ASPI’s two-decade Critical Technology Tracker: The rewards of long-term research investment

The Critical Technology Tracker is a large data-driven project that now covers 64 critical technologies spanning defence, space, energy, the environment, artificial intelligence, biotechnology, robotics, cyber, computing, advanced materials and key quantum technology areas. It provides a leading indicator of a country’s research performance, strategic intent and potential future science and technology capability.

It first launched 1 March 2023 and underwent a major expansion on 28 August 2024 which took the dataset from five years (previously, 2018–2022) to 21 years (2003–2023). Explore the website and the broader project here.

Governments and organisations interested in supporting this ongoing program of work, including further expansions and the addition of new technologies, can contact: criticaltech@aspi.org.au.

Executive Summary

This report accompanies a major update of ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker website,1 which reveals the countries and institutions—universities, national labs, companies and government agencies—leading scientific and research innovation in critical technologies. It does that by focusing on high-impact research—the top 10% of the most highly cited papers—as a leading indicator of a country’s research performance, strategic intent and potential future science and technology (S&T) capability.

Now covering 64 critical technologies and crucial fields spanning defence, space, energy, the environment, artificial intelligence (AI), biotechnology, robotics, cyber, computing, advanced materials and key quantum technology areas, the Tech Tracker’s dataset has been expanded and updated from five years of data (previously, 2018–2022)2 to 21 years of data (2003–2023).3

These new results reveal the stunning shift in research leadership over the past two decades towards large economies in the Indo-Pacific, led by China’s exceptional gains. The US led in 60 of 64 technologies in the five years from 2003 to 2007, but in the most recent five years (2019–2023) is leading in seven. China led in just three of 64 technologies in 2003–20074 but is now the lead country in 57 of 64 technologies in 2019–2023, increasing its lead from our rankings last year (2018–2022), where it was leading in 52 technologies.

India is also emerging as a key centre of global research innovation and excellence, establishing its position as an S&T power. That said, the US, the UK and a range of countries from Europe, Northeast Asia and the Middle East have maintained hard-won strengths in high-impact research in some key technology areas, despite the accelerated efforts of emerging S&T powers.

This report examines short- and long-term trends, to generate unique insights. We have updated the recent five-year results (2019–2023) to show current research performance rankings (top 5 country results are in Appendix 1). We have also analysed our new historical dataset to understand the country and institutional trends in research performance over the full 21-year period. In select technologies we have also made projections, based on current trends, for China and the US to 2030.

The results show the points in time at which countries have gained, lost or are at risk of losing their global edge in scientific research and innovation. The historical data provides a new layer of depth and context, revealing the performance trajectory different countries have taken, where the momentum lies and also where longer term dominance over the full two decades might reflect foundational expertise and capabilities that carry forward even when that leader has been edged out more recently by other countries. The results also help to shed light on the countries, and many of the institutions, from which we’re likely to see future innovations and breakthroughs emerge.

China’s new gains have occurred in quantum sensors, high-performance computing, gravitational sensors, space launch and advanced integrated circuit design and fabrication (semiconductor chip making). The US leads in quantum computing, vaccines and medical countermeasures, nuclear medicine and radiotherapy, small satellites, atomic clocks, genetic engineering and natural language processing.

India now ranks in the top 5 countries for 45 of 64 technologies (an increase from 37 last year) and has displaced the US as the second-ranked country in two new technologies (biological manufacturing and distributed ledgers) to rank second in seven of 64 technologies. Another notable change involves the UK, which has dropped out of the top 5 country rankings in eight technologies, declining from 44 last year to 36 now.

Besides India and the UK, the performance of most secondary S&T research powers (those countries ranked behind China and the US) in the top 5 rankings is largely unchanged: Germany (27), South Korea (24), Italy (15), Iran (8), Japan (8) and Australia (7).

We have continued to measure the risk of countries holding a monopoly in research for some critical technologies, based on the share of high-impact research output and the number of leading institutions the dominant country has. The number of technologies classified as ‘high risk’ has jumped from 14 technologies last year to 24 now. China is the lead country in every one of the technologies newly classified as high risk—putting a total of 24 of 64 technologies at high risk of a Chinese monopoly. Worryingly, the technologies newly classified as high risk includes many with defence applications, such as radar, advanced aircraft engines, drones, swarming and collaborative robots and satellite positioning and navigation.

In terms of institutions, US technology companies, including Google, IBM, Microsoft and Meta, have leading or strong positions in artificial intelligence (AI), quantum and computing technologies. Key government agencies and national labs also perform well, including the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), which excels in space and satellite technologies. The results also show that the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS)—thought to be the world’s largest S&T institution5—is by far the world’s highest performing institution in the Critical Tech Tracker, with a global lead in 31 of 64 technologies (an increase from 29 last year, see more on CAS in the breakout box on page 19).

The results in this report should serve as a reminder to governments around the world that gaining and maintaining scientific and research excellence isn’t a tap that can be turned on and off. Too often, countries have slowed or stopped investing in, for example, research and development (R&D) and manufacturing capability, in areas in which they had a long-term competitive advantage (5G technologies are an example6). In a range of essential sectors, democratic nations risk losing hard-won, long-term advantages in cutting-edge science and research—the crucial ingredient that underpins much of the development and advancement of the world’s most important technologies. There’s also a risk that retreats in some areas could mean that democratic nations aren’t well positioned to take advantage of new and emerging technologies, including those that don’t exist yet.

Meanwhile, the longitudinal results in the Critical Tech Tracker enable us to see how China’s enormous investments and decades of strategic planning are now paying off.7

Building technological capability requires a sustained investment in, and an accumulation of, scientific knowledge, talent and high-performing institutions that can’t be acquired through only short-term or ad hoc investments.8 Reactive policies by new governments and the sugar hit of immediate budget savings must be balanced against the cost of losing the advantage gained from decades of investment and strategic planning. While China continues to extend its lead, it’s important for other states to take stock of their historical, combined and complementary strengths in all key critical technology areas.

This report is made up of several sections. Below you’ll find a summary of the key country and institutional findings followed by an explanation of why tracking historical research performance matters. We then further analyse the nuances of China’s lead and briefly explain our methodology (see Appendix 2 for a detailed methodology). We also look more closely at 10 critical technology areas, including those relevant to AI, semiconductors, defence, energy, biotechnology and communications. Appendix 1 contains visual snapshots of top 5 country rankings in the 64 critical technologies.

We encourage you to visit ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker website (https://techtracker.aspi.org.au) and explore the new data.

What is ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker?

ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker is a unique dataset that allows users to track 64 technologies that are foundational for our economies, societies, national security, defence, energy production, health and climate security. It focuses on the top 10% of the most highly cited research publications from the past 21 years (2003–2023).9 The new dataset is analysed to generate insights into which countries and institutions—universities, national labs, companies and government agencies—are publishing the greatest share of innovative and high-impact research. We use the top 10% because those publications have a higher impact on the full technology life cycle and are more likely to lead to patents, drive future research innovation and underpin technological breakthroughs.10

Critical technologies are current or emerging technologies that have the potential to enhance or threaten our societies, economies and national security. Most are dual- or multi-use and have applications in a wide range of sectors. By focusing early in the science and technology (S&T) life cycle, rather than examining technologies already in existence and fielded, the Critical Technology Tracker doesn’t just provide insights into a country’s research performance, but also its strategic intent and potential future S&T capability. It’s only one piece of the puzzle, of course: it must be acknowledged that actualising and commercialising research performance into major technological gains, no matter how impressive a breakthrough is, can be a difficult, expensive and complicated process. A range of other inputs are needed, such as an efficient manufacturing base and ambitious policy implementation.

The Tech Tracker’s dataset has now been expanded and updated from five years of data (previously, 2018–2022)11 to 21 years of data (2003–2023). This follows previous attempts to benchmark research output across nations by focusing on quality over quantity, key technology areas and individual institutions, as well as short-term, long-term and potential future trends. This update continues ASPI’s investment in creating the highest quality dataset of its kind.12

Both the website and two associated reports (this one included) provide decision-makers with an empirical methodology to inform policy and investment decisions, including decisions on which countries and institutions they partner with and in what technology areas. A list of the 64 technologies, including definitions, is on our website.13 Other parts of this project include:

  • the Tech Tracker website: ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker14 contains an enormous amount of original data analysis. We encourage you to explore these datasets online as you engage with this report. Users can compare countries, regions or groupings (the EU, the Quad, China–Russia etc.) and explore the global flow of research talent for each technology.
  • the 2023 report: We encourage readers to explore the original report, ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker: the global race for future power.15 In addition to analysing last year’s key findings, it outlined why research is vital for S&T advances and it examined China’s S&T vision. The report also made 23 policy recommendations, which remain relevant today.16
  • visual snapshots: Readers looking for a summary of the top 5 countries ranked by their past five years of performance in all 64 technologies (see example below) can jump to Appendix 1.
Example of the visual snapshots depicted further in the report.

Data source: ASPI Critical Technology Tracker.

Full Report

For the full report, please download here.

  1. Critical Technology Tracker, ASPI, Canberra. ↩︎
  2. Jamie Gaida, Jennifer Wong Leung, Stephan Robin, Danielle Cave, ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker: the global race for future power, ASPI, Canberra, 1 March 2023. ↩︎
  3. 21-year dataset with improved search terms and institution cleaning, see Methodology for more details. ↩︎
  4. In the early years, such as 2003–2007, some of the 64 technologies have not yet emerged and the credits assigned to top countries or institutions are too low to be statistically significant. Where this is the case we have avoided pulling key insights from the rankings of countries and institutions in these technologies. ↩︎
  5. Bec Crew, ‘Nature Index 2024 Research Leaders: Chinese institutions dominate the top spots’, Nature, 18 June 2024. ↩︎
  6. Elsa B Kania, ‘Opinion: Why doesn’t the US have its own Huawei?’, Politico, 25 February 2020. ↩︎
  7. See, for example, Zachary Arnold, ‘China has become a scientific superpower’, The Economist, 12 June 2024.
    ‘China’, Nature, 9 August 2023, https://www.nature.com/collections/efchdhgeci ;
    ‘China’s science and technology vision’ and ‘China’s breakout research capabilities in defence, security and intelligence technologies’ in Gaida et al.
    ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker: The global race for future power, 14–20; Tarun Chhabra et al., ‘Global China: Technology’, Brookings Institution, April 2020, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/global-china-technology/ ;
    Jason Douglas and Clarence Leong. “The U.S. Has Been Spending Billions to Revive Manufacturing. But China Is in Another League”, The Wall Street Journal, August 3, 2024, https://www.wsj.com/world/china/the-u-s-has-been-spending-billions-to-revive-manufacturing-but-china-is-in-another-league-75ed6309 . ↩︎
  8. Eva Harris, ‘Building scientific capacity in developing countries’, EMBO Reports, 1 January 2004, 5, 7–11. ↩︎
  9. These technologies were selected through a review process in 2022–23 that combined our own research with elements from the Australian Government’s 2022 list of critical technologies, and lists compiled by other governments. An archived version of the Australian Government’s list is available: Department of Industry, Science and Resources, ‘List of critical technologies in the national interest’, Australian Government, 28 November 2022.
    In May 2023, the Australian Government revised their list: Department of Industry, Science and Resources, ‘List of critical technologies in the national interest’, Australian Government, 19 May 2023, https://www.industry.gov.au/publications/list-critical-technologies-national-interest .
    A US list is available from National Science and Technology Council, ‘Critical and emerging technologies list update’, US Government, February 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/02-2022-Critical-and-Emerging-Technologies-List-Update.pdf .
    On our selection of AUKUS Pillar 2 technologies, see Alexandra Caples et al., ‘AUKUS: three partners, two pillars, one problem’, TheStrategist, 6 June 2023, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/aukus-three-partners-two-pillars-one-problem/ . ↩︎
  10. Felix Poege et al., ‘Science quality and the value of inventions’, Science Advances, 11 December 2019, 5(12):eaay7323;
    Cherng Ding, et al., ‘Exploring paper characteristics that facilitate the knowledge flow from science to technology’, Journal of Informetrics, February 2017, 11(1):244–256, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joi.2016.12.004 ;
    Gaida et al., ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker: The global race for future power, 9. ↩︎
  11. Jamie Gaida, Jennifer Wong Leung, Stephan Robin, Danielle Cave, ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker: The global race for future power. ↩︎
  12. See more details in the full methodology in Appendix 2. ↩︎
  13. ‘List of technologies’, Critical Technology Tracker. ↩︎
  14. Critical Technology Tracker ↩︎
  15. See Jamie Gaida, Jennifer Wong-Leung, Stephan Robin, Danielle Cave, ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker: the global race for future power. ↩︎
  16. Jamie Gaida, Jennifer Wong-Leung, Stephan Robin, Danielle Cave, ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker: the global race for future power, 44. ↩︎

When China knocks at the door of New Caledonia

China’s covert foreign interference activities in the Pacific are a very important, and yet under-researched, topic. This report uses New Caledonia as the case study to examine China’s hidden front, 隐蔽战线, throughout the wider Pacific.

Successive months of violence and unrest in New Caledonia in 2024, have heightened regional and international awareness of the uncertain future of the territory, and the role of China in that future. The unrest erupted after France pushed through legislation extending voting rights in the territory.

The CCP has engaged in a range of foreign interference activities in New Caledonia over many decades, targeting political and economic elites, and attempting to utilise the ethnic Chinese diaspora and PRC companies as tools of CCP interests. Local elites have at times actively courted China’s assistance, willingly working with CCP front organisations.

Assessing the extent of China’s foreign interference in New Caledonia is a legitimate and necessary inquiry. The debate about China’s interests, intentions and activities in the territory has lacked concrete, publicly available evidence until now. This study aims to help fill that lacuna. The report draws on open-source data collection and analysis in Chinese, French and English. It was also informed by interviews and discussions that took place during my visits to New Caledonia and France in 2018, 2019, 2022 and 2023, as well as conversations in New Zealand.

My research shows that the French Government and New Caledonian authorities are working to manage risks in the China – New Caledonia relationship. Moreover, civil society, the New Caledonian media, many politicians, and Kanak traditional leadership have also had a role in restraining the extent of the CCP’s foreign interference activities in New Caledonia. Few Pacific Island peoples would welcome a relationship of dependency with China or having the Pacific become part of a China-centred order.

The report concludes by recommending that New Caledonia be included in all regional security discussions as an equal partner. New Caledonia needs to rebalance its economy and it needs help with the rebuild from the riots. Supportive partner states should work with France and New Caledonia to facilitate this.

Ice panda: navigating China’s hybrid Antarctic agenda

Antarctica is often overlooked in strategic discussions, but its role in geopolitical competition deserves attention.

This report assesses the continents importance to Australian security, China’s hybrid Antarctic activity, and the need for Australia to develop a balancing strategy capable of bolstering the Antarctic Treaty and ‘pushing back’ against growing Chinese power in Antarctica.

Antarctica offers significant strategic advantages for the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Although Beijing’s actions in Antarctica may not overtly violate the Antarctic Treaty (AT), they effectively undermine its principles and, by extension, Australia’s strategic interests. Currently, the PRC is adeptly navigating the AT System to challenge the status quo without explicitly breaching the treaty.

China’s domestic policies, which merge civil and military sectors, appear to contravene the spirit of the AT’s military prohibitions, even if they have not yet resulted in direct military activity on the continent. This evolving dynamic underscores the pressing need for Australia to safeguard the existing Antarctic status quo.

With robust Australian foreign and security prioritization, the AT can counter Beijing’s growing ambitions, which may directly impact Australian interests. We must protect and uphold the principles of the AT.

With diverse domestic and international priorities, Australia must not neglect Antarctica, as Beijing continues to exploit the strategic gap left by our limited focus. Australia, with its rich history and commitment to Antarctica, must assert its role as an Antarctic claimant and clarify that China’s presence is contingent on Australian and other claimants’ cooperation. It’s time for Australia to lead in Antarctica and protect our strategic interests.

Australia’s new digital ID system: finding the right way to implement it

This report reviews the Australian Government’s proposed plans for establishing a digital ID, and the ways the new system is expected to work. It explores the planned digital ID system, the key features of the approach, and the privacy and security protections that have been built into the proposals.

Australia has had a long and troubled history with national ID systems, dating back to the mid-1980 when the government failed to introduce the Australia Card. Since then, Australia has ended up with a clunky and inefficient process to identify peoples’ identities online. It has led to an oversharing and storage of sensitive personal data. As the Medibank and Optus data breaches has shown, this creates serious cybersecurity risks.

Now that Parliament has passed the Digital ID legislation, it’s critical that government gets the implementation right.

The report outlines that, although the proposed federated model for a digital ID system is commendable and a needed step-forward, there is a need to still address a range of policy issues that – if left unresolved – would jeopardise trust in the system.

The ‘official’ histories of Australian and British intelligence: Lessons learned and next steps

Unclassified, official histories of ‘secret’ intelligence organisations, for public readership, seem a contradiction in terms. These ‘official’ works are commissioned by the agencies in question and directly informed by those agencies’ own records, thus distinguishing them from other, outsider historical accounts. But while such official intelligence histories are relatively new, sometimes controversial, and often challenging for historians and agencies alike, the experiences of the Australian and British intelligence communities suggest they’re a promising development for scholarship, maintaining public trust and informed public discourse, and more effective functioning of national security agencies. Furthermore, these histories remain an ongoing project for Australia’s National Intelligence Community (NIC).

Gender mainstreaming in United Nations peace operations: An unfulfilled promise?

The principle of gender equality is a cornerstone of the United Nations (UN). Centred on equal access to rights, opportunities, resources and decision-making powers irrespective of gender, it’s embedded within the UN Charter and championed in the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Mechanisms such as the inaugural resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agreed to in 2000 by the UN Security Council (UNSC), and the adoption of an additional nine WPS resolutions, further represent the critical intent to achieve this goal. The purpose of such WPS mechanisms is to cultivate gender balance, foster diverse leadership and champion gender equality in a global effort to establish sustainable peace after conflict.

Yet, as we stand on the threshold of the 25th anniversary of UNSC resolution 1325, the UN’s stride towards gender equality for uniformed women in peace operations has been ‘exceedingly slow’. The lofty aspiration of ‘equal opportunity peacekeeping’ through gender mainstreaming policies and practices remains elusive, entangled in a web of misconceptions and entrenched systemic barriers and institutional challenges.
The purpose of this ASPI report is threefold.

First, it examines the blocks to implementation and the effects of gender mainstreaming strategies.
Second, it advances three strategic interventions for the UN system and its global peace and security community:

  • redefining peacekeeping benchmarks for an efficient and effective uniformed component
  • shifting the narrative on peacekeepers’ contributions regardless of gender
  • incorporating feminist voices and practices in the development of policies and practices for the deployment of peacekeepers.

These proposed interventions offer a unique prospect for the final section of this report: encouraging Australian Government departments and agencies that have responsibilities for and commitments to execute the Australian National Action Plan (NAP) on WPS. Those commitments extend to fostering gender equality in both domestic and international WPS endeavours, thereby strengthening Australia’s position as a proactive UN member state.

The geopolitics of water: How the Brahmaputra River could shape India–China security competition

This report assesses the geopolitical impact of a possible dam at the Great Bend of the Brahmaputra. In particular, it exams the dam as a potential source of coercive leverage China may gain over India. A dam there would create four likely strategic effects: it would very likely consolidate Beijing’s political control over its distant borderlands; it would create the potential for massive flooding as a tool of violence; it may affect human settlement and economic patterns on the Indian side of the border, downstream; and it would give Beijing water and data that it could withhold from India as bargaining leverage in unrelated negotiations.

To mitigate those challenges and risks, the report provides three policy recommendations for the Indian Government and its partners in Australia and the US. First, it recommends the establishment of an open-source, publicly available data repository, based on satellite sensing, to disseminate information about the physical impacts of the Great Bend Dam. Second, it recommends that like-minded governments use international legal arguments to pressure Beijing to abide by global norms and conventions. Third, it recommends that the Quad—the informal group comprising Australia, India, Japan and the US—use its humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) guidelines to begin to share information and build capacity for dam-related contingencies.