Devolved data centre decisions: Opportunities for reform?

Data has been referred to as the ‘new oil’ or ‘new gold’, but it’s more than that. Most organisations can’t function without it. That applies equally to government.

Government data creation, collection, storage and analysis has grown and continues to grow, as does government reliance on it. With continued government policy directions promoting increased outsourcing of data storage, processing and cloud storage, the value and protection that disaggregation and diversification generate may be lost in the absence of appropriate oversight.

In this report, ASPI’s Gill Savage and Anne Lyons provide an overview of the current state, the implications of the panel arrangements and the resulting challenges. They review the unintended consequences of the Australian Government’s data centre procurement arrangements, first introduced over a decade ago, and suggest areas for reform. The aim is to shape a better conversation on issues, challenges and factors to consider relating to arrangements for the provision of outsourced data centres.

The influence environment

A survey of Chinese-language media in Australia

What’s the problem?

In the past two decades, Australia’s Chinese-language media landscape has undergone fundamental changes that have come at a cost to quality, freedom of speech, privacy and community representation. The diversity of Australia’s Chinese communities, which often trace their roots to Hong Kong, Southeast Asia and Taiwan as well as the People’s Republic of China, isn’t well reflected in the media sector.

Persistent efforts by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to engage with and influence Chinese language media in Australia far outmatch the Australian Government’s work in the same space. A handful of outlets generally offer high-quality coverage of a range of issues. However, CCP influence affects all media. It targets individual outlets while also manipulating market incentives through advertising, coercion and WeChat. Four of the 24 Australian media companies studied in this report show evidence of CCP ownership or financial support.

WeChat, a Chinese social media app created by Tencent, may be driving the most substantial and harmful changes ever observed in Australia’s Chinese-language media sector. On the one hand, the app is particularly important to Chinese Australians and helps people stay connected to friends and family in China. It’s used by as many as 3 million users in Australia for a range of purposes including instant messaging.1 It’s also the most popular platform used by Chinese Australians to access news.2 However, WeChat raises concerns because of its record of censorship, information control and surveillance, which align with Beijing’s objectives. Media outlets on WeChat face tight restrictions that facilitate CCP influence by pushing the vast majority of news accounts targeting Australian audiences to register in China. Networks and information sharing within the app are opaque, contributing to the spread of disinformation.

Australian regulations are still evolving to meet the challenges identified in this report, which often mirror problems in the media industry more generally. They haven’t introduced sufficient transparency to the Chinese-language media sector and influence from the CCP. Few Australian Government policies effectively support Chinese-language media and balance or restrict CCP influence in it.

What’s the solution?

The Australian Government should protect Chinese-language media from foreign interference while introducing measures to support the growth of an independent and professional media sector. WeChat is a serious challenge to the health of the sector and to free and open public discourse in Chinese communities, and addressing it must be a core part of the solution.

The government should encourage the establishment and growth of independent media. It should consider expanding Chinese-language services through the ABC and SBS, while also reviewing conflicts of interest and foreign interference risks in each. Greater funding should be allocated to multicultural media, including for the creation of scholarships and training programs for Chinese-language journalists and editors. The government should subsidise syndication from professional, non-CCPcontrolled media outlets.

On WeChat, the government should hold all social media companies to the same set of rules, standards and norms, regardless of their country of origin or ownership. As it does with platforms such as Facebook and Twitter, the government should increase engagement with WeChat through relevant bodies such as the Department of Home Affairs, the Australian Cyber Security Centre, the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, the Australian Communications and Media Authority, the eSafety Commissioner, the Australian Electoral Commission and the Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Communications. The aim should be to ensure that WeChat is taking clear and measurable steps in 2021 to address concerns and meet the same sets of rules, standards and norms that US social media platforms are held to. This effort should be done in tandem with outreach to like-minded countries. If companies refuse to meet those standards, they shouldn’t be allowed to operate in Australia.3

The government should explore ways to amend or improve the enforcement of legislation such as the Broadcasting Services Act 1995 and the Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme Act 2018 to increase the transparency of foreign ownership of media in any language, regardless of platform.

Introduction

Australia’s Chinese‑language media sector is an important part of our democracy, yet its contours and its challenges are poorly understood.4 Australia is home to large and diverse Chinese communities. According to the 2016 Census, nearly 600,000 Australians spoke Mandarin at home, and more than 280,000 spoke Cantonese.5 Only a minority of Australians with Chinese heritage were born in mainland China—many were born in Australia, Taiwan, Hong Kong or Southeast Asia.6 However, individuals born in mainland China are probably the largest group of WeChat users. Migration from mainland China is likely to remain high, and Australia has been home to large numbers of visiting Chinese students and businesspeople.

It’s been claimed that most Chinese‑language media in Australia are controlled or influenced by Beijing.7 While that’s broadly accurate, past research hasn’t systematically examined the extent and mechanisms of CCP influence over Australian media.8 In particular, the pervasive effects of WeChat on the Chinese media sector haven’t been widely appreciated. Our research identified no significant influence in Australian Chinese‑language media from governments other than China’s.

Growing concerns about the lack of Chinese‑Australian representation in Australian politics, CCP interference in Australia and Australia–China relations highlight the need for policymakers to understand the Chinese‑language media environment. For example, Australian politicians and scholars have questioned WeChat’s role in elections, called out disinformation on the app and complained about the past absence of relevant security advice from the government.9 Marginal seats such as Chisholm and Reid have large Chinese communities, among which Chinese‑language media, particularly through WeChat, have been an important factor in some elections.10

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Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank John Fitzgerald, Danielle Cave, Louisa Lim, Michael Shoebridge, Peter Jennings and several anonymous peer reviewers who offered their feedback and insights. Audrey Fritz contributed research on media regulation and censorship.

Funding: The Department of Home Affairs provided ASPI with $230k in funding, which was used towards this report.

What is ASPI?

The Australian Strategic Policy Institute was formed in 2001 as an independent, non-partisan think tank. Its core aim is to provide the Australian Government with fresh ideas on Australia’s defence, security and strategic policy choices. ASPI is responsible for informing the public on a range of strategic issues, generating new thinking for government and harnessing strategic thinking internationally. ASPI’s sources of funding are identified in our annual report, online at www.aspi.org.au and in the acknowledgements section of individual publications. ASPI remains independent in the content of the research and in all editorial judgements.

ASPI International Cyber Policy Centre

ASPI’s International Cyber Policy Centre (ICPC) is a leading voice in global debates on cyber, emerging and critical technologies, issues related to information and foreign interference and focuses on the impact these issues have on broader strategic policy. The centre has a growing mixture of expertise and skills with teams of researchers who concentrate on policy, technical analysis, information operations and disinformation, critical and emerging technologies, cyber capacity building, satellite analysis, surveillance and China-related issues.

The ICPC informs public debate in the Indo-Pacific region and supports public policy development by producing original, empirical, data-driven research. The ICPC enriches regional debates by collaborating with research institutes from around the world and by bringing leading global experts to Australia, including through fellowships. To develop capability in Australia and across the Indo-Pacific region, the ICPC has a capacity building team that conducts workshops, training programs and large-scale exercises for the public and private sectors.

We would like to thank all of those who support and contribute to the ICPC with their time, intellect and passion for the topics we work on. If you would like to support the work of the centre please contact: icpc@aspi.org.au

Important disclaimer

This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information in relation to the subject matter covered. It is provided with the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering any form of professional or other advice or services. No person should rely on the contents of this publication without first obtaining advice from a qualified professional.

© The Australian Strategic Policy Institute Limited 2020

This publication is subject to copyright. Except as permitted under the Copyright Act 1968, no part of it may in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, microcopying, photocopying, recording or otherwise) be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted without prior written permission. Enquiries should be addressed to the publishers. Notwithstanding the above, educational institutions (including schools, independent colleges, universities and TAFEs) are granted permission to make copies of copyrighted works strictly for educational purposes without explicit permission from ASPI and free of charge.

First published December 2020.

ISSN 2209-9689 (online),
ISSN 2209-9670 (print)

#WhatsHappeningInThailand: The power dynamics of Thailand’s digital activism

Thailand’s political discourse throughout the past decade has increasingly been shaped and amplified by social media and digital activism. The most recent wave of political activism this year saw the emergence of a countrywide youth-led democracy movement against the military-dominated coalition, as well as a nationalist counter-protest movement in support of the establishment.

The steady evolution of tactics on the part of the government, the military and protesters reflects an increasingly sophisticated new battleground for democracy, both on the streets and the screens. Understanding these complex dynamics is crucial for any broader analysis of the Thai protest movement and its implications.

In this report, we analyse samples of Twitter data relating to the online manifestation of contemporary political protests in Thailand. We explore two key aspects in which the online manifestation of the protests differs from its offline counterpart. That includes (1) the power dynamics between institutional actors and protesters and (2) the participation and engagement of international actors surrounding the protests.

After Covid-19 Volume 3: Voices from federal parliament

For this volume of ASPI’s After Covid-19 series, we asked Australia’s federal parliamentarians to consider the world after the crisis and discuss policy and solutions that could drive Australian prosperity through one of the most difficult periods in living memory. The 49 contributions in this volume are the authentic voices of our elected representatives.

For policymakers, this volume offers a window into thinking from all sides of the House of Representatives and Senate, providing insights to inform their work in creating further policy in service of the Australian public. For the broader public, this is an opportunity to see policy fleshed out by politicians on their own terms and engage with policy thinking that isn’t often seen on the front pages of major news outlets.