North of 26 degrees south and the security of Australia: views from The Strategist, Volume 9

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The Northern Australia Strategic Policy Centre’s latest report, North of 26 degrees south and the security of Australia: views from The Strategist, Volume 9, contains articles published in ASPI’s The Strategist over the last six months.

Expanding on previous volumes, this edition introduces thematic chapters focused on a range of subjects relevant to northern Australia. These include;

1. Defence in the North,

2. Developing Northern Australia,

3. Northern Australia and the Indo-Pacific

4. Critical Minerals, Energy, and Commodities,

5. Space, Food Security and Climate Trends

As in previous editions, Volume 9 contains a range of expert opinions across these varied topics.

Volume 9 also features a foreword by the Hon. Eva Lawler, Chief Minister of the Northern Territory. Chief Minister Lawler calls readers attention to the relevance of northern Australia in light of the National Defence Strategy and updated Integrated Investment Program as well as Australia’s economic ambitions, stating “the strategies in this volume can inform our efforts to unlock northern Australia’s full potential and build a stronger, more resilient nation.”

The 36 articles discuss practical policy solutions for decision makers facilitating development, prosperity and security of northern Australia. These policy solutions tackle both the challenges and opportunities present in the north, and reflect the potential of the north to increasingly contribute to Australia’s national security and economic prosperity.

Negotiating technical standards for artificial intelligence

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The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) is delighted to share its latest report – the result of a multi-year project on Artificial Intelligence (AI), technical standards and diplomacy – that conducts a deep-dive into the important, yet often opaque and complicated world of technical standards.

At the heart of how AI technologies are developed, deployed and used in a responsible manner sit a suite of technical standards: rules, guidelines and characteristics that ensure the safety, security and interoperability of a product.

The report authors highlight that the Indo-Pacific, including Australia and India, are largely playing catch-up in AI standards initiatives. The United States and China are leading the pack, followed by European nations thanks to their size, scope and resources of their national standardisation communities as well as their domestic AI sectors.

Not being strongly represented in the world of AI governance and technical standards is a strategic risk for Indo-Pacific nations. For a region that’s banking on the opportunities of a digital and technology-enabled economy and has large swathes of its population in at-risk jobs, it’s a matter of national and economic security that Indo-Pacific stakeholders are active and have a big say in how AI technologies will operate and be used.

Being part of the conversations and negotiations is everything, and as such, governments in the Indo-Pacific – including Australia and India – should invest more in whole-of-nation techdiplomacy capabilities.

Authored by analysts at ASPI and India’s Centre for Internet and Society, this new report ‘Negotiating technical standards for artificial intelligence: A techdiplomacy playbook for policymakers and technologists in the Indo-Pacific’ – and accompanying website (https://www.techdiplomacy.aspi.org.au/) – explains the current state of play in global AI governance, looks at the role of technical standards, outlines how agreements on technical standards are negotiated and created, and describes who are the biggest ‘movers and shakers’.

The authors note that there are currently no representatives from Southeast Asia (except Singapore), Australia, NZ or the Pacific Islands on the UN Secretary-General Advisory Body on AI – a body that’s tasked to come up with suggestions on how to govern AI in a representative and inclusive manner with an eye to achieving the UN Sustainable Development Goals.

The capacity of the Indo-Pacific to engage in critical technology standards has historically been lower in comparison to other regions. However, given the rapid and global impact of AI and the crucial role of technical standards, the report authors argue that dialogue and greater collaboration between policymakers, technologists and civil society has never been more important.

It is hoped this playbook will help key stakeholders – governments, industry, civil society and academia – step through the different aspects of negotiating technical standards for AI, while also encouraging the Indo-Pacific region to step up and get more involved.

ASPI’s submission to PM&C’s review of funding for strategic policy work

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Independent, expert and evidence-based national security research and analysis has never been more important than it is now that we are in a period of rising strategic uncertainty. The Australian Strategic Policy Institute believes that government support for such research is crucial to the nation’s interests.

The Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet’s Independent Review of Commonwealth funding for strategic policy work—led by University of Queensland Chancellor Peter Varghese—provides an opportunity to strengthen the role that think tanks play in bringing contestability and adding vitality to established national security policy debate.

Over the past two decades, ASPI has evolved and adapted to strategic developments, addressing immediate defence and security issues while identifying new trends and exploring emerging areas that fall into research gaps or require new expertise. Changes in technology and geopolitics have dramatically transformed the strategic landscape—and ASPI has demonstrated a continuing agility in keeping up with, and staying ahead of, those trends.

ASPI has developed a globally competitive advantage in foundational, data-driven and policy-relevant work that looks over the horizon. Our publication of original datasets, coupled with frank and fearless advice, provides contestability and an essential evidence-base to inform decision-makers.

ASPI’s leadership and Council is closely cooperating with the PM&C review, have met with Peter Varghese and the review secretariat several times and appreciate the ongoing engagement. ASPI is publishing our submission to the review to ensure stakeholders have full access to it. As we told PM&C and the review team, we believe all submissions to the review should be published.

As Australia’s only dedicated defence and security think tank—and one of the very few in the Indo-Pacific region—ASPI complements the work of other institutes in Australia that focus predominantly on foreign policy, trade and economics. Most of these institutes aren’t traditional think tanks but are embedded within Australian universities and hence are shaped by that academic setting. Both types—stand-alone and university-based—are valuable inputs to policy.

The establishment of an ASPI office in Washington DC in mid-2022 has filled a gap that existed in the non-government policy community between Australia and the United States—an important priority at a time when Australia’s strategic concerns, centred on the Indo-Pacific, need to be championed in the capital of our major ally. This value has long been recognised by other countries that have established think tanks in Washington, such as the United Kingdom, India, Japan and Germany.

ASPI’s submission outlines the role of think tanks in Australia and makes 10 recommendations to the PM&C review. Most of these recommendations aren’t limited to ‘strategic policy work’ but should apply to all Commonwealth funding, especially in related fields.

The submission also made the following key points to the PM&C review:

  • Australia’s think-tank sector is small and remains underdeveloped. Nonetheless, some now attract a very global audience and it would not serve Australia’s interests to lose that global access and influence. Ten years ago ASPI’s stakeholder base was largely in Canberra. Today, our stakeholders are global, and readership is just as strong internationally as it is in Australia. The sector needs to be supported and developed, and new entrants should be encouraged.
  • Fee-for-service funding and narrow grant parameters rarely generate work that is innovative, far-reaching and relevant to long-term policy making. ASPI’s most forward-looking and globally impactful research projects are the result of ideas that our staff generate, not simply responding to grants or tenders, many of which tackle yesterday’s policy challenges. As such, a narrow funding model would limit national security research to parameters set by the government of the day. Responding to current policy priorities is important, but think tanks must also look long-term and set their own research agendas to provide fundamental contestability.
  • Australian think tanks should have a presence in Washington as other countries do. The US has more than 2200 think tanks, with more than 300 in Washington alone. ASPI’s office in Washington has filled a longstanding gap. The ANU has a unique presence in the Australian Embassy in DC. Australian think tanks and universities should have a greater presence in Washington to share Australian perspectives.
  • Funding for sensitive research should be incentivised and increased. Australian Government departments and agencies tend to avoid funding research on sensitive topics. This goes against the national interest and puts a greater burden on Australia’s partners and allies to fund that work (notably, ASPI’s China research, for example, is heavily used by Australian officials, but most often funded by Australia’s partners). Think tanks can and need to delve into challenges that go beyond the topic and government of the day. There is demonstrably strong interest from government stakeholders and the public in that analysis.
  • National security has at times suffered from limited transparency and ‘closed shop’ tendencies, leading to a combination of considerable public interest but limited public knowledge. This can increase Australia’s vulnerability to disinformation and misinformation that can be easily and cheaply spread online. Platforms such as ASPI’s Strategist (and the Lowy Institute’s Interpreter) are powerful ways to reach wider audiences in Australia and globally, especially in an era where there is shrinking space for international news and analysis.

ASPI has an international reputation that reflects the appreciation that the policy community around the world has for Australia’s defence and security thinking. The PM&C review affords an opportunity to consider in depth the value of dedicated national security research and an informed public discourse. We encourage all interested stakeholders to engage with the review and with national security debate in Australia.

The cost of Defence: ASPI Defence budget brief 2024-2025

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Australia needs to spend more on defence—and it needs to do so immediately. The strategic imperative has been firmly established in the government’s own major defence documents.

The Albanese government and the Coalition opposition agree that we are in the gravest geopolitical period in generations and this is only going to intensify.

But as the Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s latest Cost of Defence report finds, the rhetorical urgency is not being matched by action in the form of defence investment. The May budget is the latest demonstration of this mismatch, lacking spending for swift increases in capabilities that the Australian Defence Force would need if our region were to deteriorate quickly.

In particular, this year’s budget priorities are not directed towards strengthening the Australian Defence Force’s ability to fight in the next decade.

This is not doom-mongering; the government has acknowledged that the warning time before any conflict, which had long been set at 10 years, has shrunk to effectively zero time.

We have war in Ukraine and the Middle East, aggression and increasingly dangerous and unprofessional behaviour from China causing instability and confrontation in the South China Sea and across the Taiwan Strait, erosions of the rule of law and revisionist agendas from authoritarians. Instability is heightened by foreign interference, economic coercion and artificial intelligence-enabled dangers such as cyber attacks and disinformation.

If war were to break out at any time in the next 10 years, our military would essentially fight with the force it has today. Based on current resourcing, nothing significant will change over the decade.

Most of the major new capabilities in the government’s defence investment blueprint are two decades away from being fully fielded. That blueprint does contain some shorter-term enhancements, but these will not be fielded until the 2030s.

The welcome $5.7 billion in new defence spending over the four-year forward estimates period is devoted to just three priorities: the AUKUS submarines, the next fleet of surface warships and investment in long-range strike, targeting and autonomous systems. But two thirds of this funding doesn’t arrive until 2027-28. The relatively impressive longer term plan leaves us vulnerable in the immediate period ahead. More money immediately is not a silver bullet, and ambition must be balanced with how much Defence can actually spend each year. But the nation’s security requires a two-pronged strategy of enhancing our existing force to meet threats within the decade while investing in long term capabilities.

Other countries are furiously pursuing new capabilities that can be put into action quickly—such as creating masses of small drones and prototyping and developing new technologies.

We talk about technology and asymmetric advantage—playing to your strengths and finding effective means to exploit an opponent’s weaknesses–yet we lack a credible pathway to bring them into operation to bolster the force we have today.

Over the longer term, the picture starts gradually to improve. The $50 billion in additional spending over the next decade is an important commitment, even if far away. The plan for a complete recapitalisation of the surface combatant fleet will eventually give us the biggest and most capable navy Australia has had since World War Two.

But, so far, we are failing to grasp the opportunity to link our traditional large platforms such as submarines and warships to more modern developments in warfare—drones and various small uncrewed and smart capabilities. AI, robotics, electronic warfare and space capabilities remain aspirational, without any pathway for inclusion and integration into a truly focused force capable of meaningful deterrence and warfighting. That is why it is so important to realise AUKUS Pillar II, which is dealing with these capabilities.

It’s easy to criticise; harder to do. All governments are grappling with tight budgets amid competing demands and the unremitting expectations of voters and taxpayers. As a nation, we need to accept the need for higher defence spending. Hoping that conflict won’t come is not a viable strategy. If we are prepared for war, we have a better chance of deterring and hence averting it.

Europe is living that lesson now, having put all hope in the judgment that global trade and economic entanglement would bring security. Now it is clear that military investment is imperative to deter war or best prepare nations for it.

The government has a vital responsibility to speak plainly to the nation about the geopolitical risks and the possibility of conflict.

We need to grasp the challenge that is in front of us today, not in three or five years’ time. Otherwise, we risk delivering on Macarthur’s famous two word warning: “The history of failure in war can almost always be summed up in two words: “Too late.” Too late in comprehending the deadly enemy. Too late in realizing the mortal danger. Too late in preparedness. Too late in uniting all possible forces for resistance.”

Why take the risk of only acting after a crisis and saying better late than never? The world in turmoil demands we act in real time to both deter crises and be best prepared for them.