Devolved data centre decisions: Opportunities for reform?

Data has been referred to as the ‘new oil’ or ‘new gold’, but it’s more than that. Most organisations can’t function without it. That applies equally to government.

Government data creation, collection, storage and analysis has grown and continues to grow, as does government reliance on it. With continued government policy directions promoting increased outsourcing of data storage, processing and cloud storage, the value and protection that disaggregation and diversification generate may be lost in the absence of appropriate oversight.

In this report, ASPI’s Gill Savage and Anne Lyons provide an overview of the current state, the implications of the panel arrangements and the resulting challenges. They review the unintended consequences of the Australian Government’s data centre procurement arrangements, first introduced over a decade ago, and suggest areas for reform. The aim is to shape a better conversation on issues, challenges and factors to consider relating to arrangements for the provision of outsourced data centres.

The influence environment

A survey of Chinese-language media in Australia

What’s the problem?

In the past two decades, Australia’s Chinese-language media landscape has undergone fundamental changes that have come at a cost to quality, freedom of speech, privacy and community representation. The diversity of Australia’s Chinese communities, which often trace their roots to Hong Kong, Southeast Asia and Taiwan as well as the People’s Republic of China, isn’t well reflected in the media sector.

Persistent efforts by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to engage with and influence Chinese language media in Australia far outmatch the Australian Government’s work in the same space. A handful of outlets generally offer high-quality coverage of a range of issues. However, CCP influence affects all media. It targets individual outlets while also manipulating market incentives through advertising, coercion and WeChat. Four of the 24 Australian media companies studied in this report show evidence of CCP ownership or financial support.

WeChat, a Chinese social media app created by Tencent, may be driving the most substantial and harmful changes ever observed in Australia’s Chinese-language media sector. On the one hand, the app is particularly important to Chinese Australians and helps people stay connected to friends and family in China. It’s used by as many as 3 million users in Australia for a range of purposes including instant messaging.1 It’s also the most popular platform used by Chinese Australians to access news.2 However, WeChat raises concerns because of its record of censorship, information control and surveillance, which align with Beijing’s objectives. Media outlets on WeChat face tight restrictions that facilitate CCP influence by pushing the vast majority of news accounts targeting Australian audiences to register in China. Networks and information sharing within the app are opaque, contributing to the spread of disinformation.

Australian regulations are still evolving to meet the challenges identified in this report, which often mirror problems in the media industry more generally. They haven’t introduced sufficient transparency to the Chinese-language media sector and influence from the CCP. Few Australian Government policies effectively support Chinese-language media and balance or restrict CCP influence in it.

What’s the solution?

The Australian Government should protect Chinese-language media from foreign interference while introducing measures to support the growth of an independent and professional media sector. WeChat is a serious challenge to the health of the sector and to free and open public discourse in Chinese communities, and addressing it must be a core part of the solution.

The government should encourage the establishment and growth of independent media. It should consider expanding Chinese-language services through the ABC and SBS, while also reviewing conflicts of interest and foreign interference risks in each. Greater funding should be allocated to multicultural media, including for the creation of scholarships and training programs for Chinese-language journalists and editors. The government should subsidise syndication from professional, non-CCPcontrolled media outlets.

On WeChat, the government should hold all social media companies to the same set of rules, standards and norms, regardless of their country of origin or ownership. As it does with platforms such as Facebook and Twitter, the government should increase engagement with WeChat through relevant bodies such as the Department of Home Affairs, the Australian Cyber Security Centre, the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, the Australian Communications and Media Authority, the eSafety Commissioner, the Australian Electoral Commission and the Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Communications. The aim should be to ensure that WeChat is taking clear and measurable steps in 2021 to address concerns and meet the same sets of rules, standards and norms that US social media platforms are held to. This effort should be done in tandem with outreach to like-minded countries. If companies refuse to meet those standards, they shouldn’t be allowed to operate in Australia.3

The government should explore ways to amend or improve the enforcement of legislation such as the Broadcasting Services Act 1995 and the Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme Act 2018 to increase the transparency of foreign ownership of media in any language, regardless of platform.

Introduction

Australia’s Chinese‑language media sector is an important part of our democracy, yet its contours and its challenges are poorly understood.4 Australia is home to large and diverse Chinese communities. According to the 2016 Census, nearly 600,000 Australians spoke Mandarin at home, and more than 280,000 spoke Cantonese.5 Only a minority of Australians with Chinese heritage were born in mainland China—many were born in Australia, Taiwan, Hong Kong or Southeast Asia.6 However, individuals born in mainland China are probably the largest group of WeChat users. Migration from mainland China is likely to remain high, and Australia has been home to large numbers of visiting Chinese students and businesspeople.

It’s been claimed that most Chinese‑language media in Australia are controlled or influenced by Beijing.7 While that’s broadly accurate, past research hasn’t systematically examined the extent and mechanisms of CCP influence over Australian media.8 In particular, the pervasive effects of WeChat on the Chinese media sector haven’t been widely appreciated. Our research identified no significant influence in Australian Chinese‑language media from governments other than China’s.

Growing concerns about the lack of Chinese‑Australian representation in Australian politics, CCP interference in Australia and Australia–China relations highlight the need for policymakers to understand the Chinese‑language media environment. For example, Australian politicians and scholars have questioned WeChat’s role in elections, called out disinformation on the app and complained about the past absence of relevant security advice from the government.9 Marginal seats such as Chisholm and Reid have large Chinese communities, among which Chinese‑language media, particularly through WeChat, have been an important factor in some elections.10

Download full document

The full document “The influence environment” is available for downloaded here.


Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank John Fitzgerald, Danielle Cave, Louisa Lim, Michael Shoebridge, Peter Jennings and several anonymous peer reviewers who offered their feedback and insights. Audrey Fritz contributed research on media regulation and censorship.

Funding: The Department of Home Affairs provided ASPI with $230k in funding, which was used towards this report.

What is ASPI?

The Australian Strategic Policy Institute was formed in 2001 as an independent, non-partisan think tank. Its core aim is to provide the Australian Government with fresh ideas on Australia’s defence, security and strategic policy choices. ASPI is responsible for informing the public on a range of strategic issues, generating new thinking for government and harnessing strategic thinking internationally. ASPI’s sources of funding are identified in our annual report, online at www.aspi.org.au and in the acknowledgements section of individual publications. ASPI remains independent in the content of the research and in all editorial judgements.

ASPI International Cyber Policy Centre

ASPI’s International Cyber Policy Centre (ICPC) is a leading voice in global debates on cyber, emerging and critical technologies, issues related to information and foreign interference and focuses on the impact these issues have on broader strategic policy. The centre has a growing mixture of expertise and skills with teams of researchers who concentrate on policy, technical analysis, information operations and disinformation, critical and emerging technologies, cyber capacity building, satellite analysis, surveillance and China-related issues.

The ICPC informs public debate in the Indo-Pacific region and supports public policy development by producing original, empirical, data-driven research. The ICPC enriches regional debates by collaborating with research institutes from around the world and by bringing leading global experts to Australia, including through fellowships. To develop capability in Australia and across the Indo-Pacific region, the ICPC has a capacity building team that conducts workshops, training programs and large-scale exercises for the public and private sectors.

We would like to thank all of those who support and contribute to the ICPC with their time, intellect and passion for the topics we work on. If you would like to support the work of the centre please contact: icpc@aspi.org.au

Important disclaimer

This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information in relation to the subject matter covered. It is provided with the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering any form of professional or other advice or services. No person should rely on the contents of this publication without first obtaining advice from a qualified professional.

© The Australian Strategic Policy Institute Limited 2020

This publication is subject to copyright. Except as permitted under the Copyright Act 1968, no part of it may in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, microcopying, photocopying, recording or otherwise) be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted without prior written permission. Enquiries should be addressed to the publishers. Notwithstanding the above, educational institutions (including schools, independent colleges, universities and TAFEs) are granted permission to make copies of copyrighted works strictly for educational purposes without explicit permission from ASPI and free of charge.

First published December 2020.

ISSN 2209-9689 (online),
ISSN 2209-9670 (print)

Mapping Pacific contributions to UN peacekeeping

Past experiences and future opportunities

Executive summary

There’s a long and proud history of peacekeeping in the Pacific. Countries in the region have hosted missions, and contributed to them, to support their neighbours, resolve conflicts and maintain a more secure and peaceful region. They have also sent personnel abroad to contribute to global efforts to maintain international peace and security. Yet, this is an area that’s less explored and understood. The Pacific is frequently viewed as a beneficiary of peacekeeping rather than as a substantive contributor. In this report, we attempt to address that gap, drawing on interviews and discussions with government officials and returned peacekeepers in seven case-study countries (Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Timor-Leste and Vanuatu). We offer recommendations for Pacific countries, as well as the Australian Government, about opportunities for further partnerships to support the engagement of countries in the region in UN peacekeeping.

Over the past 40 years, countries in the Pacific region have deployed hundreds of military and police personnel to serve in peacekeeping missions around the globe and to support peacebuilding efforts within the region. For most, that has mostly involved deploying individual police and military officers; Fiji is the only country in the region to deploy sizeable troop contingents to missions. Several factors have motivated those deployments, including support for conflict-affected countries, contributing to the rules-based order and maintaining national pride, as well as gaining the benefits of operational experience and financial incentives. For countries such as Timor-Leste and Solomon Islands, which have previously hosted peacekeeping missions, there’s a strong desire to support conflict-affected countries, drawing on their own experiences of hosting peacekeeping missions.

There is interest among Pacific countries in initiating, resuming and continuing engagement in UN peacekeeping. Indeed, the focus on human security and collective action in response to security concerns underpinning the Boe Declaration aligns with contemporary peacekeeping endeavours. However, there are many barriers and challenges to the ongoing deployment of personnel to peacekeeping missions, ranging from limited domestic resources, through to poor access to information and a lack of strategic approach to peacekeeping. While women are represented in some countries’ deployments from the region, they haven’t deployed in others.

To overcome some of those challenges and barriers, Pacific countries could seek to engage more strategically and sustainably with UN peacekeeping by putting in place institutional measures and processes to support engagement. That might include options such as identifying opportunities for deployments and influencing reforms; supporting professional development and leadership opportunities; elevating the training profile of the region; advancing women, peace and security; enhancing regional security cooperation; supporting peacekeepers on operations and on return; and sharing the Pacific’s experiences and lessons. Some of the challenges will require working with partners in the region to support training, enablers, and deployments.

There are many different countries engaged in providing support in the region to facilitate UN peacekeeping engagement, as well as broader security cooperation. Australia has a history of working with partners in the region to support peacekeeping engagement, including deployments as part of missions in Bougainville, Timor-Leste, and Solomon Islands. This has been complemented by the ongoing work of the Defence Cooperation Program, and the Australian Federal Police’s Pacific Development Program. However, there is scope to provide more support.

The ‘Pacific Step-up’ offers an opportunity to build on work that has already taken place with countries in the region to support their peacekeeping engagement. Australia should continue to work with Pacific counterparts to identify areas where they are interested in support, whether it be in the form of technical assistance to develop whole-of-government strategies on peacekeeping, facilitating engagement with UN headquarters and regional peacekeeping institutions, undertaking an audit of training and capability gaps, identifying the barriers to women’s participation, or facilitating regional discussions on engagement in UN peacekeeping. There would be considerable benefits if these activities were undertaken in a coordinated manner with New Zealand. Work underway to facilitate a Memorandum of Understanding with Fiji on peacekeeping, and to support the development of the Blackrock Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Camp, will offer opportunities for further cooperation. Mechanisms such as the annual Joint Heads of Pacific Security leaders’ meetings could offer a valuable platform to exchange lessons and identify areas for further civil-military cooperation in this regard. Importantly, this support needs to be guided by the requirements and objectives of the countries in the region. Any initiatives will need to listen carefully to the needs of countries in the Pacific and recognise potential limits.

Engaging in dialogue around UN peacekeeping can also offer an opportunity for preliminary conversations about what the region can do to talk about peace in a Pacific way. With concerns about potential crises in the region in the future, dialogue and cooperation offer an opportunity to plan and facilitate responses when there are threats to regional security. Cooperation to support the development of skills and further professionalise civil-military approaches as part of preparation for UN peacekeeping missions, will have longer-term benefits for the region in the event of a crisis, whether or not the UN is involved.


#WhatsHappeningInThailand: The power dynamics of Thailand’s digital activism

Thailand’s political discourse throughout the past decade has increasingly been shaped and amplified by social media and digital activism. The most recent wave of political activism this year saw the emergence of a countrywide youth-led democracy movement against the military-dominated coalition, as well as a nationalist counter-protest movement in support of the establishment.

The steady evolution of tactics on the part of the government, the military and protesters reflects an increasingly sophisticated new battleground for democracy, both on the streets and the screens. Understanding these complex dynamics is crucial for any broader analysis of the Thai protest movement and its implications.

In this report, we analyse samples of Twitter data relating to the online manifestation of contemporary political protests in Thailand. We explore two key aspects in which the online manifestation of the protests differs from its offline counterpart. That includes (1) the power dynamics between institutional actors and protesters and (2) the participation and engagement of international actors surrounding the protests.

Indo-Pacific election pulse 2020: Taiwan, Singapore, New Zealand, Myanmar and the United States: Views from The Strategist

The ‘Indo-Pacific Election Pulse’ is an annual project examining the most consequential elections in the region and the most important for Australia’s strategic environment. In what was an ‘unprecedented’ year, Taiwan, Singapore, New Zealand, Myanmar, and the United States braved the challenge of conducting elections under the shadow of a pandemic.

This diverse collection of views – from experts from different countries and fields – looks at how the Covid-19 pandemic has impacted the key elections in our region. A key challenge faced this year included countering misinformation, disinformation and cyber-enabled attempts at foreign interference, as in-person campaigning was restricted, and the virus forced campaign activities online.

The victories of incumbents in Singapore, New Zealand, and Myanmar showed how effective responses to the pandemic granted legitimacy to governments. Taiwan also saw an electoral win by the sitting government. But this was largely a response to Xi Jinping’s harsh politics rather than the government’s pandemic response, as the election took place in January before Covid-19 spread globally.

Conversely, in the US, the Trump administration’s disastrous response to the Covid-19 crisis resulted in a change of leadership. With the Biden administration preparing for the transition, partners and allies in the Indo-Pacific are growing more hopeful to see a return of a more engaged, predictable, or at least conventional, US foreign policy.

The year has been short on good news, and the Indo-Pacific democracies, like all nations, have had their fair share of challenges. But despite the creeping trend of democratic decline globally – arguably exacerbated by the Covid-19 pandemic – the results show that democratic activism and accountability are doing well.

Last years Indo-Pacific Election Pulse report can be found here.

Be’er Sheva Dialogue 2020 – Proceedings & Outcomes

The sixth annual Be’er Sheva Dialogue was held virtually this year. Established in 2015, the annual strategic dialogue between Australia and Israel is facilitated by ASPI. This year we partnered with the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) at the Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) Herzliya, and the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies (BESA). The dialogue brings together defence officials, senior parliamentarians and analysts from Australia, Israel and elsewhere to discuss areas of strategic common interest and potential collaboration.

The dialogue is named in honour of the historic Anzac Light Horse victory at the Battle of Beersheba during World War I and alternates its location between Australia and Israel each year.

Address by the Minister of Defence Linda Reynolds

ASPI/KAS The impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on extremism dynamics: Towards national resilience

The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) and the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung’s (KAS) Regional Programme Australia and the Pacific held their annual Australia–Europe Counter Terrorism Dialogue in virtual form this year. This publication provides an overview of the issues discussed at the 5th Dialogue in Europe in 2019, and the two events held in Australia and virtually with European experts, in August and September.    

The annual ASPI–KAS Counter-Terrorism Dialogue, now in its sixth iteration, seeks to foster knowledge exchange on continuing and emerging forms of terrorism and violent extremism across the ideological spectrum, exploring how to proactively deal with an ever-evolving threat landscape. Keynote speakers were live-streamed from Europe joining a selected group of Australian experts and representatives of the European diplomatic corps. A tried and proven format, it brings together policymakers, representatives from relevant government institutions, academic experts and practitioners from Australia, Germany and other European countries for frank discussions.

Security in our countries relies on peace, civility and collaboration within and beyond our own borders. The propagation of hate speech and disinformation is being creatively used by terrorists and conspiracy theorists, as is the current global pandemic. This report focuses on the theme of the 2020 dialogues – building national resilience, including consideration of the impact of the Covid-19 crisis on the dynamics of violent extremism and terrorism.

Last years ASPI-KAS dialogue report is available here.

‘Thinking big!’: Resetting Northern Australia’s national security posture

This report highlights the vast economic opportunities in northern Australia and how they can contribute to our national security.

The author makes the case that, while defence spending is vital to northern economies and nation building, it’s focused more on the Defence organisation’s more narrowly conceived portfolio capital investments in defence establishments and facilities rather than on much-needed broader national security and economic decisions.

Instead, there’s a need for the federal government and the Northern Territory, Queensland and Western Australian governments to take a more holistic perspective on northern Australia’s critical economic and national security role. The cities of Townsville, Cairns, Darwin and Katherine are vital to our defence, but also to our financial and national security. They’re most definitely more than home bases for the ADF.

After Covid-19 Volume 3: Voices from federal parliament

For this volume of ASPI’s After Covid-19 series, we asked Australia’s federal parliamentarians to consider the world after the crisis and discuss policy and solutions that could drive Australian prosperity through one of the most difficult periods in living memory. The 49 contributions in this volume are the authentic voices of our elected representatives.

For policymakers, this volume offers a window into thinking from all sides of the House of Representatives and Senate, providing insights to inform their work in creating further policy in service of the Australian public. For the broader public, this is an opportunity to see policy fleshed out by politicians on their own terms and engage with policy thinking that isn’t often seen on the front pages of major news outlets.