Punching above our weight? Australia as a middle power
The Australian Strategic Policy Institute today released Strategic Insight 18 Punching above our weight? Australia as a middle power.
Punching above our weight? presents a short comparative analysis of the personnel and economic resources that Australia, other developed nations, allies and our neighbours devote to national defence.
In releasing the document, Dr Thomson said:
On the economic side, our defence spending is largely in line with our economic weight. We have the thirteenth largest economy in the world and rank fourteenth in terms of defence spending. However, as a percentage of GDP, we spend a greater proportion than most developed western nations with the notable exceptions being the US, UK and France – all nuclear armed permanent members of the US Security Council.
Over the last six years, the Australian Defence Force (ADF) has been busier with offshore deployments than at any time since the Vietnam conflict, while defence spending has undergone sustained and substantial growth. So does this ] amount to Australia punching above its weight?
In terms of human resources we have a tiny population – representing less than one-third of one-percent of the world’s total – and we devote a smaller proportion of our population to defence than many western countries. This is not surprising for a country with an avowed ‘maritime strategy’ which does not demand a large standing army.
As for our efforts in international operations like Iraq and Afghanistan, we tend to make carefully calibrated ‘niche’ contributions that are proportionately smaller than our key US and UK partners but proportionately larger than most other contributing nations. This makes sense for a nation like Australia on the southern periphery of Asia. As operations in East Timor showed in 1999, we must retain adequate forces close to home as a hedge against unforeseen developments.
None of this is likely to change soon. The government has shown little inclination to boost defence spending beyond that currently planned for the modernisation of the ADF. Chances are that we’ll continue to play the role of middle-power as we have in recent years: By carefully marshalling our resources to maximum effect in support of global security interests and the alliance, while developing and maintaining the self-reliant capability for operations closer to home where our interests can be vitally and uniquely engaged.