Chaos in Syria will complicate an already complicated world
The Assad family’s half-century rule has come to a seemingly unexpected demise in the span of just 11 days. There is little doubt the end of the 13 years of murderous repression and civil fighting which has fragmented Syria is welcomed. But the need to avoid the establishment of a new Islamic State-style regime or the further implosion of the Syrian state into little fiefdoms requires us to pause any celebration.
While the apparent blow to Iran and Russia’s grip on the region consumes immediate oxygen, the chaos that is likely to follow is the greater strategic concern. As Bruce Hoffman reminds us, the fall of the Shah of Iran was heralded as a positive development as Ayatollah Khomeini triumphantly swept into Tehran. It was the same with Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi.
The prospect of chaos in Syria further complicates an international scene that is already challenging Western countries and their allies—from terrorism to dealing with China and Russia. It heightens the need for them to work together.
The commentator Richard Haass is correct in his observation that the one thing that brought the opposition together is now gone, meaning we should expect fracturing. The expected power vacuum will make the Middle East less stable and fuel a more combustible mix of internecine rivalries. This will embolden regional and global terrorist actors, such as ISIS or al-Qaeda affiliates, to exploit the chaos, increasing the terrorist threat against Western countries and their allies. A more lethal and fatalistic reincarnation of Jabhat al Nusra, one of the groups in cahoots with ISIS, is also a distinct possibility.
As the founder of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), Abu Mohammed al-Julani has for almost a decade tried to create an ‘Islamic republic’. While al-Julani has since walked back from previous allegiance to al-Qaeda, purportedly in favour of domestic nationalist ambitions, we should beware his skill in being all things to all people.
Assad’s departure is likely to prompt a new surge in refugees to Europe and calls from European leaders for the (premature) return of Syrian refugees. This in turn will intensify already heated debates about the political, social and economic challenges facing Europe and how it should respond.
But the biggest humanitarian impact lies in Turkey. It hosts nearly three million Syrian refugees. As the country sponsoring the forces that brought down Assad, Turkey is now in the driver’s seat. Turkey has at its disposal the umbrella group of Syrian militias called the Syrian National Army and a relationship of sorts with HTS. Turkey’s response more than any other country’s will shape what happens next.
Russia and Iran, still reeling from the effect of Assad’s fall on their influence, will try harder to protect their strategic interests. Russia could lose its naval base at Tartus in Syria. Iran no longer has a route across Syria for supplying Hezbollah in Lebanon.
Meanwhile, Israel is working to ensure the chaos does not pose further threats to its borders. Saying the 1974 border agreement with Syria had collapsed, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu ordered the Israeli army to seize the buffer zone in the occupied Golan Heights.
The world is already dealing with overlapping conflicts, crises and tensions—including the emergence of hybrid threats—challenging the West’s ability to respond.
US president-elect Donald Trump has said the United States should ‘have nothing to do with’ the situation in Syria. While most Americans will agree with Trump, his defence and security advisers will probably recognise the need to ensure terror groups (ISIS in particular) cannot use this uncertain time to rebuild—meaning the US will still have security interests even if they decide they have no Syria domestic interests.
Only a day before the surprise and successful offensive by Syria’s opposition, the chief of MI5, unprompted by developments in Syria, said the British security agency would need to ‘pare back’ its counter-terrorism focus and make ‘uncomfortable choices’ because of the growing threat from Russia, China, Iran and other hostile states.
We should not be surprised. The challenges of prioritisation are not new. Finite resources and capacity require tough choices—especially where it requires investing in new approaches to counter the pre-eminent pacing threat of our times—China, and manifestations of Beijing’s malign influence.
China and Russia’s ‘no limits’ partnership, along with a broader network of autocratic countries—like Iran and its terrorist proxies as well as North Korea—highlights how partnerships built around a shared interest in trashing global rules, wreaking havoc and disrupting and dividing democratic societies are exploiting this turbulence and disruption.
In the same way, it will only be through partnerships and coalitions—new and old—that Western allies will be able to respond.
Sharing the burden of responding to chaos means we will all still have a price to pay (in addition to already heavy current demands), but it will mean a far lesser cost than if we allow the chaos to metastasize as we have done elsewhere before.