanning defence, space, energy, the environment, artificial intelligence (AI), biotechnology, robotics, cyber, computing, advanced materials and key quantum technology areas, the Tech Tracker’s dataset has been expanded and updated from five years of data (previously, 2018–2022)2 to 21 years of data (2003–2023).3

These new results reveal the stunning shift in research leadership over the past two decades towards large economies in the Indo-Pacific, led by China’s exceptional gains. The US led in 60 of 64 technologies in the five years from 2003 to 2007, but in the most recent five years (2019–2023) is leading in seven. China led in just three of 64 technologies in 2003–20074 but is now the lead country in 57 of 64 technologies in 2019–2023, increasing its lead from our rankings last year (2018–2022), where it was leading in 52 technologies.

India is also emerging as a key centre of global research innovation and excellence, establishing its position as an S&T power. That said, the US, the UK and a range of countries from Europe, Northeast Asia and the Middle East have maintained hard-won strengths in high-impact research in some key technology areas, despite the accelerated efforts of emerging S&T powers.

This report examines short- and long-term trends, to generate unique insights. We have updated the recent five-year results (2019–2023) to show current research performance rankings (top 5 country results are in Appendix 1). We have also analysed our new historical dataset to understand the country and institutional trends in research performance over the full 21-year period. In select technologies we have also made projections, based on current trends, for China and the US to 2030.

The results show the points in time at which countries have gained, lost or are at risk of losing their global edge in scientific research and innovation. The historical data provides a new layer of depth and context, revealing the performance trajectory different countries have taken, where the momentum lies and also where longer term dominance over the full two decades might reflect foundational expertise and capabilities that carry forward even when that leader has been edged out more recently by other countries. The results also help to shed light on the countries, and many of the institutions, from which we’re likely to see future innovations and breakthroughs emerge.

China’s new gains have occurred in quantum sensors, high-performance computing, gravitational sensors, space launch and advanced integrated circuit design and fabrication (semiconductor chip making). The US leads in quantum computing, vaccines and medical countermeasures, nuclear medicine and radiotherapy, small satellites, atomic clocks, genetic engineering and natural language processing.

India now ranks in the top 5 countries for 45 of 64 technologies (an increase from 37 last year) and has displaced the US as the second-ranked country in two new technologies (biological manufacturing and distributed ledgers) to rank second in seven of 64 technologies. Another notable change involves the UK, which has dropped out of the top 5 country rankings in eight technologies, declining from 44 last year to 36 now.

Besides India and the UK, the performance of most secondary S&T research powers (those countries ranked behind China and the US) in the top 5 rankings is largely unchanged: Germany (27), South Korea (24), Italy (15), Iran (8), Japan (8) and Australia (7).

We have continued to measure the risk of countries holding a monopoly in research for some critical technologies, based on the share of high-impact research output and the number of leading institutions the dominant country has. The number of technologies classified as ‘high risk’ has jumped from 14 technologies last year to 24 now. China is the lead country in every one of the technologies newly classified as high risk—putting a total of 24 of 64 technologies at high risk of a Chinese monopoly. Worryingly, the technologies newly classified as high risk includes many with defence applications, such as radar, advanced aircraft engines, drones, swarming and collaborative robots and satellite positioning and navigation.

In terms of institutions, US technology companies, including Google, IBM, Microsoft and Meta, have leading or strong positions in artificial intelligence (AI), quantum and computing technologies. Key government agencies and national labs also perform well, including the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), which excels in space and satellite technologies. The results also show that the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS)—thought to be the world’s largest S&T institution5—is by far the world’s highest performing institution in the Critical Tech Tracker, with a global lead in 31 of 64 technologies (an increase from 29 last year, see more on CAS in the breakout box on page 19).

The results in this report should serve as a reminder to governments around the world that gaining and maintaining scientific and research excellence isn’t a tap that can be turned on and off. Too often, countries have slowed or stopped investing in, for example, research and development (R&D) and manufacturing capability, in areas in which they had a long-term competitive advantage (5G technologies are an example6). In a range of essential sectors, democratic nations risk losing hard-won, long-term advantages in cutting-edge science and research—the crucial ingredient that underpins much of the development and advancement of the world’s most important technologies. There’s also a risk that retreats in some areas could mean that democratic nations aren’t well positioned to take advantage of new and emerging technologies, including those that don’t exist yet.

Meanwhile, the longitudinal results in the Critical Tech Tracker enable us to see how China’s enormous investments and decades of strategic planning are now paying off.7

Building technological capability requires a sustained investment in, and an accumulation of, scientific knowledge, talent and high-performing institutions that can’t be acquired through only short-term or ad hoc investments.8 Reactive policies by new governments and the sugar hit of immediate budget savings must be balanced against the cost of losing the advantage gained from decades of investment and strategic planning. While China continues to extend its lead, it’s important for other states to take stock of their historical, combined and complementary strengths in all key critical technology areas.

This report is made up of several sections. Below you’ll find a summary of the key country and institutional findings followed by an explanation of why tracking historical research performance matters. We then further analyse the nuances of China’s lead and briefly explain our methodology (see Appendix 2 for a detailed methodology). We also look more closely at 10 critical technology areas, including those relevant to AI, semiconductors, defence, energy, biotechnology and communications. Appendix 1 contains visual snapshots of top 5 country rankings in the 64 critical technologies.

We encourage you to visit ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker website (https://techtracker.aspi.org.au) and explore the new data.

What is ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker?

ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker is a unique dataset that allows users to track 64 technologies that are foundational for our economies, societies, national security, defence, energy production, health and climate security. It focuses on the top 10% of the most highly cited research publications from the past 21 years (2003–2023).9 The new dataset is analysed to generate insights into which countries and institutions—universities, national labs, companies and government agencies—are publishing the greatest share of innovative and high-impact research. We use the top 10% because those publications have a higher impact on the full technology life cycle and are more likely to lead to patents, drive future research innovation and underpin technological breakthroughs.10

Critical technologies are current or emerging technologies that have the potential to enhance or threaten our societies, economies and national security. Most are dual- or multi-use and have applications in a wide range of sectors. By focusing early in the science and technology (S&T) life cycle, rather than examining technologies already in existence and fielded, the Critical Technology Tracker doesn’t just provide insights into a country’s research performance, but also its strategic intent and potential future S&T capability. It’s only one piece of the puzzle, of course: it must be acknowledged that actualising and commercialising research performance into major technological gains, no matter how impressive a breakthrough is, can be a difficult, expensive and complicated process. A range of other inputs are needed, such as an efficient manufacturing base and ambitious policy implementation.

The Tech Tracker’s dataset has now been expanded and updated from five years of data (previously, 2018–2022)11 to 21 years of data (2003–2023). This follows previous attempts to benchmark research output across nations by focusing on quality over quantity, key technology areas and individual institutions, as well as short-term, long-term and potential future trends. This update continues ASPI’s investment in creating the highest quality dataset of its kind.12

Both the website and two associated reports (this one included) provide decision-makers with an empirical methodology to inform policy and investment decisions, including decisions on which countries and institutions they partner with and in what technology areas. A list of the 64 technologies, including definitions, is on our website.13 Other parts of this project include:

  • the Tech Tracker website: ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker14 contains an enormous amount of original data analysis. We encourage you to explore these datasets online as you engage with this report. Users can compare countries, regions or groupings (the EU, the Quad, China–Russia etc.) and explore the global flow of research talent for each technology.
  • the 2023 report: We encourage readers to explore the original report, ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker: the global race for future power.15 In addition to analysing last year’s key findings, it outlined why research is vital for S&T advances and it examined China’s S&T vision. The report also made 23 policy recommendations, which remain relevant today.16
  • visual snapshots: Readers looking for a summary of the top 5 countries ranked by their past five years of performance in all 64 technologies (see example below) can jump to Appendix 1.
Example of the visual snapshots depicted further in the report.

Data source: ASPI Critical Technology Tracker.

Full Report

For the full report, please download here.

  1. Critical Technology Tracker, ASPI, Canberra. ↩︎
  2. Jamie Gaida, Jennifer Wong Leung, Stephan Robin, Danielle Cave, ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker: the global race for future power, ASPI, Canberra, 1 March 2023. ↩︎
  3. 21-year dataset with improved search terms and institution cleaning, see Methodology for more details. ↩︎
  4. In the early years, such as 2003–2007, some of the 64 technologies have not yet emerged and the credits assigned to top countries or institutions are too low to be statistically significant. Where this is the case we have avoided pulling key insights from the rankings of countries and institutions in these technologies. ↩︎
  5. Bec Crew, ‘Nature Index 2024 Research Leaders: Chinese institutions dominate the top spots’, Nature, 18 June 2024. ↩︎
  6. Elsa B Kania, ‘Opinion: Why doesn’t the US have its own Huawei?’, Politico, 25 February 2020. ↩︎
  7. See, for example, Zachary Arnold, ‘China has become a scientific superpower’, The Economist, 12 June 2024.
    ‘China’, Nature, 9 August 2023, https://www.nature.com/collections/efchdhgeci ;
    ‘China’s science and technology vision’ and ‘China’s breakout research capabilities in defence, security and intelligence technologies’ in Gaida et al.
    ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker: The global race for future power, 14–20; Tarun Chhabra et al., ‘Global China: Technology’, Brookings Institution, April 2020, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/global-china-technology/ ;
    Jason Douglas and Clarence Leong. “The U.S. Has Been Spending Billions to Revive Manufacturing. But China Is in Another League”, The Wall Street Journal, August 3, 2024, https://www.wsj.com/world/china/the-u-s-has-been-spending-billions-to-revive-manufacturing-but-china-is-in-another-league-75ed6309 . ↩︎
  8. Eva Harris, ‘Building scientific capacity in developing countries’, EMBO Reports, 1 January 2004, 5, 7–11. ↩︎
  9. These technologies were selected through a review process in 2022–23 that combined our own research with elements from the Australian Government’s 2022 list of critical technologies, and lists compiled by other governments. An archived version of the Australian Government’s list is available: Department of Industry, Science and Resources, ‘List of critical technologies in the national interest’, Australian Government, 28 November 2022.
    In May 2023, the Australian Government revised their list: Department of Industry, Science and Resources, ‘List of critical technologies in the national interest’, Australian Government, 19 May 2023, https://www.industry.gov.au/publications/list-critical-technologies-national-interest .
    A US list is available from National Science and Technology Council, ‘Critical and emerging technologies list update’, US Government, February 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/02-2022-Critical-and-Emerging-Technologies-List-Update.pdf .
    On our selection of AUKUS Pillar 2 technologies, see Alexandra Caples et al., ‘AUKUS: three partners, two pillars, one problem’, TheStrategist, 6 June 2023, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/aukus-three-partners-two-pillars-one-problem/ . ↩︎
  10. Felix Poege et al., ‘Science quality and the value of inventions’, Science Advances, 11 December 2019, 5(12):eaay7323;
    Cherng Ding, et al., ‘Exploring paper characteristics that facilitate the knowledge flow from science to technology’, Journal of Informetrics, February 2017, 11(1):244–256, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joi.2016.12.004 ;
    Gaida et al., ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker: The global race for future power, 9. ↩︎
  11. Jamie Gaida, Jennifer Wong Leung, Stephan Robin, Danielle Cave, ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker: The global race for future power. ↩︎
  12. See more details in the full methodology in Appendix 2. ↩︎
  13. ‘List of technologies’, Critical Technology Tracker. ↩︎
  14. Critical Technology Tracker ↩︎
  15. See Jamie Gaida, Jennifer Wong-Leung, Stephan Robin, Danielle Cave, ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker: the global race for future power. ↩︎
  16. Jamie Gaida, Jennifer Wong-Leung, Stephan Robin, Danielle Cave, ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker: the global race for future power, 44. ↩︎

Chief defence scientist: We must get emerging technologies into the hands of our war fighters faster

For chief defence scientist Tanya Monro, the concept of ‘minimum viable capability’ is critical to shifting Australia’s thinking on how to get cutting edge technologies into the hands of military personnel fast enough to give them an advantage on the battlefield.

Professor Monro believes a major mindset change is needed to develop new capabilities much more quickly. ‘Our thinking about a capability needs to be how can the war fighter use it, not in some ideal situation in 10 years when a piece of equipment or a platform is perfect, but in three months, in six months?’ That provides the clarity and the inspiration needed for the R&D community to know what they need to get after.

Last year’s defence strategic review (DSR) provided the scaffolding for a different approach to defence capability, says Monro. ‘It clearly articulates the priorities for innovation and science and technology. I think key leaders understood and knew of great examples in the past where some scientific breakthrough would mean a capability leap, but I don’t think they had a way of thinking about it systematically. That’s a significant shift.’

Monro says the DSR’s identification of innovation as one of six priorities, and that being followed up with substantial resources and a shift of intent through the creation of the Advanced Strategic Capabilities Accelerator (ASCA) is a critical development. There’s also a conceptual shift that includes an acceptance of the idea that introducing a minimum viable capability now is better than waiting 10 years until it’s perfect.

‘The shift that I believe we’re driving through the system—as a clear response to the DSR—is from trying to develop technologies that Defence says need to be developed, to solving problems that Defence decides are the highest-priority problems. And that’s a profound shift.’

The Defence, Science and Group (DSTG), which Monro heads, is key to making that work. ‘We’ve been headed down this path through our STaR Shots, but now it’s clear that we get the best out of the whole Australian system by harnessing creativity and ingenuity, and respecting industry enough to tell them what problems we’re trying to solve, creating a mechanism by which we can bring good responses into Defence solutions.

‘That’s profound because historically Defence would go out and look for technologies without providing that partnered pathway that allows industry to understand what Defence needs and develop their capabilities accordingly.’

The idea that Defence takes war fighters’ needs and comes up with an exquisitely detailed specification for industry to respond to, will not work in the fast-moving modern military environment, she says. Defence must go hand in hand with companies to help them develop what they need to do that work.

That will involve an acceptance of risk that projects may not succeed, Monro says.

‘Giving frontline personnel an asymmetrical advantage will sometimes mean working on a concept before we fully understand what it will do, how and how fast it can be developed and precisely how it will be combined with existing equipment when it’s deployed in a conflict,’ she says.

‘We also we need to harness the ingenuity of our smart, young men and women in uniform and I think that, historically, we’ve struggled with how to unlock that potential.’

‘The challenge is to do all of this before the best way to develop and use those technologies is necessarily fully understood. ‘You can have all the best scientists with the best ideas in the world working collaboratively, and until you can put them in a military context alongside those war fighters the concepts of operations and employment won’t be well developed from a war fighter perspective.’

Working closely with military personnel to Identify the key characteristics of a capability they need can provide the clarity and inspiration the research and development community, and defence manufacturers, require to create a ‘minimum viable’ version, Monro says.

‘And it provides tangibility so that if reduced warning time of a possible conflict means we have to give the government choices, we have a fighting chance of using some of the things this nation can do.‘

Monro’s a physicist and she says there’s a culture change at the science end too. ‘You don’t want your scientists beavering away until they think there’s no more to do, because then they’ll never finish.’

She was recently made a member of the US National Academy of Engineering, the first Australian woman to be recognised with that award.

Monro says budget and resource constraints are such that it can no longer be a matter of replacing like for like and introducing new. ‘We need to be a bit cleverer’.

Her goal is to change the culture of Defence’s scientists to consider what is the biggest difference each can make in all stages of the process. ‘To me, we’re not using our science enterprise well if the primary role we play is reducing risk of acquisition.’

Monro is officially the ‘owner’ of technical risk in Defence. ‘One way to deal with technical risk is to make decision makers aware of it. But you can also come up with ways of doing R&D which mitigate that risk. That can sometimes lead to significant benefits.’

She wants to focus on what needs to be done differently to get the right results quickly. ‘When I look across the whole Defence enterprise, not just the department but I include the department, they’re tackling hard problems, whether its workforce or platforms or resources. I see it as our role as scientists to create different, unexpected ways of making a better future for them. I guess I’ve seen my own mindset shift to be one of, how do we get more creative about supporting the whole enterprise so we can deal with the difficult trade-offs that are required.’

A good example is how uncrewed systems can remove men and women from the most dirty, dangerous, and difficult situations. ‘It allows us to experiment a bit more with this concept of minimum viable because you’ve not got a person inside a capability. You can take more risks than you would if you actually had people under the seas, for example.’

Planning to provide the ADF with uncrewed aerial systems was ASCA’s first major innovation challenge, says Monro.

ACSA asked Australian companies what they could contribute to a sovereign aerial drone capability—anything from a full system to relevant algorithm software or other components that would contribute to their manufacture and operation.

ADF chief, General Angus Campbell, commented in this context that the paradigm change was that in Afghanistan troops needed to look at the ground in search of improvised explosive devices, but Ukraine had demonstrated the need to watch the sky for drones.

Drones are highly relevant across all the services, Monro says. ‘To me this is a great example because they use relatively simple technology, and we got around 250 responses from Australian industry. We picked the best 11, put them in contract in December and we’re doing a sovereign drone fly-off shortly. We’ve essentially given resources to those best 11 companies to come and bring their wares and then, in a controlled environment with the war fighter, show us what they can do so that we can rapidly procure solutions.

‘To me that’s where the innovation, science, technology community comes together with the ADF to go after something really tangible where we might not know precisely every specification we would put out for procurement, but where we can together figure out what can be done now, and in the future.’

The Ghost Shark program is intended to provide the ADF with uncrewed vessels for the undersea environment. It’s a $140 million, dollar-for-dollar match of Defence and industry money, with about 40 companies in its supply chain. ‘It’s not an R&D project. It’s a prototyping program contracted to deliver three prototypes to Navy for use in exercises, says Monro.

‘DSTG folk are part of that integrated team with Navy, the SMEs and Anduril Australia. It uses, for example, sophisticated science that makes submarines quiet. This cross fertilisation of deep expertise in this next generation of defence technology is a different way of working.’

Monro says it’s about starting out with a shared understanding of the problem, having a commitment to deliver something to personnel in the short to medium term and having a partnered approach where risk in genuinely shared. ‘It’s not just about funding industry to do something, it’s about them putting skin in the game and accepting risk. And having an expectation that if you deliver and it meets a priority there’ll be an acquisition path. That’s going beyond the world of science and tech and prototyping, into reform of our acquisition system,’ she says.

‘To me, applying your best science and your best innovators, your engineers to a tangible problem that your military says is important, means you implicitly and explicitly get their buy-in to use it. You get it on exercise, you get it on trials, and you insert it.’

A key area of strength for Australia is hypersonics, with the goal of enabling craft to travel at more than five times the speed of sound. In 2022, establishment of the Eagle Farm hypersonics precinct was announced to bring together a critical mass of industry, defence science, and military personnel engaged in flight testing.

Monro says the research is vital so that Australia understands how to deal with hypersonic weapons if they are every deployed against it. But for Australia to develop the capability would also give our government additional deterrence options ‘that might discourage an adversary from ever considering that today’s the day’.

Governing AI in the global disorder

It’s a truth universally acknowledged that finding consensus on anything in the international system is difficult at the best of times, let alone in this age of geopolitical fracture, ideological contest and ‘permacrisis.’

Yet the United Nations General Assembly took a historic step in March by unanimously adopting the world’s first-ever UN resolution on artificial intelligence.

Proposed by the United States, and co-sponsored by more than 120 nations, including China, the resolution focused on AI safety and the development of ‘safe, secure, and trustworthy’ AI in line with the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The resolution reportedly took months of diplomacy by the US and, while not legally binding, represents a crucial first step toward fostering some kind of global cooperation on responsible AI development.

Indeed, in response to the rapid recent advances, AI is at the top of the UN agenda.

Last year, UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres convened a new High Level Advisory Board on AI to provide urgent recommendations on international AI governance. The board’s work will feed into the negotiations on the UN Pact for the Future and the accompanying Global Digital Compact, which will be announced at the UN’s Summit of the Future in September this year. Together these will set out the international community’s approach to challenges arising from AI and other digital technologies.

Last July, the UN Security Council also held its first formal meeting on AI to discuss its implications on international peace and security. Guterres has backed calls from some countries and tech figures to establish a global AI treaty or new UN body to govern AI. The Secretary-General has also encouraged nations to engage in multilateral processes around the military applications of AI and to agree on global frameworks for the governance of AI.

This momentum builds on a number of UN processes and forums that have been considering how best to govern and regulate AI as far back as 2013.

Yet multilateralism has been in crisis now for many years—and even more so as the world becomes dangerously unstable and increasingly fragmented. With AI increasingly affecting our economies, societies, communications and security, the debates on how to govern AI go to the heart of the ideological competition that is reshaping the global order.

To get around the growing fragmentation among nations—coupled with the UN’s challenges in establishing quick and effective governance mechanisms at the best of times—there’s a rise in minilateral and other initiatives on AI as nations race to ensure rules on AI reflect their own values and interests.

Democracies are particularly keen to set the rules for AI. The UK’s AI Safety Summit in November was the first global initiative that brought together governments, leading AI companies, civil society groups, and research experts to deliberate on the risks and potential benefits of AI. One of the summit’s noteworthy outcomes was the Bletchley Declaration, a joint statement endorsed by 28 countries, including the United States, the United Kingdom, India, the European Union and even China. The declaration affirmed AI developers’ responsibility for ensuring the safety and security of their systems, committed to international co-operation in AI safety research, and called for the establishment of common principles for AI development and deployment. Follow-up summits will be held in South Korea and France later this year.

This builds on other work that democracies are doing to get out in front and shape global AI governance. G7 leaders released the International Guiding Principles on Artificial Intelligence and a voluntary Code of Conduct for AI developers in October, marking the culmination of the G7 Hiroshima AI Process. The Quad released its own principles on AI in 2024. Meanwhile the European Union’s AI Act—officially endorsed by the EU Parliament a few weeks ago—will establish the world’s first comprehensive framework for regulating AI development and use, focusing on risk assessment, human rights and transparency.

While democracies use these minilateral and multistakeholder initiatives to chart a course towards responsible and ethical AI governance, China is also advancing its own vision of AI governance—one that prioritises government control over individual rights—through its Global AI Governance Initiative (GAIGI).

Launched by President Xi Jinping last October—and still in its early stages—it’s clear the GAIGI represents China’s efforts to shape the global AI landscape in line with its own political and ideological interests. It shows an obvious intent to promote this system as an alternative to US or Western-supported AI governance frameworks.

Yet while Western counties and likeminded democracies are focused on writing the rules of the road for AI, China is also building the road itself by exporting Chinese-made AI eco-systems around the world. ASPI’s Mapping China’s Tech Giants research has shown how China’s Digital Silk Road has served as an important vehicle for exporting Chinese technology, standards and digital authoritarianism to other nations. This is the same with AI. With Chinese AI technology dominating markets around the world, Chinese AI governance frameworks become the default on the ground.

In a way this highlights the challenges of establishing unified global AI governance frameworks in a fragmenting world.

With nations gravitating towards AI governance models that align with their existing political and social systems, we are likely to see an increasingly fragmented global AI landscape emerge, with different regions and blocs adhering to distinct rules and norms. The free and open internet is already under strain, and AI has the potential to turbocharge this fragmentation. This poses significant risks, potentially hindering international cooperation, exacerbating existing geopolitical tensions, and creating barriers to innovation – let alone the impact on human rights and freedoms in different parts of the world.

This is why, despite the UN’s inherent challenges, multilateral efforts such as last month’s General Assembly resolution to govern AI remain essential. The UN, with its inclusive platform that brings together diverse voices from governments, civil society, academia, and the tech industry, provides a unique forum for global dialogue on AI governance. While the UN may not ever be able to mandate a single global AI governance framework, it can play a crucial role in setting minimum standards, fostering consensus on core principles and facilitating interoperability between different technological blocs, ensuring that AI is developed and deployed responsibly for the benefit of everyone.

This is more important than ever, and last month’s resolution is a good start.

India in the Quad: insider or outlier?

The Raisina Dialogue, India’s flagship conference on geopolitics and geoeconomics, was held from 21 to 23 February this year, and discussions on and around the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) took centre stage. Indian Minister of External Affairs S Jaishankar summed up his opening remarks at the inaugural Raisina Quad Think Tank Forum, stating ‘The Quad is here to stay. The Quad is here to grow. The Quad is here to contribute.’ However, India’s commitment to double down on its ties with Russia, coupled with the potential impact of Japan’s new security bill on India–Japan relations, raises concerns over India’s suitability and reliability as a partner within the Quad alliance.

The Quad is a diplomatic partnership between Australia, India, Japan and the US initially formed in 2004 to provide humanitarian relief and disaster assistance after the Indian Ocean tsunami. In 2017, the focus shifted to the Indo-Pacific region to counter China’s growing assertiveness there. Over the years, the Quad has formed multiple working groups. While member nations have progressed bilaterally and trilaterally, substantial collective progress is missing. Security cooperation between the four members looks more like a symptom of regional instability than a solution.

The Quad essentially suffers from the drawbacks of minilaterals. Minilaterals are voluntary, non-binding and consensus-based, and, therefore, while the motivation to shape policies and actions is present, they lack effective implementation mechanisms. Minilaterals are issue-specific partnerships with shared interests and security concerns, as is the Quad, but the national interests and priorities of individual countries might take precedence, resulting in poor execution efforts. India’s relations with Russia could be a classic example of national interests being embedded in strategic decisions.

Even though India has historically trodden the path of non-alignment, rising geopolitical tensions in the Indo-Pacific region have made it imperative for India, as a key player and middle power, to actively participate in alliances in counterbalancing China’s growing assertiveness. Consequently, India claims to have shifted to a multi-aligned strategy by playing a moderating part in the Quad, the G7, the G20, the BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. The State of Southeast Asia 2023 survey shows India’s improved standing as a trusted partner in the region: it jumped from the bottom to third place when its approval rating doubled from 5.1% in 2022 to 11.3% in 2023. However, it’s crucial to evaluate India’s evolving foreign policy, given its challenges in upholding international law, as seen in its responses to events such as the Russia–Ukraine conflict and the Myanmar coup in 2021.

What might possibly explain India’s current approach? India’s porous borders have presented a longstanding and significant security concern for the country. Sharing borders with six countries (Pakistan, China, Myanmar, Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh), India faces a diverse range of threats, from armed infiltrations to insurgency and smuggling activities. The 2020 Galwan clash and continuing Myanmar border challenges underscore the need for ongoing vigilance and decisive action. Strengthening border infrastructure is therefore a top security priority, shaping diplomatic and strategic ties. For instance, following the Galwan clash, India expanded its security cooperation, inviting Australia to join the US–India–Japan Malabar exercise for the first time since 2007. This could also explain India’s longstanding ‘Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership’ with Russia. India–Russia relations were initially bolstered after the Soviet Union helped to mediate a ceasefire between India and Pakistan in their 1965 war. Ever since, India has relied on first the Soviet Union and then Russia for its military equipment, and, while India aims to diversify its defence procurement, reducing dependency on Russia might not be an option. At Raisina, Minister S Jaishankar advocated for strengthening ties with Russia, stating ‘It makes sense to give Russia multiple options’ and arguing that shutting doors to Russia could push it closer to China—a scenario undesirable for regional stability.

Looking ahead, shifts in the political landscape and the policies of member nations could add to the Quad’s challenges, amplifying doubts about India’s role in the alliance.

First, amid uncertainties over political leadership changes in Quad countries, including the possibility of a second Trump administration in Washington, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi is probably well positioned for a third term. Modi’s re-election would mean a continuation and even a doubling down of India’s current approach to foreign policy matters and alliances, including the Quad.

Second, Japan’s new security bill could have indirect implications for India’s suitability as a Quad partner. Recently, Japan’s cabinet extended support to the Security Clearance Bill. When it’s enacted, the bill will certify the government’s and the private sector’s handling of sensitive economic information, including data on critical infrastructure, advanced chips and cybersecurity. The bill is expected to bolster Japan’s national security and promote further international collaboration.

The passage of the bill also stands to strengthen Japan’s ties with its Quad partners, particularly the US and Australia, by enhancing its credibility as a partner and facilitating greater information sharing. However, that may inadvertently strain relations between Japan and India, moving Japan closer to the other Quad partners and positioning India as an outlier and limiting India’s ability to cooperate, share intel and build trust with the partners. India, unlike Japan and Australia, is not an ally of the US and emphasises its strategic autonomy. India–Japan relations were initially strained when the main promoter of this bilateral relationship, Japan’s PM Shinzo Abe, was assassinated in 2022. Coupled with differences in policy approaches to the Ukraine–Russia war, that affected bilateral security cooperation, especially when India refused to land transport planes of the Japan Self Defence Force to carry UN stocks to support Ukraine. Nevertheless, India is still considered to be an important partner for Japan, as underscored at the recent Raisina roundtable held in Tokyo, where both the nations agreed to ‘step up‘ economic and security ties.

What could be a few possible ways to improve the effectiveness of the Quad?

One possible way could be to adopt a hybrid structure, keeping the ad hoc and flexible nature of minilaterals but having a governing body bounded by some legal framework to guide the implementation process and hold member nations accountable for progress. The governing body could consist of a rotating chair and secretariat selected from the member nations. Under each chair’s term, certain deliverables could be laid out as goals. At the end of the term, the member nations could organise a sitting to discuss successes and challenges.

Another mechanism could be to narrow the scale and scope of projects being undertaken by the Quad. That would allow countries to prioritise their most important issue while scoping out the feasibility and funds for the solution.

Finally, improving India’s credibility within the Quad could involve strict information-sharing protocols, including adopting standardised formats for exchanging information.

Adopting such measures will help build a framework that allows all member nations, including India, to contribute more effectively.